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ABSTRACT
WHAT ARE THOUGHTS?

FEBRUARY 1991

MARK ARONSZAJN
Ph D
.

.

,

B.A., UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

,

Directed by:

Professor Barbara Hall Partee

In this dissertation,

investigate a conception of

I

thoughts figuring in ordinary discourse, and argue that this

conception is an improvement over

a

certain standard

conception employed in current philosophical and linguistic

endeavors
In Chapter 2,

I

discuss the leading principles of the

standard conception, a conception according to which

thoughts in general are to be identified with propositions.
I

also briefly preview some of the main features that

distinguish the conception developed in the course of this
study from the standard conception.

Chapter

4

is the heart of the thesis.

reading of (forms of) the verb 'think’ that

I

isolate a

I

contend is

both familiar from and central to our ordinary discourse

about thoughts and thi nki ng--the "generic reading",
it.

I

call

An investigation of the relation expressed by the verb,

'think’, on this generic reading, and of the correlative

conception of thoughts, occupies the remainder of the study.
If this ordinary conception of thoughts is to serve the

principal functions to which thoughts have standardly been
vi

i

assigned,

in

philosophical and linguistic endeavors, then

there should be a discernible sense in which it is correct
to say that thoughts, so conceived, are things that

sentences express

In Chapter 5,

.

notion of sentential expression.

discuss the relevant

I

Accounts of this notion

have commonly faced a stumbling block in the case of non-

declarative sentences.
can imperatives or

Chapter

6,

i

What sort of thoughts, for example,

nterrogati ves be said to express?

explain how, on the present conception, there

I

is a clear sense

in which sentences of a variety of

grammatical moods-- mperati ves and
i

declaratives

In

— may

be said,

i

nterrogati ves as well as

with equal propriety, to express

thoughts
In Chapter 7,

I

discuss a fundamental thesis of the

standard conception, and argue, in Chapter

8,

that any

account of the nature of thoughts accommodating this thesis
is incompatible with the conception of thoughts arrived at
in

Chapter

4.

Then,

in order to retain this familiar

conception and its benefits,

account of the nature of

Such an account is described in

thoughts must be provided.

Chapter

a new

9.

vi

i
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

I

accept an old, though still widely favored

philosophical

idea according to which, simply put, there are

such things as thoughts.

By

'thoughts’ what is meant,

roughly, are things that can properly be said to be what a

person is thinking, what has occurred to a person

— the

"something” we speak of when we say, more colloquially, that

something has crossed a person’s mind, or that something has
dawned on the person.

This idea has served and continues to

serve as a cornerstone of much work in analytic philosophy;
it figured prominently

Moore,

in the work of Frege,

Russell and

and continues to figure prominently in the work of

most who have followed in the footsteps of those three.
Support for the idea is sometimes drawn from

consideration of things said

in

everyday discourse.

It is

pointed out, for example, that when we say such things as
"I’m thinking what he was thinking",
"That never crossed her mind",

or

"The same thing just occurred to both of them",

it’s not as if we’re always saying something false.

fact is,

it would be claimed,

The

many times when we say such

things, we are saying something true.

A natural

way to

account for the truth of what we say on these occasions

is

to allow that there are things we refer to when we speak,

1

for example, of what a person is
thinking, or of that which
never crossed some person’s mind, or of
the thing occurring
to two persons at some point in time.
I

assume that the informal characteri zation of
thoughts

given here is familiar.

Many philosophers willing to hold

that there are such things as thoughts, conceive
of them in

accordance with this familiar gloss, so far as it goes.
Many such philosophers would also allow, as

I

do,

that the

considerations of ordinary usage cited above provide at
least some prima-facie motivation for countenancing

thoughts, so conceived.

But agreement on this much does not

determine any very detailed conception of the nature of the
entities to be countenanced.
What are thoughts?

It is easy enough to cite

categories that everyone agrees don’t include thoughts:
rocks,

lampposts (inanimate physical objects generally),

people, cats (animate creatures generally).

Most everyone

agrees that thoughts are not numbers, that they are not any
sort of properties of inanimate, physical objects.

But the

question as to precisely what sort of thing thoughts are

is

still subject to dispute and inquiry.

The main project of this thesis is to set forth a

particular conception of thoughts that, as far as
has had no other contemporary adherents

—a

I

know,

conception the

main outlines of which have only rarely been considered in

contemporary philosophical literature.

2

Of course,

I

believe there is more to be said for this
conception than
merely that it has not recently been
much considered.
The

thesis that thoughts are lampposts of a
certain sort would
do as well on that count.
In the next chapter,
I

shall

offer a rough sketch of this new conception
in order to

contrast it in a provisional way with what
current, standard view.

I

take to be the

Presently, however, there are

certain matters of terminology and conceptual background
that

1

•

1

would like to address.

I

Relational Readings
Let us say that a reading of a verb (or verb phrase)

is

relational just in case, on that reading,

i)

it has a

single complement position, and ii) introduction of

referring terms in, and objectual quantification over either

subject or complement position is admissible.

Standard

examples of the syntactic category of transitive verb
such as 'kick’,

verbs that,

'hit’,

in the

'thank’,

— verbs

accept --are clear cases of
’

'

present sense, admit relational

readings
I

assume that if a verb phrase has a relational

reading, then it is properly symbolized, on that reading, by
a two-place predicate constant.

phrase,

I

Moreover, for any such verb

assume it acceptable to employ that verb phrase

itself as a predicate, with its relational reading(s) (that
is,

the reading(s) it has as an expression of natural

3

language) affording its intended interpretation(s)
(as an

expression of the formal calculus).
x

is kicking y,

x

thanked

Then, we can treat

y,

for example, as bona-f i de open formulas, and sensibly
speak
of pairs satisfying them, on their intended
I

i

nterpretati ons

assume it acceptable, too, to form complex terms with such

open formulas, or to affix quantifiers to them, obtaining

closed sentences formulating such claims as, for example,
that the one William thanked is who Sarah is kicking, or
that someone is kicking everything that thanked it.
A central

assumption of the present study is that

progressive forms of the verb,
reading.

'think’, have a relational

Perhaps it will be granted that there is a certain

reading of these forms upon which any of the following can
be interpreted:

(1)

There’s something I was just thinking, but now I’ve
forgotten what it was.

(2)

You are thinking what I’m thinking.

(3)

Someone else was thinking that, too.

And if, on this reading, the appearance of referential terms

figuring in complement position in (2) and (3), and the

appearance of a quantifier binding that position
to be taken at face-value,

as

I

in

(1),

think they are, then we will

have it that the reading in question is a relational one.

4

are

I

noted at the beginning, that a natural way to
account

for the truth of claims made by use of
sentences similar to
(1)

-

is to accept that there are thoughts.

(3)

It seems to

me that the assumption that 'is thinking’ has
a relational

reading is at the heart of such an account.
follows,

shall commonly use sentences of the form

I

t is

where

In what

t and t

thinking

t’

are terms (variable or constant) in providing

formulations of claims about persons thinking things.

1

•

2

Ob.iects of Thought.

In philosophical

thought’

is

So-called

discussions, the phrase,

sometimes used as

a

'object of

technical term for thoughts.

Why use a technical term when a word in ordinary language

seems suited?

After all,

'thought’

is a perfectly familiar

common noun that we apparently do use to refer to just the
right sort of thing:

presumably, when we speak of what a

person is thinking we are speaking of the thought he is
having

— the

thought

j_s

what he is thinking; when we say that

something just occurred to a person we are saying that she
just had a thought--the thought

i_s

what just occurred to

her, and when we say of two people that the same thing

crossed their minds or dawned on them, this means (more or
less) that they had the same thought

— the

crossed their minds, what dawned on them.

5

thought

j_s

what

The problem with 'thought’
usage,

is that in

its ordinary

it is ambiguous in at least a couple
of ways:

sometimes it is used to stand for items of the
relevant
sort, the sort of thing a person can be said
to be

thinking;

but sometimes the term is used instead to refer
to events of

thinking,

instances of activity that consist of particular

people doing some thinking.

Frege was careful to point out

that when he used the term ('gedanke’) he was not using
it
to apply to such mental phenomena.

He argued that the items

to which he did mean to apply the term are things that may
be said to be common to many particular events of thinking,

whereas no event of thinking is itself, in any recognizable
sense, common to various particular events of thinking 4
.

using the technical expression,

By

'object of thought’, the

idea is to make it clear that the intended reference is to

the item that is being thought,

rather than to any

particular event that consists of some person thinking that
item.

'Object of thought’

is a reasonable choice of phrase

for the entities in question.

'thought’

is commonly used as

a singular term to denote the relationship a person has to a

thing in virtue of which he or she may be said to be

thinking the thing.

And it is customary to refer to the

items in the range of a relation as "objects" of that

relation.

In light of these facts of usage,

the proposal to

use 'object of thought’ as a common noun for the relevant

Nevertheless,

things seems quite natural.
6

I

think it might

prove misleading in the present study to adopt
this use.
Shortly,
first,

I

I

will give some indication of why

.

think so, but

wish to discuss some background concepts that
will

be important in several

1

I

connections as we go along.

Events

3

I

take as basic and familiar the notion of an event.

No particular theory of events is presumed in what follows,

and

I

would expect (and hope) that any central claims

I

shall make involving talk of events could be accommodated by

various, current theories.

However,

I

with a certain informal conception, and

am operating here
I

should discuss

some of its features that I’ll be taking for granted.

Events may be said to take place, happen or occur.
'Take place’,

'happen’

according to my usage.

and 'occur’ are all synonyms
I

distinguish the notion of an

event’s occurrence from that of it’s existence.
are not occurring at this moment:

Some events

Caesar’s conquering

Gaulle, Oswald’s firing a gun at Kennedy.

This means,

seems to me, that there in fact exist such events.

it

The

existence of an event, then, does not entail its present
occurrence;

I

assume this much.

Are there events that have

never occurred, aren’t occurring now, and never will occur?
I

am inclined to think so.

Are there also events whose

occurrence is a mere metaphysical possibility, perhaps even
some whose occurrence is metaphysically impossible?
7

Although the notion of event is central
to this study,
addressing these questions would require far
more of a
theory of events than I need, or am prepared
to adopt.

I

suppose that any event may be thought of, loosely,

as a particular instance of activity,

said to consist of this activity.

I

that the event may be

also suppose that any

given event involves one or more constituents:

things that

are essential participants in the activity of which
the

event consists.

Further,

I

suppose that there are different

roles that may be occupied by the constituents of an event,

including the roles of subject and object.
these two roles comes roughly to this:

The idea of

when an event

occurs, a subject of the event is any constituent that

initiates or performs the activity; an object of the event
is a

constituent that is subjected to, or bears the brunt of

the activity
di

—a

constituent on which the activity is

rected

There are some clear examples of events in which

constituents may be seen to occupy these roles of subject
and object:

if

I

kicked a certain football yesterday, then

there is an event of kicking having me and that football as

constituents

— an

relevant sense,
football

is at

event that occurred yesterday
I

— and,

in the

am the subject of that event, and the

least one of its objects.

It seems clear

that any event of kicking will have one of its constituents

8

serving in the role of subject and at least one
of its

constituents serving in the role of object.
Actually, this claim requires some qualification.

We

may correctly describe a situation as being one,
for

example,

in which a mother pulled her child,

kicking and

screaming, away from the TV, even though there isn’t

anything that the child is kicking.

In such a situation,

we

could say, an event of kicking occurred that involves no

constituent as object.

But the verb 'kick’ has both a

transitive and an intransitive entry in the dictionary.
I

So

take it there are two correspondi ng senses of the verb.

In the first sense,

to the question,

if we cite a fellow,

Jones,

in response

"Who was doing the kicking?" and our

citation is correct, then it follows that there was a thing
such that Jones was responsible for kicking it.

In the

intransitive sense, to cite a person for having done the
kicking does not imply that there was anything he or she was
kicking.

ambiguous.
do,

Accordingly, talk of "events of kicking" will be
In one sense,

in general,

the phrase applies to events that

involve objects;

in the other sense,

the

phrase does not have this application.
Some events do not involve subjects:

in the collision

of two rocks in a landslide, for example, neither rock is in

any sense responsible for the activity of which the event

consists; neither one initiated the collision.
case, there are only objects of the event.

concerns, though,

it is

In this

For our present

important to note that some events

9

lack objects.
or walking,

Events of persons dancing, smiling,
running

for example, seem not to involve any

constituents other than their subjects; they
lack
constituents that are in any way the brunt of
the activity
involved; hence such events do not,

in the relevant sense,

have objects.

Before proceeding,

let me express one caveat about the

notion of constituency at issue.

Above

I

described the

constituents of an event as things that are essential
participants of the activity of which the event consists.
And

I

character zed the role of object as that occupied by
i

the constituents that are,

this activity.

in a certain sense,

This description and character i zati on

presuppose that for any event there

is some uni que bit of

activity of which that event consists.
correct.

the brunt of

I

assume this to be

But for any given event, ordinary language may

permit many ways of describing this single bit of activity.
Some such ways of describing the activity of which an

event consists may involve locutions of the form
e

is an event of t’s 0-ing

for some possessive form of a singular term as substituend
for

'

t’s

’,

and appropriate gerund substituend for '0-ing’.

In some such descriptions there may be singular terms

figuring in the gerund substituend, and in some such cases,
it may seem very much as if the thing denoted by the

10

singular term should be counted as a brunt of
the instance
of activity being described.
It will be tempting
then,

concerning such a description, to suppose that
the referent
of the singular term in question is a
constituent of the

event being described, in particular that it is the
object
of that event.

But this temptation should be resisted.

It

may be correct, accurate and fairly clear to describe
an

event as one of a person 0-ing some object

x,

though it is

not the case that x is a constituent of the event in

question

even if,

roughly speaking, the gerund, 0-ing,

certainly does make it

sound" as if x is the brunt of the

activity being described, and hence an object of the event.
Maybe the following example will illustrate the point.
Suppose that my only chore for the day was to kick

certain football

(readers are welcome to devise a story on

their own in which
chore).

a

I

do indeed have such an activity as a

Suppose, too, that

I

did my chore,

football at some point in the day.

kicking the

So there was this event

that occurred that we may describe as an event of my kicking

that football.

But ordinary parlance also allows us to

describe this event as one of my dispatching my sole chore
for the day.

To describe the event this way seems to me to

be accurate and tolerably clear,

yet it should not be

inferred from this description that the event in question is
one having some item denoted by "my sole chore for the day"
as its object.

There may be a unique object of this event,

but presumably it is the football

I

kicked.

Whatever it is

that is denoted by "my sole chore for
the day" with respect
to the envisioned context, it is hardly
plausible to suppose
that it is the football I kicked.
Then it is hardly

plausible to claim that whatever is denoted by "my
sole
chore for the day" when

describe that event as an event of

I

my dispatching my sole chore for the day,

any other constituent

I

it should not be supposed,
y

in

loosely, by saying that

will sometimes describe an event, according to

ordinary usage, as one of x’s 0-ing

the

object— or

of the event in question.

Let me summarize this caveat,

although

is an

y,

for given x,

0 and

y,

from any such description, that

question is an object, or any other essential

participant of the activity of which the event being
described consists.

It will

be worthwhile keeping this

caveat in mind in discussions to follow.

1

.4

Reservations Concerning 'object of thought’
Having said this much about the nature of events, we

may return to consider my reservations concerning use of the
phrase,

’object of thought’.

The problem is that there is

this technical sense, discussed just above,

in which

I

will

be speaking of items as "objects of events", characterizing

them as playing a certain role, among other constituents, in
the events in question.

earlier,

Now on the standard usage cited

’object of thought’ applies to items of the sort

that persons can be said to be thinking.
12

So in adopting

that usage here,

I’d risk conveying the idea that

I

take

items of that sort to occupy the role of
ob.iect in events of
thinking, that they have a role in events of
thinking akin,
in

relevant respects, to that of footballs in certain
events

of kicking.

But

I

do not accept the view that the things

persons are thinking, if they are the subjects of occurring

events of thinking, are literally
events,

in the sense of

ob.i

ects of those very

'object’ discussed just above.

It might seem counterintuitive not to accept this view.

After all,

one might say,

that a football

"if an event of kicking is such

is the item being k i cked-- what is kicked--

when that event occurs, then the football
that event of kicking."

mutand

i

s

thought?

.

i_s

the object of

Can’t the same be said, mutat

i

for events of thinking and so-called objects of

Since 'object of thought’

is

intended to apply to

items that are being thought-- what subjects are thinking--

when events of thinking occur, can’t we infer that these

things called objects of thought are

objects of events of thinking?

I

.

in the relevant sense,

think not.

Perhaps one would make such an inference because one

accepts the following:
where 0-ing is the present participle of an event verb,
t and t’ are terms, and [is 0-ing] has a relational
reading, then on that reading, from [t is 0-ing t’],
infer [t’ is an object of an event of 0-ing].

(*)

But

I

am inclined to believe that this rule is fallacious.

13

To explain why, consider how we
talk about dances, when we
use the transitive reading of the
verb 'dance’.
If the terms

'the Twist’

and 'the Charleston’ are

referring terms, as they occur in such
sentences as
John is dancing the Twist,

Sarah is dancing the Charleston,
and if quantification is involved, as it
appears to be,

in

the claims we express by such sentences as these:

John is dancing something none of us have ever
seen before,

Everything John was dancing the other night Sarah
had taught him
and if, moreover

,

there is a single reading of 'is dancing’

admissible for all of these sentences, then the verb,
dancing’ has a relational reading.

I

argument that the conditions of these

do not have an
"

ifs" are met,

believe that they are, and consequently,

progressive forms of the verb,

'is

I

but

I

take it that the

'dance’, have at least one

relational reading.

Nevertheless,

I

suggested above that events of dancing

are examples of events that do not, or at least do not

clearly,

involve any constituents in the role of object.

But if such events do not have objects, then the things we

refer to when we speak of what persons are dancing

dances denoted by 'the Twist’,

'the Charleston’, etc.

cannot be objects of the reported events.
14

— the

Moreover, even if

there are objects involved in any events
of dancing reported
when someone is said to be dancing the
Twist or the

Charleston, or what have you,

it seems

implausible to hold

that the dances we are speaking of are themselves
any such

putative, further constituents of those events

dances are themselves,

— that

in addition to the dancers,

these

in some

sense participants in the activity of which such events
consist.

(Though ordinary usage would certainly allow us to

describe such events as events "of" persons doing the Twist
or the Charleston.)

Rather,

I

think it more plausible to

see dances as types or manners of dancing

— things

be said to be exemplified by the reported events.
be inclined to deny that such a thing

— the

that may
I

would

sort of thing

having various particular events as examples

— is

itself a

constituent of any of the events that are its examples; and
if the type or

manner is not

a

constituent of its instances,

it is not an object of those instances either.

Consequently,

I

am inclined to deny that 'the Twist’,

'the Charleston’, etc., when they figure as complements of
'is dancing’,

dancing.

refer to objects of the reported events of

So it appears to me that there will be pairs

satisfying
x

is dancing y,

whose second members do not satisfy

y

is an

object of an event of dancing
15

If this is right,

then not all infe rences sanctioned by
(*)
are valid; the rule is fallacious.
My view is that our talk of what
a person is thinking
is,

in this respect,

more like our talk of what a person is

dancing, and that when we refer to what
a person is

thinking, or more colloquially, to what occurred
to a
person, or crossed a person’s mind, or dawned
on a person,
the items we thus refer to are types of the
events reported,
not objects of those events.
a

This idea

— that

there is such

similarity between, on one hand, the example of our talk

of what a person is dancing and, on the other hand, talk of

what a person is thinking
of thoughts that

I

shall

of the present study.

underlies the view on the nature
be aiming to develop in the course

I’ve raised the matter at this point

only to guard against a certain confusion:
am adopting for the term 'object’

— to

given the use

I

apply to items

occupying a certain role among constituents of events--si nee
I

reject the view that what we are thinking when we are

thinking things are objects of those events of thinking, it
could prove misleading to employ the phrase,

'object of

thought’, for the items at issue.
Instead,

it seems to me that we can make do with the

familiar common noun,

'thought’.

What of the ambiguity

attaching to the ordinary usage of this term?
two uses earlier.

Well,

I

cited

One ordinary use is that on which the

term applies to the items of the sort we are thinking when
16

we may correctly be said to be thinking things

being thought.

what is

The other use is that on which 'thought’

serves as a common noun standing for the events of
thinking
themselves,

instances of activity consisting of particular

persons doing some thinking.

One way we can avoid this

ambiguity is to accept the stipulation that the word
'thought’ be used in the first way hereafter.
shall

proceed here.

rather

,

And hereafter, when

to events of thinking,

I

That is how

I

wish to refer,

I’ll just use

'event of

thinking’, or sometimes, too, I’ll use the gerund,
'thinking’, as a common noun applying to such events.
Let me stress that

I

am not claiming that anyone has

suffered any confusion either resulting from, or resulting
in the use of

"object of thought" to stand for thoughts.

For reasons mentioned earlier, this use of the phrase seems

quite natural.

My claim is only that in the context of the

present study, the phrase is better left unemployed.

1

.

5

A

Criterion for Thoughts

I

do not have a definition to offer for the usage of

'thought’ adopted here.

There is however a mark of

thoughthood suggested in the preceding discussion,

a

criterion employed more or less explicitly since the outset,
that can be formulated:

(

T1

Necessarily, for any x, if it is possible tgat
someone is thinking x, then x is a thought.

As

see it,

I

(

T

1

)

expresses an analytic criterion:

it is

part of the very concept of thought
that if a thing could be
something someone is thinking, it is a thought.
Others who

countenance thoughts may not see
analytic truth, but

I

(

T1

)

as expressing an

think it would be generally agreed

that there is at least some sense of 'is
thinking’
it

is

correct to say that as

a

in which

matter of necessity, anything

a

person could possibly be thinking is a thought.

I

think it would be agreed by virtually all who countenance

Moreover,

thoughts that the criterion of thoughthood expressed by
(T1)
is

in fact

exemplified by a vast number of things; only

thoughts of a rather exceptional variety (see remarks

concerning

(

D?

)

just below) are perhaps not included.

So

the criterion has some force.

Can’t the notion of thought be defined along the lines
of

(

D?

(

)

T1 )?

Consider:

x

is a thought

=df

it

is

possible that someone
is thinking x.

But it may be doubted that for any thought whatsoever

.

it

is

possible that the thought be something someone is thinking.
One consideration that provides grounds for doubt:

maybe

there are thoughts so complex or so deep that it would be

impossible for anyone to be thinking any of them.
Could there be such thoughts?

The question may seem

rather insignificant, of no importance to the assessment of

18

competing accounts of the nature of thoughts.
with this sentiment.

I

disagree

Perhaps it is very difficult to

determine which side is right on the matter— or
perhaps the
philosophical concept of thought is vague and it is,
in

particular,

indeterminate whether or not there could be

thoughts that no one can be thinking.

At any rate, although

the (partial) account of thoughts that

I

in this

shall be proposing

thesis will not settle these matters,

it seems to me

that a correct and complete account should get these things
right:

either determining that there are or at least could

be unthinkable thoughts,

or that there couldn’t be such

things, or that it is indeterminate as to whether there

could or couldn’t be.

Since

I

am not sure about which side

right on these matters, and since

i_s

matters insignificant,
(D?).

I

do not consider the

I

am going to suspend judgment on

The criterion formulated in (T1

)

will serve our

purposes well enough.

1

.

6

"In-House" Business
The thesis that there are thoughts is not

uncontroversi al

.

It has been questioned,

for example,

whether there really are any things that we refer to when we
speak of what

a

person is thinking.

It might be questioned

whether, when apparent referring expressions figure as

complements to the verb phrase 'is thinking’, or when idioms
of quantification appear to govern its complement position,

we really are referring to or objectually quantifying over

19

any things at all.

Nevertheless, the view that there are

such things as thoughts is a very
traditional philosophical
perspective, one that I am not aiming to
undermine.
My

project is parochial in this respect.
will

Instead, my aim here

be to question certain aspects of
what has come to be a

standard conception of thoughts within this
traditional
perspective, and to offer a viable alternative.

The present

study, then, may be seen as an attempt to
straighten out

some "in-house" business that

I

believe has so far not been

adequately addressed, not even by those of us who are "inhouse

,

who accept that there are such things as thoughts.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

S

1

S e Frege s
s !
discussion
’

discussion in Frege [1956] and
M9701 Rn«®n;
L1970],
Russell
in Russell [1904] and Moore’s
S
SS1
bellefS
(his term for the 1 tems
question)
?n Mn
°MSLi
1953 ^’ P* 62 ff
It should be noted that as early
I
as 1906, Russell had abandoned the view
that thinking (or
de)
3 relation of Persons to "thoughts"

^

•

Uee°Mr[?906])

^

Indeed the only example I know of is the consideration
given by Sosa to a view on thoughts suggested in
the
writings of Descartes.
See Sosa [1967] pp. 58.
Richard
Montague has proposed a view on the nature of certain
entities reports, sensations, obligations that resembles
the one I propose in Chapter 9, concerning the nature
of
thoughts.
See his "On the Nature of Certain Philosophical
Entities (Montague [1974]).

—

5.
3.

Why not speak of "transitive" rather than "relational"
readings? I take the notion of transitive verbs, and of
transitive readings of verbs, to be largely syntactic
notions.
A standard criterion for transitivity is
permissibility of passive transf ormat on
I do not assume
that this feature implies the semantic character sti cs I
have posited for relational readings.
i

.

i

Frege [1970].
At least this is how I read the argument
he gives there, p. 59, to distinguish thoughts (the senses
of sentences) from ideas.

4.
6.

My choice in formulation here is meant to display a link
between the concept of a thought and the concept of a
thing’s being possibly such that someone is thinking it. On
some fairly natural assumptions, however, (T1) and the
following simpler formulation are nterder i vabl e
i

(

T

1

Necessarily, for any
then x is a thought.

’

x,

if

someone is thinking

x,

The added assumptions are needed to get from T
to (T1),
since the embedded antecedent of T
is stronger than that
1

(

’

)

1

(

of

(

T

1

)

)

See, for example, A.N. Prior in his Objects of Thought
(Prior [1971]); cf. Chapter 1, and especially, Chapter 2,

pp

.

1

6-21

.
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CHAPTER

2

THE PROPOSITIONAL TRADITION AND AN
ALTERNATIVE

In this chapter,

I

would like to give some provisional

idea of the conception of thoughts that

the course of this thesis.

that conception with what
canonical view.
then,

I

will

I

I

I

.

aim to develop in

do this by contrasting

consider to be the prevalent,

begin by reviewing the latter outlook;

give a brief overview of some distinguishing

features of the alternative

2

will

I

I

intend to develop.

The Propositional Tradition

1

There is a received perspective concerning the nature
of thoughts that will

outlook that
I

be the "foil" of this thesis--not an

wish to refute exactly, but one against which

I

will promote my own view as a worthy competitor.

The

outlook has been prevalent long enough that adherence to it
may be properly termed a tradi tion--the "Propositional

Tradition" as
shall

shall call

it.

In the present section,

I

be discussing various features of this received

perspective;
in the

I

I

hope it will be evident enough to the reader

course of this discussion that the Propositional

Tradition is indeed

a

prevalent and long-standing outlook on

the nature of thoughts, and that Propositional

Traditionalists are not straw men.
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There are various points of view
encompassed within the
Propositional Tradition that differ amongst
themselves

concerning the exact nature of thoughts.

Nevertheless, as

camps within this single tradition, they
all agree on

certain key tenets.

In the remainder of this section,

I

want to draw attention to three such tenets that
distinguish
the perspective of the Propositional Tradition from
the view
to be developed in this study.
2.1.1

(

PT 1

)

One of these tenets is very st rai ghtf orward

According

.

to the Propositional Tradition, thoughts are to be

identified with propositions.
(PT1)

Necessarily Vx(
proposition

That is,

is a

x

thought iff

x

is a

)

I

think it would be agreed by most proponents of the

tradition that, as

a

matter of definition, propositions are

things that have truth-values.

adherence to
all

(

PT

1

)

then,

that

commits most proponents to the view that

thoughts are truth-val ued
The second tenet that

lengthier discussion;
all

It may be noted,

it

is

I

wish to attend to requires

a

implied by another thesis that

camps in the Propositional Tradition agree on,

that is commonly put by saying,

thesis

roughly, that propositions

are the "objects" of "propositional attitudes".

investigate what this latter thesis comes to.

23

a

Let us

2,1,2

P ropositional

Attitudes. So-called

wish to begin by considering briefly
what is meant by
the phrase "propositional attitude".
in this connection, it
I

will

be useful

expressing

to be able to speak of a verb or
verb phrase

relation on

a

reading, subject to the following

a

constraint (here, and in other formulations
to follow,
nec’
'R’

to abbreviate

to range over verb phrases,

respecti vel
(A1)

'necessarily’, and

WP

Vr

y

)

take 'VP’,

'r’

and

readings and relations,

:

VR(

if

is a rel ational

r

expresses R on r, then if VP v,v
R satisfies the following:
[

I

use

I

WW’(

nec(

bears

v

R

,

readi ng of VP and VP
is interpreted on r,
iff VP v,v

to v’

'

))

]

where VP
is the result of placing distinct
variables v and v
respectively, in the subject and
complement positions of VP.
’

,

Take the verb 'runs’, for example.

It has a relational

reading (close in meaning to 'directs’).
that if

runs’

expresses

(A1)

guarantees

relation, R, on this reading,

a

then on that reading it will be correct to say that

necessarily one thing bears

R

to another iff the one runs

the other.
In addition to

(A2)

WP

VR

Vr(

expresses

(A1),

if VP
R’

on

I

assume:

expresses
then R’

r,

That is, only one relation,

phrase on a given reading.

R on r,
= R ))

if any,

1
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is

then VR

’

(

if VP

expressed by

a verb

will occasionally speak of an
open formula expressing

I

relation on a reading provided that
it is obtained from a
verb phrase, VP, by placing distinct
variables
a

in the

subject and complement positions, and VP
expresses that
relation on that reading.
Some have taken the phrase,

"propositional attitude",

to apply to verbs or verb phrases, though
more typically it
is taken to apply to certain relations.

adopt the latter usage.

In what follows,

I

There are some fairly clear and

uncontroversial examples of relations of the relevant kind.
Belief and desire, for instance, are said to be

propositional attitudes.
But it is worth considering which relations are

intended by the terms 'belief’ and 'desire’, when it is said
that belief and desire are propositional attitudes (and what
is said

is true).

and what

Take the case of belief.

think is customarily supposed,

I

relational

reading of the verb,

What

I

assume,

is that there

is a

'believes’, on which it

expresses the intended relation.

And

sufficient to say that the reading

in

I

think it is

question is that on

which we get truths expressed by sentences of the form
t

bel

i

eves that 0

where the substituend for
A

'

0

'

is an

indicative sentence.

similar claim could be made for 'desire’:

if the

term is used as a proper name for a propositional attitude,
it denotes a relation expressed by the verb

25

'desires’ on a

certain relational reading, the reading
on which true claims
are expressed by sentences of the form
desires that 0

t

this time with substituends for

'

0

'

being sentences whose

main verbs are in the subjunctive.

There are other relations commonly taken to be

propositional attitudes that we may cite by appeal to the
verbs that express them.
ones that,

like

Common examples of such verbs are

'believes’ and 'desires’, are used to report

mental states or events and that take indicative or

subjunctive sentential clauses as complements.

For

instance, the relations expressed on appropriate readings by
'is wishing’,

'is pleased’,

'knows’,

'hopes’

would commonly be counted as propositional attitudes.
I

Most,

think, would also count

'wonders’,
as examples,

'is wondering’,

along with other verbs that take

sentential complements.
I

'doubts’

I

i

nterrogat ve
i

shall do so.

also suppose that on their relational readings, the

various forms of the verb 'thinks’--in particular, the

progressive forms

— all

express relations of the type in

quest on
i
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There are verbs that, on
certain relational readings,
express what could be termed
psychological attitudes and
have important logical features
in common with the
propositional attitude verbs just
cited (in particular, the
feature of creating intensional
contexts in sentences from
which they are formed), but which,
I assume, would not be
counted as expressing propositional
attitudes.
'seeks’ and
'worships’ are cases in point.

It may be that these verbs

express relations that can be analyzed
in terms of
propositional attitudes, nevertheless, I shall

suppose, the

relations they express would not be deemed
propositional

attitudes themselves.
do not have an informative set of conditions
to offer

I

that fix the precise boundaries of this concept
of

propositional attitude.

I

will

have to assume that the

reader has an acceptable grasp of which relations

I

mean,

perhaps aided by the sampling of verbs expressing them that
have just given.

I

On this count,

though,

I

am not worse

than most proponents of the tradition we are reviewing.
is

It

remarkable how often an idea of what is meant by

propositional attitude

is taken to be

acceptably conveyed

by a short list of verbs that are supposed to express some

of the relevant relations (the list followed by an ellipsis
or an

'etc.’).

better.
I

Unfortunately,

I

am not able to do any

Probably, the reader can supplement the short list

have given by examples of other verbs that would without

controversy be held to express relations of the right sort.
27

I

think it is safe to assume that what

have to say about

I

propositional attitudes in what follows
may be understood to
apply to all such examples.
2.1.3

(

I

PT 2

think it safe to assume that, when it is

cl

aimed that

propositions are the objects of the propositional
att tudes
one thing that is meant is that only propositions
are
i

in the

ranges of these relations.
of belief,

(1)

Vx

(

if

Thus,

for example,

in the case

the claim could reasonably be taken to imply:
-}y

(

believes

y

then x is a proposition)

x

But this is certainly not all that is intended when it is

claimed that propositions are the objects of belief.
Certainly,

it would be denied that belief

that although in

f act

is a relation such

everything in its range is a

proposition, one cou

1

cats or lampposts.

Rather, when it is said that

bear that very relation to trees,

propositions are the objects of belief, the following
stronger claim is intended (here, and in formulations to
follow,

(2)

'pos’

abbreviates 'possibly’):

nec Vx( if pos Jy(
proposition

y

believes

x

),

then

x

is a

)

The claim is that as a matter of necessity, only

propositions cou

1

be in the range of belief.
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It is worth noting that a verb
may have various

relational
readings.

readings, and express various
relations on those
This is true in the case of 'believes’;
there is

sense of the verb on which a person
may be said to believe
another person.
Does this mean that the thesis expressed
in
a

commits its adherents to the view that some
people are
propositions? That would be a Moorean nightmare! 2
(2)

The

answer is "no”.

The reading of 'believes’ on which

I

may

correctly be said to believe people is just not the
one on
which the verb expresses the relation proponents of
the

Propositional Tradition mean by "belief" when they claim
that propositions are its objects.
The claim about belief expressed in (2) can be put in a

convenient way
of a relation.

if we

introduce the notion of the modal range

Let [R(t,t’)] abbreviate [t bears R to t’],

for terms t and t’; we adopt:

(

D1

)

the modal range of R

Each member of the modal

=df

{x:

R(y,x)

pos(

))

}

range of a relation is possibly a

thing to which something bears that relation.

In many

cases, the range that a relation actually has will only be a

proper subset of its modal range.

For example,

the modal

range of the relation expressed by 'is an offspring of’

includes all parents, but includes any two-year-old
potential parents as well.

Using this notion of modal range, we can say something

equivalent to what is expressed by (2),
29

if we say

that

necessarily, propositions make up the
modal range of belief.
(But the scope of the description
"the modal range of
belief" should be understood to be as
narrow as possible.)
Now I think we may say what is intended
when it is said
that propositions are the objects of the
propositional
attitudes.

The thesis is captured by the following

general zati on
i

(PT2)

VR (

R

nec Vx

is a propositional
pos( ly R(y,x) )
(

attitude -»
-> x is a proposition

The thesis entails that for any propositional attitude,
it would

R’s modal

))

R,

be impossible for anything but thoughts to be in

range.

(PT2)

is the second key tenet of the

Propositional Tradition distinguishing it from the

alternative
2.1.4

A
I

I

sketch below.

Point of Terminology:

"Intentional Attitudes"

doubt that it would be held within the Propositional

Tradition that (PT2) is true as a consequence of the
def i

n

i

t i on of

'propositional attitude’.

I

think proponents

would allow that we can agree with them on which relations
are to be referred to as "propositional attitudes", and yet

coherently reject their view as to the make-up of the modal
ranges of those relations.

A denial

claimed false, but not incoherent.

of (PT2) would be

Then perhaps it can be

agreed that the term "propositional attitude" is somewhat
theory- aden
1

.

Since the theory with which it is laden
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is

one that will be in dispute in
what follows,

I

think it will

prove best to adopt some term that
is neutral with respect
to the contending theories in this
study.

From here on,

I

propose to refer to relations of the

sort in question as '‘intentional
attitudes" (or occasionally
just attitudes", if it is clear from
the context of

discussion that intentional attitudes are
in question).
think that appeal to the terms 'intentional’

I

and

'

intentional ity’ has been common enough in the
literature,

in

application to matters pertaining to the so-called

propositional attitudes, that my choice of phrase here is
not unreasonable.
itself,

has already been employed by Chisholm in what would

seem to be the use
[1981

]

The phrase 'intentional attitude’,

p. 13

,

ff

)

I

am proposing (see, for example Chisholm

.

At any rate,

it will

'intentional attitude’

be

important to bear in mind that

is posited here simply as a theory-

neutral stand-in for 'propositional attitude’.

The two

terms should be understood to have the same application.

Accordingly, although in other contexts our phrase may be

assigned
apply,
or

a

different usage, on its present usage it does not

in particular,

to the relations expressed by

'seeks’

'worships’, even if these are to be in some way analyzed

in terms of

intentional attitudes.

Nor shall

it apply to

the relation expressed by 'desires’ that may be said to

relate us to consumer products; nor to the relation

expressed by 'believes’ that may be said to relate one
31

person to another.

These too, perhaps, can be analyzed
in

terms of relations to which 'intentional
attitude’ does
apply, but they are not themselves
examples of such
rel ati ons

2.1.5

(PT3)

There is a further tenet distinguishing the
outlook of
the Propositional Tradition from the one

I

shall

be

proposing that is not implied by the claims we have

formulated so far.

This third tenet is concerned

specifically with the attitudes expressed by 'believes’,
desires
'

wonder ng
i

(PT3)

and 'wonders’
’

)

(let us call

the latter attitude

:

VR(

if R

i)

is an intentional attitude, then
nec Vx ( pos( iy R(y,x)
pos( iy{ y believes
)

ii)

nec V*( pos(

iy R(y,x)

)

pos(
iii)

nec V*( pos(

iy R(y,x)

x

)))

x

)))

-»
iy (

y

desires

)

pos(

iy(

y

wonders

x

))))

Alternately, the claim could be put by saying that belief,
desire and wondering are indiscriminate with respect to
their modal
the modal
it

ranges:

necessarily,

if an

item is included in

range of any other attitude at all, you will find

in the modal

range of each of these three.

From (PT3) and (A1) we can derive the following
equ valences
l
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3

(

nec Vx(

)

pos

(

Jy(

y

believes

x

))

pos(

nec Vx

pos

(

(

-}y(

y

desires

x

))

Pos(

From (3) and (4),
modal

in turn,

iff

Jy(

y

desires

x

)))

y

wonders

x

)))

iff
Jy(

it follows that necessarily
the

ranges of belief, desire and wondering
coincide.

Consequently, anything at all that can
be believed is also
thing that could be desired, and a
thing that could be
something someone wonders as well. This
result would be
widely accepted without a moment’s
hesitation within the
Propositional Tradition.
Now let us turn to consider some main
features of an

alternative to this received perspective.

2

•

2

An Alternative Conception

I

wish to begin this section by discussing some

apparent points of conflict between the Propositional

Tradition and the alternative
2-2.1

A

I

shall

be proposing.

Taxonomy of Thoughts

The alternative is incompatible with the tenets

expressed by

(

PT

1

)

and (PT2), as

tenet expressed by (PT3) as well.

I

read them,

and with the

Let’s consider each case

in turn..

According to my view,
(Alt 1)

Thoughts come in separate species only one of
which includes members that are truth-val ued
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a

But

agree with the Propositional Tradition
in
understanding 'proposition’ to apply to
truth-valued
thoughts.
Consequently (Alt 1) is incompatible with
(PTl),
as I read it; according to the new
conception,
I

not all

thoughts are truth-valued, hence not all are
propositions.
Depending on your view of what counts as a
species, you
might accept (Alt 1) with equanimity, if you
think there

are

any truth-val ue- ess thoughts at all:
1

there’s the truth-

valued species, you might say, and then there’s the non-

truth-valued species.
1

essness doesn’t determine

thought that
rather,
i

But as

I

by the

a

I

see things,

species.

truth-value-

The species of

count are distinguished from one another,
intentional attitudes whose modal

ranges they

ncl ude

(Alt 1) does not require that any attitudes have modal

ranges that fall outside of the truth-valued species of
thought.

Consequently,

expressed by (PT2), as

(Alt
I

1)

is

compatible with the tenet

interpret it.

respect to very many familiar attitudes,
the case that their modal

valued thoughts.

'knowledge’

agree that with
it

necessarily

is

ranges contain exclusively truth-

Belief is perhaps an example, though

have some qualms.
(by

I

I

Knowledge would seem to be

a

I

clear case

mean the intentional attitude expressed by

'knows’ on the reading yielding true claims expressed by

sentences in which the verb takes indicative sentential
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complements

)

However,

it

is a

further contention of the

new view that

(Alt 2)
(as

I

is

incompatible with the thesis expressed by
(PT2)

read the latter).
In fact,

the new conception holds that certain
quite

familiar attitudes have modal ranges that
exclude

propositions

Desire is an example, or so

I

claim.

I

am

also inclined to hold that the attitude of
wondering has a

non-proposi

t i onal

modal

range that falls within a species of

thought other than that of desire.

Assuming that the modal

range of belief includes at least some proposi

ti

ons--that

some truth-valued thoughts are at least possibly believed-we have the following picture:

Propos

The m.

i

t

i

ons

The m.

range of belief
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The m.

range of desire

range of wondering

The contention that wondering and
desire have modal ranges

comprising distinct species is not

conception

I

am proposing.

Also,

a

firm commitment of the

the diagram may suggest,

but the view does not require that the
modal

disjoint from that of desire.

is

have modal

range of belief

Some intentional attitudes

ranges that overlap more than one of the
species

of thought,

and perhaps belief is one of these.

The view

will require, however, that neither the modal range of

wondering nor that of desire coincide with that of belief.

Consequently the present view
expressed by
the modal

2-2.2

(

PT3

)

incompatible with the tenet

is

for this tenet entails the claim that

,

ranges of belief, desire, and wondering coincide.

The Nature of the Dispute
In the preceding section,

I

spoke of

(

PT 1

-

)

(PT3) as

tenets "distinguishing" the Propositional Tradition’s

conception from the one that

I

shall

propose.

speaking, this may not be quite right.
In Chapter

(

T

1

)

1

I

,

nec Vx( pos }y{

to formulate what

thoughthood.

I

Strictly

Let me explain why.

took

y

is thinking x

)

-» x is a thought

)

claimed to be an analytic criterion of

My principal

goal

in

Chapter

4

wi

1

1

be to

isolate one particular reading of the verb,

'is thinking’,

displayed in that verb’s ordinary usage.

shall contend

I

that if our understanding of (T1) involves this reading,
then the concept of thought conforming to the criterion
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expressed by (T1), so understood,
will be a concept whose
features motivate the outlook on
thoughts that I am going to
propose.
Further, as I shall argue, if we
understand
'proposition’ to apply to the truth-valued
items in the

modal

range of the relation expressed by
'is thinking’ on
this reading, then we have grounds
for rejecting the tenets
formulated, on that understanding, by
(PT
and (PT2).
1

There are several places where

)

Propositional

a

Traditionalist might part company with me

in these matters.

Let "Pete" name some arbitrary Propositional
Traditionalist.
Is

it the case that the tenets that Pete
expresses with

(PT1) and (PT2) distinguish his conception
of thoughts from

the one I’m proposing?

somewhat complicated.

Well,

that depends; the issue is

The matter hinges on whether Pete’s

understanding of 'proposition’

is the same,

necessarily coextensive with the one

I

or at least

derive from the

conception of thought to be developed in the course of this
study.

For

I

assume that Pete and

for the sake of argument, on the

(

D2

)

x

is a

proposition

=df

1

I

etter of:

i)
i i

could agree, at least

)

x
x

is
i

truth-valued;
thought

s a

But though we might agree on this formulation,

it remains

open whether we would interpret the second clause of the
right side the same way, or at least in such ways that

necessarily equivalent conditions are expressed.
heart of this question,

in turn,
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is the

At the

issue of whether

Pete grants (T
is

1

thinking

),

and whether we understand the
occurrence
in that

formulation according to the same

reading, or at least readings on
which 'is thinking’

expresses necessarily coextensive
relations, or not.
after all, Pete and I mean different
things by
'proposition’, then perhaps the view

I

if,

propose does not

conflict with the tenets Pete expresses
by (PT1) and (PT2).
It will

become clear,

in our conception of

'proposition’, and even if,

consequently, the view that

tenets expressed by
them,

think, that even if we disagree

I

(

PT1

)

I

and

propose is compatible with the
(

PT2

)

on Pete’s reading of

,

there will still be substantial disagreement
between

me and Pete on other related fronts.

2-2.3

A

Cartesian Precedent ?

There is a passage in the Meditations where Descartes

espouses what seems to be
I

am proposing.

a view of

thoughts akin to the one

The passage occurs in the third

Med tat ons
i

i

considerations of order appear to dictate that I now
classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask
which of them can properly be said to be the bearers
of truth and falsity.
Some of my thoughts are as it
were the images of things and to these alone is the
title "idea" properly appl ed ... Other thoughts have
various additional forms:
thus when I will, or am
afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a
particular thing which I take as the object of my
thought, but my thought includes something more than
the likeness of that thing.
Some thoughts in this
category are called vol ti ons
whi e others are
called judgements.
i

i
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.

.

.

1

Descartes goes on to claim that
only judgments, not ideas or
volitions, can properly be said
to be bearers of truth and
falsity.
I

think a natural

interpretation of these remarks would

have it that Descartes’ view is
quite like the one I have
suggested (apart from his counting
"images of things" as

thoughts— I shall set aside the question
of idea comes to).

of what his concept

it would not be far-fetched to
suppose

that what Descartes meant by "judgment"
and "volition" are
distinct types of thoughts whose instances
are to be found,

respectively,

in the modal

ranges of belief and desire.

Then Descartes’ contention that truth-value
is displayed by
the former and not the latter would be one
with which my

view is in agreement.
Indeed,

I

think it is tempting to see Descartes’ view

as conflicting with the Propos ti onal Tradition on just
the
i

same counts as does mine:

contra

(

PT

1

)

,

not all thoughts

are propositions (if we take propositions to be truth-valued

thoughts); contra (PT2), not all intentional attitudes have

propositions in their modal ranges (if we suppose Descartes’
volitions to be in the modal ranges of any att tudes--of
i

desire, for example); contra

(

PT3

)

,

the modal

ranges of

belief, desire and wondering do not coincide, since those of

belief and desire do not coincide (if we assume that

volitions exhaust the modal range of desire but not that of
belief).
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There is a problem of

i

nterpretat i on

,

though,

confronting the idea that Descartes’
conception of thoughts
really resembles the one I will
propose.

At the beginning of Chapter

1,

I

mentioned a common

usage of the word 'thought’ on which
the term stands, not
for thoughts, but rather for events of
thinking.
Nothing in
what Descartes says in the passage quoted
above rules out
that he is speaking of items of this second
sort of mental

—

events of a particular variety
they come in species.

— and

claiming of these

.

that

Nothing in this passage rules out

that he is claiming of two particular sorts of events
-- the

instances of one denoted by the noun 'judgment’, the other’s

instances denoted by 'volition’
sort,

— that

events of the former

and not of the latter, may be said to be true or

false.

For the Latin noun 'cogitatio’

is

ambiguous in the

two ways we have noted for the English common noun

thought’.

Hence there is no guarantee, none to be

discerned from the passage quoted above, that when Descartes
used

'

cogi tationes

’

he meant things of the sort

I

have

stipulated that we shall mean here by 'thoughts’.
However, Descartes did not confine himself to a simple

taxonomy of the things to which he applied the term
"cogitatio".

He also suggested a view as to their nature, a

view concerning the sort of things he took thoughts to be.

According to Descartes, thoughts are "modes of thinking
substances", by which

I

take him to have meant properties of

th i nkers
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IS

may
be taken as ">°des of a
ce
if ?far aS ° neals0
and the same mir>d is
caoahlp nf
h
capable
of having
many different
the same body, with its quantity thought-S and one and
unchanged, may be
ma " y deferent ways (for example,
at one
9reater in length and smaller in
?!
bre3dth or depth, and a little
later, by contrast
it
may be greater in breadth and
smaller in length) 5
;

As

I

read this passage,

a view on the nature of thoughts

is

suggested that is in certain important
respects like the one
I

shall

be proposing.

What should be noted for present

purposes is that Descartes is evidently
concerned here with
items that could be said to be had in
common by various
thinkers.

He doesn’t say this, but in drawing this analogy

between thoughts that a mind may have, and ways that
a body
may be extended, he does seem to suggest it.

Provided

Descartes would have allowed that different bodies may be
said to be extended in the same ways, presumably he would

also have held that different minds could be said to have
the same thoughts.

using

'

cog i tat i ones

This suggests to me that Descartes was
’

to stand for things of the same sort we

mean here by 'thoughts’.
cog i tat i ones

’

Then if Descartes intended

in the same way

in both of the

passages

quoted above, there would be some reason, after all, to
think that his conception of thoughts was a precedent for
the one that

I

will

be proposi ng--not only because the two

conceptions involve roughly similar taxonomies, but also
because,

it would appear,

we have the same genus of thing in

mind to which we are attributing these taxonomies.
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would very much like to think that
the conception of
thoughts that I shall be proposing
is a Cartesian one.
Unfortunately, I have been unable to
find very many passages
besides the two just quoted where
Descartes explicitly
discusses his view of "thoughts". There
is consequently not
much basis for attributing to him anything
akin to the view
I

I

shall

be proposing.

The nature of those items Descartes

referred to when he used the word 'cogitatio’
as a common
noun and the distinction of whatever notions
might be

expressed by the term, so used, seem not to have been
topics
that he chose to attend to in his written work.
2.2.4

Four Central Roles for Thoughts
To conclude this chapter,

I

would like to mention four

roles that thoughts are standardly assumed to play,

that ought to be accommodated,

I

believe,

account of the nature of thoughts.

roles

by any acceptable

It is an

important

feature of the new conception of thoughts developed here
that one may consistently adopt it without relinquishing the
view that thoughts do serve these four standard roles.
Cons der
i

(5)

VR (

R

is an

nec Vx( pos

(5)

is an

(

intentional attitude —
-» x is a thought
ly R(y,x)
)

))

implication of the first two tenets of the

Propositional Tradition,

(

PT

1

)

and (PT2); consequently, the

thesis it formulates is a commitment of the Propositional
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Tradition.

But although

(PT1) and (PT2)
of thoughts that

(as
I

I

I

reject the claims expressed by

read them), the alternative
conception

shall propose is compatible with
the

claim formulated by (5); the claim
(5)

captures what

I

is one

that

I

accept.

shall refer to as the 'intentional

role" that thoughts are standardly
supposed to serve:
as a matter of necessity, the modal
ranges of all the

that

attitudes are made up exclusively of
thoughts; put roughly:
The Intentional RoIp
Thoughts are the "objects" of intentional
attitudes.
In addition to this

intentional

role,

thoughts are

standardly assumed to be items to which logical
concepts are
applicable.

For example,

it

is

assumed that thoughts may be

said to be necessary or contingent, to be incompatible
with
or to entail one another,

to be the conjunctions,

disjunctions or generalizations of other thoughts.
2

.

Thus:

The Logical Role
Thoughts exemplify logical properties, and are terms
of logical relations and operations.
A third

role that thoughts are taken to serve has to do

with their relationship to language.

It is assumed that

there is an important connection between thoughts and the
use of sentences in language, a connection in virtue of

which we manage to communicate our beliefs, desires, wishes,

questions and other concerns about the world to one another.
Ideas along these lines have been put in various ways, but
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as a provisional

3

stand-in,

I

shall simply say:

The Linguistic Rnl P
Sentences express thoughts.

•

Finally,

it is standardly supposed
that many semantic

properties of and relations among
sentences can be accounted
for by appeal to corresponding
properties of and relations
among the thoughts that those sentences
express.
An example
here would be the idea that an ascription
of truth or

falsity to a sentence may be understood
in terms of the
truth or falsity of the thought that sentence
expresses.
A
similar account is standardly assumed for various
semantic
relations that hold among sentences.

Consistency,

implication, and contradi ctori ness are examples.
case,

it would be maintained,

In each

there is a relationship among

thoughts by means of which we may account for the relevant
semantic relationship attributable to sentences.

Finally,

then

4

.

The Semantic Role
Semantic properties of and relations among sentences
can be explained by appeal to correspondi ng properties
of and relations among thoughts.

I

hope to give evidence in the course of this thesis

that the conception of thoughts developed here accommodates

each of the four roles just cited.

I

take as a starting

point the view that thoughts do serve each of these roles;
it

is an

important constraint on my project that the
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conception of thoughts that

I

develop in the present study

be compatible with this
starting assumption.

There are various features of
thoughts required by
these roles that I assume to be
familiar to

the reader, and

that

I

have already been taking for granted.

two chapters,

I

In the next

propose to devote some attention to the

intentional role, and in Chapter

5

I

shall

linguistic role, for these two roles—

especially important in the arguments

focus on the

3— will

1

and

I

shall propose that

be

are designed to show that the new
conception is incompatible

with the key tenets of the Propositional
Tradition.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

2

1.

Strictly speaking, this notion of a verb
or verb phrase
expressing a relation must be understood
to
be
relative not
2.
only
to readings but to contexts, since verbs
and verb
phrases may be indexicals.
For discussion of the relevant
n
f
d X1Callty
COntext
see cha P ter 5, sections
5°2
1

3.

1

2

and

5

2

3

^

’

4.

Moore is said once to have had a nightmare
in which he
couldn t distinguish propositions from tables.
See
Cartwright [1962], p. 51, and Bergmann [1960],
p. 3.
Bergmann attributes the anecdote to Keynes.
The proof requires S5

Haldane and Ross, [1931], p.159 The extent to which
English translations of this passage differ is remarkable.
I
have chosen the Haldane and Ross rendition, since it is
most amenable to an interpretation that puts Descartes’ view
of thoughts close to mine.
The greatest discrepancy among
the different renditions I’ve seen lies in the handling of
the sentence that Haldane and Ross put as:
For example in willing, fearing, approving,
denying, though I always percieve something as the
subject of the action of my mind, yet by this
action I always add something else to the idea
which I have of that thing.

Haldane and Ross note that they have used the French version
in obtaining this rendition.
They claim it to be "more
explicit' than the Latin.
Here are two other versions I’ve
seen; the following from Cottingham [1986], p. 26:
thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or
deny, there is always a particular thing which I
take as the object of my thought, but my thought
includes something more than the likeness of that
thing.
and the following from Anscombe and Geach [1971], p.78:

when I will, am afraid, assert, or deny, there is
always something that I take as the object of my
experience, by my experience comprises more than
the likeness of the thing in question...

notable difference is that Haldane and Ross have ’subject’
and
(of the action of my mind’) where both Cottingham et al
Anscombe and Geach have 'object’ ('of my thought’ in
A

.
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9ha

f
a * Derience
in Anscombe and
Ta?k of'"oh°
object of my thought" in the version of
Cottinoham
I
may suggest the idea that Descartes
is here
a
h
1S 1 i
iQa and sa y in 9 that something
more than°tha£ ie "
n
^
1Ud
1n his thou 9 ht (in the event of
u
rns
h?s thinking?).
thinki^f^
!a°
Haldane
and Ross’s use of 'subiect’
e
3 tl t Deacartes is speaking, not
of what he
is
t hinking
is°tMnkinS
bu? rather
?h
but
of what he is thinking about— the
hl
h ° U9ht
what his thought concerns and
Kvin^
t^ what
w J he
saying that
is thinking adds something more to
it.
This is the idea that resembles my view.
A
ong time ago Fred Feldman suggested to me
1
that the
conception of thoughts I am proposing was "Cartesian".
It0 ° k his suggestion to be merely: that the At
idea
that "Tuthinking applies to a broad range of mental
activities, including more than occurrent believing,
was an
idea advanced by Descartes.
I’m afraid that I may not have
paid careful enough attention to what Feldman was
suggesting.
The idea that, apart from having the same views
on the nature of th i nk i ng Descartes’ conception of
thoughts
might actually be a precedent to mine in significant
respects, did not sink in until much later, when I came
across this passage from the Meditations quoted in the essay
by Sosa [1967] on the semantics of imperatives.

T

GeacM

^ "^.eta,

’

.

^

’

—

’

*

1

.

,

5.
From article 64 of the Principles of Philosophy
Cottingham [1985], p.2 5
.
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CHAPTER

3

OCCURRENT ATTITUDES AND THEIR
NON-OCCURRENT COUNTERPARTS

In this chapter,

I

wish to discuss some matters of

terminology, and some matters concerning
the classification
of attitudes,

that will be useful

in several

connections

throughout the remainder of the study.

3

.

1

Occurrent Attitudes
By

occurrent attitude"

I

shall mean,

roughly speaking,

any intentional attitude that one bears in virtue
of

engaging in some breed of mental activity
that,
3

for some type of mental event,

— any

attitude such

bearing the attitude

ust—is being the subject of an occurring event of that

type.

Examples of what

I

count as occurrent attitudes are

the relations expressed (on familiar readings) by the

following present progressive forms:
is wishing
is

wondering

is

thinking

Take the case of 'is wishing’ for example.

There is at

least one reading of this verb on which it expresses an

attitude that a person has

in

activity of a particular sort.
fact that if

I

virtue of engaging in mental
This is reflected in the

say and am right in saying that a person is
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at this very moment wishing that
he hadn’t put down a
deposit on some apartment, then I

ascribe

a

certain attitude

to this person which he bears in
virtue of being the subject
of an occurring mental event, in
particular an event of

wishing.
By contrast,

bel

i

these verbs (and verb phrase):

eves

knows
loves to hear

though they do express intentional attitudes, do not
express

what

I

am calling occurrent attitudes, at least not on any

common usage.
well

To say that the poor fellow knows all too

that he put down the deposit on that apartment,

ascribe to him an attitude which he can have even
is no mental

activity of any sort

engag ng--perhaps he is in
i

a deep

in

if

is to

there

which he is presently

dreamless sleep at the

moment--at any rate not any sort of mental activity such
that it is in virtue of his engaging in mental activity of

that sort that he bears the attitude ascribed.
It would not be correct to assume that occurrent

attitudes are simply those expressed by the progressive
forms of attitude verbs.

admits a progressive form,

occurrent reading.

In particular,

although 'believes’

it seems to require a non-

Consider the following sentence, which

think is representati ve
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I

His tes tim° n y was so persuasive
that the
believing everything he tells them.

j

urors are

assume that the most natural interpretation
of this
sentence is one involving a reading of
the progressive on
which it does express an intentional
attitude.
Yet on this
I

interpretation,

if the

sentence expresses a truth,

I

would

say that it reports a disposition to
believe, not an

occurring event of any sort.
all

in a

It may be that the jurors are

deep and dreamless sleep at the moment, yet
still

correct to say of them that they have this disposition,
that
they are believing everything the witness tells them.

But

then it isn t in virtue of the jurors’ now engaging in

mental events of any sort that we may ascribe to them the

attitude expressed on this reading by the progressive form.^

3

.

2

Occurrent Belief
Some occurrent attitudes may be paired with non-

occurrent attitudes as counterparts
Here are some examples:

in a

certain respect.

the attitude of desire and that of

occurrent wishing (the relation expressed by the present
progressive form of the verb 'wish’) are counterparts of one
another in the relevant sense.

The attitude of wondering--

expressed by the simple present form of the verb 'wonderland the attitude of occurrent wonder ng--expressed by the
i

present progressive form of the verb--are also counterparts
in this

respect.

There is, then, a way in which occurrent

50

wishing is related to desire and in
which occurrent
wondering is related to wondering such
that in virtue of
being related in this way, these pairs
of attitudes may be
counted as counterparts in the sense in
question.
I

don’t suppose that every non-occur rent
attitude has

an occurrent attitude as a counterpart.

For example,

these

attitude verbs,
knows
loves to hear

express non-occur rent attitudes for which,
there are no occurrent counterparts

.

I

would claim,

It is important

however, to distinguish the claim, such as

I

have just made,

that there is no occurrent counterpart of a given attitude
at all,

from the claim that there is no occurrent

counterpart that is expressed by any locutions of ordinary
di

scourse

Consider the case of belief.

I

noted above that the

present progressive of 'believes’ does not express an

occurrent attitude.

Nevertheless, one finds it commonly

supposed in the philosophical literature that there

is an

occurrent attitude related to belief in a way relevantly
like that in which occurrent wishing is related to desire,

and in which occurrent wondering is related to wondering in

virtue of which these latter pairs may be said to be

counterparts

.

"Occurrent belief" is the phrase commonly

used to refer to the attitude at issue.
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I

assume that such

an occurrent counterpart of
belief exists,

yet it is not

clear to me that there is any
verb or verb phrase in English
that expresses it.
There vs a class of English
ascriptions that serve to
report exactly the events that, I
think, would be considered
to be events of persons bearing
this attitude of occurrent
belief.
The ascriptions in question are
those formed from
the present progressive of the verb
'think’ when it is

complemented by

sentential clause got by prefixing the

a

word 'that’ to an indicative sentence
(from here on
refer to such complements as "indicative
clauses").

ascriptions, then,

(

F1

)

t

is

I

shall

The

include any of the form

thinking that 0

where substituends for
and substituends for

'

't’

0

'

,

are appropriate singular terms,

are indicative sentences.

Consider:

William is thinking that Sarah will not say "yes".
Sarah is thinking that William seems a little
nervous
At least on one familiar reading of the progressive, each of

these sentences,

if

it expresses a truth,

that would be said to be one of a person

reports an event

— William

bearing the attitude of occurrent belief to
Hereafter,

I

or Sarah--

a thing.

shall use the phrase "occurrent believings" to

refer to events of the sort reported by ascriptions that
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instantiate (FI), and

I

shall assume that these events are

ones of persons bearing the attitude of
occurrent belief.
If one accepts that there

which instances of (FI),

is a

if true,

familiar reading on

report occurrent

believings, then one might be led to suppose that
there is
after all a verb phrase of English that expresses
occurrent
belief, namely, the phrase 'is thinking’ on this
familiar

reading in question.

I

am inclined to think that if any

English verb phrase expresses occurrent belief at all, it is
this one, on that very reading.

Nevertheless,

it does not

follow from the fact that true instances of (FI) report

occurrent believings, that there is any reading of 'is
thinking’ on which it expresses occurrent belief.
do not know whether there is such a reading.

I

simply

Though it

won’t be settled, we shall consider this matter further

in

the next chapter.

Since

I

shall want to appeal to this attitude of

occurrent belief in various claims and discussions to
follow, and since

I

am uncertain whether there is any verb

already available in English expressing
introduce

a

it,

I

propose to

technical phrase to serve this function.

Although the terminology is somewhat cumbersome, from here
on I’ll

use 'occurrently believe’ as a verb whose present

tense forms shall be understood to express occurrent belief.
I

shall assume that the verb and its forms admit subject and

53

complement terms of exactly the same syntactic
sorts as do
the various forms of the verb 'believes’.
I

'

shall suppose that the present progressive
of

occurrent

1

y

believes’

is

linked to that of the verb 'think’

by the following two constraints:

(A3)

For any indicative sentence, 0
expresses a truth:

nec Vx(

[

x

is

,

the following

is occurrently believing that 0 iff
thinking that 0
]
x

)

and

(

What is expressed by an instance of (FI) is true
with respect to the same circumstances as the
correspondi ng instance of

A4

(

F2

t

)

is

occurrently believing that 0

(fixed readings for substituends of
(A3) tells us,

't’

and

'

0

'

)

for example, that the following strict

conditional is true:
nec Vx( x is occurrently believing that Sarah will not
say "yes" iff x is thinking that Sarah will not say
"yes"
)

According to (A4), what is expressed by this instance of
(

F2

)

:

Sarah is occurrently believing that William is nervous
and what is expressed by the following instance of (FI):

Sarah is thinking that William is nervous
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are things true relative to precisely
the same
ci

rcumstances

3

3

•

Ch aracter i

I

is a

z

i

ng Counterparts

have assumed that there is an occurrent
attitude that

counterpart of belief,

a

"counterpart" in the same

sense in which occurrent wishing may be said
to be an

occurrent counterpart of desire, and
wondering

is a

wondering.
I

in

which occurrent

counterpart of the non-occurrent attitude of

What sense of 'counterpart’

is

in

question here?

propose, now, to consider this question somewhat more

careful

1

y

One might suppose that at least some non-occurrent

attitudes can be analyzed in terms of dispositions to bear
the very occurrent attitudes that

counterparts

.

I

would count as

In the case of belief,

for example, such a

proposal would be that to believe a thing is to be disposed
to occurrently believe it.

Or,

in the case of desire:

to

desire something (where the intentional attitude, and not
some other concept of desire,
is to be

is

understood to be at issue)

disposed to be wishing it.

Then perhaps we could

say that a pair of attitudes, one occurrent, one non-

occurrent, are counterparts if they are linked by such

dispositional analysis.

a

But there are problems with these

anal yses
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A

matter that some would find problematic in
such

proposals has to do with the ingredient notion of
disposition.

It might be claimed that the idea of a

person’s being disposed to do something is not acceptably
clear and that consequently such dispositional accounts
of
the non-occu r rent attitudes are themselves unacceptable.

The relevant notion of disposition does admit of some

vagueness, but it is not clear to me that it is unacceptable
on this count.

Is the complaint that,

on some occasions,

there is no saying whether a person is disposed,

in the

relevant sense, to occurrently believe something?

But this

may be so, and yet the proposed analysis entirely proper.
For it may be that, on precisely the same occasions, and for

similar reasons, there is no saying whether the person
be

1

i

eves the thing in question.

The proposed analysis,

then, might be clear and correct even if it relates two

concepts that do not themselves have a perfectly clear
application.
his [1973],

(On this matter,
p.

91

ff,

compare Lewis’ discussion,

in

of an analogous objection to his

treatment of counterf actual s in terms of a concept of
relative similarity).
Other objections could be raised, though, to the

proposals

I

made above, even if the involved concept of

disposition is granted.

Let us suppose that we have an

acceptable idea of what it is to be disposed to do
something,
The general

if not

entirely clear-cut and free of vagueness.

line of account suggested above was this:
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(1)

VR VR’( if R is an intentional
attitude and R’ is the
occurrent counterpart of R, then nec VxVy( R(x,y)
iff
x is disposed to bear R’ to
y ))

The following is a consequence of (1) concerning
belief and
its occurrent counterpart:

(2)

nec VxVy(

x

believes

y

iff x is disposed to occurrently
bel i eve y )

This formulates pretty closely the dispositional proposal
for the case of belief cited before.
to counterexample.

But (2) seems subject

Suppose the fellow who knows all too

well that he put down the deposit now wishes to avoid facing

this unpleasant fact for as long as possible.
that he will go to the Bahamas for a month.

He decides

He resolves not

to consider anything having to do with the deposit until his

return.

Under normal circumstances he is quite good at

sticking to his resolve, and we may suppose that the

circumstances are,

in this

respect, normal.

This would

appear to be a case where a person believes something (he
knows it all too well), but is not disposed to occurrently

believe anything at all about the deposit.
right,

If this

is

then we should reject (2).

Since (2) is a consequence of (1), this example alone

suffices to refute (1).

But the general problem does not

have to do with any peculiarity of belief:
(1)

concerning desire and wondering
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— and

consequences of

the occurrent

attitudes

have cited as their counterparts—
woul

I

d

seem to

face similar difficulties.
One might suppose we can get around
this sort of
difficulty in the following way.
In the case of our fellow

heading to the Bahamas,

it could be maintained that although

he is not disposed to occurrently
believe that he put down

the deposit (indeed, he is disposed not
to), and will be

thus indisposed for at least a month, nevertheless,

if,

during this month, his busybody accountant were
to drop

in,

and lead him to consider the thought that he
put down the

deposit, then he would be disposed to occurrently believe
and probably would occurrently believe it, much to his

it

chagrin.

This suggests the following amendment to the

general thesis:

(1

)

VR

VR
if R’ is the occurrent counterpart of an
intentional attitude R, then nec VxVy( R(x,y) iff were
x to cons de r y
then x would be disposed to bear
’

(

i

R’

to

y

.

))

The idea,

in short,

is that

if

a

non-occur rent attitude

has an occurrent counterpart, the former may be analyzed in

terms of a certain conditioned disposition to bear the
latter.

Employing this idea, one might propose to

characterize the relevant counterpart relationship by saying
that two attitudes, R and R’, are counterparts in the

relevant sense just in case

R

is

non-occur rent

,

R’

occurrent, and the pair, <R,R’>, satisfies the main

consequent of (1’).

That is, we could put:
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is

(D3)

is an occurrent counterpart of
R’
=df R is
occurrent; R’ is non-occur rent and nec
VkVy( R(x y)
W
0
onsider y then x would be disposed’to
bear R^ to y°^
R

,

>

doubt that this characterization would
be considered very
appealing.
For one thing, I suspect that some would
not
I

find the ingredient notion of a person
considering a thought
to be acceptably clear as it stands.

stands,

is

about as clear as

I

Yet this notion, as it

know how to make it.

Moreover, the subjunctive form that was introduced in (1’)
adds another parameter of vagueness to what some might have

considered an already unacceptable vagueness stemming from
the concept of disposition.

What’s more, even if we give

the condition expressed by the definiens a run for its

money--I think

I

have some working grasp of what condition

that is

there seem to be problem cases.

the sort

I

Here is a case of

have in mind.

Jones has always accepted that a certain footbridge she

crosses on her way to town is quite sturdy.

For some time,

however, she has been undergoing sessions of hypnosis, and
at the most recent session,

the hypnotist told her

— while

she was under hypnosi s--that whenever she considers whether
the footbridge is sturdy, she ought seriously to doubt it.

Perhaps he was being

a

prankster, perhaps he had some

serious reason for not wanting her to occurrently believe
that the bridge is sturdy.

At any rate,

he did not

explicitly tell her to change her belief about the
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sturdiness of the footbridge, nor even
merely to suspend
judgment on the matter, nor did he suggest
that she ought to
have doubts on the matter whenever she
crosses
the bridge.

His suggestion was only that from that
point on, whenever
she does happen to consider the thought
that the footbridge
is sturdy,

she ought then to occurrently doubt it.

It seems to me that the preceding is a
description of a

possible situation and that we may suppose moreover
that in
some such situations the doctor’s post-hypnotic
suggestion
has in fact taken hold.
I

think that with respect to some such circumstances it

would be correct to say that, subsequent to the session in
question, Jones persists in the belief that the bridge is
sturdy.

It might be that she continues to cross the bridge

without worry for the rest of her days, provided she has no

occasion to consider whether the bridge

is

sturdy or not.

She might even be surprised on an occasion if the bridge

wavered as she was crossing it

— surprised,

in part,

because

until this occasion, she would have had the belief that the

bridge is sturdy.

Of course, once she does occurrently

doubt that the bridge is sturdy, she may then change her
belief.

But for the period following her hypnosis up until

such time as she has doubts,

it seems to me that Jones may

correctly be said to persist

in the

is sturdy.

belief that the bridge

Nevertheless, since the post-hypnotic suggestion

has taken hold, this very period is one during which it is

not the case that were she to consider the thought that the
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bridge is sturdy, she woul

believe it.

be disposed to occurrently

Indeed, were she to consider it, she would

straight-away occurrently doubt

it.

This seems to me to be

a tolerably clear counterexample to the
proposal

for

in

(D3),

take it that the definition should not lead us to
say

I

that belief and occurrent belief are not counterparts
do not see any way of amending (D3) that looks at all

I

promising.

Perhaps we had better seek some other way to

characterize which occurrent/non-occurrent attitude pairs
are counterparts in the relevant respect.
It may be noted that in the three cases of counterpart

attitudes that have been mentioned above,

if

a

person bears

the occurrent attitude towards a thought, then that person

also bears the non-occur rent attitude towards it.
case of belief:

if

Take the

someone is at this moment occurrently

believing, say, that he put down

a

deposit on his apartment,

then it will be correct to say that this person now be! eves
i

that he has put down the deposit.

He may change his mind,

and come to doubt whether he did or even to believe that he

didn’t;

it seems,

however, that it is a sufficient condition

for him to be in a state that we report by saying that he

believes that he put down the deposit, that, at the moment,
he is occurrently believing that he did so.

hold, mutatis mutandis

,

Similar points

for the case of desire and

wonder ng
i
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think that a relatively simple and clear
way of

I

distinguishing which pairs of attitudes are occur
rent/non-

occurrent counterparts is suggested
observations.

(

D4

in the

preceding

Consider:

is an

occurrent counterpart of R’
=df R is
occurrent; R’ is non-occur rent and nec VxVy( R(x
only if R’(x,y)
R

)

v)
*

,

)

The idea,

roughly,

is

that an occurrent counterpart of a

non-occurrent attitude,

R,

is any

occurrent attitude that

one cannot bear without thereby bearing
It may be noted that this proposal

R.

does not guarantee

that if a non-occur rent attitude has an occurrent

counterpart it has only one.

In fact

I

think there will be

cases in which an attitude is counted by
several occurrent counterparts

.

(

D4

)

as having

The following case is

somewhat fanciful, but it may help to convey the point

I

have in mind.
I

am inclined to hold that there are distinct occurrent

attitudes expressed by the following two verb phrases:
wishing fervently’ and 'is wishing passively’.
these attitudes,

if one

is

Each of

them "fervent wishing" and

let us call

"passive wishing",

'is

is such that one bears

wishing that thing.

it to a thing only

Then we should expect that

either one, coupled with the non-occurrent attitude of
desire, satisfies the definiens of
a

is

(

D4

)

person is wishing something fervently,

From the fact that
it follows that she

wishing it; then it will follow that it is something that
62

she wishes.

The same goes for passive wishing.

But then,

since fervent wishing and passive wishing
are distinct

occurrent attitudes, we have it that there isn’t
occurrent counterpart,

in the

a

unique

present sense, of the attitude

of des i re
I

do not see that this is a troublesome result;

I

think

there is a useful and intuitive concept of counterpart

defined in

(

D4

)

case of desire,
that

Nevertheless,

.

I

attend again to the

if we

think that it would be generally held

however many occurrent attitudes are counterparts of

desire according to

(

D4

)

— among

these counterparts, the

occurrent attitude expressed by the present progressive of
the verb 'wish’, unadorned by adverbs or other modifiers,

distinguished

in an

important respect.

is

In contrast to

fervent wishing" or "passive wishing", occurrent wishing
s

i

mp 1 i c i ter is in some sense the principal counterpart of

desire, the other two being counterparts only derivatively,
by virtue of being species of this principal

distinction,

I

think,

one.

A

similar

should be claimed for occurrent belief

among whatever other occurrent attitudes

counterparts of belief.

In general,

(

D4

)

would count as

the idea is that any

attitude that has an occurrent counterpart distinguished

in

this way as a principal counterpart, has exactly one

counterpart thus distinguished.
I

suggest that this notion of an occurrent attitude’s

being the principal counterpart of a non-occur rent attitude
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is captured by the following:

(D5)

R is the principal counterpart
of R’
=df
occurrent counterpart of R’, and VR*( if R* R -jsis an
an
occurrent counterpart of R’, then nec VxVy{
R*(x,y)
y
only if R x y
K

(

,

)

'

’

)

Let us say that one (two-term) relation
entails another just
in

case necessarily the one holds of a pair only
if the

other does.
way.

Then the idea expressed by (D5) may be put this

an attitude R,

is a principal

counterpart of

occurrent attitude, R’, just in case

R

a non-

occurrent

is an

counterpart of R’, but, moreover, every occurrent
counterpart of
Does

(

D5

)

entails

R’

R.

guarantee, as desired, that if an attitude

has a principal counterpart,
to think so,

it has only one?

I

am inclined

but the following objection might be made in

the case of belief (similar objections could be made

concerning desire and wondering).

The objector grants us

that there is a relation expressed by our verb 'occurrently
believes’ which, together with belief, satisfies the

definiens of

(

D5

)

.

But the objector has us consider the

following definition:

(

D*

)

is non-seven-i shl y believing y

x
x

occurrently believes

=df

x

i

7,

and

y

The objector now makes the following claims:

i)

(D*)

defines an occurrent attitude, call it "non-7 belief"; ii)
non-7 belief is distinct from occurrent belief, but iii) it
is also a

counterpart of belief.
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If all

these claims are

correct, then we cannot hold that our
relation of occurrent
belief is the principal occurrent counterpart
of belief, for
if there

is a relation defined

in

(

D*

)

,

it is one that

is

necessarily coextensive with occurrent belief;
so it will
entail belief, and if it is an occurrent attitude,

it will

be a counterpart of belief;

occurrent belief,
of belief,

if the

it will

In response,

an intentional

and since it is entailed by

latter is a principal counterpart

be too.
I

would be prepared to grant that there is

attitude that is defined in

(

D*

)

,

and that

this attitude is distinct from occurrent belief (the

objection requires, and

am inclined to allow that non-7

I

belief and occurrent belief are distinct yet necessarily

coextensive).

However,

am inclined to think that the pair

I

consisting of non-7 belief and non-occurrent belief fails to
satisfy the definiens of

(

D5

)

.

For

I

am inclined to deny

that non-7 belief is an occur rent attitude;

occurrent attitude, then it
of any attitude,

is not an

if

it is not an

occurrent counterpart

and hence not a principal counterpart of

belief.
The intuitive characteri zation of occurrent attitudes

offered at the start was this:

an attitude is occurrent if

there is some breed of mental event such that in virtue of
being the subject of an occurring event of that breed, a

person may be said to bear the attitude.

virtue of" here

I

When

I

say "in

do not mean merely that as a matter of
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necessity, a person bears the attitude
if and only if
subject to an occurring event of the
breed.
I mean that an
attitude is occurrent if what it is
for a person to bear the
attitude, is for that person to be a
subject of the relevant
breed
Now the reason
is

I

am inclined to deny that non-7 belief

an occurrent attitude,

that,

as far as

I

if

it is an attitude at all,

is

can see, there is no breed of mental event

such that a person may be said to bear non-7
belief to a
thing,

i

breed.

n

virtue of being a subject of an event of that

It is true that there is a type of mental

particular, that of occurrent believings

— such

event

that as a

matter of necessity, one bears non— 7 belief iff one is

subject of an occurring event of that type.
not suffice.

which

a

If

it

is asked:

what is it,

— in
a

But this does
in

virtue of

person may be said to bear non-7 belief?— if one

wishes to understand what it is to bear this att tude--the
i

answer should be that

a

person bears non-7 belief in virtue

of i) being the subject of an occurrent believing and

additional

1

ii)

being diverse from

7

.

Then it is not

simply in virtue of being the subject of an occurrent

believing that one may be said to bear non-7 belief.
I

Since

cannot see any other breed of mental event that would fill

the bill,

I

am inclined to say that non-7 belief is not

itself an occurrent attitude.
In what follows,
a principal

I

counterpart,

shall assume that if an attitude has
it has only one,
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and in particular,

assume that belief, desire and wondering
each have
principal counterparts, and that these
are the occurrent
attitudes expressed, respectively, by
'occurrently
I

believes’, as

I

have proposed to use it, and by the present

progressive forms of the verbs,

3

*

4

'wish’

and 'wonder’.

Ihe Modal Ranges of Principal Counterparts
To conclude this chapter,

assumption

I

I

would like to mention an

make here concerning the modal ranges of non-

occurrent attitudes and their principal counterparts.
I

What

assume is that if an attitude has a principal counterpart,

then the attitude and its principal counterpart have the
same modal

range.

A thesis equivalent to this assumption

may be formulated:
(A5)

I

VRVR’( if R is the principal counterpart of R’,
then nec Vx( pos iy R(y,x) iff pos Jy R’(y,x) ))

take it to be a consequence of (A5) that the following

expresses a truth concerning the modal ranges of the three
pairs of counterparts to which we have been attending:
(A6)

Necessarily, for any x,
pos iy{ y is occurrently believing x
iff
pos Jy( y believes x
ii.
pos Jy( y is wishing x
iff pos Jy( y desires x
iii. pos Jy( y is wondering x
iff
pos Jy( y wonders x
i.

)

)

)

)

)

In the remainder of this study

I

shall

be concerned

primarily with occurrent attitudes and their modal ranges.
67

)

But given (A6), conclusions that we shall
reach in

subsequent chapters concerning the modal ranges
of occurrent
belief, occurrent wishing and occurrent
wondering will
be

directly relevant to our assessment of the
Propositional
Tradition, and in particular to our assessment
of (PT3),
even though that tenet, as it stands, only concerns
the non-

occurrent attitudes in the counterpart pairs at issue
(

A6

)

in

.

Within the Propositional Tradition, attention has been
devoted, for the most part, to non-occur rent attitudes.

However

,

I

believe the assumptions formulated by (A5) and

(A6) would be agreed to by many proponents of that

trad t on
i

i

I

propose that we turn our attention, now, to some

neglected features of an occurrent attitude expressed by our

ordinary use of the present progressive of the verb,
'think’--a relation that seems to me to be one that we

commonly express when we talk of

a

person thinking

something, or of two persons thinking the same thing.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

1

.

3

The following sort of case was brought
to my attention
Consider this sentence:

by Phillip Bricker.

The judge is believing everything that
the
prosecutor is telling him.
We can imagine that this is uttered in
a situation where the
prosecutor has been feeding the judge a pack of
lies and
half truths about the defense’s handling of
the case
judge is buying each assertion that comes up.
Isn’t this a
case where the verb calls for a reading on which
it
expresses an occurrent attitude? I think not.
I
believe
that there are at least some possible situations
concerning
which it would be correct to say of a person that she is
believing things she’s being told, in the relevant sense
of
is believing’, but is not bearing any occurrent
attitude.
Let us suppose that a person is not conscious but is in
a deep, hypnotic trance.
The hypnotist is telling her
things, issuing assertions which he intends her to accept,
and there is a fancy piece of machinery to which our subject
is hooked up that monitors whether she is coming to believe
the things the hypnotist is telling her.
If we find that
she j_s coming to believe these things, as he asserts them,
then it seems to me that we may say, in precisely the same
sense called for in (a), that our subject is believing
everything the hypnotist is telling her. This, despite the
fact that she is in a deep sleep and not engaged in any
events that I would count as involving occurrent attitudes.
But if this reading of the verb is one on which the relation
expressed is possibly such that someone bears it, but is not
bearing any occurrent attitude, then the relation expressed
on this reading is not an occurrent attitude.
This seems to
me to be the case with the reading of 'is believing’ called
for in
a
Note, however, that this point is compatible with it’s
being the case both that (a) expresses a truth relative to a
situation, and that the judge happens to be bearing some
occurrent attitude or other in that situation.
(

)

.
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CHAPTER

4

THE CONCEPT OF GENERIC
THINKING

In Chapter 1,

I

claimed that it is part of the very

concept of thought that

if a thing

is possibly such that

someone is thinking it, that thing
is a thought.
The
following was the formulation I offered
for this analytic
criterion of thoughthood:
T

(

nec Vx

1

pos

(

is thinking x

y

)

is a

x

In order that the reader be

alleged criterion,
how

I

in a

in my

formulation of

want to try to make it tolerably clear

it.

'

thought --that figure
’

We are agreed on which modal

notions we take the operators,
and

and 'pos’,

'nec’

conditional pose no problem of interpretation.

question of how
that

to express,

assume that the quantifiers and the material

I

I

I

Then the

am reading (Tl)--of which criterion it is

intend it to formulate

— hinges

on how

I

understand

the occurrence of the present progressive form of the verb,

think’.

In this chapter,

I

shall

reading of 'is thinking’ upon which

4

.

A

)

position to assess this

interpret the terms— other than

I

thought

isolate and expound the
I

interpret (T1).

Generic Reading of Progressive Forms of 'think’

In the last chapter we noted that some of the

expressions that occur as complements of progressive forms
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of the verb

'think’

are sentential clauses formed by

prefixing 'that’ to an indicative
sentence— "indicative

clauses

as

t

We noted,

I

call

them.

Thus, we noted the construction

is thinking that 0

too,

that when ascriptions of this form express

truths, they may be understood to report
occurrent

believings, events of persons bearing the
attitude of

occurrent belief.
It may also be observed that ascriptions
formed by

attaching indicative clause complements to the simple
present tense,
t

including any instances of

thinks that 0

,

serve to report states of belief, and will be equivalent to

correspondi ng instances of
t

bel

i

eves that 0

.

Consider, for example,

William thinks that Sarah won’t say "Yes"
William believes that Sarah won’t say "Yes"
I

think it is clear that these express equivalent things.

Moreover, apart from ascriptions involving indicative
clauses, there is certainly a natural reading of the

b.

sentences in the following pairs on which those sentences
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express things equivalent to,

if

not identical to the things

expressed by the sentences resulting
from replacement of
think by believe’ (the sentences
in parentheses):
a.

Jones:

b.

William:

a.

Jones:

b.

William:

Is Sarah going to say "Yes"?
I

don’t think so.

don’t believe so.)

(I

I’m sure Sarah will say "Yes".

That’s what you think.

(That’s what you
be 1

i

eve

.

)

These observations about the simple present
tense, and
about the present progressive form when it is
complemented
by an indicative clause,

might lead one to suppose that

there are just two closely related "doxastic"
readings

attaching to these two forms of the verb 'think’:

the

simple present applies to states of belief and expresses
the

attitude of belief; the present progressive applies to

occurrent believings and expresses occurrent belief.
There is, however, a common usage on which the

progressive form,

'is thinking’,

applies to a very broad

range of mental events, encompassing events of persons

bearing various occurrent intentional attitudes,
to that of occurrent belief.

in

addition

It seems plain to me that

there is a familiar sense in which,

if a person

is wonde ring

whether something is the case, or wishing that something
would be the case

something

j_s

— as

well as if he is thinking that

the case--it is correct to say, whichever of

these conditions holds, that the person is thinking
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something.

And if two persons are wondering the same
thing,

wishing the same thing, or occurrently believing
the same
thing, whichever the case may be, if it is
then asked

whether these two people are thinking the same thing,
at
least one thing we may be asking has "yes" as its
correct

answer.

It may be expected that we proceed to specify
what

sort of thinking they are engaged in ("they are both

wondering whether...",
etc.),

"they are both thinking that...",

but "yes" would be a correct initial

response.

There are constructions in English in which 'is
thinking’

is followed,

not by an indicative clause, but

rather by a displayed sentence, where the sentence can be of
any mood.

The following are instances:

(1)

Jones is thinking:
here?

(2)

Jones is thinking (to herself):

How am

I

going to get out of
Catch the ball,

Jones.

Each of these is perfectly acceptable in ordinary English
and each one seems to me to express a perfectly coherent
claim, a claim that is true with respect to quite familiar

circumstances.
(2)

(1)

serves to report an event of wondering,

serves to report an event of wishing, and either will be

true if an event of the appropriate sort is in fact taking
place.

Now concerning these two ascriptions and

circumstances relative to which either expresses a truth,
it is asked:

"What is Jones thinking?",
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"Nothing" would

if

surely be an incorrect response.

One might answer with

either (1) or (2), or as well with
one of these:
Jones is wondering how she is going
to get out.
Jones is wishing that she would catch

the ball,

the appropriate response depending
on which of (1) and (2)
is true, but any such circumstances
would be ones with

respect to which Jones could properly be said
to be thinking
something; so it seems to me.

There are several colloquial idioms that we
sometimes
use more or less interchangeably with 'is thinking’.

Rather

than saying that a person is thinking something we may
say

(albeit with some variation in meaning) that something has

dawned on that person, or is occurring to the person, or is

crossing this person’s mind.

Further evidence for the

existence of a reading of 'is thinking’ on which it applies
to a wide variety of mental events,

occurrent believings,

rather than just to

lies in the fact that these more

colloquial verbal forms, too, display

application.

a

similarly broad

If a person says:

"Something is occurring to me",
"Something is crossing my mind", or

"Something is dawning on me"
the claim that person expresses may serve to report an event
of occurrent belief,

but it may, just as well, serve to

report an event of wishing, or of wondering.
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I

say

I

am thinking:

how are we going to get our
money back?”

You could respond with any of these
That question is occurring to me, too."
That question is crossing my mind, too."
That question is dawning on me, too."
It seems to me that each of these responses
would be

coherent and that we would both be reporting ourselves to
be

wondering something,

indeed the same thing.

examples suggest that something a person

Analogous

is wishing,

also,

may be said to occur to the person, to dawn on the person,
to be crossing the person’s mind.

There is, then,

a

family of locutions

x

is

thinking

'y

is

occurring to x’,

'y

is

crossing x’s mind’,

'y

is

dawning on

'

y
’

x’

that we employ to express a family of seemingly closely

related relations between persons and thoughts.
that one of the verbs of this family,
a generic reading on which

of breeds--wi shi ngs

alike

— then

,

'x

If we claim

is thinking y’,

has

it applies to events of a variety

wonderings and occurrent believings

we might expect to find such an application
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among other verbs in the family;
this expectation is
conf rmed
i

The preceding considerations
seem to me to afford
substantial grounds for allowing that
there is at least one
reading of the present progressive
of the verb, 'think’, on
which this particular form of the verb
applies broadly to
mental events of a variety of breeds,
events of persons
wishing things and wondering things, as well
as to those of

persons occurrently believing things.

From here on,

I

shall

assume that there is such a reading of progressive
forms of
the verb, 'think’, a "generic" reading,
as
I

In the examples considered so far,

which

I

shall call

it

1

.

the ascriptions for

have claimed that a generic reading is available

have principally been ones in which the complement
position
of the progressive is occupied by a quantifier
phrase;

I

have been considering claims to the effect that a person is

thinking somethi ng

.

It is also fairly clear that the same

reading of the progressive applies to sentences in which,

apparently at least, the complement position of the

progressive is instead occupied by referring terms.
if

I

Thus,

say

I

am thinking:

how are we going to get our
money back?"

you might respond in one of the ways noted above, but you

could also say:
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I

am thinking that, too.

or

Then

I

am thinking the same thing you are.

Again these responses seem to me to
express perfectly
coherent claims, and it would appear that
the word, 'that’,
and the phrase,

'the same thing you are’,

that figure as

complements in these sentences refer to a thing
that you are
thinking, if these responses are true.
If we take the
in these

idioms of reference and quantification

examples at face-value, then we are led to the view

that there is a generic reading available for the present

progressive that is re at ona
1

Chapter

1

(1.1).

I

i

in the sense

specified in

mentioned at the end of the first

chapter that some would resist such

a

proposal.

But the

evidence here that the generic reading of the progressive of
think

is relational

seems to me to be precisely on a par

with the intuitive evidence standardly offered in the case
of any other readings of forms of the verb 'think’,

or,

for

that matter, with such evidence standardly offered in the

case of any other verbs of attitude.
'believe’ for example.

Take the verb,

It is standardly observed that we

often speak of persons believing things, or of several
people believing the same thing, and that we can

meaningfully say such things as that everything a certain
person believes is false, or crazy, or unwarranted, etc.
Then it is noted that such ways of speaking apparently
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involve quantification over a complement
position.
This in
turn is taken as pH ma-facie support
for assuming that there
is genuine objectual quantification
involved in speaking in
these ways, and it is taken as well
to be sufficient

motivation for semantic accounts of how 'believe’
functions
that accord relational readings to the
verb.
It is hard for me to see any motivation,

then,

for

allowing that objectual quantification and genuine
reference
is

involved in all these other cases, while insisting
that

the apparent quantification and reference

j_s

merely apparent

when a generic reading of the progressive of 'think’

is

in

question
In keeping with my starting assumption from the first

chapter,

propose,

I

in the present connection,

that we allow

that a generic reading of the present progressive form of
'think’

available on which this form admits objectual

is

quantification over, and introduction of genuine, referring
terms into a complement position.

This is to grant that

there exists a generic reading of 'is thinking’ that is
relational
It has been noted

(amply) that there is a reading of

the progressive of 'think’ on which an ascription of the

form
(FI)

t

is thinking that 0

,

serves to report an occurrent believing.
also,

It was noted,

that on this particular reading, any instance of (FI)
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and the corresponding instance of
(F2)

1

is

occurrent

1

y

believing that 0

.

will express equivalent things-given
the interpretation for
this latter construction proposed in
the previous chapter.

But if

I

am right that there is a generic reading
on which

ascriptions formed from the present progressive
of 'think’
may apply to events of wishing and wondering,

occurrent believings, then we may expect that

as well

as to

it will

not in

general be the case that an instance of
(FI

)

t

is

interpreted on

thinking t*
a

generic reading, and the correspondi ng

instance of
(F2

)

t

is

occurrently believing t*

will express equivalent things.

(3)

For example,

Jones is occurrently believing something.

implies but is not implied by
(2’)

(2’),

Jones is thinking something.
but not (3), expresses something true relative to any

circumstances in which Jones
wishing something.

is

wondering something, or

Or at least, this is so if a generic

reading is attached to the occurrence of 'is thinking’
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in

(2’).

So understood,

implied, for example,

(2’) expresses a thing that
is
by the claim that there is
something

crossing Jones’ mind, or that
something is occurring to her.
Either claim may be true, whether
Jones is occurrently
believing anything or not.
In order to place certain
features of this concept of

generic thinking into sharper focus,

I

think it may be

worthwhile to consider what other forms
of the verb,
'think’,

besides the present progressive, may exhibit
a

generic reading, and also to consider what
other readings,
apart from any generic ones, are available for
various forms
of the verb.

4

•

2

Tra nsitive and Intransitive Readings
The various forms of the verb,

and intransitive readings.

the relational,

have transitive

One common transitive reading is

generic reading of the present progressive

discussed above.

But intransitive readings are also

commonly called for.
the most natural

'think’,

i

With each of the following remarks,

nterpretati on involves an intransitive

reading of the relevant form of 'think’:
(4a)

We have to be quiet.

(4b)

It is not true that we humans are distinguished
from all other animals by our ability to think.

(4c)

Max thinks for a moment, then he hastens to the
door

(4d)

We had to think fast; the guard was due to arrive.
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Jones is thinking.

In all

these various forms, the verb 'think’
takes an

intransitive reading that appears to be
generic.
Consider
the present progressive as it figures
in the second sentence
of

(4a).

express
is

I

a

think it is plain that this sentence may
well

truth

Jones may be "deep in thought"

engaged in occurring mental events of any of

sorts:

— though
a

she

variety of

she may be wondering things, wishing things,
making

decisions, etc.

displayed in (4b)

Similar remarks hold for the other forms
-

d).

In

(4d) for example,

the claim

expressed by the first sentence could be fairly paraphrased
this way:
it,

we had to do some thinking fast.

As

I

understand

such a claim allows that the thinking required of us

might include some wishing, some wondering, some deciding,
etc.

Then the reading at issue is

a

generic one.

I

have

not been able to find any examples at all suggesting that

there are any intransitive readings of forms of the verb
'think’

apart from such generic ones.

case that there are on
is a

1

y

If

it

is

indeed the

generic intransitive readings, this

somewhat remarkable fact.
It is worth noting too that all

intransitive readings

of forms of the verb 'think’ appear to be event readings.
By an event reading,

very roughly,

I

mean a reading on which

the verb applies to events of thinking, or to states that

have to do with the occurrence of events of thinking.

Some

evidence for the idea that all intransitive readings are
event readings comes from the following observation.
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For

any ascription in which a form of
'think’, say think*,

occurs,

if that

occurrence requires an intransitive reading,

it appears that we may arrive at
a roughly synonymous

ascription by replacing that occurrence of think*
with an
occurrence of a form of 'do some thinking’ where the
form of
the verb 'do’, itself, has the same tense and
inflection
as

think
some

.

The point is that there is activity in question,

doing

at issue,

by a form of

'think’

when we employ the concept expressed

on an intransitive reading.

We have

seen this to be the case just above in connection with (4d);
let us consider (4b).

With the substitution just proposed

we get:

(4b

I

It is not true that we humans are distinguished
from all other animals by our ability to do some
thinking.

)

take it that this is fairly close in meaning to (4b).

here the connection with events is manifest.

And

The ability in

question is one that consists in our being able to engage
a

certain type of activity, that of thinking.

in

Paraphrase

along these lines of (4a) and (4c) also yields sentences

that express claims having in a similar fashion to do with

events of thinking.
(4a) - d),

Moreover,

I

think that these examples,

are fairly representat i ve of constructions in

which forms of the verb 'think’ call for intransitive
readings.

p
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wish to turn now to a question
concerning the
relationship between the intransitive
and transitive
readings of forms of 'think’. With
some verbs, their
transitive and intransitive readings
are logically related
in a way that we shall make
explicit, shortly.
I

For the

moment, consider the verb 'eat’.

In my edition of

Webster’s, a principal transitive sense of
this verb is
claimed to be:
"to take in through the mouth as food".
principal

intransitive sense is:

The

"to take food or a meal".

Now it seems to me that if we are allowed
just a little

leeway in interpreting these entries,

instead of taking the

proposal for the intransitive at its letter, we could accept
its place:

in

as food

If this

.

eat

by

to take in food or a meal through the mouth
is acceptable then the concept expressed

on its principal

intransitive reading is plainly

derived from the transitive reading cited above.
(v.i.)

is just to eat

(v.t.) food or a meal.

To eat

Then we could

expect the following inference to be valid (with superscript
or

i

t
'

to indicate the intended reading,

’

transitive or

intransitive, respectively):

(

I

)

(

5

eating

1

)

x

::

There is something that

i

s

x

is

eating

1"1
.

And indeed on suitable intransitive and transitive readings

this inference does seem an acceptable one.

Of course it is

important to separate the "habitual" intransitive reading

available for (5), from the "occurrent" reading on which
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it

serves to report occurring events of
eating.

The "habitual

reading is the one called for more
evidently by the
f ol lowing
Jones is eating these days; her anorexia
seems
under control
But even in this case there is a correspondi
ng habitual

transitive, manifest for
Jones is eating things these days; her anorexia
seems under control
Let me use a superscript 'h’ to indicate an habitual

reading; then the following seems an acceptable inference:
(II)

x
::

is eat i ng h

’

^

these days.

There are things that

x

is

eating h,t these days

Let us say that an intransitive reading of a given

verb, VP, supports complement quantification for a

transitive reading of VP

if the two readings are

related in

such a way as to warrant the introduction of an existential

quantifier (with singular or plural inflection) as displayed
in

inferences (I) and (II).

Then we may say that there are

at least some intransitive readings available for forms of

the verb 'eat’ that support complement quantification for

certain available transitive readings of those forms.
me add that

I

Let

am not claiming that every intransitive

reading of a verb that supports complement quantification of
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transitive reading is derivative, got from
the transitive
reading of the verb in the manner of
this intransitive
reading of 'eat’

a

Not all verbs that admit both transitive
and

intransitive readings have intransitive readings
that

support complement quantification for any of
their

transitive readings.
Chapter

We considered a case in point in

Whatever exactly the relationship may be between

1.

the intransitive and transitive readings of 'kick’,

it does

not warrant the following inference:
x
::

is kicking

1

There is something that

x

is

kicking 1

.

Timmy may be kicking and screaming as he is dragged from the
TV room to his bedroom, even though there isn’t anything

that he is managing to kick.
Does the intransitive reading of 'think’ support

complement quantification for the generic, relational
reading?

In other words,

attending to the present

progressive, does the following inference hold,

if the

conclusion is understood according to the relational,
generic reading of 'is thinking’ noted above:
(III)

x
::

i

s

th i nki ng

1

There is something that

x

is

thinking 1

.

Perhaps it will be of interest to consider a case of the
sort that inclines me to think that this inference fails.
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Suppose that a connoisseur of antique
furniture,
call

him,

‘'Max",

let us

has been administered a drug which
causes

him to have extremely real-seeming
hallucinations of things
he would like to possess.
He is staying in a hospital room
that in fact has nothing but dull,
institutional

furnishings, but he is having a very vivid
hallucination at
the moment and this hallucination is of
an ornate,

immaculately preserved,

18th-century Chippendale chair

sitting in a corner of the room.
quite empty.
1

Max stares in amazement;

mint-condition,

s a

The corner is,

in fact,

he is thinking:

late 70’s Chippendale.

That

There is

nothing else that is crossing his mind at the moment; he
isn’t engaged in any wondering or wishing, though he might
be soon enough.

Max

s

To put it roughly, the complete text of

thinking at the moment is reported by the ascription

I

made just above:
(6)

I

Max is thinking:
70 ’s Chippendale.

That is a mint-condition,

am inclined to say, concerning such cases,

late

that there

needn’t be anything that Max is occurrently believing.
get an idea why

I

am so inclined,

consider what proposition it

I

invite the reader to

is that Max

occurrently believing in this case.

To

could be said to be

And keep in mind that

there shouldn’t be any ad-hoc variation in which proposition
we claim Max to be occurrently believing,

as we go from this

case of hallucination to veridical cases in which there
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j_s

a

chair that he is looking at, and he’s
actually managing to
think of it that it’s a mint-condition
Chippendale, though
the complete text of what is on Max’s
mind is still reported
by (6).
I
assume such veridical cases are possible.
My

inclination is to say that,
cases,

in

contrast to such veridical

in the case of hallucination,

there needn’t be any

proposition that Max is occurrently believing.
Isn’t he believing the proposition that there is

a

chair before him, or the proposition that furniture
exists?
I

grant that in such cases,

bel

i

it is most likely that he does

eve that there is a chair before him, and that furniture

exists.

But

I

would be inclined to deny that it follows,

simply from the description of the case as it stands, that

— that there is
exists — are ones that

either of these propositions

a chair

him or that furniture

he is

o ccurren tly believing

chad

r

.

What about the proposition that that

is a mint-condition,

late 70’s Chippendale?

at least occurrently believing

i

?

One concerning some

chair of which Max is having an hallucination?

But in the

description of the case, the corner of the room he
attending to is in fact quite bare.

Then

I

At any rate,

if

is

would claim that

there’s no proposition about any such

for Max to occurrently believe.

Isn’t Max

But which proposition

are we supposed to be picking out here?

in this case,

before

a

chair

O

there are cases meeting the above

description in which there isn’t any proposition that Max
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is

occurrently believing, then he isn’t
occurrently believing
anything.
And if this is the case— if he isn’t
occurrently
believing anyth i ng— then he surely isn’t
thinking
anything.

After all, according to the description
of the case, he
isn’t wondering anything, or wishing any
th i ng

.

.

.

he is

thinking something in this situation only if
he is

occurrently believing something, and in this
situation, that
condition isn’t met; or so I’m inclined to say.
Nevertheless, Max is thinking.

He is engaging in some

mental activity properly reported by (6), and the activity
in

question seems to me just as clear

a case of

thinking as

any other mental activity in which one could be engaged.

If

this is right, then there are circumstances with respect to

which Max satisfies the premise of (III) (for 'x’), but with
respect to which he does not satisfy the conclusion of
(III).

So,

I

am inclined to think that (III)

is not valid,

and consequently that the intransitive readings available

for a given form of the present progressive of 'think’ do
not support complement quantification for any available

transitive readings.

But

I

haven’t intended here to give

the reader much grounds to share this inclination;

I

propose

to leave it as an open question whether the intransitive

reading of the present progressive supports complement

quantification for any transitive readings that may be
available for this form of the verb. 4
In Chapter

1,

I

proposed to use the gerund 'thinking’

as a common noun to stand for events of thinking,
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"instances

Of activity involving particular
persons doing some

thinking".
question,

If,

in this

characterization of the activity in

'persons doing some thinking’

understood to

is

mean the same thing as 'persons thinking’
on the
intransitive reading of the verb— this
is how

to be understood in common parlance—
then

abide by my stipulation.

what

I

I

I

think it is

can continue to

And it is worth noting that if

have said in this section concerning the
intransitive

reading is correct, then events of occurrent
believing,

wondering and wishing alike may be counted as examples
of
what I am referring to as "thinkings".

^

^

Readings Available for

Pi spl

aved-sentence Ascriptions

Let me use the phrase

di spl

ayed-sentence ascription"

for any sentence of the form

(

F3

t

)

...think...:

where substituends for

't*

0
are referring terms,

substituends

for '...think...’ are suitably inflected forms of the verb
'think’

and where substituends of 0 are sentences (of any

mood).

It is worth noting that a variety of forms of

'think’ may figure in such ascriptions.

noted

d

i

We have already

spl ayed-sentence ascriptions formed with the present

progressive; but the main verb may be

other tense as well.
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a

progressive of any

The simple present can figure
in such ascriptions, too,
though as far as I have been able
to discern, a certain
usage— the so-called " report! ve"
usage— is required. This
reportive usage is one on which the
simple present tense of
an event verb serves to describe
a situation, whether
present, past, future, or even
hypothetical or fictional, as
if

it were

unfolding before the describer’s very
eyes— in

the manner of a sports-caster
describing the unfolding

events of, say,
mound.
pi tch.

a baseball

He winds up.
.

.Wi Ison

game:

“McElroy returns to the

Wilson raises his bat.

swings; he connects ... i t

The

a hard

’

line-drive

to center field...", etc.
In a similar fashion,

we could describe a scene by

say i ng

Ernie stops in his tracks.
He thinks:
How am I going
to get out of here? Suddenly he begins to retrace
his
steps
The second sentence in this passage
He thinks:

is an

How am

I

going to get out of here?

instance of (F3) formed with the simple present.

don’t see that there is any way to interpret such

a

I

sentence

without understanding it on the reportive usage.
It also seems to me that,

in general,

these displayed-

sentence ascriptions require generic readings for whatever
forms of the verb 'think’ they contain.

appropriate substituends for

*t’
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If we fix

and '...think...’

in

(F3),

say t* and think*, we will have the
schema
[

t* think*

0]

:

It seems to me that think* will

be univocal

across all

instances of this schema, and yet these
instances serve to
report events of wondering, wishing and
occurrent believing
alike (or to report the past or future occurrences
of events
of these various sorts,

depending on the tense of think*).

The sort of event reported will vary depending on
what

sentence is the substituend for'0'
but there is,

I

instance at hand,

would claim, no correspondi ng variance in

the reading of think
i

in the

.

Consequently, a generic reading is

nvol ved

But which generic reading?
to a relational,

In section 4.1,

I

attended

and hence transitive generic reading,

in the previous subsection,

but

we noted that that there are

intransitive as well as transitive generic readings

available for various forms of 'think’.
of these is involved in our

sentence ascriptions?

i

Is

it plain which

nterpretat on of displayedi

Let us consider this matter,

briefly.

Perhaps a plausible initial perspective would be the
following.

In our

i

nterpretati on of any given displayed-

sentence ascription, the substituend of '...think...’ calls
for a relational,

generic reading, one on which the verb

expresses a relation, call it "R".

Further, the displayed

sentence--the substituend for '0’— serves as
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a

referring

term in such ascriptions, designating
a certain thought, x.
(One would presumably want to say
that the reference of a
given substituend for 0' may vary with
context of
'

utterance; we may set this point aside
for the present.)
Then, as this view would have it, if
the given instance of
(

F3

)

expresses a truth, the thing expressed is true
because

the referent of the substituend of 't’

bears R to

x.

Let us confine our attention to instances of
(F3)

formed with the present progressive.
those

I

shall make in what follows would hold concerning

displayed-sentence ascriptions
think

Points analogous to

figures as main verb.

in which some other form of

Now,

in fact,

in the case of

any of a large number of present progressive displayed-

sentence ascriptions,
truth,

if

a given

ascription expresses

a

the subject of the ascription may properly be said to

be thinking something that is indicated in some fashion by

the displayed sentence.

expresses

a

If the following,

for example,

truth

Ernie is thinking;
here?
we would say,

I

the displayed

i

How am

I

going to get out of

think, that there is a thing indicated by

nter rogat i ve

,

and this thing is something

that is crossing Ernie’s mind or occurring to him;

something Ernie is thinking.

it

is

And in this latter claim--that

this thing is something Ernie is thi nki ng--the relational

reading of 'is thinking’

is surely
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involved.

Such observations may be thought
to lend credence to
the general view of displayed-sentence
ascriptions cited
just above, that a relational reading
of the contained form
of 'think’ is called for, and
that the displayed sentence
serves as a device of reference, and
denotes, if the

ascription expresses

a truth,

an item in the modal

range of

the relation expressed by the relevant
form of 'think’ on
its relational

reading.

However,

I

am inclined to think

that this view is mistaken and my reasons
for thinking so
are connected to considerations canvassed
in the preceding

section
Let me continue to attend to the case of displayed-

sentence ascriptions formed from the present progressive
(3rd person singular).

I

am inclined to believe that such

an ascription,

[t

for suitable t

is thinking:

0]

and sentence,

0,

may be true and the

following true as well:
[There isn’t anything that t* is thinking.]

Recall the case of the hallucinating antique collector

discussed before.

Such cases suggest that the view outlined

just above is incorrect.

For

I

suggested, with respect to

the case described, that the sentence:

(6)

Max is thinking:
70 ’s Chippendale.

that is a mint-condition,
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late

expresses something true in the
situation, while the
sentence
(8)

There is something that Max is
thinking,

does not.

Then

I

am inclined to say that (6) and

There isn’t anything that Max is thinking.

express things that may be true with respect
to the same
situation.
And I take it that if this is the
case then,

contrary to the view under consideration,

(6)

may express

something true even though there isn’t anything to
which Max
(9)
bears the relation expressed by the progressive,
on its

relational, generic reading.
Let me stress that although

I

am inclined to think that

(6) expresses something compatible with what is expressed by
,

I

am not claiming that this has been established;

have left it an open question.

these considerations to settle

question of whether (6) has an

Consequently,

— in
i

I

the negative

I

do not take

— the

nterpretati on involving a

relational, generic reading.
However,
i

if

it

is not the case that

nterpretat on involving
i

a

relational

(6)

has an

reading of 'is

thinking’, and we retain my suggestion above that the

reading of 'is thinking’ will be univocal throughout
di spl

ayed-sentence ascriptions

in

progressive is the main verb, then
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which the present
in general

the reading

available for such an ascription
will not be a relational
one.
And I think a similar conclusion
would be sug 9 ested
concerning readings of other forms of
'think’ figuring as
main verbs in di spl ayed-sentence
ascriptions, such as the
simple present figuring in (7).
Perhaps a natural view to adopt in
response to these
considerations is that a given di spl ayed-sentence
ascription
should be understood to take the intransitive
reading of its
main verb.
The displayed sentence itself, then, could
be
viewed not as a referring phrase denoting something
thought,
but rather as an adverbial modifier, its function

assimilated to that of the prepositional phrase,
concentration’, or the adverb,

'fast’,

'with great

in such ascriptions

as

Max is thinking with great concentration

Ernie thinks fast
On this view, we take the occurrence of the present

progressive and the simple present figuring in (6) and (7),
respectively, to have their intransitive readings, and we
take the displayed sentence in either case to indicate, not

something the subject is thinking, but rather
manner in which he is thinking.

a

way or

Whether this is the correct

view to take concerning the reading of the form of 'think’

contained in a

d

i

spl ayed-sentence ascription,

and whether

this is the correct view concerning the semantic function of
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the displayed-sentence itself,
are questions that
as yet able to answer.

~ adlnqs

4 4
‘

I

am not

Avail abl e for In di c a tive-Clause
Ascri nt.innc

Let me use the phrase "indicative-clause
ascription" to
stand for any ascriptions of the form:

(

F4

t

)

...think... that 0

where substituends for

are referring terms, substituends

't’

for '...think...’ are suitably inflected
forms of the verb
'think’

and where substituends for

sentences.

*

0

'

are indicative

What reading of the contained form of 'think’

is

available or called for in such ascriptions?
The Belief-Relational Account

4 *4.1

One might well suppose that with indicative-clause

ascriptions, we have the clearest case where forms of the
verb,

'think’,

take doxastic readings.

et the outset of section 4.1,

The idea, alluded to

is that there

is a

reading of

these forms on which they either express occurrent belief or
else the non-occurrent attitude of belief, and that

instances of (F4) require

i

nterpretati ons that involve this

doxastic,

relational reading of progressive forms of

'think’.

This proposal would account for the fact noted in

the preceding chapter that instances of (FI) have an
i

nterpretat on on which they serve solely to report
i

occurrent believings, for it is just this
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i

nterpretat on
i

,

so

the idea goes, that involves
a reading of the progressive
forms of 'think’ on which these
forms express occurrent
belief.
Let me try to convey this idea
somewhat more fully.
We may distinguish two types
of reading available for
forms of the verb, 'think’:
event readings and state

readings.

The first type has already been
cited in our

discussion of intransitive readings—
event readings are ones
on which the verb applies to events
of thinking
or to states

having essentially to do with the occurrence
of such events.
(Habitual readings are examples of the latter
sort;

instance,

for

"Jones thinks strange things these days" is

ambiguous; one

i

nterpretat on of the sentence involves
i

a

state reading, but another available interpretation
involves
an habitual

reading on which the claim expressed is more or

less this:

it tends to be these days that the things Jones

is thinking,

when she is thinking things, are strange.

With

this paraphrase, the concern with events thinking on Jones’
part is manifest.)

State readings, by contrast, are ones on

which a given form of 'think’ applies to states, but not

states that essentially concern the occurrence of any events
of thinking;
in

on these readings forms of the verb are close

meaning to cor respond ng forms of 'believe’.
i

As far as

I

have been able to tell,

readings of either

type are available for any form of 'think’, as it figures in

instances of (F4), and as well

in

other constructions.

the simple present, the most likely
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i

nterpretat on of an
i

With

instance of
(10)

(

F4

)

is one that

involves

a

state reading.

Thus

William thinks that Sarah will not say
"Yes."

would normally be taken to report

a

belief that William has.

But an event reading is available if
we take the sentence on
a report l ve usage.
This i nterpretat i on can be elicited by

features of the surrounding discourse.

So for example,

in

William looks up Sarah’s phone number. He picks up
the
phone, and begins to dial.
Suddenly, William thinks
that Sarah will not say "Yes."
He hesitates; puts the
phone down resignedly, and begins to pace again.
Here,

the occurrence of (10) calls for an interpretation

involving an event reading of the simple present.
likely

i

The most

nterpretat on is not (merely) that William believes
i

that Sarah will not say

Yes.

thought that this is so.

but that he suddenly has the

5

Progressive forms in indicative-clause ascriptions may
also take either event or state readings.

concerned ourselves with

i

So far we have

nterpretat ons of such ascriptions
i

on which they serve to report events.

By contrast,

cons der
i

(11)

His testimony has been so persuasive that those
close to the case are thinking that the .jury will
acquit him
.

Here,

the most likely

i

nterpretat on of the underlined
i

clause is one on which the claim expressed does not entail
that those close to the case are engaged in events of
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thinking at the moment; on the most
natural interpretation
of this clause, the claim expressed
could be true even if
(11) were uttered in the middle of
the
night, and all

concerned were sleeping a deep and
dreamless sleep.
on this interpretation, the clause
serves

Rather,

to report a state

of mind of those close to the case:
all

that these people are

of a mind" that the person in question
will

be

acquitted
This state reading for the progressive can be
rendered

unlikely

if we

change the sentential context.

If the

subject phrase is singular, and the indicative-clause

ascription at issue is standing alone, it is very difficult
to get an interpretation on which the ascription
reports a

state of belief rather than an event of occurrent believing:
(

12

The defendant is thinking that the jury will

)

acquit him.
This is not to say that the only
for (12)

is one

i

nterpretat on available
i

involving an event reading of 'is thinking’,

only that an interpretation on which (12) serves to report

a

state of belief is far less likely here than it is for (11).
I

should emphasize that by "event reading",

I

do not

mean solely readings that may be said to apply to presently

occurring events.

An event reading is likely for the past

progressive figuring here:
The defendant was thinking that the jury would
acquit him.
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though there is a sense in which one
might say that this
ascription serves to report a state: on
one likely

interpretation at least,

it could be said to report the

defendant’s being such that at some time in
the past he was
thinking that the jury would acquit him.
I assume that
there is such a state.
Still, this state
is one that the

defendant is in now (assuming the ascription
expresses
truth),

a

in virtue of the past occurrence of an
event of

thinking, and the above ascription serves as well
to report
that event.

thinking’

Accordingly,

I

would count the reading of 'was

involved as an event reading.

Similarly, the main

clause underlined here,
The moment court is adjourned, the defendant will
b e thinking that the jury will acquit him
.

on one natural

reporting

i

nterpretat on
i

,

could be described as

present state of the defendant, but it is a

a

state that the defendant is in,

in

occurrence of an event of thinking.

virtue of a future
The reading of the

future progressive involved here is again an event reading.
Now the idea proposed above concerning the
i

nterpretat on of indicative-clause ascriptions can be
i

expressed more fully.

For simplicity,

let me restrict

attention here to such ascriptions in which the simple
present or the present progressive is the main verb;
call

these "present-tense ascriptions":
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I

shall

—Be
i

i

ef Relational Account.

In any present-tense ascription,
one or the other of two readings* the main verb takes
a state reading and
an event reading;

)

ii)
i

1 i

i

both readings are relational, and
)

the main verb expresses belief on
the state read ng
occurrent belief, on the event read
i

i

ng

Belief and occurrent belief are
counterparts in the

sense discussed in Chapter

There, we noted that some

3.

verbs of attitude are such that their
progressive forms, on
event readings, express occurrent counterparts
(the

principal occurrent counterparts) of the attitudes

expressed, on state readings, by the simple present forms
of
those verbs.

Wish’

considered then.

and 'wonder’ were the cases we

From the standpoint of the Belief-

Relational account, the verb 'think’

is

another example.

On

the event and state reading involved in the most likely

interpretations of, say

William is thinking that Sarah will not say "Yes."

William thinks that Sarah will not say "Yes."
(respectively), the present progressive expresses the
principal counterpart of the attitude expressed by the

simple present form.

In this regard,

the Belief-Relational

account sees the verbs in the preceding two instances of
(F4) as related in their behavior in these contexts in a way

quite analogous to the way
of the verb 'wonder’

in

which the corresponding forms

are related as these figure in pair
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William is wondering whether Sarah will
say "Yes."
William wonders whether Sarah will say
"Yes."

On first pass at least, this view on
the relation between

event and state readings of the present
progressive and
simple present (respectively) of the verb 'think’
may seem
quite plausible.
4

’

4

*

Reservations Con cerning the Belief-Relational Account

2

-

Despite its initial plausibility, there are two

considerations that lead me to doubt the Belief-Relational
account; though

do not say it is plainly mistaken.

I

two considerations may in fact be closely connected.

canvass them first;
the way in which

I

in the next subsection,

I

The
Let me

shall suggest

suspect they may be connected.

The first

point can be put very briefly; the second consideration is
more telling,
1)

I

think,

If there

but requires a lengthier exposition.

is an event

reading that expresses

occurrent belief, as proposed by this account, it seems odd
that it should appear, as

I

noted in 4.2, that all

intransitive readings available for forms of the verb,
'think’

are gener i

.

If the Belief-Relational

account were

right, one might expect there to be an intransitive reading

more closely connected to the purported relational event
reading on which the present tense forms of the verb are

supposed to express occurrent belief.
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There is what seems to me a somewhat
striking fact
about certain sentences obtained from
indicative-clause
ascriptions by removing their main indicative
clauses, and
either binding the complement position
with quantifiers or
introducing expressions of other sorts as
complements; the
fact in question is not very easily
accommodated by the
2)

Belief-Relational account.
Let me attend first to cases where we begin
with an

indicative-clause ascription, and extract its main
indicative clause, binding the complement position of
the
main verb by a preceding quantifier.

And for simplicity,

let me confine my attention to ascriptions formed
with the

present progressive.

A

representat ve example of the sort
i

of operation in question is displayed in going from
(12) to
(

12a)

(12)

The defendant is thinking that the jury will acquit
him.

(12a)

There is something the defendant is thinking.

What is striking is this:

in general,

it appears that the

only event reading available for the main occurrence of the

progressive in the resulting ascription will be
reading.

In the case of

(12)/(12a),

a gener

i

it seems to me that the

latter ascription may be so interpreted that it serves to

report an event of wishing or wondering, as well as an event
of occurrent believing.

If the defendant is wondering at

the moment whether the judge will give him a light sentence,
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or if he is wishing that the
judge would do so or
occur rent 1 y believing that the
judge will do so, however the
case may be, it seems to me that
such mental activity is
,

properly reported by (12a).

And as long as an event reading

for the progressive in (12a) is
fixed, so that our

interpretation of the ascription is one
on which it serves
to report some ongoing mental
activity

(it is hard to get a

state of mind" interpretation in this
case anyway; cf. the
interpretation of (11) noted above), I cannot
detect any
such interpretation on which this sentence
serves to report
exclusively occurrent believings. The only
available
i

nterpretati on seems to be this one on which the
sentence

serves to report occurrent believings, wishings
and

wonderings alike.

Then

I

main verb involved in this

take it that the reading of the
i

nterpretat on is the generic
i

read i ng

This is striking because the introduction of an

existential quantifier would seem to be entirely innocuous;
its introduction in (12a),

binding the complement position

formerly occupied by an indicative clause, ought not

eliminate a relational reading available for 'is thinking’
as it occurs in (12).

We would seem to have a

strai ghtforward case of existential general i zati on-- i ndeed

what is expressed by (12) does entail what is expressed by

(12a)--yet the only event reading available for 'is
thinking’

in

(12a),

it seems to me,
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is a generic one.

We find a similar absence of
the alleged occurrent

belief reading when the complement
position of (12) is
altered in other, seemingly innocuous
ways.
Rather than
bind the complement position by
an antecedent quantifier, we
may instead replace the indicative
clause with a wide
variety of suitable complement
phrases— demonstrati ves

quantifier noun phrases, definite or
indefinite
descriptions.

obtain

a

an event,

By and

large,

the result is the same:

we

sentence such that if it is interpreted to
report
that

i

nterpretat on would seem to require a
i

generic reading of 'is thinking’.

6

Consider the following:
(12b)

The defendant is thinking something strange.

(12c)

The defendant is thinking the same thing you are.

Either of these,

it seems to me,

may be so interpreted that

it serves to report an event of wishing or wondering as
well

as an event of occurrent believing.

If the defendant

wondering at the moment how he’s ever going to find

is

a

certain pair of polka-dot swimming trunks when he’s in jail,
and the man knows he is about to be sentenced to death for

murder

,

I

think we may properly report his current mental

activity by issuing (12b).

Perhaps you don’t agree that

this would be a strange thing for the defendant to be
thinking; but that doesn’t affect the central point, namely,

that the question on his mind, what’s occurring to him at
the moment,

_i_s

a thing for him to be thinking,
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whether its

a

strange thing for him to be thinking or
not.
And if at this
very moment the defendant is wishing
that the judge would
give him a light sentence, and that is
what I am wishing at
the moment too, then it would be appropriate
for you to

utter (12c), addressing me.

described,

Under the circumstances

it seems to me that this sentence serves
to

report, correctly, the mental activity in which
this

defendant and

I

are engaged, though it is not fully specific

as regards what sort of mental

Moreover

,

activity we’re engaged

if we attend just to

in.

interpretations of these

sentences on which they serve to report events,

I

do not see

that anything but a generic reading is available for the

contained occurrences of 'is thinking’.

For it seems to me

that if we interpret (12b) and (12c) to be reporting

occurring events at all (as opposed to states of belief, as
in the case of

will

(11) considered above),

our

i

nterpretat on
i

not be one on which these sentences serve exclusively

to report events of occurrent believing.

Then

I

take it

that a reading of the verb on which it expresses occurrent

belief is not involved in this interpretation.
Yet in either case, the replacement of the indicative

clause in (12) by the relevant complement seems innocuous:
it

is hard to see why such

replacement should result in a

shift in the reading required of 'is thinking’, if the
reading involved in (12) is itself a relational reading, as
the Belief-Relational account suggests.
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Perhaps

for contrast,

it will

be worthwhile to

consider some examples involving
other verbs where
modification of flanking positions
can be expected to result
in a shift in available
readings.
There are certainly cases
Where substitution of one
noun phrase for another in the
subject or complement position
of the main verb of a
sentence affects what interpretations
are available for the
resulting sentence.
I have been able to
think of three
general cases where this phenomenon
might be expected to
arise:

Id ioms

Some clear examples of this phenomenon
are cases
where the main verbs figure in idioms.
There are
1)

i

nterpretat ons available for sentences of
the form
i

t

in

bought t*

which 'the farm’

is the

substituend for

t*
*

available for other instances of this form.
(13a)

Maggie bought the farm.

(13b)

Maggie bought that red dress.

’

that are not

Consider

Here the substitution of the complement 'that red dress’
for
the farm

is not

innocuous since the resulting sentence no

longer contains the idiomatic expression 'bought the farm’.
The idiom functions as an independent lexical
not interpreted by way of any relational
'bought’.

On the other hand,

item,

reading of the verb

(13a) does admit an
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and is

nterpretation that involves a relational
reading of
'bought'; perhaps Maggie bought
a dairy farm

i

in Minnesota.

But this is the very reading
still aval lable-and presumably

most likely— for the occurrence of
'bought’ in (13b).
2)

Grammatical Agreement

Hebrew provides another class of

cases where substitution in a flanking
position of the main
verb may be expected to affect what
interpretations are

available for the resulting sentence.

There are certain

nouns in Hebrew that, when occurring as
subject terms of
verbs, require agreement in gender with
those verbs.
For
example, there is a verb that means 'to float’
whose

feminine simple present inflection,

'tsafa’, has the same

spelling as the masculine simple past inflection of
that means 'to observe’

different,

a

verb

(the pronunciation involved is

I’ve been told).

Then sentences in which 'tsafa’

occurs as main verb may lack an

i

nterpretati on on which they

report present floatings, or they may lack an
on which they report past observings,

i

nterpretati on

depending on whether

the subject term requires the masculine or feminine

inflection.

7

If we substitute the feminine

masculine 'mashkif’
(14a)

'sirah’

in

Hamashkif tsafa

(The observer observed),

Hasirah tsafa

(The ship floats).

obtai ni ng
(14b)

for the
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we are forced to shift our
reading of the main verb,

Thus

substitution of a noun phrase of
feminine gender for
'mashki

in

(,4a) is not innocuous.

In this case the shift

in available reading is due
to a lexical

subst tuend
l

,

feature of the

and the grammatical rule of
Hebrew requiring

gender agreement in this case
between subject and verb. 8
3)

S emantic Constraints

We can find cases in English,

I

believe, where substitution of one
expression for another in
the complement position requires a
shift in readings of the
main verb, and the shift is forced by
a semantical feature
of the substi tuend
I am inclined to think
that the reading
involved when we may correctly say that
someone believes a
.

£grson is

d_ f ferent
i

from the reading on which 'believes’

expresses the intentional attitude of belief.

I

assume that

the latter is involved in
(15a)

Jones believes that the defendant will be
acqu tted
i

So when we proceed from (15a) to
(15b)

a

Jones believes him

shift in how we read 'believes’ seems required.

Then

replacement of the indicative clause in the first ascription
by the personal

pronoun,

'him’, would not be innocuous;

this case a semantic feature of the substituend

— that

in

it is

restricted in its denotation to things that are male--would
force the shift in readings.^
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I

that

I

can think of one other sort
of example from English
think falls under the present
class of cases, where

semantic constraints determine
available readings. Many
event verbs have transitive readings
on which they express
relations between the subjects of the
events to which they
apply, and things that are not
constituents of those events.
An example of the sort of reading
I have
in
mind is

available for the verb 'hit’.

One transitive reading,

plainly a relational reading, of this verb
is one on which
it expresses a relation between things
that can be subjects
of events of hittings and things that can
be objects of such

events--physi cal objects.
reading of the verb.

I

Let me call this the "corporal"

believe there is another transitive

reading however that is operant when we speak of someone

hitting

a

home run.

I

take it that 'home run’ applies to

particular events in baseball games.

I

am not quite

confident that this is the proper classification.
rate,

At any

whatever sort of thing home runs may be, they are not

the sort of thing one can be said to hit in the corporal
sense,

they are not physical objects, they are not spatially

extended (though presumably, like events of many sorts, they
may be said, at least roughly speaking, to have a spatial

location.)

Then since what we say when we speak of people

hitting home runs is often true, there must be some other
sense,

besides the corporal one,

said to hit things.
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in which persons may be

It might be suggested
that talk of hitting home
runs is

idiomatic.

think this is not very
plausible, for a couple
easons.
First, we may bind the
complement position with
quantifiers, and the usage is
not tongue in cheek.
Plainly
we may speak of a person
hitting several home runs in
a
given game; we may say that
there were some that he hit in
the second inning, but that
most were hit in the third.
We
can say that he hit something
in the ninth but we can’t
remember what (was it a home run,
a ground-rule double?)
All this strikes me as normal
usage.
By contrast, if I say
I

C

y

0

bought'^t ?wo dly s ag o

r

rm

^

bOU9ht

and intend by this that Maggie died
(two days ago),

engaging in

a

Und

I

She

am

play on words; the usage is not standard.

Second, there is a class of complements
that are

intersubstitutible, sal va
a

i

nterpretati one

We may speak of

person hitting a line drive, a ground-rule
double, etc.

There seems to be something that the verb 'hit’
commonly

means as it figures in any such ascription.
me to suggest that a genuine relational

This seems to

reading is available

for the verb in these ascriptions, and that the usage
is not
i

d

i

omat

i

c

If this

is

right then we have

a

fairly clear case where

altering the complement will affect the readings available
for the verb:
it figures

a corporal

reading is available for 'hit’ as

in

1

1

1

(16a)

Babe Ruth hit it.

but not in
(16b)

Babe Ruth hit the last home
run of his career.

Thus the substitution of 'the
last home run of his career’
’

n

*

16a

(

i

s

not innocuous.

I

assume that the shift

in

interpretation here is due to a semantic
constraint tying
the readings available for 'hit’
in these occurrences to the
meanings of terms occupying its
complement position.
To sum up,

I

have considered three sorts of cases
where

the substitution of one term for
another in complement

position (or the introduction of a quantifier
binding that
position) may not be an innocuous operation:
cases
involving idioms, cases in which there is
grammatical

agreement between verb and complement, and cases
involving
semantic constraints.

If a verb and complement term figure

together as part of an idiom, then it seems likely that
no

substitution for the complement will be innocuous:

substitution we lose the idiom.

with any

But in some cases involving

grammatical agreement and semantic constraints, we can

anticipate that the substitution of certain terms into the
relevant positions will be innocuous, no matter the prior

occupant
There are dual-gender nouns in Hebrew that can

accompany verbs with masculine as well as feminine

1

1

2

inflection.

'shemesh

1

(Sun)

is an example.

Substituting

this term for either 'mashkif
or ’sirah’ in (14a) or b)
above does not eliminate the
reading originally available
for the main verb
(But see note
8).

(14c)

Thus,

Hashemesh tsafa.

is ambiguous;

the sentence may be interpreted
to mean either

that the sun observed, or that
the sun floats.
In the case of

'believes’, we can replace the

complement of either (15a) or

b)

by the pronoun,

'it’,

and

clearly not rule out the reading called
for in the original.
If Jones has been consulting an
oracle, the following may

express
(15c)

a truth,

Jones believes it

with 'it’ denoting the oracle and 'believes’ taking
the

reading it has in (15b).

On the other hand,

if Jones has

just heard that oracles are generally unreliable, again,
(15c) may express a truth,

this time with 'it’ denoting the

thing that Jones has just heard about the reliability of
oracles, and 'believes’ taking its
reading.

Thus,

i

ntent i onal -att tude
i

'believes’, as it figures in (15c), has

either reading available.

Substitution of 'it’ for either

the personal pronoun in (15b) or the indicative clause in
(15a)

is

innocuous:

it doesn’t rule out any reading

available for the sentence prior to substitution.

1

1

3

The same

point holds concerning the
substitution of 'it' for 'the
last home run of his career’
in

(16b).

Introduction of quantifiers may
or may not be
innocuous.
Binding the complement position
of ‘believes’
(15a) with the antecedent
quantifier

in

'There is someone' may

not be innocuous.

It is at least not clear to
me that the

intentional attitude reading is
available for 'believes' as
it occurs in

(

1

5d

)

There is someone Jones believes

(but see reservations concerning
(15b) expressed in Note

9 ).

Binding the complement position of ‘hit’
by the quantifier,
'There was a home run’, won’t be
innocuous.
The occurrence
of

’hit’

(16c)

in

There was a home run Ruth hit in 1922 that no
one
forget.

will

cannot take the corporal reading.
On the other hand,

introducing the quantifier 'There is

something’ to bind the complement position, either
in the

case of 'believe’ or 'hit’, seems pretty clearly innocuous.
(16d)

There was something Ruth hit in the third inning.

is ambiguous.

The corporal

reading is possible, but

the "home run" reading is more likely.
hit,

(15e)

or a double,

There is something Jones believes.
14

think

Was it a home run he

or was it that sacrifice fly?

1

I

is ambiguous too.

The thing in question satisfying

Jones believes

x

may be either the oracle Jones has
been consulting, or
rather the thing that Jones heard
about the reliability of
oracles, depending on which reading of
'believe’ is at
i

ssue
Now let’s return to the matter of readings
available

for

is

c).

I

I

thinking’, as that verb figures in (12) and
(12a)

-

shall confine my attention to the case of
(12)/(l2a).

can see no reason to suppose that introduction
of the

quantifier,

'there is something’,

position should,

in this case,

binding the complement

rule out readings available

for the main verb, when the introduction of this quantifier
in the case of

Moreover,
a

it

(15e) and

(

1

6d

)

has no such effect.

is hard to see what reason could be offered by

proponent of the Belief-Relational account.

itself proposes a relational

involved in the relevant

i

That account

reading of the verb as the one

nterpretat i on of (12); this would

seem to rule out the possibility that the shift in
i

nterpretat on arises because the verb
i

part of an idiomatic expression.
of (14a) and b),

In

is

figuring there as

contrast with the case

there are no apparent syntactic constraints

that could be expected to require a shift in readings in

going from (12) to (12a).

And presumably,

in

contrast with

the case of (15d) or
(16c), there are no semantic

restrictions accompanying the
introduction of the quantifier
that could call for a shift
in readings.
It seems to me
that if there were a relational
reading involved
in our

interpretation of

(

12

)

on which the progressive
expressed

occurrent belief, we ought to
expect there to be some such
reading discernible for (12a),
a reading on which we could

expect (12a) to assert, in effect,
that there is something
Jones occurrently believes.
Yet no such reading seems
avai lable.

Let me summarize the present line
of argument against

the Belief-Relational account by
formulating it with

explicit premises and conclusion.
An_

Here is an argument:

Argument Agains t the Belief-Relational Arm. mii

If the Belief-Relational account is
correct, then
any event read i ng avai 1 abl e for 'is thinking’
in
(12) is one on which it expresses occurrent

)

bel ief
ii)

i

i

i

There is an event reading available for the
occurrence of 'is thinking’ in (12)
The event readings avai lable for the occurrence of
'is thinking’ in (12a) are precisely the event
readings available for the verb as it occurs in
(12).

iv)

There is no event reading available for the
occurrence of 'is thinking’ in (12a) on which it
expresses occurrent belief.

::

v)

There is an event reading for 'is thinking’ as it
occurs in (12) on which it doesn’t express
occurrent belief

::

vi)

The Belief-Relational account is incorrect.

I

am not sure that this argument
is successful.

and ii) are clearly true.

because

I

think

i)

am inclined to accept iv)

I

cannot myself detect any occurrent
belief reading
for (12a).
Yet I am not certain about this.
I am inclined
to accept ni)
that the introduction of the quantifier
in
I

—

(12a) does not affect available readi
ngs--but again

certain of this.

I

am not

Nevertheless, these considerations seem to

me to provide at least some reason
to question whether the

Belief-Relational account of indicative-clause ascriptions
is correct.

It may be that both sets of considerations
against the

Belief-Relational account canvassed in this subsect
point about intransitive readings that
at the start,

I

i

on— the

mentioned briefly

and the present point about lack of any but

generic event readings available for (12a)

-

c)

— are

consequences of the same general feature of event readings
of the verb

'think’.

In the following subsection,

I

shall

discuss this possibility.
4.4.3

A

Conjecture Concerning Event Readings

If we

find that

look beyond indicative-clause ascriptions, we
i

nterpretat ons
i

i

nvol vi ng event readings of

various forms of the verb 'think’ are often called for.

Contrast the following two sentences containing the simple
present form:

1

1

7

(17a)

Jones thinks some strange things
on occasion.
Jones thinks some strange things
at present.

(17b)

My impression is that one
natural

interpretation of (I7 a

involves an event reading of 'thinks’.

)

On this

interpretation, the sentence (if it
expresses

truth)

a

reports a fact about thinkings to which
Jones is

occasionally subject; we are saying, more
or less, that
Jones engages from time to time in some
events of
thinking and the things she is thinking at
those times are
strange.
I
think it is plain that this event reading is
generic.

(17a),

so understood, will express a truth if

Jones occasionally occurrently believes strange things,
but
it will
it has

express

a

truth as well, on this

i

nterpretat on
i

,

if

occasionally been the case that Jones is wondering

strange things, or wishing strange things.
With (17b), by contrast, such an event reading is

difficult.

The most natural

i

nterpretat on of this sentence
i

seems to be one on which what is expressed amounts more or
less to:
as

I

Jones has some strange beliefs at present.

can tell, the only way to get a reading for the verb as

it figures

in

(17b) on which the sentence would report

something about events of thinking,

in the

manner of (17a),

is to take the sentence on a reportive usage.
i

As far

nterpretat on is somewhat hard to get

think,

i

But such an

in this case,

I

because of 'at present’; we don’t commonly apply this

adverb to the simple present on the reportive usage.

This difference between (17a)
and b) suggests a general
distinction between those cases where
forms of
'think’

actually take readings on which they
express belief, and
cases where a generic reading is
called for.
One might
conjecture
Event readings of forms of the verb
'think’ are
precisely the generic readings.
If this conjecture

is

right,

it not only accounts for the

intuitive difference noted just now between
interpretations
of

(17a) and b),

but also explains both sets of

considerations advanced above against the Belief-Relational
account

1

)

If

(T

)

is

right, we would have a simple

explanation for the apparent feature of intransitive
readings noted in section 4.2, that all such readings are
generic.

For as we observed there, all

intransitive

readings are event readings.
2)

If

(T

)

is

right,

and if

i

nterpretati ons of

indicative-clause ascriptions involve event readings of

progressive forms of the verb,
will

be generic.

Then,

it

'think’,

is no

then those readings

longer surprising that if

we consider sentences obtained from indicative-clause

ascriptions by replacing the indicative clauses with certain
other complements, we find that,
i

if we fix on

nterpretat ons of the sentences involving event readings of
i

the contained forms of 'think',
the involved event readings
are generic.
For the relevant readings of
those forms

figuring in the indicative-clause
ascriptions themselves are
gener c
i

Since

(

T*

)

entails that there is no event reading of

the main verb in a present-tense
indicative-clause

ascription on which that verb expresses
occurrent belief,
(T

)

and the Belief-Relational account cannot
both be true.

am not convinced that

I

(

T*

)

is true,

but

matters cited above weigh in its favor.

I

I

think that the
leave the

conjecture as an open question.

4

.

5

Summary of 4.1

I

-

4.4

have been concerned with what

I

readings of forms of the verb 'think’.

am calling "generic"

Roughly speaking,

these are readings on which the verb applies equally to

thinkings of various breeds:

occurrent believings alike.

to wishings,

wonderings and

Such readings are ubiquitous;

they appear to be available for any tense and inflection of
the verb.

fact al

There are intransitive generic readings, and in

intransitive readings appear to be generic (4.2).

Indeed, there is some reason to believe that all event

readings of the verb,

in any of

its forms,

are generic

readings (see discussion of (T*) just above in 4.4.3).
In section 4.1,

I

was especially concerned to isolate

relational, generic reading available for the present

a

progressive.

think it is clear that there is
such a
reading, and there are certain
cases where such a reading is
clearly available for a given occurrence
of the verb.
However, it is not entirely clear
whether it is available in
I

all

constructions in which a present progressive
form of
'think’ figures as main verb.
In particular, it
is not

clear to me what to say about
indicative-clause ascriptions
with the progressive.
T*
If
is true, then since such
(

)

ascriptions certainly do allow event readings, we
should
have to allow that generic readings are at
least available
for the verb as it occurs in indicative-clause
ascriptions;
but

am not sure that

I

(

T*

)

is correct.

However,

not at all clear whether there is a relational

available for the progressive
it

expresses occurrent belief

in

it

is also

reading

these ascriptions on which

— contrary

to the proposal of

the Belief-Relational account proposed in 4.4.1.

I

remain

uncertain whether there is any verb of ordinary discourse
that has a reading on which it expresses occurrent belief.
I

do not see a way of demonstrating that there is only

one relational, generic reading available for the present

progressive.
however.

I

know of no evidence to the contrary,

In what follows

I

shall assume that there is only

one such reading, and it will be useful to have a phrase

with which to refer to the relation expressed by present

progressive forms on this reading;
thinki ng"
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I

shall call

it,

"generic

useful to have a way of making
it clear when
intend to express this relation
of generic thinking in
claims to follow.
In the formulation of principles
and
assumptions, then, and occasionally
in informal discussions
where the intention may not be
clear enough from the
context, I Shall prefix a superscript
'gen’ to the

participle,

'thinking’, when the relational,
generic reading

of the progressive is intended.

So we shall employ

ascriptions of the form
(^5)

t

where

.

think
of

(

F5

.

.

9en th

9en thi

with
)

.

'

i

nki ng

9en

’

nk i ng t

’

is any

present progressive form of

attached.

in which the

I

propose to accept instances

substituends for 't*’

include a wide

variety of expressions that normally figure as
complements
of the progressive of

'think’:

phrases, descriptions.

Also

I

demonstratives, quantifier
shall employ open formulas

obtained by putting variables in for
as well

't’

and 't*’

in

(F5),

as sentences that result by binding the variables in

these positions with appropriate quantifiers.
I

propose, however, to avoid instances of (F5) formed

with sentential complements.

There are two kinds of

sentential clauses that may occur as complements of the verb
'think’

itself (or of any of its forms).

We have already

considered cases involving indicative clauses.
Interrogati ve clauses may also figure as complements of the

verb in certain forms, e.g.,

We were trying to think
whether William should ask
Sarah to marry him.

Interrogative clauses seem to be
more clearly acceptable as
complements of the infinitive.
For example, the precedin
9
sentence was counted acceptable
by all speake
rs

I’ve

consulted; by contrast, the
following
I
was thinking whether
her

should tell William to ask

I

was considered acceptable by
some but not all.
do not know how sentential clauses
function when they
appear as complements of forms of
the verb 'think’.
And I
am not sure what readings of the
verb can be had as it
I

figures in ascriptions in which it has
such complements.
And I do not know, in particular,
whether a relational,
generic reading is available for the progressive
form of the
verb as it occurs in any of these sentent
i

ascriptions.

Consequently,

I

t

is

t

is gen thinking whether

nki ng that 0

or

0

;

whether the correspond ng instances of
i

t

ause

would not have any idea how to

interpret instances of
gen thi

al -cl

is thinking that 0
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and
t

is thinking whether

0

express coherent claims or
not.
On occasion,

I

will employ other tenses
and inflections

°f the verb 'think' with
the

'gen'

prefix,

we can say that

person was ^"thinking the
same thing I was the other day;
that the person will be 9 en
thinking some intriguing things
a

in the future.

On the reportive usage, we
can say that a
person suddenly stops, 9en thinks
something, and starts to
run away from us.
I assume that the
concepts expressed by

such ascriptions can be grasped
well enough if one has a
grasp of the concept of generic
thinking that is expressed
by the present progressive
forms.
In what follows, whenever
a form of the verb 'think'
occurs without the 'gen' prefix,
and the verb is not accompanied
by any sentential

complement,

it will

be safe to assume that

I

intend to

express the generic relation.

4

•

6

The Modal Range of Generic Thinking

Considerations advanced

in 4.1

suggest that the

relation of generic thinking has the following property:

whether a person is occurrently believing something,
wishing
something or wondering something, either way, the person is
gen th

inking something.

That is:

1

24

18

(

)

i

)

Necessarily, for any
Jy( x is occurrent
believing

y

,2(

X

1

i i

)

i

i

i

iy
)

(
(

x
x

is wishing y ) ->
*
is wondering y )

jw X
}z(
iz(

)

-»

9enthinkin 9

9en th
is iln
inking
-

i

s

9en th

z
)

inking

(18) proposes a particular link
relating each of the modal
ranges of occurrent belief,
wishing and occurrent wondering

to that of generic thinking.

to be made,

But there is a stronger claim

in the case of each of these
three occurrent

attitudes, concerning the relationship
of its modal range to
that of generic thinking.
4.6.1, I shall pursue this
matter, in 4.6.2, I shall consider
the question of what
other intentional attitudes besides
these three have modal
ranges that are related, in the way
to be discussed, to the
modal range of generic thinking.

m

4

-

6

-

1

1 A7) and the M odal Range of Generic Thinking
For simplicity, when

of occurrent belief,

jointly,

I

wish to speak of the attitudes

wishing and occurrent wondering

let me refer to them as "the three attitudes".

Note that it will suffice for the truth of (18) that
there
be some distinguished item,

x,

such that whenever we bear

one of the three attitudes to anything at all, it is x that
we are gen thinking and no other.
But positing such a

distinguished item does not conform to certain intuitions we
have concerning the relation of generic thinking.
if

I

Surely,

am occurrently believing something and you are

occurrently believing something else, then on the generic
reading,

it will

be correct to say that there are distinct

)

things that we are thinking.

A similar claim may
be made

with respect to our wishing
or wondering distinct thin.
igs
So we have:
(19)

n

nec
V?Vvf
the n
Z*
and z t z’ <
(

V,

e
th
^°j
?
f iZ j°t/
)

V

three atti tudes, R,
z ^ R(y,z’), and z
t z
s *geb thinking z;
y is ^"thinking
R(x

’

’

)

z

5

)

rules out the possibility of
some single distinguished
object" of thought that we are
thinking whenever we bear

(19)

one of the three attitudes
towards things.

However,

it

doesn’t rule out the possibility
that there are precisely
two such "objects" of generic
thinking.
I think that a
stronger assumption than (19) is
warranted by intuitions
concerning the "objects” of these three
attitudes and of
generic thinking.
Take the case of occurrent wondering.

Suppose that at

this moment, William is wondering whether
Sarah will say
yes".
Then there is something he is thinking.
But I think
we may also say that at least one thing
William is thinking
is

something any others would be thinking too, provided
they

too are wondering whether Sarah will say "yes"
(same Sarah
in mind).

If this

is

right,

it suggests that for anything,

x,

that a person can be wondering, there’s a thing that can

be

9

x,

that person is 9en thinking

thought,

y,

such that whenever a person is wondering

claims, mutatis mutandis

,

y.

I

think that the same

are warranted concerning occurrent

1

26

belief and wishing, an d the
relationship of the modal ranges
Of these two attitudes
to that of generic thinking.
What seems to be required,
minimally, is an assumption
ong these lines.
for each one of the three
attitudes, R,
there is a one-one correspondence,
f, between R’s modal
range and the modal range of
generic thinking such that
necessarily, a person bears R to
a thing x only if the thing
to which f maps x is something
that person is 9en thinking:
(

20

VR(

)

i

)

i

i

)

if R

is one of the three attitudes,
then if:
m- range R) one-one-* m-range(
generic thinkin 9
nec Vx Vy ( R(y,x) -* y is gen thinking
f(x)
f

:

)

))

There are several questions that can
be stated clearly
by appeal to such presumed one-one
cor respondences

questions that are left unsettled by
(20) itself.

occurrent belief;
mapping each thing
a

the modal

(perhaps proper) subset, call

of generic thinking.
(

guarantees that there is a function

(20)
in

20

)

(21)

Consider

range of occurrent belief to
it

"OB",

of the modal

range

Moreover, concerning this set, OB,

implies:

Vx( if pos
z is occurrently believing x
),
then Jy y is in OB, and nec Vz( if z is occurrently
believing x, then z is 9en thinking y ))
(

But this fact about OB doesn’t settle certain questions.
may still ask:
modal

i)

We

are the members of OB themselves in the

ranges of any occurrent attitudes?

Perhaps they

comprise some breed of thing disjoint from any kind to which
we may bear intentional

attitudes.
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Does OB overlap with the

modal

range of ocourrent belief
itself?

the modal

range of ocourrent belief.

possibilities
i

is

compatible with

(

21 ),

Perhaps, OB

just,

i*

Each of these
but not settled by

t

The questions just raised may
be put, somewhat more
loosely,
the following way:
if (20) is correct, then
whenever we occurrently believe things,
there is an

m

associated set of things we are thinking,

in the

generic

sense.

What is the connection between the
things
occurrently believed and these associated
things that we are
thinking? Are the latter items "objects"
of attitudes at
all? Maybe the things we may be
said to be thinking

comprise some entirely separate category of
item, disjoint
from the modal ranges of any intentional
attitude.

On the

other hand, perhaps the things we are gen
thinking when we

occurrently believe things are themselves "objects"
of
attitudes;

indeed perhaps they are the very things that we

are then occurrently believing.
is

ruled out by any of (18)

-

None of these suggestions

(20).

One way to settle these matters is to assume that for

each of the three attitudes,

R,

the one-one correspondence

satisfying the two clauses of the main consequent of (20)
an

identity function.

main assumption

I

is

This is in fact a consequence of the

propose to make here.

On the view

I

adopt, the "objects" of the three attitudes are themselves

"objects" of generic thinking.
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In the

remainder of this

study,

shall

I

be developing a position
that,

as a starting
point, views the relation of
generic thinking as an
intentional attitude, albeit a
generic one.
And moreover,
on the view to be adopted
here, it will in general be
the
case that when one may be said
to be thinking something in
virtue of bearing one of the three
attitudes to a thing, x,
one thing one will then be
thinking is x itself.

Accepting (20) does not force this
perspective on us.
Just above, I noted several
alternatives to this view

that

one might adopt instead.

One might deny that generic

thinking is an intentional attitude at
all— it is compatible
with (20) that the modal range of
generic thinking is

disjoint from that of any intentional
attitude.

Nevertheless it seems to me intuitively plausible
to assume
that the things we may be said to be thinking,
in virtue of
occur rent

1

y

believing, wishing or wondering things, are just

those things occurrently believed, wished or wondered
themsel ves
So
(A7)

I

propose to adopt the following:

nec Vx nec Vy
gen thinking
is occurrently believing y
x is
geft
is wishing y
x is
thinking y, and
iii)
is wondering y -> x is gen thinking y
i)

i

i

)

Roughly,

x
x
x

(A7) tells us that any of the three attitudes is

such that necessarily,

if

a

person bears it to a thing, then

that thing is something the person may be said to be

thinking,
(20),

y

in the generic sense.

This assumption implies

and consequently (18) and (19) as well.

4

'

6

'

2

^U-£h_ Attitu des Are Sn P r.i cc

Generic Thinking?

We may say that an attitude
requires generic thinking
according to the following:

(

D6

)

requires R*

R

=df

nec Vx(

Jy R(x,y)

fy’R (x,y’)

(Here and in the following
definition,

'R’

and

be taken as ranging over
relations generally.)

R*

*

'

)

are to

Roughly, an

attitude may be said to require
generic thinking if a person
can’t bear the attitude to a thing
without thinking
something.
An attitude’s requiring generic
thinking should
be distinguished from its being
such that whenever one bears
it to a thing,

one is thinking that very thing.

The latter

property is entailed by an attitude’s being
a species of
generic thinking, which may be understood
according to:
(

D7

)

R

is a

species of R*

=df nec VxVy:
R ($>y) -> R*(x,y)
and ii) R does not require
1

)

,

Specification

is

stronger than requirement:

an attitude is a species of generic thinking,

R

the claim that

implies but is

not implied by the claim that it requires generic
thinking.

The thesis we started with in this section, the one

expressed by (18),

implies merely that the three attitudes

require generic thinking.

The assumption captured in (A7),

however, together with the claim, which is surely correct,
that generic thinking does not in turn require any of the
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three attitudes,

implies that each of the
three attitudes
are species of generic
thinking.
Are there other intentional
attitudes for which there
is reason to claim
that they are species of
generic
thinking? I think it is clear
that many familiar, nonoccurrent attitudes will not
have this property.
For
example, consider belief,
desire and wondering.
Each of
these is such that one may
bear it at a time without being
engaged in any mental activity
at the time.
I
may correctly
be said to believe that the
defendant will be acquitted,
even though I am n a deep and
dreamless sleep; William may
correctly be said to wonder whether
Sarah will say "yes" (on
a state reading of the present
tense), even though he is in
a deep and dreamless sleep.
Examples concerning many other
i

non-occurrent attitudes will go the same
way.
is

thinking something only if he or she

mental activity.

So one can,

is

for example,

But a person

engaged in some
believe something

without thinking anything; plainly then, one
can believe
something without thinking that very thing.
I

know of no familiar occurrent attitude that is

required by generic thinking, except for generic thinking
itself.

Then can we say that all occurrent attitudes apart

from generic thinking are species of generic thinking?

Perhaps we may accept not only (A7) but:
(A?)

For any occurrent attitude, R,
x is gen thinking
y
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)

nectfxVy(

R(x,y) -»

Then we could say at least
that any occurrent attitude
not
requi red by generic thinking
is a species of generic

thinking

But

•

I

think it may be doubted whether
(A?)

i

s

correct
I

am inclined to think that
there is an occurrent

attitude expressed by the present
progressive of 'doubts':
when we say that a person is
doubting something (and an
event reading is intended), I
think we imply that the person
is engaged in an instance
of a certain type of mental
activity, that of doubting.

But

I

also suppose that the

sort of thing to which one may be
said to bear this
occurrent attitude of doubting are by
and large the things
that can be occurrently believed.
The modal ranges of

occurrent belief and occurrent doubting surely
overlap to
great extent; I am inclined to think that
they

a

coincide.

But now suppose

I

am doubting something,

are occurrently believing.

something

I

am thinking?

x,

Should we say that
Well,

(A7)

x

that you
is

implies that

x

is

something you are thinking, for according to (A7), occurrent
belief is a species of generic thinking.

suppose that

x

is

something that

I

So if we do

am thinking, we should

have to say that there is a thing, namely
are thinking.

x,

that both of us

More generally, we would have to say that

anytime there is something that one person is doubting and
that another is occurrently believing, there is something
the two people are thinking in common.

counterintuitive.

But this seems

Keep in mind that we are
dealing here with a certain
familiar concept of thinking-a
concept involved when we
say, for example, that two
people are thinking the same
thing, and mean more or less
that the two persons are having
the same thought, that the
same thing is occurring to them,
or crossing their minds.
If I am doubting something
that
you are occurrently believing,
it is surely not plausible
to
say that it fo llows that we are
thinking the same thing.
These considerations lead me to
reject (A?).
I do not
deny that it is p ossible for one
person to be doubting what
another is occurrently believing, while
the two are thinking
something in common.
Here is a case:
you are occurrently

believing that William will be happy and that
Sarah will say
"yes".

happy,

I

am occurrently believing that William will
be

but doubting that Sarah will say "yes'*.

to me to be a possible situation.

that

I

This seems

Then there is something

am occurrently believing and that you are doubting—

that Sarah will say "yes"--but at the same time it is
true
that there is something that both of us are thinking in
common, a thought that both of us are having:
will

be happy.

that William

But in this case the common thought is not

the thing that you are occurrently believing and that

I

am

occurrently doubting.
I

thing,

also do not deny that if a person is doubting a
it follows that there

thinking.

is

Suppose again that

1

I
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someth ng that person is
i

am doubting that Sarah will

say

yes".

something

I

I

am inclined to think that
there will be

am thinking;

perhaps it is what

I

would express

by uttering:

Maybe Sarah won’t say "yes" after
all.
I

am inclined to think that the
occurrent attitude of

doubting does

r equire

generic thinking.

Indeed

am

I

inclined to think that all occurrent
attitudes require
generic thinking.
But it is the property of being a sner.ip*
of generic thinking that is my
concern at present.

I

doubt

that all occurrent attitudes have this
property.
I

have not been able to discover any informative

criterion that distinguishes those attitudes
that are
species of generic thinking from those that are
not.

So

I

do not see any significant way of generalizing
(A7).

However,

in the

remainder of this study,

I

shall

be

primarily concerned with these three attitudes of occurrent
believing, wishing and occurrent wondering.

So,

the claim

formulated in (A7) will suffice here.
Although
assumption,

it

think that (A7) is a very natural

I

is a substantial

to the arguments

I

one.

present in Chapter

It will
8,

prove crucial

by means of which

shall seek to join issue with the Propositional Tradition.

1
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I

4

.

Thesis

7

1

Let us consider again
nec

P° s iy(

is thinking x

y

)

-»
is a thought

x

In Chapter

1

,

I

)

claimed that this expresses an analytic

criterion of thoughthood.

The labors of this chapter

prepare us to consider a more guarded
claim:

occurrence of 'is thinking’

is taken on

if the

its generic,

relational reading, then (T1) expresses an
analytic

criterion of thoughthood.
this claim.

think that we should accept

I

It is part of the very concept of thought

concerned with in this study,

a

concept that

I

I

am

think is

familiar from ordinary discourse, that if one may
be said to
be thinking a thing, in the generic sense,
that thing is
a

thought
We have seen that there is a state reading available

for the progressive forms of 'think’
is close

in

meaning to 'believes’

in

English on which it

(see 4.4.1

re

"His

testimony has been so persuasive that those close to the
case are thinking that the jury will acquit him").
fact

I

think that the claim expressed by (T1) with this

reading of the progressive is true.
on this

And in

i

nterpretat on is not what

criterion.

i

But the claim expressed
I

am counting an analytic

We may say that a person is thinking something

and mean more or less that something is occurring to him or
her,

that something is crossing his or her mind, that the

1
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Person is having

a

thought.

truth is that anything

What

I

claim to be an analytic

person may be sa,d to be thinkingthis sense-is a thought.
I
believe it is clear that an
event reading of 'is thinking’
is involved here.
a

m

We have considered grounds
for doubting whether there
is any event reading available for
progressive forms of
'think’, apart from its generic
reading (see 4 4 4 ).
of
.

.

course this is not to say that one
could not devise some
such other reading, by a definition,
and propose to
interpret (T 1 ) by means of it.
I
would
have to see a

proposed definition, before

I

could have anything to say

about whatever thesis would be expressed
by (T1) on the
resulting nterpretat on
i

i

The criterion

accept may be unambiguously formulated

I

as foil ows

nec Vx ( pos iy(

is 9en thinking x

y

)

Hereafter,
"Thesis

1

shall

I

i)

1

and (A7) jointly imply

(

pos iy
iii) pos iy{
l

)

)

the criterion thus expressed,

Necessarily, for any x,
pos iy y is occurrently believing

(23)

thought

"

Thesis

l

call

-»
is a

x

(

.

y
y

is
is

.

wishing x
wondering

)

x
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)

-»

x

is a

thought,
-» x is a thought,
x is a thought.
)

And from (23), together with the assumption,

1

x

(

A6

Necessarily, for any x,
pos -}y
y is occur rent

)

i

)

(

iii;
\\U

wis
*
ir 9
wondering

s

pos -jy
ill
(

is
i s

i
y

believing

y

1

x

)

x

>

x

iff

)

pos iy{

(proposed in Chapter
(24)
i

)

i i )

3,

i

i

)

Necessarily, for any
pos iy{ y believes x
pos iy( y wishes x
pos iy{ y wonders x

At the end of Chapter

1,

y

wonders

x

)

section 3.4, p.20), we get:
x,

I

is a thought,
is a thought,
x is a thought.
x

)

x

)

i

iff

considered four roles that are

part of the standard philosophical
conception of thought.
One of these I called "the intentional
role":
the idea that
thoughts are the "objects" of the intentional
attitudes.
This was formulated as follows (the sentence
number is

changed to accord with numbering of the present
chapter):
VR(

if R

is an intentional attitude, then
(
iy R(y,x) ) -» x is a thought

nec Vx( pos
(25)

role

implies both (23) and (24).

))

Since this "intentional

expressed by (25) is part of the guiding conception of

thoughts with which this study began,

I

consider the fact

that (23) and (24) are consequences of Thesis

1

(together

with (A6) and (A7)) something to be welcomed.

Before proceeding to the next chapter,

let me bring

this very, very long chapter to a close by digressing just

briefly to discuss a matter that

I

find somewhat puzzling;

the matter has to do with the circumstances under which a

person should be said to be thinking more than one thought.

^ ®

How Ma ny Thoughts

A re

You Thinking ?

It is traditionally
assumed that thoughts can be
terms

of standard logical
operations;

in particular,

it is held

that thoughts may be said
to be conjunctive, formed by
conjunction from other thoughts.
It would be natural to
suppose that such a conjunctive
thought is what I am
thinking in some circumstances
in which the following is
true

(26)

Aronszaj n is thinking that politicians
lie and cheat.

Can it ever be the case that
(26) is true in virtue of my
thinking just one thought, a conjunctive
one, intuitively:
the thought that politicians lie and
cheat? It seems

natural enough to suppose that

I

could be thinking just this

one conjunctive thought and no other, and
that,
the case,

(26) would be true.

if

this were

Indeed it is tempting to

think that the following expresses a claim true
with respect
to such a situation:

(27)

Aronszaj n is thinking only one thing.
thinking:
Politicians lie and cheat.

On the face of it,

perfectly possible

Aronszajn is

it seems that such situations are

— that

it is possible that

I

be thinking

the conjunctive thought that politicians lie and cheat, and

thinking that thought alone.
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Nevertheless, there is an argument
that seems to show
that w heneve r (26) is true, I
am thinking more than one
thought, and consequently, whether
or not there is such a
conjunctive thought as the thought,
that politicians lie a nH
cheat, and whether or not there
could possibly be a
circumstance in which I am thinking
that thought and that
thought alone, (26) will never be
true with respect to such
a circumstance.
Moreover, the argument would show, contrary
to what seems to me a natural
first impression, that the
claims expressed in (27) are literally
contradictory.
For I
think it is plain that the second
sentence of (27) implies
(26), which, according to the argument, implies
that I am

thinking more than one thing, yet the first
sentence of (27)
asserts that I am thinking only one thing.
Roughly, the argument goes as follows.

plausible to claim that there is

a

It seems

certain thing

I

am

thinking whenever I’m thinking that politicians lie, and

a

certain thing I’m thinking whenever I’m thinking that

politicians cheat such that it is possible for me to be
thinking the former and not thinking the latter.
can’t

I

be thinking that politicians lie and not thinking

that politicians cheat ?
i

After all,

ndi scerni bi

1

i

But if we accept the

ty of identicals (along with some fairly

natural modal assumptions), then

I

think we should also

accept
(Inld)

nec VxVy( x

=

y

-» nec( Aronszajn is thinking

iff Aronszajn is thinking y

1
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))

x

From this, and our previous
contention, we get that there is
a certain thing that I’m
thinking whenever I’m thinking that
politicians lie that is distinct
from a certain thing I’m
thinking whenever I’m thinking
that politicians
cheat.

suppose that

(

26

)

is true,

politicians lie and cheat.
that

I

that

I

Now

am thinking that

Then is it not correct to say

am thinking that politicians lie
and also thinking

that politicians cheat?

correct.

That is,

is thinking’

(DIST)

I

I

am inclined to think that this is

am inclined to accept that 'Aronszajn

distributes over 'and’, thus:

Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and
cheat
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat.

But if

I

am both thinking that politicians lie and thinking

that politicians cheat, then our previous reasoning leads
to
the conclusion that there are two things

I

am thinking.

no matter the ci rcumstances with respect to which

true,

in such

circumstances

I

(

26

)

So,
is

am thinking more than one

thing.

The argument may be laid out somewhat more carefully;
the conclusion will be that necessarily,

if

I

am thinking

that politicians lie and cheat, then there are two things
am thinking:
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I

The Plurality of Thoughts
Argument (PTA)
i)

There is an

and y, such that:
iS tMnMn9 that Politicians
lie,
he's tMnk?ng x );
2
thinkin9 that P ° liticians
he’s tMnking y)? Ind
P°s( Ar °nszajn is thinking x and
not thinking y ).
x

2

ii)
::

(

in)
nec(
he s
nec(
he s

J

Inld

There is an x
if Aronszajn
thinking x );
if Aronszajn
thinking y ),

and
is

y such that
thinking that pol

i

ti ci

ans lie,

is

thinking that pol

i

ti ci

ans cheat

and

x

i

y.

SH0W

nec( if Aronszajn is thinking that
politicians lie
and cheat, then Jx-}y{ Aronszajn is
thinking x;
Aronszajn is thinking y, and x i
Y ))
[by necessity-intro, with the
following sub-proof 10 ]

SHGW:

If Aronszajn is thinking that
politicians lie and
cheat, then JxJy( Aronszajn is thinking
x; Aronszajn is
thinking y, and x t y
[by Conditional Proof as follows]
)

iv)

Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie and cheat
[Assumption]

Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie, and
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat.
[from iv) by (DIST)]
::

vi

)

y,

JxJy( Aronszajn is thinking x;
and x
y )

Aronszajn is thinking

j.

[from

i

i

i

)

and v

)

The argument can be readily generalized of course; with

appropriate amendments,

a parallel

result can be reached

concerning you and your thinking, say, that politicians are
honest and fair

.

The result seems to be that whenever such

reports as (26) are true, the subject of the report must be

thinking more than one thing, and consequently, any pair of
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sentences relevantly like the pair
in (27) will be
contrad ctory
i

Perhaps

I

may be engaged in two simultaneous
events of

thinking, one reported by
Aronszaj n is thinking:

Politicians

lie.

the other by

Aronszajn is thinking:
If this

is a possibility,

Politicians cheat.

then presumably it is a case

concerning which we should be inclined to say that

I

am

thinking two things (at least) and that in virtue of my
thinking these two things,

(26)

is true.

But it is somewhat

remarkable to find out that it is impossible for (26) to be
true,

unless

I

am thinking more than one thought.

PTA depends essentially on premise i),
rule,

(DIST).

Surely (Inld) is beyond reproach, so we must

either deny premise

i),

reject (DIST) or accept the

conclusion of this argument.
a

(Inld) and the

It may be noted,

too,

that on

certain assumption about the semantic treatment of the

main indicative clauses of indicative-clause ascriptions
(see 4.4),

premise

i)

can be reached by a subsidiary

argument with a single extremely plausible premise.
semantic assumption

is:
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The

(A?)

For any true or false indicative,
the main indicative clause in'

t,

[t

is thinking that

rigidly designates.

0

0

and any term,

,

]

11

Perhaps,

intuitively, for relevant indicative,
0 we might
think of the designatum of [that
0 ] as the thought we'd
,

refer to by [the thought that
0]

;

but it makes no difference

to the argument what we take the
designatum to be.

essential

What is

is that we suppose that if the main
indicative

clause of an indicative-clause ascription
is formed from a
true or false sentence, then the occurrence
of that clause
in that ascription rigidly designates
someth ng
i

.

The single premise of this subsidiary argument
is:
1

a

)

P° s Aronszaj n is thinking that politicians lie
and not thinking that politicians cheat
(

)

This seems indisputable.

Now we proceed as follows:

we

derive the following necessi tati ons

i

b

)

nec Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie ->
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians lie
(

)

i

c

)

nec( Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat,
Aronszajn is thinking that politicians cheat
)

Then,

conjoining

derive premise
existential

i)

i

a

)

-

i

c ),

if

(A?)

is correct,

we may

simply by appropriate application of

introduction. 12,13

If this subsidiary argument is accepted,

we are faced

with the choice of either rejecting (DIST) or accepting the
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conclusion of PTA— that, whene vex

presumably whenever

I

(

26

)

is true,

and

am thinking a conjunctive thought
that

can be reported by such a sentence
as

thinking more than one thing.

I

(

26

),

I

must be

do not consider either of

these choices to be very satisfactory.

Nevertheless,

I

see

no motivation for the first
alternative, and find the

reasoning behind the subsidiary argument
fairly compelling.
So I am tentatively inclined to
accept the conclusion of
PTA.
(

26

)

will

This issue of whether ascriptions of
thought such as
imply that the subject is thinking more
than one thing

arise to bother us (me at least) at several
points in

subsequent chapters.

Be forewarned.

In the next chapter,

what

I

we shall turn our attention to

called "the semantic role" of thoughts, and the

central concept involved in this role:

expressing

a

thought.
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that of a sentence’s

NOTES TO CHAPTER

h£ i„r ron

4

*

-si

S

nouns, readin 9
Shich suc^nouns ZpVyTo
the
th, ngs to wh,ch they ..apply on
them "nCn- 9 eneMc ? readings
e.g.
Dogs bark
Do computers think?"
I use the term
just because, on the (family of)
readings I have in mind
forms of the verb 'think' apply
to events of a variet) of
3 C ° mn"° n 9e " US:
that of
Tents of

spec“f

’

,

^

Paraphrasing instances of the matrix

2.

.

th nk
i

.

.

by corresponding instances of
... do

some thinking.

doesn’t always work.
(

a

is not close
(

b

in

meaning to

thi nk si owl

I

)

Here is an example due to Lee Bowie:

do some thinking slowly

I

)

.

The use of the gerund, 'thinking’, as a "mass" noun in
(a)
seems to rule out an habitual or dispositional reading which
is the most natural reading for (b).
Nevertheless, a close
paraphrase of (b) is available with "do" which brings out
the "eventive" character of the relevant habitual reading:
(c)

do (my) thinking slowly

I

stick to my main point which is that, in general
intransitive readings of forms of 'think’, including such
habitual readings as that available for (b), are event
readings, in the relevant sense.
I

3.
Russe
ans/F regeans might contend that for some
description 'the F’, perhaps contextually determined, Max is
occurrently believing a proposition in these ci rcumstances-a proposition expressed by
1

(a)

1

i

The

F

is a mint-condition,

late 70’s Chippendale.

Here is where my point enters in, that there be no ad-hoc
variation in the accounts one proposes in Max’s case and in
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1

^

th

^ .concerning
"
9rOUnds

veridical
(the ^cus
is in KMpkrMsanTw
P
L
980] ) for rejecting such
Russel 1 isn/crliL
3
'
P :° P sals as ?o which thought
Max is
having.
hav
Let us fix on ?
a particular choice
f or^the"? °as an
i 1 1 ustrati
on
Oppose it is "The chair before me
now".
Now

cases ^Kripke^as offe^ed

11

classics

9

1

f"„

’

.

rr

i,S£ \;;«s

sSr „ «;;^

„

i°hs depends precisely on
whether or not x
itself is a mint
"t-condition late 70's Chippendale.
The truth
of his thought
r ° P0 ltlOn he ls
°ccurrently
believing-doesn’t
a oesn t depend nn
on tw
there wbeing any chair before him and
does not depend on the chair
before him, if there ?s one
Chippenda1e
But then (a) doesn't
express
press this
thi s'thCuah^h
thought he is having.
But if (a) dopqn’t
haVin9 iP -ridicl! casI2 of the
sort"? n
h6n nt W ° u1d require an ad-hoc and
*
unmotivatPri
propose that this sentence does express
a thought he ?s Lv?
]" cases of Hallucination that are,
apart from the
thi fact that he is
hallucinating, relevantlyy
like tl
the veridical cases.
’

ft

T ere are
rhaps 1ess controversial cases that call
tAto
^
+
J®
to question
the idea that intransitive readings
of 'think’
support complement quantification.
The cases I^ow have in
mind trade on a fact not noted in the
text:
that on their
intransitive readings, forms of 'think’ seem
to
properties that persons may have without bearing express
any
attitudes towards things,
In this respect, the intransitive
generic readings are quite broad in their application.
One
may be said to be thinking in virtue, simply,
of doing a
lengthy calculation, or of attending to a melody
that one is
humming to oneself.
Yet I think it is not so plausible to
hold that in any such case it would be correct to
say that
one is thinking someth ng
i

.

5.
Barbara Partee has pointed out that a frequentative
event reading is also available for this and other instances
of (F4).
The reading in question is that involved in the
most likely nterpretat on of (10) as it figures in
i

i

Whenever his hypnotist commands him to do so,
William thinks that Sarah will not say 'Yes’.
6.
There are certain exceptions in which the indicative
clause complement is replaced by a phrase that is itself
formed from that clause, and whose reference is determined
by that of the contained clause.
For example, if we replace
the complement of
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(a)

with

The defendant is thinking
that the jury will
acquit him.
the thought that the jury will
acquit him’, we get

<b)

d
dant
jinking the thought that the
jury
iurv w
wn? acquit him.
1

?’
IndYLkf ir?n Sty1
mply

bUt 1 suppose <b> to be grammatical
as does < a >. that the defendant is
ocruJ-rentiv
h ^
occur
re ntlybelieving
that the jury will acquit him.
7.
U9h WS C ° Uld expect that an account
exolai^nina whvy th
?w
presence of indicative clauses as
!S i
f ° rC S
nt e r P r etations implying occurrent
belief
would also n
w
e ?P lanation for such an implication
in
the nreslnt caslf
6
C ° mPleme " tS are derived
from'indtcative
’

’

1

^

'

closes

This case is from Kit Fine (Fine
[1989], see p.228).
Fine is concerned with failures of
substi tut i vi ty
There
t0 be ln Hebr( w both a masculine and
a
feminine
wor^fnr t h
yare f aCh
(m<) and
levana (f.).
Fine
8.
notes that
.

,

’

'

’

Levana tsafa rakeia
may be true, which he translates "The moon
floats in (sic
the sky.
while

)

,

Yare’ach tsafa rakeia
9.

is false,

which he translates "The moon observes the sky".
(Pop quiz for the reader:
Is this an example of a failure
of substitutivity?)

Perhaps this case is best viewed not as one in which
there is a shift in available readings of a single verb, but
rather in which there is a shift, given the grammatical
rules of agreement, in what the main verb of the sentence
is there are two verbs that count 'tsafa’ among there
inflected forms in Hebrew.
Still, the case motivates the
general concern here which is that sometimes, there may be a
different nterpretat on available for the result of
substituting one noun phrase for another in subject position
of a given sentence.
Some substitutions in subject position
are not innocuous.
i

i

If indeed the shift is forced; I am not quite sure that
we can’t get either reading with (15b).
Let p be some
proposition to which Jones in fact bears the attitude of
belief.
Now suppose that Smith is suffering a conceptual
confusion:
though he knows that p is a proposition to which
Jones bears belief, he also thinks that p is Jones’ husband.
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°f 9

Who "-took his wife
ke an ° ther s husband for
proposition
a
AnS reoairMoor^fH
^ or the references,
see Note 2 to Chapter
ui n
1C
cou dn, t distinguish
propositions from tablpp
e
Th
mi ght utter (15b)
intending "Llieves ? to
the
readln
9 on which it
e
expresses
presses the
thp intentionalV attitude
of
ur
D
belief
MeT
q m ith’c
bmith
s
intentions, of course aren’t
f
1
question
of
whether this reading iss availabll
available for t£°
the occurrence of
'believes’ in rmhi
ll ° n about the semantics
of English.
I’ve descMbedlmUh’f
D d Smith s case here
only to give a
conteyt -in h ch 4-u
thls Question might naturally
be addressed
It is nnt ri
cl ear to me whether
the
semantics
of
English
1
S
nte t onal attitude reading for
the
hp?
uuuurrence
occurrence^of
of
believes ? in (15b).
f or'a

hat^erhaos^

’

^

nw

•

-

.

1

^

'

10.
I’m assuming quantified S5
(with =).
At step iii
we
should instantiate.
With ’a’ in for ’x’ and 'b’ in for y
this leaves us with:
)

’

nec( if Aronszajn is thinking
that politicians lie
he s thinking a );
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking
that pol t i c ans c heat, he’s thinking
b ), and a + b.
’

i

i

With necessi tation of the last conjunct,
we have:
nec( if Aronszajn is thinking that
politicians lie,
he s thinking a ).
neet

nec(

Arcnszajn is thinking that politicians

if

cheat,

he s thinking b

a i

b

).

)

We may import the content of each of these
modal claims into
the necessity introduction subproof (after the
first SHOW
line).
From these and line v), PC yields vi).

This assumption is intended to apply to de dicto
nterpretat ons of such ascriptions.
I
think it is
plausible, if it js right that indicative clauses designate
when they occur as complements in ascriptions of form
11.
i

i

(El)

t

thinking that

is

0,

to claim that on the de dicto nterpretat i on of such
ascriptions, the indicative clauses designate rigidly.
Consider a particular example:
i

(

a

)

Jones is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy.

Let us refer to what La) expresses, on its de dicto
i nterpretat i on
as "A d ".
If indicative clauses are
,

1

48

referenti al
r
e ati n
f ascript i° ns of
form
tr^
?n a
?
3 ® ? uatlon
Jones is thinking the
Just in case
referent nf th
^
th
’ "di cat, ve
that some shrewd spy
clause,
sdv is !I!nL°T
?
wealthv’
T
^
It- does seem clear
enough that, on the de dirtn
l
interpretation
of (a), this
clause serv^ Jn
0 ® peclfy what it is
that Jones is being
cla^medTo
thinking.
if this is our
reason for holdingthat the ri a bbiTth
h
c1ause
ls referential,
designatina a thiL
"9
f the ascri Ption
true), then it
s
n°
may^e^oL^that
y
t ted that ^h
the
clause
doesn’t seem to
vary
which though^
'aer^to
to specify,
spec?^ when
whe n we evaluate
the truth-value of A^ d from
sltuatlon
to another.
very natural to think that
it
s
at there 13 J ust one thoughtintuitivelv fL +1
9 1
S ° me shrewd s Py is wealthy
such that A^is true
n9
dones is thi nking^just^ne
1

;

^

+-

'

lrirr
.

,

1

i

i

i

1

^
!

—

1

of Several

“dtca^v^i^r

r-?

^Mngs^i i^PT/U^^

on8ideri “«-

» -

;z«.

t

f° r

Pnderstandi 9 this interpretation of
to v lew these ascriptions, on this
inte^rltation
1
asserting
a relation, not between person
h
.
h
bU
a
between Person, attributed property,
and
?h?
\
1Ch
property is attributed (or person^
5 t?h,
r ° n an
an ordered sequence of things to
wMch
the
e re ^ a ^i° n
s attributed; for simplicity
I shall
6 m
t
nti ° n
hat follows to the least complex
cases
cases).
In H
The view would
be that an instance of the form:
1

instances^f^F?

«
)

V^

'

1

.

^

')

(FI

’

)

t

is

thinking that

t’

VP

d
.expresses the same thing as the following
Iscrin^on which is taken to be more
ascription,
perspicuous as to
logical form:
'

t

is

attributing the property of VPing to t’.

Here there are three principal referential positions,
the
first occupied by a term referring to the subject
of the
attribution, the second, by a term designating the property
being attributed, the third, by a term designating
the thing
to which the property is being attributed.
On this account,
the de re l nterpretat on of (a) would consist of a
strai ghtf orward existential quantification on the third
position, thus:
i

(

a ’)

There is some shrewd spy, x, and Jones is
attributing the property of being wealthy to
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x.

ndtcattve^l ause^esi 9gnated^for^ d

1

0t Claim that its
* ' nd
f
hat Up ° n proper

regimentation as (a’) there’
is „o"L
)
9natln9
occurrenc e of
the original clausethere arl„^„
°
occurrer>ces of indicative
clauses at all.
’

part^ular^riant^f^ucrln'f
persp^cuou^ paraph rase

° Ut * difficult * with
this

^2^

pSl
S

paraphrase! of ^ucl^i nterpretat^c^
o?
attitudes, e.g., hopes, wonders
fears
t^ree-?erm
these lines is to be found^n

^

'

^QuTne^T

t

i

° f ° th>r

P

ltc'

iihat

up^th^ropriate,
T^ 6
[ 1

976

hP

~

along

eves

V

where substituends of [that
0 y ] (with
free) are taken to
rt
S <and
° f course
’° n
Q uin ® expresses
misgivings).
misgivingsr On
0 n Quine’s
0
way, there is more ho D e of a
tlC tr atment for de. re nterpretat
ons^f
a^r?n+
ascriptions of other attitudes, for we
may allow three term
relations for each of the following'

i

!?

i

x

hopes concerning

x

wonders concerning

y

x

fears concerning

that 0

y

y

that 0

whether 0
etc.

derived fairly (!) strai ghtf orward
y from the original
ascription.
There is a lot more to say on the matters
raised here, but I am not prepared to do such
matters
justice on the present occasion.)
There is another account that has been proposed of
de
nterpretat ons of attitude ascriptions.
On this
account, instances of (FI) do report relations between
persons and thoughts, interpreted de re but the thoughts
reported are not in general the ones designated, on the de
nterpretat on by their indicative clause
^- ! c t 0
complements.
On this account, it would be claimed that the
logical form of (a), interpreted de re
is best reflected by
the fol lowing:
1

—

l

i

.

i

i

,

.

(a’’)

A

There is some shrewd spy,
that x is wealthy.

x,

and Jones is thinking

proponent of this view might hold that the occurrence of

th© indicative clause in
But
there is still no occurrence
in U’
lndlcatlve
clause of (a).
So (a) would sti 1 nob
not be seen as asserting
a relation between
^
^
f
Partlcu1ar
Clause.
(Accounts along ?hes!
ne e llnes have been
H
proposed by
various writers- ccsc * i Sn f ??nes"hav«
3P
^ 1989b ^>
Salmon [1986], and
Soames [1987b].)
h
a
OUnt ° f the .^-C®' we d ° cot
get sSpporr?or°[he
e
senr,an
^mant?c
tic assumption
as
r
*._ v+
at issue in the
^

.

L

'

^

.

>

.

pre^rH^
e

r

f

m °^ catura^i nterpretat?on of^step

i

iv) of p^A? °?l:

(27)

of®

Aronszajn is thinking that politicians
lie and
cheat.

e
1
dict0
We ma y take PTA, then, buttressed
with the 2i!hJ
H
subsidiary
argument for premise i) relying on (A’)
Ur
S
Sh that ° n tMs Very
reading of
(27)
?he t^th
asCr,ptlon entaila that I am thinking
Ionian one ?hing
l

-

"al

of^

th a free logic, it would be required,
th
that fk
there is an x such

additionally,
that x = that politicians lie and
ere is a y such that y = that politicians
cheat.
requirement may s ound odd, but isn’t it an obvious This
implication of the following, which doesn’t sound
odd at all
and is surely true:
one thing that can be thought is that
politicians lie, and one thing that can be thought
is that
politicians cheat.
*

.

13.
I should stress that nothing in
what I have assumed in
this study so far requires that indicative clauses are
designators, let alone that they are rigid designators.
I
have assumed that there is a relational reading of 'is
thinking
then it follows that the verb, on that reading,
admits introduction of referential terms in a complement
position.
I
am prepared to allow, further, that indicative
clauses occur as complements of the verb, on the relevant
reading.
Does it clearly follow that when indicative
clauses occur as complements of 'is thinking’, on that
reading, those occurrences are referential? Consider an
analogy.
'is kicking’ takes referring terms as complements,
as
n
;

i

William is kicking his favorite football.
and,

in the same sense
complements, as in

,

the verb admits prepositional

William is kicking with his right foot.
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h

h

p repos i” t?ona^ ph r ases
occu

thos
f

^rrd~

r
^

ai^r

"T

thSSe f3CtS that when

ziTti

of

th ® yare functioning as
designators.
Various svntlr?n>

- i

D f-V"

is
r
h ° Uld be claimed to
y
designate rigidly,
do not think that thhese
laims
ar
®
clearly
consequences of
any assurriDtinn^
^
assumptions tI ?have already
made.
i
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CHAPTER

5

A CONCEPT OF SENTENTIAL
EXPRESSION

0n shin9 what 1a "9 ua 9® can
do.
With a few
: Can
11
ex P ress an incalculable
number of thoughts,
so fh J
hOU9ht «r“P»a
‘
a
terrestri^
being for
thee ver y first time
^
can be put into a form of words
which
will be understood by someone
to whom the thought is
ent i re y new

«v,^ hb ?f
e

^

1

Frege 1

Virtually all philosophers who accept
that there are
such things as thoughts, would hold,
too, that there is an
important sense in which a vast number
of

all

— are

thoughts— if not

things that can be said to be ’’expressed"
in

language.

Some such idea is commonly taken for
granted in

philosophical discussions; regimented versions
of such an
idea figure time and again as cornerstones
in work
in

Philosophy of language, philosophical logic,
linguistic
theory, and related areas of study.

Moreover, the concept of expression that philosophers
have had in

mind— what Frege

meant, for example, when he

spoke of language being able to express an incalculable

number of thoughts
discourse.

Or so

is
I

intuitively grounded in ordinary

believe.

It is certainly an acceptable

way of speaking to say that a person can express what he or
she is thinking by a certain sentence.

William is thinking
crossing his mind

— what’s

— is

For example,

if what

occurring to him, what’s

that Sarah will not say "yes", then we

would say that William can express this thing
153

— what

he’s

thinking, what’s occurring
to him, what

— by

s

crossing his mind

uttering:

Sarah will not say "yes".

That such a concept exists in
ordinary discourse is also
evident from our use of constructions
of the sort I called
"di spl ayed-sentence ascriptions",
that were discussed in the
preceding chapter. We allow ourselves
to report the
thoughts that people are having simply
by displaying
appropriate sentences.
For example, we may report something
William is thinking by issuing:

William is thinking:
An ascription of this sort will

Sarah will not say "yes"
be counted true only if the

displayed sentence is one that the subject could
use to
express what he or she is thinking.
I

do not say that any familiar notion involved
here is

precisely the concept that philosophers employ when
they
speak of the expression of thoughts.
is

I

do not believe there

anything answering to the description "the concept of

expression of thoughts that philosophers employ".

Nevertheless

I

think there is surely a family of more or

less closely related notions to be discerned from both

ordinary and philosophical discourse.

In this chapter

I

wish to lay out the main features of at least one concept in
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this family that will be important
throughout the remainder
of the study.

^

•

**

What Things Do the Expressing ?
There has not been complete agreement
among

Philosophers on just which things may be
said, in the sense
they have in mind, to express thoughts.
One natural

view—

view suggested by the sort of instances
of ordinary usage
cited just above— is that pe rsons express
thoughts, doing so
in a

variety of ways, but commonly, and perhaps

paradi gmat i cal

1

y

,

by uttering sentences.

In the philosophy

of language though (and in other fields where
this

relationship of language to thought is deemed important to
theory),

is common to find talk of sentences expressing

it

thoughts.

This,

abstraction:

perhaps,

results from a certain

a shift for the sake of

simplicity (to avoid

any parameters unnecessary for tasks at hand) from

One expresses

x

by uttering S

to

x

is

expressed by

S

Strictly, abstracting in this way is acceptable only if the

thought expressed doesn’t vary depending on who is doing the
uttering.
i

We shall soon see that for some sentences there

such variance in which thought is expressed, and that our
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concept of sentential expression
must be understood to
involve a parameter that,
roughly speaking, takes who
is
doing the uttering into
account.
In any case, some
Philosophers have been unwilling
to accept talk of sentences
expressing thoughts, and have
maintained that other items
be seen as the things that
do the expressing,

some

holding that persons do it, some
holding that utterances of
sentences are the responsible items,
others preferring to
speak of uses of sentences as
the things that do the
expressing
Still, on each of these various
conceptions— whether

the idea is that persons do the
expressing by uttering

sentences, or that sentences themselves
express thoughts, or
that utterances of sentences do the
job— the relationship
posited is one that does connect sentences
to thoughts.
There may well be significant differences
separating these
various conceptions; and perhaps one of these
points of view
is

conceptually fundamental, the other conceptions being

definable in terms of it.

For our purposes, though, what is

important is that an intuitive link of the relevant sort
can
be discerned between sentences and thoughts;

the fact is

that in a vast number of particular cases, the question

— Is

this sentence linked, by the relation of expression, to that

thought?

will

be answered the same by proponents of any of

these conceptions, however much these conceptions may differ
from one another.

Present purposes, then, do not dictate a

choice as to which things do the expressing, and
156

I

will

typical ly settle hereafter for
speaking of sentences

expressing thoughts.

In any example or contention
important

for subsequent discussions,
when

expresses a thought,

I

say that some sentence

expect that the case at hand will
be
one about which proponents of these
various conceptions
I

of

expression would be in agreement ... not
about what thing,
strictly speaking, is doing the expressing,
but about
whether the sentence and thought in
question are connected
according to their respective conceptions
of expression.

5

2

Some Parameters of Expression
We want to be able to speak of the thought
expressed by

a

sentence, and to express this functional relationship
by

some basic locution...

S

expresses

x

would be a natural proposal.

However,

it can be seen,

strictly speaking, that it is not sufficient to speak of
sentence expressing some particular thought, simpl iciter

a
.

Intuitive considerations show that it is only relative to

a

variety of parameters that we can speak of any thought being

uniquely expressed by a given sentence.
5.2.1

2

Interpretat ons
i

I

assume that some languages may be said to have

sentences in common.

And

I

assume that in the case of
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certain sentences, it will be
sufficient to posit which of
the languages containing that
sentence
is

determine which thought is expressed.

in question,

In such cases,

to

then,

it would suffice to have a
parameter for language:
s

expresses

x

in L

With s ome sentences, specifying language
will suffice, but
not all.
A natural language typically
contains ambiguous
sentences sentences that have more than
one available
i

nterpretat i on in the language.

i

nterpretations that an ambiguous sentence has

will

And typically, the
in a language

be ones relative to which the sentence
expresses

different thoughts.

3

If an expression is ambiguous in a given
language,

then

roughly speaking there is more than one set of rules
and

conventions each of which governs some one strict and
literal usage for that expression in the language (I count

sentences as expressions here).

I

shall speak of any such

set as a particular meaning that the expression has in the
language. 4

Then an interpretation may be understood to be

any function,

domain of

i

meaning that

i,

is the set of
S has

to a language,

two

L

such that, for some language

L,

in L.

sentences in

L,

L:

1)

the

and 2) i(S) is a

Any functions related in this way

shall be termed "L

i

nterpretations"

.

Any

interpretations will agree in their assignments to the

unambiguous sentences of

L;

they may agree in their

assignments to different sentences as well (in the case of
158

synonymous sentences).

But there will be L interpretations

that disagree in their assignments
to any ambiguous
sentence
In preceding discussions,

I

have spoken of ambiguous

sentences having several available
interpretations, as
such sentences were distinguished
by there being

if

several

interpretations with those sentences in
their domains.
But
an* sentence of a given language,
L, figures in the domain
of everjr L interpretation.

When

I

say that ambiguous

sentences have more than one available
interpretation,
be understood to mean that, where
L is the language in

may

I

question, these sentences each have more than
one meaning to
which L interpretations assign them.
The concept of
by the general

i

nterpretati on at issue here is subsumed

notion of the reading of an expression in a

language, and consequently akin to the notion of a
reading
of a verb or verb phrase introduced in Chapter

2.

In a full

account of these concepts, one would want to develop the
idea that readings in general are governed by a principle of

compos

i

t

i

onal i ty

,

and that,

in the case of

interpretations,

the interpretations available for a sentence will be

determined at least in part by the readings available for
the constituents of the sentence.
If we incorporate a parameter for

may drop the reference to language.
be
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i

nterpretati ons

,

we

Then our locution would

S

expresses

x on

i

With the assumption that for
any
on

S,

x

and

only if s is a sentence of
a language

i

i,

L,

s expresses x

and

i

is an L

interpretation.
5

-2.2

Index i cal i tv and
If an L

i

iiqo

nterpretati on is specified for a given

sentence, one particular meaning that
the sentence has in
is thereby determined.
And with many sentences, this will
suffice to determine what thought is
expressed— wi th many
sentences, but not all. 5 in English and
other natural

L

languages, there are certain expressions,
so-called

indexicals, that have the following character
i sti c

:

if a

sentence of the language contains such an expression,
0
then which thought is expressed by the sentence
will not
,

be

determined once and for all by the meaning of the sentence
alone, but will vary from one use of the sentence to

another,

in a way having to do with certain features of

involved

u ses of

0

.

Personal pronouns ('I’,

'yours’, etc.) and demonstratives ('that’,

'You’,

'these’,

'me’,

'then’,

etc.) along with certain adjectives, adverbs and adverbial

modifiers ('present’,

'now’

'here’

'actually’ etc.) are

standardly taken to be examples of English indexicals.
Before discussing the connection between indexicals,
uses and the expression of thoughts,

background assumptions.

I

let me mention a few

take a use of an expression
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(sentence, word or phrase) to be
an event of a certain
kind,
and I propose to confine
attention here to linguistic uses
of expressions. 6
I suppose that
typical examples are events
of a person’s uttering a
sentence or a word, in the course
of-as we might intuitively describe

it-expressing

thought.

7

Also,

a

assume that a use of a sentence, of
the
sort I am considering, may be
said to involve events each of
which is a use of one of the words
that make up that
sentence; any such involved events
will, then, also be uses
of the sort relevant here.
Finally, we assume that if S is
a sentence of L, then it makes
sense to speak of S

expressing

a

I

thought on a use (for given

Briefly,

L

interpretation).

let’s consider a case that serves to

illustrate the point that if a sentence contains
an
indexical, then which thought is expressed by the
sentence
will vary from use to use, depending on features
of involved

uses of the indexical.

(

1

shall assume that

You are ill.

)

is an

acceptable example of an unambiguous sentence in

English.

In this connection,

the word 'you’
in the

it

I

important to see that

itself is unambiguous; the one meaning it has

language is indicated (well enough?) by noting that

is a

that,

it is

pronoun whose denotation is restricted in such

on any occasion of use,

persons being addressed.

a way

it denotes the person or

Then,

if

it is granted that (1)

unambiguous (in English), and yet there is found to be an
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is

intuitive variation in which thought
can be expressed by
,
(in English), this variation
will not be attributable to
any
sh i ft from one of the sentence’s
English interpretations to
another
(

Now let

u

and u’

be two uses of

( 1

and suppose that

),

am the one being addressed by the
use of 'you’

)

I

involved in

whereas you are the addressee of the use
of the pronoun
involved in u’.
I think it is intuitively
clear that there

u,

is a unique thought expressed by
(1) on either of these

uses,

but that the thought expressed by

( 1

from the thought expressed by (1) on u’.

)

on u is distinct

The first thought

concerns me not you; the second concerns you not
me. 8
Note that the selection of

u

and

u’

was arbitrary,

subject only to the provision that the two uses are ones
involving uses of the personal pronoun addressed to
people, you and me.

And the choice of distinct

addressees was arbitrary as well.

So,

it appears to be a

sufficient condition for getting distinct thoughts expressed
by (1)
'you’

(in English) on given uses that the involved uses of

have different addressees.

a necessary condition as well:

Moreover it appears to be
If uses are picked that have

n

common who is addressed by the involved uses of 'you’, it

is

intuitively clear that the same thought is then expressed

i

on those uses.

Consider, for example, which thought we

should say is expressed by (1) on either of two uses, one

where the user is you, the other having me as the user, but

162

both involving uses of
'you' addressed to me
(I am facing
mirror, perhaps, persuading
myself not to go out for the
evening).
I think it is
clear that the same thought
is
expressed by
on either use.
)
(

a

1

Consequently, which thought is
expressed by ( 1
does
not depend solely on what
meaning the sentence has (on a
given interpretation).
Rather, there are different thoughts
expressed by the sentence on
different occasions of its use,
despite the fact that it has only
one meaning in English,
and which thought is expressed
on a given use may be seen to
depend on a particular feature of
the involved use of ’you’,
nam6ly
person is the rnirtr..... of that use
Like
considerations suggest an analogous
dependence on features
of use in determining which thoughts
are expressed by
)

’

.

sentences containing other expressions
standardly considered
to be indexicals.

Which thought is expressed on

by a sentence containing

'I’,

a

given use

for example, will depend on

w ho is the user (of the involved use
of 'x’)

;

is expressed on a use by a sentence
containing

which thought
'that cat’,

will depend on w hat thing is the demonstrandum
(of the

involved use of 'that cat’).
More generally it appears that with any indexical term,

0

,

we may associate a family of features of use,

that if a sentence contains occurrences of 0
the sentence expresses on a use,

the features of
in u.

F

u,

,

F,

such

which thought

will depend on which of

is exemplified by the uses of 0 involved

In the case of

'you’,

for example, the relevant
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family of features includes
exactly those featu res
that for some x,
f = the

5

2

.

f

>

,

property of being a use addressed
to

such

x. 9

Contexts

3

propose to accommodate this
variation in which
thought a sentence expresses in
a way that has become
pretty
much the standard, by adopting
a parameter slated for
contexts of use.
Some possible situations are such
that for
a given sentence, s, there is
a single use of that sentence
in the situation.
I shall call such
a situation a context
I

of use for s 10
.

I

context of use for

shall suppose that by specifying
a
S,

we may determine a set of features
of

use of whatever families are relevant
to the use-to-use

variation in which thought this sentence
expresses.
Then, the locution

I

shall adopt for the concept of

sentential expression will be:
S

expresses

x on

i

with respect to (wrt)

c.

It is important to keep in mind that the sole
function of

this added parameter of context is to fix, for any
sentence

containing indexicals, whatever features of a given use of
the sentence are relevant in determining the thought

expressed on that use.
We make the following assumption concerning the concept

expressed by this locution:
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(A8)

VS Vx Vi Vc
if s expresses x on i wrt
c, then c
context of use
anc
L
a language,
sentence of L, and i is an L
interpretation ).
(

*

•

s

a

S

i

s a

Before proceeding let me consider
some matters of
terminology:
suppose that we are concerned with
the thought
expressed by a sentence that is
unambiguous in a certain
language L, and we are interested in
the thought expressed
by this sentence on its L
interpretations.
It is simpler to
speak of the thought expressed by the
sentence in L (wrt a
context),

rather than saying "on any given

or like phrase.
in L,

interpretation"

Provided that the sentence is unambiguous

this procedure will suffice.

given context,

L

c,

So,

for example, with a

we may speak of the thought expressed by

(1) In English wrt c,

and which thought we are speaking of

will be well defined, assuming that (1) is indeed

unambiguous in English.

In what follows,

I

will

occasionally omit reference to interpretation (or language)
or context altogether in speaking of the thought expressed
by a sentence.

language,

On such occasions,

there will always be some

interpretation or context, as the case may be,

that is pretty obviously the one intended.

If the omission

occurs in my formulation of a principle or definition, it
may be assumed (unless otherwise noted) that

I

have a

generalization in mind that holds with respect to any
interpretation and context.
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Consider the following sentence
There are at least three
dishonest politicians.
I

assume that

unambiguous in English, and that
it
involves no indexical elements.
Then on the present
(

2

)

is

conception we may say that this
sentence expresses the same
thought in English wrt one context
as it does wrt any
11
other.
But is this an intuitively acceptable
result?

What about contexts of use for
(2) in which the uses of
the sentence are in other languages
that happen to count (2)
as a sentence? 12
Does (2) express the same thought wrt
those contexts? On the present conception
of sentential
expression there will be cases with respect
to which it is
correct to say that a thought expressed by
a sentence in a
given language, and wrt a given context, is
distinct from
any thought expressed by that sentence in the
language used
in that context.
it will

This may seem counterintuitive and perhaps

be worthwhile to consider such a case.

suppose that for any linguistic use of an expression

I

there is some language that may be properly identified as
the language of use.

I n which the user
uses,

Intuitively, this will be the language

is doing the uttering.

Concerning some

it may be difficult to determine which language is the

one of use; presumably, the matter depends principally on
the user’s intentions in uttering the sentence, though

exactly how it depends on such intentions
(nor am

I

prepared) to say.

And
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I

I

don’t propose

suppose that it is

possi bl

for there to be a language,
call

it English*,

counting (2) as a sentence
but in which the meaning
of
is rather the English
meaning of
12*)

(

2

)

There are at most four roast
dumplings

What is expressed, according
to the present conception,
by (2) wrt a context in which
the use of (2) is in English*?
(A cook, we may imagine, is
warning the waiters about the
shortage in dumplings.) Let 'c
denote the context in
2
question.
It may seem somewhat counterintuitive
to say that
the thought expressed wrt c is one
that has to do with the
2
number of dishonest politicians.
Indeed, this is not what
we should say if the intended question
is:
what thought is
expressed by (2) in English* wrt c ?
A proper answer to
2
this question is rather what we would
expect:
that the
thought expressed is the same one expressed
'

by (2*)

English— a thought having to

do,

in

not with the number of

dishonest politicians, but with the number of roast
dump! i ngs

But there is also, on the conception

clear question posed by asking:

English wrt

c

2

.

I

am proposing, a

what is expressed by (2) in

The answer to this question is that (2)

expresses the same thought in English wrt
any other context:

c 2 as

it does wrt

a thought concerning dishonest

politicians, true relative to and only to those situations

where there are at least three of them.
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It may seem odd to

say that any thought at all

is

expressed by

(

2 ),

in Fna

„. h

with respect to some context
where the sentence is used
in
another language.
But as long as there is not
contextual
variation in which thought the
sentence expresses,
specification of a context is otiose.
in the case of (2),
we already have our thought in
hand, independent of fixing
the contextual parameter; it’s
been determined by the

meaning of (2) in English.

Imagine that we are viewing the

situation in which the chef is uttering
(2), speaking
English*, and it is put to us:
"what has just been
expressed in English?"
I take there to be one
clear sense
of this interrogative such that, if
we know the meaning of
(2)

in English,

even if we haven’t the slightest idea of

what language is being used, the question
asked is one that
we can answer. 13

5

•

3

Not Purely Semantic Conception

A

The notion of sentential expression that

intended to isolate is,
soiftQn t

i

conception.

in a certain sense,

a

I

have

purely

What is expressed by a sentence is

determined as far as possible by the meaning of the
sentence

— by

the rules and conventions governing its strict

and literal usage.

It is true that in the case of a

sentence containing indexicals, meaning alone does not
suffice to determine what is expressed.

However, by

indicating a context, we specify all features of use
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relevant for the contained
indexicals; the meaning of the
sentence, together with this
information supplied by the
context, does suffice to determine
which thought is
expressed.
It is a feature of the
present concept of
sentential expression that
considerations having to do with
what the speaker in a given
context intends to be conveying
to his or her audience will not,
in general, be relevant to
which thought is expressed 14 a
point that can be seen from
the example above concerning the
cook’s English*
;

use of (2).

Also, considerations concerning
pragmatic principles will
not, in general, be relevant in
determining which thought is
expressed. These are two marks of the notion
of sentential

expression adopted here in virtue of which it
may be said to
be a purely semantic conception, two
marks that distinguish
this notion from a certain other conception of
"what’s

expressed" that is also familiar and that also has a fairly
clear application to certain cases.

It will

be worthwhile

to consider an example that highlights the difference

between our concept and this other one.

Consider a case of irony:

Sarah and

I

are having a

conversation at a party and she has made it clear that she’s
operating in a facetious mode; she’s made plenty of

obviously sarcastic remarks already.
that

I

I

have just exclaimed

am very unhappy at how many of our country’s

politicians are dishonest, to which Sarah replies (with a
nudge),
pol

i

"Oh Aronszajn,

there aren’t any dishonest

ticians.
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I

take it that

(3)

There aren’t any dishonest
politicians.

is unambiguous and free of

indexicals, and (like (2) above)

paradigm of the sort of sentence that
does not vary in
which thought it expresses from context
a

to context.

It

expresses just one thought with respect
to any situation in
which it is uttered, no matter what the
utterer is thinking,
no matter what he or she means to
convey to an audience, and
no matter what features are displayed
by any conversation in

which the utterance is made.

The thought this sentence

expresses is one that will be true relative to all
and only
those situations that are free of dishonest politicians.
These are all things that can be said concerning what
is

expressed by (3),

in the sense of

question so far.

Let us call the thought expressed by (3),

in this sense,

"T3“.

'express’ that has been in

Nevertheless, it is plain enough that

Sarah is agreeing with me in her facetious way, and it is
clear that,

in uttering

convey, call

it

"T3*"

(3),

the thought she means to

is one that is not true in situations

where there are no dishonest politicians.

Plainly, then,

T3* and T3 are different thoughts.

Now

I

think it must be acknowledged that there is a

familiar sense in which,
above,

in the case of

irony described

it would be uncontroversi all y correct to say that

Sarah has expressed T3*, and not T3.
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If,

in response,

I

were to ask Sarah:

po^i

Jcians^?

are l0tS ° f disho "*st

9

could expect her to pat me on the
back, congratulating me
on catching her drift; -yes" would
be the correct answer to
my question.
It seems to me that there is,
derivatively, a
sense in which it would be proper to say
that the sentence
Sarah has uttered expresses T3*, and not
T3, in this
situation.
I shall suppose that there
is such a sense.
It
I

should be clear, however, that for a thought
to be expressed
with respect to a situation, in the purely
semantic sense
I

have been concerned with,

is not for that thought to be

expressed in the situation, in this derivative sense
just now suggested.

expressed,

in the

In the former sense,

T3

j_s

I

have

what’s

latter sense, not.

To determine which thought is expressed in a given

situation,

in this other sense now at issue,

it

i

necessary

to consider which thought the user intends to convey or

express.

The fact that it is,

in this sense,

T3* that is

expressed stems in part from the fact that Sarah is being
facetious;

I

take it that this depends in turn on what it is

that Sarah means or intends to express or convey in the

situation.

Also, that Sarah successfully expresses T3* in

this situation, and hence,
said,

in a

in turn,

that her sentence may be

derivative sense, to express that thought in the

situation, depends on features of the conversation she and
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I

are having.

The conversation must accord
with certain

pragmatic principles, in particular,
with maxims governing
the proper use and expression of
irony.
I suppose that
one
such principle or maxim sets certain
standards of
explicitness:
if Sarah had not made it
sufficiently
explicit that she was being facetious,

then her remark would

not be (or at least not so clearly
be) counted as having the
desired effect:
that of expressing T3*.
in these respects,
then, this other conception of what’s
expressed differs from
the purely semantic one I have been
concerned with up to

now
I

believe that both of these notions of sentential

expression may figure in our intuitions concerning
which
thoughts are expressed in everyday contexts of use.^

In

what follows, though, any principles, assumptions or

contentions that involve a concept of sentential expression
should be understood to involve the original, purely

semantic notion.

have attempted, here, to draw attention

I

to the existence of another, not purely semantic conception
of what’s expressed mainly as a preventative measure.

Suppose
a

I

claim at some point that a sentence,

certain thought,

x,

S,

expresses

with respect to some context,

c.

The

reader may envision situations fitting my description of c

(exemplifying the same features relevant to the

contributions of any contained indexicals, etc.), yet find
there to be a plain sense of 'expresses’ such that it is

clearly true to say,

in thi

sense, that S does not express

x

in those situations.

Then the reader may be
tempted to

suppose that my claim as to
which thought is expressed
by S
with respect to c has been
refuted.
But this is too hasty.
To refute my claim, it doesn’t
suffice to adduce situations
such that, in s ome sense or othe
r (perhaps quite
familiar),
it is clearly true to say
that S doesn’t express x in those
si tuati ons

5

•

4

Some Final Provisos

Before proceeding, it is worth stating
a few provisos
concerning the range and application of
this purely semantic
concept of sentential expression.
5

*

4,1

Tho ught, Expression and Utteranrp

Perhaps the most familiar occasions on which
we would
ordinarily speak of thoughts getting expressed
by sentences
are those in which a person has been thinking
a certain
thought, utters a sentence, and thereby, as we would

intuitively put it, expresses what he or she has been
thinking.

Sarah is thinking that the chairman has put on a

little weight, and she tells me so, uttering:
"The chairman has put on a little weight."

Certainly a thought has been expressed.

The reader would be

correct to anticipate, however, that on the present

conception of sentential expression, there are sentences
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that express thoughts that
have never been, are
not, and
will never be what anyone
is thinking, and there
are
thoughts expressed by sentences
that have never been,
are
not being, and will never
be uttered.
5

‘

4 2
-

Expressin g Emotions, etc.

There are a lot of things
besides thoughts that, in
some sense or other, may be
said to be expressed by
sentences:
we may speak of expressing
emotions (anger,
happiness, frustration), of
expressing various attitudes
(intentional or otherwise— bel ief,
desire, disdain, pity),
and odd and sundry other things
(rumors, opinions, ideas).
Some such talk is to be found in
preceding chapters of this
study.
it is a feature of the concept
of sentential
expression adopted here, that if a
sentence expresses a
thing, for a given interpretation and
context, that thing is
a thought.
I do not propose to
examine whether these
various other uses can be understood by
appeal to the

present notion.
Two last provisos concern some limitations
on the link

established, by the present notion of expression,
between
the domains of sentence and thought.

5.4.3

Performati ves

There are sentences that we might be inclined to say do
not serve the purpose in ordinary use of expressing

thoughts.

So-called perf ormati ves are cases in point.

Instances of the following schema are examples:
174

(FI

)

I

hereby promise to 0

.

It may be observed that in
normal

contexts of use, the

speaker does not intend to express
a thought when he or she
utters an instance of (FI); rather,
the purpose is normally
that of making a promise.
Some might conclude from this
observation that such sentences do not
express thoughts at
all (l.e. with respect to any
contexts); they are just not
sentences of the appropriate sort.
Let me set aside the question of what
should count as a
normal
context of use, and of whether it would
follow from
the fact that no thought is expressed
in any normal context,

that no thought is expressed in

arvy

context.

I

am prepared

to allow that there is a sense in which,
concerning typical

cases of the use of an instance of (FI),

it would be correct

to say that the sentence does not express a
thought.
in mind some sense of

have

'express’ akin to the not purely

semantic one discussed in 5.3.
no thought is expressed,
in a given context,

I

in th

However, from the fact that
i

sense, by such a sentence

it does not follow that there isn’t a

thought expressed by the sentence, in our sense, with
respect to that context.

I

am inclined to think that there

are contexts and thoughts such that instances of (4) express

those thoughts with respect to those contexts.
(FI’)

He thereby promised to 0
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.

Consider

Aren't there plenty of contexts
relative to which instances
of this schema should be said
to express thoughts? And
wouldn’t it be proper to say that
corresponding instances of
(FI) and (FI') express the same
thought relative to contexts
c and c’ (respectively) such that
the user in c = the

demonstrandum of 'he' in o’?
and c’ are required,

I

suppose, concerning the contributions

of 'hereby' and 'thereby'.)
5

•

(Some further constraints on c

I

am inclined to think so. 16 17
-

Inexpressible Thouflhts ?

4

It is not universally agreed that for every
thought

there is a sentence that expresses it.

Perhaps some

thoughts are somehow too complex or too "large” to even
possibly be expressed in any language.

Tradition and the alternative to it that
Chapter
as if,

9

are both mute on this matter.

to put it roughly,

The Propositional
I

describe in

Moreover,

it’s not

the spirit of either account of

the nature of thoughts suggests any generalization that

would rule out one side or the other of the present issue.
So

I

think it is safe and best for present purposes to

suspend judgment on whether, for every thought,

it is at

least possible that there be a sentence in some language

that expresses it.

I

think the matter is important and

interesting, and one that ought to be settled by any

adequate, complete account of the nature of thoughts and of
the relationship of language to thought.

Such an account

does not lie within the intended scope of the present study.
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The two provisos just
considered in 5.4.3 and 5 4.4
concern certain limitations that
some might wish to impose
on the relation of sentential
expression.
Despite these
provisos, it is still safe to say
that virtually all
.

philosophers who have accepted that
there are such things as
thoughts would hold i) that sentences
do express thoughts
(in a sense of 'expresses’

relevantly like the one

I

have

sought to isolate in this chapter),
and ii) that the set of
things expressed, in that sense, by
a vast number and wide
variety of sentences coincides with a
vast and varied
(though perhaps proper) subset of thoughts.
In the next

chapter,

I

shall present and discuss what

I

believe is an

important addition to this thesis that sentences
express
thoughts, an addition that, broadly speaking,
connects

certain types of sentence to certain types of thought
by
appeal to our relation of sentential expression.
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To use a worn and weary example, we
may note that what
thought is expressed by

Jones owns both banks.
will depend on how we disambiguate
the sentence, on which of
its interpretations we pick:
on one of these it has a
meaning close to that of
(al)

Jones owns both river sides;

not close to that of
(a2)

Jones owns both financial institutions.

On another available interpretation, (a) has
a meaning close
to that of ( a2 )
not close to that of (al).
And these two
sentences, (al) and a2 )
in virtue of having these
different meanings, express different thoughts.
Another way of accomodating ambiguity relies on
individuating sentences (and other expressions) more finely.
In the case just discussed this way of handling
ambiguity
would claim that there are two words spelled the same, B-AN-K, and two correspondi ng sentences either one of which
is
exhibited in (a) above.
Disambiguation, then, will be an
operation mapping, not sentences to meanings, but rather
spellings to sentences, since on this way of handling
matters, each sentence of the language has exactly one
meani ng
I believe that the approach taken in the text,
of
supposing that one and the same word or sentence may be said
to have several meanings relative to varying
i nterpretat i ons
is acceptable for purposes at hand.
(

,

The term 'meaning’ has a history of conflicting usage
Some have used the term in such a sense
that, when they speak of the meaning of a sentence, they are
speaking of what I would say is the thought expressed by the
sentence.
It should not be expected that this usage
4.

in philosophy.
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A fairly simple argument can be given
for the claim
that the thoughts expressed by
on u and u’ are distinct
we appeal to the notion of a thought’s being
true or
false relative to situations.
Let ’T(me)’ denote the
thought expressed by (1) on u, and 'T(you)’ the thought
expressed by (1) on u’. The question is whether T(me) =
T(you).
But it seems intuitively plain that T(me)
the
thought expressed by (1) when I am being addressed is a
thought that is true relative to any situation provided
that, in that situation, X am ill; T(me) may be true
relative to situations where you are as healthy as can be.
On the other hand, it seems just as clear that T(you) the
thought expressed by (1) when you are the addressee will be
true relative to a situation only if you are ill in the
situation.
So, there are situations relative to which T(me)
is true while T(you) is false, ones where I am ill and you
are not; let s* be such a situation.
Then I take it that
(

1

)

l

—
—

—
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5

b9
9 trUe relative to »*.
property acked'b^T^vouI
a
pr ° vi cjed that discernibles
are not identical, T(me) i
T(you)
Per * aps this argument
will not persuade die-hard
+
IS not an indexical and
that (1) does not^ary^ir^the y ° U
Ste
th
9ht
expresses 'from one
anoth!r
Nev
N4vertheiess
ertheless, ?h
the argument seems to me to use
be
conclusive

^

1

‘

'

’

U

L

0t at 311 certain that the
functioning
2
expressions in any language can always of
be
for in this way by appeal to
some associated
features of use. Moreover, it would
be an
oversimplification to suppose that all
variation
in which
thought is expressed, from one use
of
a
sentence
to
another
is the result of the
36
the sentence.

indexing?
indexical
accounted
family of

-

’

Let^^rthltTLn^nce^rus;-^"

0 ?’ jUSt in Case ^ich thought
ex
lxp^ses
presses on that interpretation
varies from use to usp
(this i S pretty much Kaplan’s notion
of context
CaSS ° f
ser| tences7^thei r use1
fr ° m a certain f°nn of a contained
exDrlaiTnn nr I m 3 syntactlc feature
of the sentence
TtseTf?

n

thatTf^

s^U^tv^eJ/^f

—

A clear

“

example of this, as I see it, is in the case nf
sentences in English.
I believe these are
1
Se s ® nsitlve
but imperatives needn’t contain any
ind^v? ?
indexicaTs.
An imperative free of indexical
sensitive in virtue of its being an instance terms is useof a particular
grammatical construction.
I will
discuss the matter of
imperative sentences expressing thoughts in the
following
section.
My point here is only that, as I see it,
an
explanation of use-sensitivity by appeal to an
association
families of features of use to certain lexical
items will
not be adequate.

impede

>

10.
This is a departure from a certain canonical
conception.
Standardly, when contexts are introduced in
discussions of formal semantic theory, they are taken to be
(or to be idealizations of) situations, but not
generally
situations in which some sentence or other is being uttered
or otherwise used. (See Kaplan [1989b]
pp. 492-512, and
[1989a], pp. 591-98; also Cresswell [1973], especially
pp.
109-19, and Lewis [1980].)
And there are some good reasons,
for semantic and logical purposes, for not requiring that
contexts involve uses of sentences, generally. (Again, see
Kaplan [1989b], p. 522.) Still, I think any intuit ions we
have concerning what a sentence (in particular, a sentence
with indexical constituents) expresses with respect to a
situation are guided by consideration of situations in which
that sentence is used.
It will not undermine any central
points in what follows if we continue to conceive of
contexts as bona-f de contexts of use.
i
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Pace Mark Richard and Nathan
Salmon
These two
authors (along with many
others)
maintain
that which thought
is expressed by a
sentence such
1

1

•

as

(a)

There are exactly three
1
dishonest politicians
depends not only on the meaning
of the sentence but as
on the time of utterance.
well
(a), it would be claimed,
expresses a
rent thought at 6:00 a.m.
GMT, 12/20/1990
than it did at/!®
the same time of day,
12/20/1853
To use
3 t® rmin °l°9y, the meaning
of any
sentence
ntence thJ
that lacks a time indication
for the main V prh
f
nonj S? the ^nst^ u

’

®^’

^r^’"essi^n^

a

the meanings of such

e

seniLLl allne--wSarhe^eferr?o b L

view, tne sentence as a whole is
seen to behave as if thorp
were an indexical element in it,
since which ^hoCght it
expresses varies from context to context.
U
dl
S
n of this Perspective, See
Richard
Liaoij
[1981 ]°and
ana LI
M982l
anH Salmon
s ?
r
982], and
[1986], pp. 24-40
I do not
r
tS
Ut forward for this vi ew about timeindication less
iesr sentences
?
very persuasive, but the grounds
r
n
are " ot Sermane to any points essential
to the main
rnair
v?ews ? am developing here.
vlews
I shall
?,
set this
}
dispute aside
in what follows and proceed with
the
assumption that such time-indicationless
sentences as (a)
are not use-sensitive.
i

7

S a thi ket of issue s that I find
puzzling here.
Suppose thatl rI say ^ That is a sentence of
English,"
referring to a sentence tokened by some batch
of chalk marks
on a blackboard.
Suppose what I say is true.
The next day
I
say
That was a sentence of English.", referring to
a
sentence tokened by a bunch of sounds produced by my
wife
during a conversation at the dinner table.
Suppose again
that what I’ve said is true.
Could the same English
sentence be at issue on the two occasions? Presumably
so.
Then whatever English sentences are, they must be
items that
can have both batches of chalk residue and bunches
of sounds
as tokens.
Cal
the batch of chalk marks and the bunch of sounds
cited above, t and t
respectively, and suppose that they
s
are tokens of the same English sentence.
Could some
language have a sentence of which t is a perfectly good
c
token, but of which t
is not?
I would think so.
And we
s
might be inclined to say that this will be the case i_f the
sentence of which t is a token is a sentence of both
c
languages but is pronounced differently in the other
language than it is in English.
But is this a necessary
1

,
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“

°f
b
s
a°token°and°t
c
'
61 6 1 S no overla
in the sentences of English
P
and
fiH
,
rather, some of the sentences of of^hi
°^ her lan9ua 9 a
1

;

y
,

rii-P-P _

+

rather

th.i ??

languages

t^ ere ls a common sentence
pronounced
What condit i°ns should we say,

d U " der

£ SttEnft — " «"

-

-

two

m re fd " damental pair of
is:
under
what
at conS???on<=
conditions ?is a thing a sentence of questions
a languaqe
and
w at sort of items satisfy these
conditions? (Sentences
“* they?) 0ne mi 9 ht be inclined ?o !; y of
15 3 sentence of a language if its
a bunch of
words o?^hI?
of the language put together in
accordance with a rule
governing the formation of sentences.
But
kindred trouble from the notion of a thing'sthis only borrows
being a worSin
“
a language
We normally suppose a language to have
a
lexicon a list of the basic items counted
as words.
But
under what conditions does an item count
as a word of a
9e
and What
rt ° f items satisfy those conditions?
’f course, t°
(Words, of
but what are they?)
Fortunately, we needn’t (I hope) address these
questions for present purposes. What I shall suppose
is
hat an event, e, and item, S, may be so related
that
i) e
is a
inguistic use of S and ii) S is a sentence of some
language.
I
think there are many familiar examples of pairs
of event, e, and item, S, related in this way
and that in
many cases we have no problem in telling when such
a pair
are thus related or not, even if we don’t have a clear
idea
what sort of item one (or either) of the pair is.
I do not
have any proposal of informative conditions under which
this
relation holds or of informative conditions under which an
item may be said to be a sentence of a language.

fSc
1

What should we say is expressed by a sentence in a
language, L, with respect to a given context, when the
sentence contains a term that is an indexical according to
L, but not according to the language of use?
Consider the
following case: A person utters (1), 'You are ill’, but she
is speaking a language, call it "Minglish", just like
English except that the English meanings of 'you’ and 'ill’
are switched, respectively, with those of 'monkeys’ and
'crazy’.
Let us call the context in which this woman’s
Minglish use of (1) occurs, "c^"
Then what is expressed by
(1) in Minglish with respect to c. is the same thought
expressed in English, with respect any context, by
13.

(1*)

Monkeys are crazy.
182

by

W

S

P

( 1

l

n

seen to be

especially problematic.
S e

respect to
Here Shere may be a Drobli^
sentence in
Minglish, contains no index°clls’ anH
d we may su PPose that
the woman’s use of M 1 ?„ J h
lnVOlVe ause of
that is addressed to inySne
pltuT*
6
Umerita ry ab ° Ut the
tropical
She°h
c 1?

-

’

'W

1

1^0^’

for^
nyone

s

listening; she’s not addressing
herself- there is

1 s a11
pr °P°se to understand this
situation it is a
case of£ underdetermination:
there is no thought expressed
ed
by (1) in English with respect
to c<
It i^orth
9
that We n dn,t attend to siih
cases--s^tua??ons in
wMch^h
which the value
i
of the parameter of language and
the
language of use in the context do not
match—
in
order
to
find examples of such underdetermi
nati on
Consider the following case (a resemblance
between this
case and that of Max, the hallucinating
antique dealer
describee! in the preceding chapter
(section 4.2 pp. 16-19)
should be clear).
I am suffering a vivid
seeming hallucination; I think I have just utterly realtaken the
temperature of a person seated in front of me,
and that I am
looking at a thermometer reading 03 u f
say (to this
person, as it seems to me)

r

1

"You are ill
T he fact is that I really do utter the
sentence (and no
other use of the sentence occurs, so we have a
context of
use of the sentence) but there is no addressee of
the
involved use of the pronoun.
I take the underdetermination
in this case to be entirely analogous to that
involved in
c i*
Then, on the present conception, we should say that
no
thought is expressed by (1) in English with respect to this
context.
The fact that English happens to be the language I
am speaking in this case makes no difference.
In cases where an indexical is associated with a family
of features of use such that it is essential to any use that
it possess some one feature of that family, cases of underdetermi nat on will not arise involving uses of that
indexical.
It seems plausible to suppose, for example, that
necessarily if an event occurs, then there is a specific
time at which it occurs (or perhaps period during which it
occurs).
So, any use of an expression will have some unique
time of occurrence.
Then, consider the following case.
A
i
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man utters
2 **

There are now three
dishonest politicians,
speak i ng a language just
”
like English except that
th-io i
the worn
now
i
s what
9
ieasv means
Engl i sh
Let-s cin ?hrr
language, "now/at-least
English
and let C**"
"h
h th1s man s use ’of
the sentence occurs
thetrtfa ih 0 w?
by (2 **>
in now/at-least En^ish
„Uh
to
P
the same
thought expressed bv ( 22**1 in tetpett
that tlanguage with respect to
any context (fnr (»i,
C
>
contalns no indexicals of this
language)
language)
The very same thought is
expressed hv lot i n
WltH reSP8Ct to a "* context?
But ?“?. is also
thtulht
b
f or
there was neverthele
a unique time of the man’s
use of the
term in c
Let *t
expressed by ( 2 **, in
same thought expressed by (2**)
in English with respett to
any context in which the use
of ’now’ is at t** a thought
true relative to just those
situations n which there are at
least three dishonest politicians
at t;*i
There are other sorts of cases with*
respect to whirh t
ne
at s P ecif y in 9 values for both of
our
Daramptl --r°
parameters
for both l nterpretat on (or language)
and
context -does not suffice to determine
a thought expressed
y a given sentence.
Some such cases do not hinge on there
ny fa lure to determine some relevant
feature of use
Th^n ?
^
°^ senten al expression I intend is such that,
In general
f
fj^nce contains a directly
term pnH
and a» use of that sentence in a context, referential
c, involves a
use of the term lacking a referent,
then no thought is
expressed by the sentence with respect to that
context,
(I
am using the term 'directly referential’
in the sense
developed by Kaplan; see Kaplan [1989b].
Salmon also
provides a very clear discussion of the relevant
notion n
Salmon [1981], Chapter 1. Yet I do not think
that all
irectly referential terms are indexicals; proper
names for
example, are directly referential, but are not
indexicals.
Failure of expression of thought in such cases due
to nonreferring proper names, then, cannot be accounted for by
appeal to an underdetermi nat ion of relevant features
of use
Some (Strawson perhaps is one) might even hold that
this failure of expression is true not only in cases where
there are uses of directly referential terms which fail to
denote, but more generally, whenever there is a failure of
reference in what he calls the "referential use" of a
referring term (see Strawson [1956], p. 220-1). A full
discussion of this matte r wou Id involve not only further
consideration of the present conception of sentential
expression, but some consideration of questions about the
(

'

’

^

’

’

V"

sMSh^.

u?r>

.

En^wuifr^ct

,

^^

1

i

^

l
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1

of "the present^study ?
S

S

3^

^

U " f ° rtU " a tely

e

beyond the scope

which thought is expressed^9 bu b r6leVan in
t ?f
^

demining

^»w«s?S5 £ ssrS3%r “~
:

be demonstrating.
But I suppose that a person cln
demonstrate something they didn’t
intend to and that
SOmet ing else °th4r than what
the
speaker
peaker Tnte^ded
intended, to the speaker’s
^
use of the demonstraHup
rt ° f 0386 maKeE
unclear to "e how
In;«nt°
1
are t° ® n ter into the determinationspeaker's
of which
J is designated by a demonstrative
thing
relative to a context
a
se ue t1
which thought is expressed,
relat?ve to J°" J |?
the present purely semantic
sense,
sense by
hv a sentence
Ln?
containing a demonstrative.

T^h

'™

>

U

^

'

he notions of reference and sentential
expression are
S ln various ways.
For example, the notion of a
t
D fe r n
t0
thln 9 calls for parameters akin to the
[ 6d
H S
?
he
nter P ret ation (or language) and
contPv?wfor sentential} expression.
context)
Kripke [1977] draws a
distincticDn between two notions that may be
intended when
one speaks of the referent of a term in
a situation:
what
he calls semantic reference and speaker’s
reference.
suspect that a further parallel between the concepts I
of

In«irJ
a
O

.

^°

^

reference and sentential expression is that this
distinction
Kripke proposed, separating semantic reference from
speaker s reference, is paralleled by a distinction
between
two notions of sentential expression, two notions
that may
be intended when one speaks of the thought expressed
by a
sentence in a situation.
I suspect,
also, that if there is
this parallel to Kripke’s distinction, it separates
notions
that are close to the two concepts of sentential expression
that have been under discussion in the present section.
In
this connection, see Salmon’s distinction of speaker
assertion and semantic content in Salmon [1982].
’

16.
Is it safe at least to assume that if an unambiguous
sentence does express a thought with respect to a given
context, then there is only one thought that this sentence
expresses with respect to that context? That is:

(A

)

nec VSV!x,yVc( if S is unambiguous, then if
expresses x wrt c and S expresses y wrt c
y

=

x

)
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S

There is

9

ne^s thrpiur!^?°

L

)

(C)

^

advanced against

(

A*

For the
let us assume "that the
sentences

sake of argument,
<

u

Politicians lie.
Politicians cheat.

^

Un
U
nd
6aCh e *0 resses just one thought
(hen, briefly,
Then
bMi?lv %h
the argument may be put as
follows:

(L&C)

‘

Politicians lie and cheat.

expresses the thought expressed by
(L), but it also
expresses the thought expressed by
(C)
But (U and (d do
e
U9htS
Conse entl V there mist be
yac
?at ?eastftwo
least; two thouohr°
thoughts expressed by (L&C)
Henrp -it i c
the case that every unambiguous
senLn^e
that
expresses a
Expresses
thought expresses only one thought.
Details aside, why accept the premise
that (L&C)
expresses the thoughts expressed by (L)
and (C)? We might
ordinarily say that if a person has expressed
the thought
that pol lticians lie and cheat by uttering
(L&C),
the person
has thereby said that politicians lie,
and also said that
1
n
Cheat
And ° ne mi ht take this as reason enough
?
th
to a^rpn?
accept the
premise in question.
I would say,
however, that concerning
which a person may be said to express the situations in
thought
politTcians lie and cheat by uttering (L&C), all that
that can be
aimed, generally, is that the person expresses
something
JJI1P y. 1 n 9 the thought that politicians lie
and also implvina
—
the thought that politicians cheat.
And I would maintain
that, in the sense of 'expresses’ I have
intended to
i s°
ate, we should say this:
(L&C) expresses a thought (in
bnglish) that imp 1 i es any thought expressed by (L)
or by
(C), but does not express a thought identical to anv
expressed by (L) or by (C).
'

^

•

'

•

17.
The suggestion here is that the "normal" function of
these perf ormat ves be relegated to pragmatics, and that
their perhaps not-so-normal function of expressing thoughts
be taken^to be their only genuinely semantic role.
Perhaps
this isn’t right.
There are two alternatives that I think
are worth looking at in this connection (the following is
very rough; related matters are discussed in Chapter 6, pp.
19-23; also see Notes 5 and 6 to Chapter 6).
Let us stick with the assumption that our concept of
sentential expression links sentences exclusively to
thoughts.
But perhaps:
the semantics of performatives should allow that such
1)
sentences are ambiguous: on one class of i nterpretati ons
i
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SE

T ^

bear's^rother^elatiCn^rso^ °5 ther ^^retations,
SOrt of

We might say, for

Lin f

e
aSk
if we allow tha+ +£

h

entity.

sayin9 what Promises are!).

f

n

6Si

^

But

expression that may^e central
Soln accoSn? of ?he
semantics of such sentences, then
another proposal suggests
itself that doesn t require
positing an ambiguity.
Perhaps
2)
performati ves vary from context to
context in what
relationship they bear to what sort
f
S
e 1 ations biPs coS?d be seen^be
required
reqSi^bv^nv^T
by any
^
nterpretat
on available for each
Thus
instead of Proposing that instances of
(F1)°a?e
a [® ambiguous,
Imhio
having one class
which, they express thoughts, another of interpretations on
on whi ch^heymake
promises, we could hold that such
sentences are not always
Y
ambiguous, and that the matter of whether
one of them
expresses a thought or rather makes a
promise is settled bv
contextual cons i de rati° ns
An instance of (FI) will express
m
nt t8
3t ° ther contexts express no
thought^?
hought at all
a?? but
hu?° rather
?E
make promises.
This would
U
re U1
that
n W Class ° f Matures of contexth as
Lt nf [h
th
pe ?
ker ? s 1 ritendi ng to make a promise,
?
f
and that of the speaker’s
intending to express
accepted as semantically relevant features in a thought— be
determining
contextual variation.
Both of these possibilities incorporate the
"normal"
performative uses of performative sentences into their
semantics.
I do not have a settled opinion
as to which of
the three alternatives the pragmatic one
suggested in the
text, and these two semantic ones suggested
here— is
preferable, but I don’t believe that any matters central
to
the present study hinge on this question.
i

V

1

i

’

)

.

’

^
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CHAPTER
WHAT INDICATIVES,

6

'

1

—

6

IMPERATIVES AND INTERROGATI VES
EXPRESS

g Expression of

Thought s by Non- i nd

Although 'indicative’

is

i

cat.i

commonly used as an adjective

applying to forms of verb or verb phrase,

shall use the

I

term here as a noun, standing for a
class of English

sentences which

I

shall assume to be familiar to the reader.

The simplest, though certainly not the
only

what

I

,

examples of

am calling "indicatives" are sentences
formed with a

noun phrase subject term succeeded by an
indicative verb

phrase
There are exactly two dishonest politicians.
Sarah will not say "yes".

Somebody has been eating the cookies.
are all examples of the sort of sentence

'imperative’

naked

I

I

have in mind.

By

shall mean any sentence of English having a

infinitive as a main verb phrase.

Examples here

would be
Go get that shovel

Somebody lend me

a dime.

See that you don’t do it again, Jones.

I

assume that there are compound imperatives formed with

various sorts of connectives ("Get that shovel and be snappy

188

about it") but for my
purposes it will be safe to set
aside
consideration of these. By
'interrogative' I shall mean any
sentence of English obtained
from an indicative by
interrogative transformation
(interchanging subject and main
verb or auxiliary), or by
introduction of wh-terms— such
terms as 'who', 'where', 'when',
'which',

'which 0

'

etc.

,

I

would count the following as
examples:
Will

you get that shovel?

Does anyone have some spare change?

Which woman will reach the finish
line first?
As in the case of imperatives,

complex interrogatives, but

I

I

assume there to be more

shall only need to be

concerned here with the simplest examples.
When

I

speak of grammatical moods, hereafter,

may be

I

understood to mean the categories of English sentences
suggested above; and when

I

say that a sentence is of a

certain grammatical mood,

I

may be understood to mean that

it is a member of one of these categories.

6.1.1

Some Examples

Throughout the preceding chapter, the examples
of sentential expression involved indicatives.

I

cited

But

considerations of ordinary usage support the view that
thoughts are expressed by sentences of all three grammatical
moods

189

At the outset of the previous
chapter, I cited the
following sort of case:
If William is thinking that
Sarah
will not say "yes", he can
express what he’s thinking by the
indicative

Sarah will not say

‘‘yes

M
.

Cases of this sort are commonly and
reasonably used to
convey what is meant when we speak of
sentences expressing
thoughts.
The sentence in this example happens to
be an
indicative.

Analogous cases afford just as much motivation

for the view that sentences of the other
grammatical moods

express thoughts too.
For example,

if Rachel

has just knocked Carl’s

Stradivarius to the floor and

I

am wishing that she would

pick it up, then if my wishing is sufficiently demanding
in

character, what

am thinking (in at least some situations

I

fitting this description) is expressed, with respect to this
situation,

(

1

if

utter:

I

Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin.

)

It seems natural

to say that this is a case in which a

thought--someth ng
i

i

I

am thinking--is expressed by a non-

ndi cat i ve

As another example,

if

I

am presently wondering whether

Carl will have to pick up his violin, what

I

at least in some cases,

i

is

expressed by an

190

am wondering,

nterrogati ve

(

2

Will Carl have to pick up
his violin?

)

Again,

it seems plain enough that
we have a case in which

something

I

am thinking is expressed by
a non- i nd i cat i ve

Of course these two examples
are not isolated cases,
If one grants that (
or (2) express thi ngs we are
1 )
thinking
when we are wishing or wondering
things, the same should be

granted concerning a vast number of
other imperatives and
interrogati ves.
Before proceeding, there is a special
point to be made
about the claim that (1) expresses something
I am wishing.
There are common circumstances in which
it is quite

definitely the case that we are wishing things

— perhaps

these are even the circumstances most naturally
described as
ones in which we are wishing things--yet in
which it is not

clearly right to say that the things we are wishing
are

expressed by imperatives.

Suppose for example that rather

than being "demanding" in character, my wishing that Rachel

would pick up Carl’s violin is forlorn.
desire that she do it since

I

I

have no strong

know that her doing it is

beyond reasonable hope--she’s such an obstreperous child.
Still,

in wishing that Rachel

would pick up Carl’s violin,

there is something that I’m wishing.
to say that what

I

We might be inclined

am wishing in this situation is expressed

not by an imperative like (1), but rather by an optative

sentence like:
(1’)

If only Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin,
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—

or this rather more archaic
form:
(1

Would that Rachel would pick
up Carl’s violin.

)

It is not clear to me that
we should say that

(

1

)

expresses

something other than what is expressed
by (i») and (1’’).
Perhaps there are two kinds of wishing
to be distinguished
by the nature of their "objects":
if one is engaged in one
kind of wishing, one is wishing one
sort of

thing— a thing

expressed by an imperative— if one is
engaged in the other
of these kinds of wishing, one is
wishing
a thing of some

different, non-overlapping sort, a thing
expressed by an
optative.
On the other hand, perhaps we ought to
say that
(1) -

(1”) express the same thing.

There is an intuitive

difference in what one would intend to convey to an
audience
by using the optatives instead of the imperative,

but it is

not determined by this fact alone that the thing
(things?)

expressed by (1’) and (1’’) should be distinguished from
what is expressed by (1).
What does seem natural enough to say, though, is that
there is something expressed by (1), and that at least some

wishings are such that in virtue of the occurrence of such
wishing,

its subject may be said to be wishing this thing

that (1) expresses.

And

I

take it that the same point of

view is as natural as well concerning other imperatives and
other cases of what persons are wishing.
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a

In fact,

I

think there is a pretty
simple,

intuitive

procedure for cooking up relevant
cases.
Where 0 is an
imperative, sometimes we are
wishing something and our
wishing may be properly reported
by a displayed-sentence
ascription, a sentence of the form:
(FI

NP is thinking:

)

0

The relevant instance in the case
of
(3)

Aronszajn is thinking:

( 1

)

would be:

Rachel, pick up Carl's
V io

1

in

think it is very natural to say, concerning
any such case
where the wishing is correctly reported by
an instance of
I

(FI),

that at least one thing the wisher is wishing
is

expressed by the imperative,
those,

0.

Cases in point will include

like the one above, where the wishing is
sufficiently

demanding

character

in

It is not essential

.

for my

purposes to settle whether all cases of wishings are cases
in point,

and

I

am suspending judgment on whether,

in such a

case

with respect to which (3) does express something true-

-what

I

and

(1

am wishing is also expressed by the optatives,
).

From here on,

I

shall

(1’)

leave the case of optatives

and their connection to imperatives open.

6.1.2

Qualms?
Some,

though willing to grant that (1) and (2) express

things that one can be, respectively, wishing and wondering

might contend that neither (1) nor (2) (nor any other

1
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imperatives or
fact that
violin,

i

nterrogat ves
i

)

express thoughts

From the

.

am presently wishing that
Rachel would pick up a
some might claim, it doesn’t
follow that there is

anything

I

I

am tJnjnMj^.

And even if

I

happen to be thinking

something as well as wishing something,
the contention might
be:
what I am t hinking is not expressed
by

(

1

(i)

);

is not

the sort of sentence that can ever
express something a
person is thinking.
Consequently, the claim would go, (i)
does not express a thought.
My assessment of such a claim
is:

If what is meant by

respectively,

is,

'occurrently believing’ and 'thing occurrently

believed’, then
mean,

'thinking’ and 'thought’

I

agree entirely, but this is not what

I

nor is it the only thing one can coherently mean,
by

'thinking’ or 'thought’
In Chapter 4,

I

distinguished what

I

called "generic"

readings of progressive forms of the verb,
a reading,

'think’.

it does follow from the fact that

something, that

I

am thinking something.

I

On such

am wishing

Moreover,

assumed (for supporting discussion, see Chapter

4,

I

have

section

4.6), that on this reading, anything that a person is

wishing is itself something that person is thinking.
Suppose that a friend, Grant, is also presently wishing that
Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin.

follows,

I

In that case,

claim, not only that Grant and

I

it

are wishing

something in common, but that this thing we are wishing
at least one of the things we are both thinking.
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is

Perhaps in

ordinary discourse, when two people
are wishing the same
thing, the thing would normally
be referred

to as a "wish";

it is a thought nonetheless.

An analogous point applies to
the case of the
i

nter rogat ve
i

(2).

,

In that case we would ordinarily
speak

of the thing expressed by this
sentence as a "question",
but,

it

nevertheless something a person may be said
to be

is

wondering; hence,

something

a

in the generic sense at issue,

it is

person may be said to be thinking; hence it
is

a

thought

Consider

d

i

spl ayed-sentence ascriptions,

again.

in

such a construction, we have seen, the displayed
sentence
may come in a variety of grammatical moods; but
whatever the

mood of that sentence, the resulting ascription may be

appropriate for reporting something a person is thinking.
Thus,

if

I

am asked to report what

I

was thinking on a given

occasion, each of the following might express a correct

report

(3)

Aronszajn was thinking:

Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin.

(4)

Aronszajn was thinking:

Rachel isn’t going to pick up
Carl’s violin.

(5)

Aronszajn was thinking:

Will Carl have to pick up his
vio in?
1

It should be apparent that whichever of these is my report:
i)

the report may be true;

ii)

in many

cases at least (we

noted a possible class of exceptions in Chapter
4.2)

if the

4,

report is true, there is something that
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section
I

may be

said to have been thinking on
the reported occasion, and
iii) it would be natural to
say that what I was thinking
on
the reported occasion is expressed
by the displayed sentence
(perhaps with respect to a context,
as with (3)).
This
seems to me good reason to grant
that imperatives,

interrogatives and indicatives alike may
properly be said to
express thoughts.
It might be contended that although
there is a sense in

which imperatives and

i

nterrogati ves may be said to express

things, this should not be identified with
the sense of

express’ discerned in the preceding chapter,

in which,

in

the examples considered there, various
indicatives were said
to express thoughts (relative to

language) and context).

i

nterpretati on (or

There presumably is some notion we

might intend when we speak of sentences "expressing"
thoughts such that,

if

is the

i_t

intended notion of

expression, then it would be incorrect to speak of

imperatives or
For example,

I

i

nterrogat ves expressing anything at all.
i

take there to be a clear sense in which a

sentence may be said to express a thought subject to the
fol lowing:

expresses* x =df S is an indicative; x is a
thought, and there is some familiar reading or other of
'expresses’ such that on that reading, the pair, <S,x>,
satisfies
S

[

0 expresses

where 0 and

v are

v

]

variables.
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Not that expression* is any
familiar concept of expression,
but it is a concept of
expression as clear as any.
if by

'express’ one means express
y

imperative or

i

Nevertheless,

3

*,

then one could not say that

nter rogati ve expresses anything
at all.
it seems to me that there
is a familiar

sense in which we may be said to
express what we’re wishing
by imperatives and to express
what we’re wondering by
nter rogati ves
The sense in question seems to me
to be
l

.

just as familiar as any in which we
may be said to express
what we believe by indicative sentences.
I see no reason
not to suppose that there is one sense
of 'express’ common
to all of these ways of speaking.

familiar sense in which

a

Now alongside this

person may be said to express

things by sentences of any of the three moods,
it seems to
me that we may discern, in the manner of the
preceding
chapter, a sense in which those sentences themselves
may be
said to express those things.

Moreover,

it seems to me that

one such concept of sentential expression that can be

discerned here is a purely semantic concept.
After all,

character

i

z

i

in the preceding chapter,

in the

ng the purely semantic conception,

I

course of
made no

assumptions concerning what sort of sentence was under
discussion although the examples happened to concern
indicatives.

All

the considerations raised there,

concerning distinctive features of the purely semantic
conception, could have been addressed with respect to
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imperatives and

i

nterrogat ves
i

;

or so it seems to me.

which

thoughts we would intuitively be
inclined to say are
expressed by given imperatives and
i nterrogati
ves will, at
least in one discernible sense,
depend on the meanings that
these sentences have in English
(perhaps coupled with
information supplied by specifying
context), and not on
the sort of pragmatic considerations
that were then in
question, having to do with speaker’s
intentions or

conversational maxims.
for the contention,

I

do not see any knock-down argument

but there seems to me no reason not
to

allow that there is a general, purely
semantic concept of
sentential expression according to which
(

vast number of other imperatives and

i

1

)

and (2) and a

nterrogati ves

,

as well

as indicatives, may be properly said to
express thoughts

(relative to

i

nterpretat i on (or language) and context).

There seems to be such a concept available for the
taking.
At any rate,

I

shall suppose that there is such a concept,

and the reader may presume that

I

intend such a notion to be

operant in all discussions to follow.

6

•

2

Thesis
A

2

—A

Partial Answer to an Old Problem

long standing,

recalcitrant problem in philosophy of

language has had to do with the proper semantic treatment of

non-indicative sentences
particular.

— imperatives

and

i

nterrogati ves

,

It is commonly assumed in semantic treatments

of indicatives that semantic values assigned to sentences

1
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in

ought to serve to represent
the items that we would
intuitively say those sentences
express. 1
When this
assumption has been carried over
to the treatment of nonindicatives. the problem has
been that no straightforward
answer has suggested itself
to the question:
what,

if

anything at all, is expressed
by these sentences (in
particular, by imperatives or

interrogates)?

From the perspective gained here,
however, the answer
seems plain and simple, at least
for imperatives
and

interrogates:
things, and,

imperatives and

i

nterrogati ves do express

like indicatives, what they express
are

thoughts.

Moreover, from the considerations
advanced just
above, it should be plain that we can
be somewhat more
specific on the matter. We have seen that
at least

sometimes an imperative expresses what a
person is wishing,
and that at least sometimes, an interrogative
expresses what
a person may be said to be wondering.
Further,
if we

reflect on any of a wide variety of ordinary
cases, we find
that the thoughts expressed by indicatives are
the things a

person may be said to be occurrently believing.
®

^

Jhes i s

•

2,

A Provisional

Formulation

These observations suggest a certain generalization

which

I

will formulate shortly.

First, though,

I

think it

will make the formulation more scrutable, and make

subsequent discussions somewhat easier, if we introduce some
termi nology

1
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The common nouns,

'wish’

and 'question’, are ambiguous

ordinary usage; in each case, the
ambiguity is analogous
to that of the common noun
"thought", noted in Chapter
(section 1.2).
Consider, for example, what we refer
to when
we speak of a wish:
on one usage we might be referring
to
some particular instance of someone
doing some wishing; on
what is surely another acceptable usage,
however, we would
be referring instead to what a
person is wishing.
An
in

1

analogous ambiguity affects our use of the
common noun,
'question’; it may stand for particular
acts of persons
wondering or asking things, or it may be
applied instead to
that thing the person is wondering or asking.
Philosophers
might employ 'occurrent belief’ as a common noun:
suffer an analogous ambiguity.

2

it could

have been using gerunds

I

to refer to particular acts of thinking, thus,

'wishing’,

'wondering’ and 'occurrent believing’ serve as common nouns,

respectively, for particular events of wishing, wondering
and occurrent believing.

I

propose to use 'wish’,

'question’ and 'occurrent belief’ to apply,
is,

respectively, wished, wondered and occurrently believed.

Although the notions
ones,

I

a.

I

shall propose here are technical

do not think we stray much from a fairly familiar

usage if we put:
(D8)

rather, to what

2

x is an occurrent belief
occurrently believing x

b.

x

is a wish

c.

x

is a

=df

question

=df
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y

is

)

pos Jy(
=df

pos ly(

y

is wishing x

pos Jy(

y

is

)

wondering

x

)

In other words,

'occurrent belief,

'wish' and 'question',

when used as common nouns, shall
stand for items in the
modal ranges of occurrent belief,
wishing and occurrent
believing (respectively).
Now the observations made just above
can be

generalized, provisionally,

Thesis

2

a.
b.
c.

in the following way:

indicatives express occurrent beliefs;
imperatives express wishes;
nterrogati ves express questions.

i

It seems to me that there is an

idea embodied here that is

extremely natural, though it has not been
widely considered.
Not even those who have been most concerned
with the problem
of providing a semantic treatment of noni ndi cati ves
have

given it much attention.

each of the clauses a

-

I

c),

shall propose refinements of

but this provisional formulation

offers an intuitive and fairly accurate grasp of the
basic
idea which will serve as a cornerstone for much work in
the

rest of the thesis.

6.2.2

Ref i nements
As a start,

(in each,

assume
(T2a)

'

0

let us consider the following formulations

the parameter for
'

i

nterpretat on is suppressed;
i

restricted to unambiguous sentences):
For any indicative, 0 if there is a context with
respect to which 0 expresses something, then for
any context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x
wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
,
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(T2b)

r

f°

ny im P erat ive,

t «

c
and thoSah?
9h
is a wish?

(

T2c

SSS S
’

’

if there is a context wrt
hin 9' then for any context,
lf 0 expresses x wrt c,
then x
0,

°^

For
r ° 9atlVe
0 if there is a context
« expresses
wrt wh c h 0
something,
then for any
;
context,
c, and thought, x, if
0 expresses x wrt
c, then x is a question
’

’

What these clauses assert, roughly,
is that as long as a
sentence of one of the grammatical moods
expresses something
at some context, then it expresses
a thought of the

appropriate sort with respect to any context
at all.
It will

be worthwhile to consider a sample
implication.

The following consequence of (T2a), with
You are a noisy bird

(6)

for 0,

is fairly representati ve

.

Perhaps it is safe to

assume that there is a context with respect to which
(6)

expresses something; 4 then (T2a) implies:
For any context, c, and thought, x, if 'You are a noisy
bird’ expresses x wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.

That is,

(6)

expresses an occurrent belief, if anything,

with respect to any context.
indexical,

Since (6) contains the

'you’, what the sentence expresses will vary from

context to context depending, essentially, on what person
(or bird,

etc.) is being addressed.

Surely, though,

whatever type of addressee a context may have, the thought

expressed by (6) with respect to that context could be
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something someone is occurrently believing.

Let c be any

context with respect to which (6) does
express a thought;
can’t we imagine a context, perhaps
distinct from c, with
the same addressee, but in which the
speaker is using (6) in
current English to express sincerely and
literally what he
or she is thinking?

It seems that we can;

and it seems to

me that we ought to say, concerning any
such context, c’,

that there is a thing,

x,

that the speaker of

c’

is

occurrently believing that (6) expresses, not only with
respect to c’, but with respect to the original
context,
as well.

But by (D8), since this thing, x,

c,

is at least

possibly such that it is being occurrently believed, it is
an occurrent belief.

Cases much like this one

(

mutat

i

mutandis) motivate particular consequences of clauses (T2b)
and c

)

as well.

Things are not quite so neat and tidy, though.
Consider:
Will you please bring us a menu and a couple of
glasses of your house red?

(7)

I

count this as an interrogative, yet it seems to me that

(7) expresses a wish--and not a question

— with

respect to

any context, contrary to (T2c).
A generalization of this example seems to be that

whenever ’please’ is incorporated in "yes-no"

i

nterrogat ves
i

whose main verb phrase is formed with certain auxiliaries
'will’

'would’

'can’

'could’

(but not 'should’ or 'ought’)
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the resulting interrogatives
express wishes, not questions.
However, I don’t have confidence
that this particular class
of cases involving the word,
’please’, in interrogatives

exhausts counterexamples along this
general line.
antecedent restriction in (T2c), then,

An

ruling out this

particular group of interrogatives,
seems an exceedingly ad
hoc way of avoiding the problem.
Nevertheless, I think it
would be a mistake to suppose that
there is simply no
coordination, along the lines suggested in
(T2a)

between sorts of things expressed

occurrent beliefs

— wishes,

-

c),

questions,

and our three grammatical moods.

The

coordination may not be neat and tidy, but it
exists.
I

think it best to avoid the class of counterexamples

noted above by adopting parallel amendments to
the

antecedents throughout (T2a)
(

T2a

)*

-

c).

I

propose the following

For any indicative, 0 if there is a context with
respect to which 0 expresses an occurrent belief,
then for any context, c, and thought, x, if 0
expresses x wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
,

(T2b )*

For any imperative, 0 if there is a context wrt
which 0 expresses a wish, then for any context, c,
and thought, x, if 0 expresses x wrt c, then x is
a wish.
,

(T2c )*

For any i nterrogati ve 0 if there is a context
wrt which 0 expresses a question, then for any
context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x wrt
c, then x is a question.
,

,

These clauses tell us that if a sentence of a particular

grammatical mood expresses a thought of the appropriate sort
204

(appropriate according to Thesis
2), then at any context at
which it expresses any thought at
all, it expresses a
thought of that sort.
(7), though an interrogative, does
not express a question, but rather
a wish; contrary to
(

I 20

)

(

T2c

)

However, counterexamples to the present
version,

•

>

Wl11 arise only if there are

i

nterrogati ves that do

express questions with respect to some
contexts, but express
thoughts of some other sort with respect to
other contexts.
I

do not think that (7) affords any such
case.

One further line of objection to these clauses
is worth

considering.

(T2a)*

-

c)* imply that sentences of each

grammatical mood will express thoughts of the relevant,

associated type with respect to every context, provided that
those sentences express thoughts of that type at some

context or other.

following case.
the ground.

This may seem too strong.

Consider the

Rachel has just knocked the Stradivarius to

In a stringent tone of voice,

I

address Rachel,

uttering

(8)

(

You are going to pick up Carl’s violin.

right this minute, young lady"

sentence as an indicative.

And

I

I

might add).

I

count this

think that there are

contexts with respect to which this sentence expresses

occurrent beliefs.

Then (T2a)* implies that with respect to

every context at which something is expressed by the
sentence, what is expressed is an occurrent belief.
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But

what about the context just
envisioned?

Shouldn’t we say

that with respect to this context,
my sentence expresses
something I am wishing ?

Generally, the sort of case

I

have in mind here is a

situation in which a sentence is used
and, although in other
situations the sentence does express thoughts
of the

appropriate type ("appropriate" according to
(T2a)* - c )*,
given the sentence’s grammatical mood), in
the situation at
hand,

the sentence seems,

intuitively, to express a thought

that is of some type other than the appropriate
one.
cal

1

any such case

Let us

where a sentence expresses a thought of

the appropriate type (according to (T2a)* - c )*)
with

respect to one context, but expresses a thought of another
type with respect to another context

switching".

—a

case of "type-

In the example just considered,

an indicative

was seen to express occurrent beliefs with respect to some
contexts, but, apparently, to express wishes with respect to
others.

There are plenty of other examples of similar

phenomena:

cases of imperatives expressing wishes at some

contexts, apparently expressing occurrent beliefs at others
(

Go to the corner; turn left and go down one block",

uttered in response to "How do
cases of

i

I

get to the post office?"),

nterrogat ves expressing questions in some
i

contexts, apparently expressing wishes in others ("Could you
bring us some cookies and tea?").

Are any of these cases

genuine type-switchings, or are they merely apparent ones?
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There are matters raised at
this point that hinge on
the distinction between
pragmatics and semantics, and on
empirical questions about the
nature of English that we
needn't settle (and that I’m not
prepared to address).
I
am
inclined to think, however, that
the cases suggested in the
above examples are merely apparent
type-switchings, or at
least do not pose fatal problems for
the claims formulated
in (T2a)
- c)
(It should be noted that even if we allow
that cases of genuine type-switching
exist, this is not
.

inconsistent with (T2a)*

-

c)*.

Take the case of

(

T2a )*.

A

type-switching here will be a case in which an indicative
expresses an occurrent belief with respect to some
contexts,
and either a wish or a question with respect to
other

contexts.
(T2a)

The existence of such a case will conflict with

only on the additional assumption that one and the

same thing expressed by the given indicative can’t be both
a

wish and an occurrent belief, or can’t be both an occurrent

belief and a question.
to me well motivated;
in Chapter 8.)

I

These particular assumptions do seem
the matter will be addressed at length

am inclined to think that each case of

type-switching can be handled in one of two ways, neither of
which requires much amendment to any of (T2a)*

-

c )*

First, take the case cited above in which

I

utter (8).

Perhaps there is a semantic principle governing the strict
and literal use of future tense according to which:

if a

sentence is formed with that form of an action verb together
with a second-person pronoun, the sentence may be understood
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to express the speaker’s wishes.

I

am not sure about thi s

Even if there is such a principle,
though, the semantics
governing such sentences as (8) surely
guarantee as well
that these sentences may be used
to express occurrent
beliefs.
Then I would be inclined to say that
sentences of
the forms

(

F2

)

You are going to VP.

(

F3

)

You will VP

are ambiguous, and that the appearance of
type-switching,
and the intuitive variation in which type of
thought is

expressed,

is due to

sentence in question.

amendment to (T2a)

,

variation in

i

nterpretati ons of the

This would suggest the following

with the parameter for interpretation

unsuppressed
(T2a)

For any indicative, 0 and i nterpretati on
i, if
there is a context such that 0 expresses an
occurrent belief on i wrt that context, then for
any context, c, and thought, x, if 0 expresses x
°D i wrt c, then x is an occurrent belief.
.

,

Similar amendments could be made to (T2b)* and c)*.

It may

be that a semantic ambiguity is at play in the intuitive

variation in the type of thought expressed by instances of
(F2) and (F3).

I

am not sure.

Second, there may be an apparent case of type-switching
in which there

is pretty clearly no

ambiguity involved.

Then the intuitive variation in which thought is expressed
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cannot result from a variation
in the interpretations of
the
sentence in question; consequently,
our intuitions
concerning such a case will not
be accommodated by (T2a)**
or by like amendments to (T2b)*
and c)\
There are such
cases I believe.
Take, for example, the following
case; a
teacher utters:
(9)

Are you sure that you want to circle
that answer?

She is speaking to a student taking
a quiz, and intends to
convey, by an unsubtle hint, that the
answer he is about to
circle is incorrect.
I think the sentence may be said,
in a

certain sense, to express an occurrent belief
in this

situation (roughly):

the occurrent belief that the answer

this student is about to circle is incorrect.

However, from

the fact that a sentence serves to convey an
occurrent

belief that the speaker has in mind in a context--f rom the
fact that

j_n

—some

sense or other (however familiar) it would

be proper to say that a sentence expresses what a person is

occurrently believing in a context
in our

— it

does not follow that

purely semantic sense, the sentence expresses that

occurrent belief with respect to that context.

There is,

I

think, a fairly familiar sense in which (9) may be used in

certain situations to convey an occurrent belief.

although

I

am not confident about this point,

I

Still,

am inclined

to say that the sentence does not express an occurrent

belief with respect to such a situation, and that if

anything

j_s

expressed with respect to a context by (9), in
209

the relevant semantic sense of
'express', then in that sense
what we ought to say is that what
is expressed is a

question

5

In sum,

there may cases of apparent type-switching
in
which, in virtue of a genuine semantic
ambiguity of the sort
suggested in connection with (8), an indicative
(say)

expresses something other than an occurrent
belief with
respect to a particular context.
Then the amendments
suggested by (T2a)** will suffice to accommodate our
intuitions about which thought is expressed.

Otherwise,

I

am inclined to think that the appearance of
type-switching

arises, as,

think,

I

in the case of

(9),

from the

encroachment of some not-purely semantic notion of
sentential expression

— some

concept that has to do

essentially with what the speaker intends to convey, and

is

not determined (apart from the contribution of any indexical

elements) by the rules governing strict and literal usage.
But it is a purely semantic notion that has been my

principal focus and that should be employed in testing
(T2a)*

-

)

c *

6

It might be maintained that (T2a)* - c)* (or amendments

along the lines of (T2a)**) do not express very substantial
claims.

Someone skeptical of any of the original clauses

in

our provisional formulation may be quite content to accept
the present refinement as it stands, only because, so it

might be claimed, the current versions of whichever original
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clauses they did not like are vacuously
true,
"You claim"
the skeptic says, "that for any
interrogative [for example],

—

^

t ex P re sses a thing of the type
you’re calling

question’,

'a

it expresses a thing of that type
with respect to

every context;

I

heartily agree with that:

no

nterrogati ves ever express questions (if indeed
there are
such things
i

!

)

Of course this is not the sort of acceptance
one likes
to get for one’s cornerstone principles.
(T2b)

and c)

If,

in particular,

are thus only vacuously true, we would not

have a very interesting relationship established between

non-indicatives and thoughts, nor much of an interesting
answer (of any sort, partial or not) to the old question of

what non-indicative sentences should be taken to express.

Consideration of cases of the sort produced at the
start of this section, however, show that it is at least

extremely natural, and prima-facie reasonable to hold that
for each of the three grammatical moods, a vast number and

wide variety of sentences of that mood do express thoughts
of the relevant type.

I

think there is a plain sense in

which it is correct to say that what the indicative
(6)

You are a noisy bird

expresses at a context is an occurrent belief, something
possibly such that it is occurrently believed.
just as natural to me to say that the imperative

It seems

(1)

Rachel, pick up Carl’s violin

expresses a wish— a thing possibly such
that someone
wishing it.
Likewise, it seems quite natural

is

to hold that

the interrogative

Will Carl have to pick up his violin?

expresses a question— a thing possibly such that
someone
wondering
if such

it.

And as

I

is

mentioned at the start, it’s not as

examples are isolated cases, due to some

peculiarities of (1),

and (6).

(2)

Relevantly similar

examples may be readily multiplied by attending to any of

a

vast number of sentences of these three grammatical moods.

Perhaps then it is best to think of Thesis

conjunction of (T2a)*
f ol

-

2

as the

c)* (or perhaps a** - c)**) with the

lowing:

(T2

A vast number of indicatives express occurrent
beliefs, a vast number of imperatives express
wishes, and a vast number of i nterrogati ves

)

express questions.
From here on, then, when
speaking,
(

T2*

)

I

I

refer to Thesis

2,

strictly

shall mean the conjunction of (T2a)* - c)* and

(or perhaps of (T2a)** - c)** and (T2*).

My principal claim here is that Thesis

2

7

formulates

what ought to be seen as a very natural outlook, a starting

perspective for addressing the question of what nonindicatives express that is at least prima-facie quite
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plausible, even though it has not
been much attended to in
discussions of that question.
That this outlook captured by
Thesis 2 hasn’t been
widely shared is, I think, the result
of a certain lacuna
separating the attentions and concerns
of writers taking one
or the other of two rather different
approaches
in the

Philosophy of language.

By and large,

those who have been

most concerned with the semantics of
non- ndi cat ves have
not been among those concerned with a
careful, systematic
i

i

account of the nature of thoughts, or with
the construction
of semantic frameworks in which the notion
of thought plays
a central

role.

Most writers whose work may be placed under

the banner of speech act theory seem, unfortunately,
to fit

this description.

On the other hand,

those who have been

concerned with a systematic account of thoughts, and have
appealed, centrally, to some concept of thought in their

work in semantics have not been among those most concerned
with the semantics for non-indicative sentences.

semant

i

c

i

sts

,

Many

philosophically-minded logicians and

logically-minded philosophers fall into this camp.

What

I

wish to stress here is that absence of attention to the idea

expressed by Thesis

2

does nothing to diminish its

plausibility, which seems to me to be quite great.
6.2.3

Summary
The leading idea behind Thesis

2

is that a link exists

between each of various sorts of sentence and one of several
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types of thought.

things
expressed by
i

ndi cati ves

occurrent

The idea may be depicted as follows:

things
expressed by
i mperati ves

i

wishes

questions

bel iefs

Consider the leftmost intersecting pair:

things
expressed by
nterrogati ves

I

believe there

are indicatives that do not express occurrent beliefs (and

perhaps some that do not express any thoughts at all), and
there may be occurrent beliefs not expressed by any

indicatives (nor by any other sentences, for that matter).
The claim

I

wish to make is only that there is a substantial

and significant overlap between those things expressed by

indicatives and the things that can be occurrently believed,
and

I

would make the same claim, mutatis mutandis

,

for the

other intersecting pairs depicted in this diagram.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, a few last

remarks are in order concerning the ideas that we have been

discussing.

In looking at things in the way suggested by

the above diagram, are we, perhaps, suffering from triple
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vision?

Maybe if we got the situation into
proper focus, we
would find that we are looking at
just one intersecting
pair;

let me explain.

have spoken in preceding discussions
of occurrent
beliefs, wishes and questions as "types"
of thought,
I

suggesting (sometimes by outright assertion)
that these
types are not coextensive.
Indeed, I am inclined

to see

wishes and questions as entirely disjoint, and
to see each
of these two types and that of occurrent
beliefs as forming

largely non-overlapping,

if not disjoint,

classes.

(The

view that these three types form disjoint classes is

suggested by the diagram, but

I

do not commit myself to it.)

This outlook is not required by Thesis

2

the view that these types are coextensive

necessarily so

— is

itself.

— in

Indeed,

fact

a consequence of the third tenet of the

Propositional Tradition (together with the assumption, (A6),

accepted in Chapter

3,

according to which non-occurrent

attitudes and their principal counterparts share modal
ranges )

According to the Propositional Tradition

(

modulo

there is a single category, that of propositions

.

(

A6

)

)

any member

of which is of the appropriate sort to be occurrently

believed, to be wished, and to be wondered.

chapter,

I

In the next

shall present and discuss this particular

consequence of the Propositional Tradition, and look at some

considerations that might be proposed in support of
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it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

V
nd h re eSpeC ally
David Ka P lan s work
h?s riq«c,M
h
b
bU ? ° ; lher wrlters
too, have supposed that
thnuaht q are ?(or are among) the
thoughts
semantic values assigned to
sentences.
Salmon speaks of -information content"
not
C
2.
( S6e
his [1986])
but the same concept is
in?pnH^H
intended, I think, and he takes the information
contents of
sentences to be the thoughts those sentences
express.
akeS this basic perspective for granted in his
L
987a J
though he uses "semantic contents".
I

’

kee

’

,

-

’

-

’

??^V
1

,

I continue to use
'occurrent belief’ in the way proposed
Chapter 3, as an abstract singular term denoting
the
principal occurrent counterpart of belief.
The ambiguity in
question here would attach to the use of the expression as
a
common noun

in

3.
The definitions here may be more restrictive than what
some might think is called for by the concepts of
belief,
W-lsh» ar>d Question
see the discussion of (D?) as a
definition of "thought", section 1.5, p. 8.
:

The antecedent condition common to all of (T2a) - c),
requiring that there be something expressed by the sentence
at some context, is intended to rule out cases in which a
sentence does not express anything at all (no matter the
context).
Sentences that might (for various reasons) be
alleged to be cases in point would be:
4.

The sentence immediately following the last occurrence
of a colon is not true.

Don’t let Santa Claus know that I’ve been naughty.
Does quadrupl ci ty drink procrastination?
i

5.
In this connection it is worth noting just one of the
many difficulties I find there to be in figuring out what to
say (9) expresses, in the purely semantic sense.
One might
hold that there is an interpretation available for (9) on
which it expresses a belief, and not a question, if one
takes the emphasis indicated by the underlining to have
semantic import.
Surely it is natural to interpret what a
person means to convey by an utterance if he or she has
stressed certain components differently than we would if no
stress, or else different stress had been added.
Compare
(9) with

(9’)

Are you sure that you want to circle that answer?
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S

ine f ° r him ° r
a situation in
this emphasis
emnhi^! is appropriate.herse1f
Are different thina^
9S
ye
Utte a nCe ° f < 9 > tha " »y an utterance
;?
n
(9
).
(9M"
Surely so.
Surair,
, it doesn’t
But
follow from this that thP
emphasis has a semantic import.
Perhaps it is a device
ned solely by pragmatic conventions
concerning how a
speaker may convey, and how listeners
are to underlta™,
what the speaker intends.
e
ral question to be asked, in
determining whether
pmnh a dc is a semantic phenomenon
emphasis
of English, it seems to
me, is this:
is emphasis a device essential
to proper
Eng ish usage or merely an accidental
feature of the way
English is used? Isn’t it possible that there
be a
users
who
have
a
language
exactly like
°(.
rnrroni
current £Engl
ish in lexical and syntactic features, and whose
use of the language is just like ours except
that they do
not use stress and lack any devices of emphasis?
And if
such situations are possible, couldn’t it be that
at least
some such situations are ones in which the language
of the
community is English? For what it’s worth, my own
inclination is to say that there are such possible
situations and that at least some of these are ones in which
the, language being used is current English— the people
just
don t use it like we do.
If this is right, then I am
inclined to infer that emphasis or stress is not a device
that requires interpretation by a semantics of English, and
that consequently, the presence of such devices in the
utterance of a sentence of English doesn’t affect what is
expressed by that sentence, in the purely semantic sense.
This line of reasoning is suggested by Kripke in his
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference" (Kripke
[1977], see in particular, section (3c), p. 264 ff),
although his concern there is with a different topic than
that of the semantic i nterpretati on of stress or emphasis.

wmch
which

^r

f

^uage

6.
Perhaps a preferable way to proceed here would be not to
attend to grammatical moods (identified by particular
syntactic form), associating types of thought with these,
but rather to attend to kinds of uses of sentences,
associating types of thought with these
Perhaps we can
distinguish what we could call assertive vol t i ve and
questioni ng uses.
Then, whatever syntactic restrictions
apply governing which of these various uses given sentences
may be put to, we say that a thought of one of the relevant
types is expressed by a sentence (of whatever syntactic
type) relative to a context if the context is character zed
by the appropriate, corresponding type of sentential use.
We could have it that a sentence expresses an occurrent
belief with respect to a context in which it receives an
assertive use, while the same sentence expresses a question
with respect to a context in which it receives a questioning
use, and expresses a wish, with respect to a context in
which it receives a volitive use. Or perhaps there might be
.

.

i

i
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syntactic constraints placed on which
of these types of use
a given sentence could be put
to:
certain indicatives might
serve as instruments for either
assertive or volitive uses
but not for questioning uses; certain
i nterrogati ves
might’
serve interroggitwe or volitive uses
but not assertive ones.
proposal
we suppose there to be genuine cases
f 4type switching
of
with such sentences as
«

.

(6)
(

7

)

You are going to pick up Carl’s violin.

Are you sure you want to circle that answer?

but such cases will be accounted for by
contextual variation
acknowledged in the semantics. This is very rough,
but
perhaps a formulation appealing to these notions of
assertive, imperative and interrogative uses, would
afford a
better way of capturing the basic idea behind Thesis
1.
I am not sure what to say
about this proposal.
Let me
try to make the idea somewhat more definite.
Let us suppose
that whether a use of a sentence (in a context) is
assertive, volitive or questioning, in the ways required,
has to do with the intentions of the speaker of the context.
In particular, say that a use is assertive, volitive or
questioning if and only if, respectively, the speaker
intends to express a belief, a wish, a question by that use
The present proposal, then, has it that such intentions will
be semantically relevant in determining what thought a
sentence expresses-- i n the purely semantic sense--with
respect to a context.
There seems to me to be a difficulty with this
proposal
Plainly the following thesis is not acceptable:
a sentence expresses (in the purely semantic sense) a
thought of a certain kind with respect to a context _vf the
speaker intends to express a thought of that kind by his or
her use of the sentence in that context.
To see that this
is unacceptable, consider the intentions of incompetent
speakers, or the intentions of sarcastic speakers, etc.
Thus, not just any old intention you may have as regards
what sort of thing you are expressing will be relevant in
determining what sort of thing you are expressing in the
purely semantic sense.
But then there should be some reason
given by advocates of the present proposal why a speaker’s
intentions to express a belief, wish or question those
intentions that determine whether a use of a sentence is
assertive, volitive or questioning are semantically
relevant in determining what is in fact expressed. Why
should this one particular class of intentions have semantic
import when other intentions, seemingly of the same general
kind, have only pragmatic relevance (if any relevance at
all)? I do not see what plausible explanation could be
given on this point.

—

—
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M

Can’t we be more specific than (T2a)*

7.

expresses^

U

-

cl*-

9 ive^

ran

’t

i^Snc."*"

inclined to think so.
Consider the case of
? am inclined to
accept
a
claim to the
thV ? r
dlCat e 0 satisf y in 9 the antecedent effect
of
(T2a)
a2a)^° 0/2xnrp
expresses the occu rrent belief that, a
Let us
9 ht make
mo^e

indicative
c t

.*

’

V

,

’

'

su^T^m

™

precise^'
What is wanted is a claim roughly to
the effectif 0
is an indicative, and 0 expresses
an item, x, then if a
person is occurrently believing x, that
person is
occurrently believing that 0. That is the
basic idea; it s
vep roughly put, and not exactly right. The
metalinguistic formulation expresses the claim following
I want as
precisely as I have been able to manage:
i

(

T2a )+
E

For any indicative,

Mc(

0

believing

0

if the

,

sentence

expresses
x -»

y

x wrt c & nec Vy( y is occurrently
is occurrently believing that 0
)) ],

expresses something with respect to a context, c’, then
what it expresses with respect to c’ is (in fact) true.
To get a better grasp of what this claim comes to, and what
it adds when conjoined to (T2a)
consider a particular
consequence:
say, with 'You are quiet’ for 0.
(T2a)+
implies that, with respect to any context, if the following
sentence expresses something, it expresses something true:
,

(a)

}xjc(

'You are quiet’

occurrently believing
that you are quiet ))

expresses
x ->

y

is

x wrt c & nec Vy( y is
occurrently believing

Suppose that (a) does express something with respect to a
context, c a
Then there is an addressee for the involved
use of 'you’; suppose this is Henry.
Then what (a) says, in
effect, is that there is some context with respect to which
'you are quiet’ expresses a thought necessarily such that if
a person is occurrently believing it, the person is
occurrently believing that Henry is quiet. Surely this is
the case.
I assume that there is a context in which
'you
are quiet’ is addressed to our fellow, Henry.
Then, with
respect to that context, 'you are quiet’ expresses just such
a thought:
intuitively, the thought that Henry is quiet.
I
take it, then, that (a) expresses a truth with respect to
ca
Since selection of c a was arbitrary, we have our
particular consequence of (T2a)+.
I think that the conjunction of (T2a)+ and (T2a)*
approximates reasonably well the idea that for any
appropriate indicative, 0, 0 expresses the occurrent belief
that 0.
I am inclined to think that the conjunction is
true, and that analogous strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)*
.

.
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old as well.

(Roughly, these strengthenings may be put
as
lf 0 is an im P era tive (with no subject
tUlZ and
* h I
term),
0 expresses an item x, with respect to a context
n wh-, ch you are the addressee, then
necessarily if a person
is wishing x, that person is wishing
you would 0.
(T2c)+:
& is an i nter rogati ve whose indicative counterpart is 0*
anti 0 expresses an item x, then
necessarily, if a person is*
wondering x, that person is wondering whether *
0
An objection may be raised to (T2a)+, however
b +:

.

Consider

Hesperus is visible in the evening
This sentence expresses a certain thought, call it M H".
But, one might claim, it is not necessarily the case
that if
a person is occurrently believing H, the person is
occurrently believing that Hesperus is visible in the
evening.
Perhaps one would claim this if one thought that
an ascription of the form
t

is

occurrently believing that

0.

does not merely imply that the subject (the denotation of
the substituend of t
is occurrently believing the thought
expressed by the embedded sentence.
Such an ascription, the
idea might be, also implies something about the way in which
the subject grasps the thought expressed by 0, something
about the manner in which the subject is thinking this
thought.
With such a view, one might claim that it is
possible for a person, say Henry, to be occurrently
believing H and yet not occurrently believing it in the
manner implied by
'

’

Henry is occurrently believing that Hesperus is
visible in the evening.

Perhaps Henry is occurrently believing
manner implied by

H,

rather,

in the

Henry is occurrently believing that Venus is
visible in the evening.
If such an outlook is correct then (T2a)+ would have to be

rejected, for the thesis would have a false implication,
namely, that with respect to any context, if the following
expresses something, it expresses a truth,
Jxic( ’Hesperus is visible in the evening’ expresses x
wrt c & nec Vy( y is occurrently believing x -» y is
occurrently believing that Hesperus is visible in the
even ng ) )
i

We may assume that there is a context with respect to which
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this sentence expresses somethi
ng— the
assume, with respect to every context. same thing, we mav
What is expressed
S
hat the tt OU9ht expressed by 'Hesperus
is
vilih
visiblep’in
in th
the evening ? is necessarily such
that
if a person
occur rentl y believes it, he or she occurrently
believes that
1S
ls b e in the evening.
But
this
is
l
preciselyM
.T
^ in
th ® outlook
question denies.
Thus,
if
we
accept
th?o °" t1o °
must re J ect T2a )+
And
plainly,
this
n
outlook
would also require rejection of the analogous
strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)* alluded to before.
I do not have a settled
opinion on these
propose just to suspend judgment on (T2a)+ (andmatters, and
analogous
strengthenings of (T2b)* and c)*).

^

'
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CHAPTER

7

THE RECEIVED VIEW

It seems natural to say one believes
a proposition and
unnatural to say one desires a proposition, but
as
matter of fact that is only a prejudice. What you a
believe and what you desire are of exactly the same
nature
Russel
1

1

7

•

1

The Propositional Tradition. Again
At the end of Chapter 2,

I

cited four roles that

thoughts are standardly supposed to serve, roles that, as

I

see it, should be accommodated by any acceptable account of

the nature of thoughts:

1

The Intentional Role
Thoughts make up the modal

ranges of intentional

attitudes
2

The Logical Role
Thoughts exemplify logical properties, and are terms of
logical relations and operations

3

The Linguistic Role
Thoughts are the things expressed by sentences

4

The Semantic Role
The semantic properties of and relations among
sentences can be accounted for by appeal to
correspondi ng properties of and relations among the
thoughts expressed by those sentences.

Given that this is the standard conception, one might well

suppose that an investigation of the nature of thoughts
should be considered an important project in the philosophy
of logic and of language.

But this is not precisely a
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project that most who work in these fields have taken
upon
themselves, at least, not as

I

see it.

Rather, since the

turn of the century, almost without exception, philosophers
of logic and of language have restricted their attention

instead to an investigation of the nature of proposi ti ons
I

use this term in the sense proposed in Chapter

.

2,

according to:
(D2)

is a proposition
=df
either true or false.
x

x

is a thought,

and x is

This practice of restricting attention to propositions is

character i sti c of the tradition discussed in Chapter
I

called there the "Propositional Tradition".

2;

what

It is

character i sti c of this tradition to suppose that
propositions, and only propositions, play the four roles
cited above.
Of course it begs the question against the

Propositional Tradition to claim, without further argument,
that there is any restriction of attention involved in their

attending to propositions when thoughts are at issue; for
according to that tradition, thoughts just are propositions.
Still

it is coherent to ask whether the proponents of this

tradition are right about this identification.
connection,

And in this

it is important to separate the view of the

Propositional Tradition on this matter from the one that has
served as the starting position of the present study, which
is that the entities that perform roles
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1

)

-

4) are

thoughts,

in the sense of

Thesis
nec Vx

(

'thought’

governed by Thesis

1:

1

pos fy(

y

is gen thinking x

)

x

is a thought

)

It is not clear whether the concept of proposition employed

by proponents of the Propositional Tradition may be defined

according to (D2),

if

it is understood that this notion of

thought is the one involved in the definiens.
being

I

shall assume that this is the case.

interpretation is significant (as

I

For the time

This matter of

suggested in Chapter

see section 2.2.2 The Nature of the Dispute

),

and

I

2,

shall

return to examine it more carefully in the next chapter.

7

.

2

The Received View

There is a certain perspective distinctive of the

Propositional Tradition that

I

have not discussed yet, but

which underlies all three of the tenets of that tradition
that were formulated in Chapter

2.

perspective as "the Received View".

I

shall

refer to this

The Received View

concerns the nature of the "objects" of intentional
attitudes, and has to do, more specifically, with which

things a person may be said to bear those attitudes to under
given conditions.

One consequence of the view is that the

"objects" of all attitudes are propositions.

consequence was formulated in (PT2).
the Received View is that,

This

Another consequence of

in the case of quite many

intentional attitudes, the "objects" of any one of them will
224

.

be precisely the objects of any other

— the

question have the very same modal range.

attitudes in
A restricted

version of this consequence, concerning the attitudes of
belief, desire and wondering, was captured in (PT3).
(

PT2

)

and

(

PT3

)

will

be restated shortly,

in 7.2.1.)

(Both

But

the Received View would have it that a host of other

attitudes have the same modal range as the three of concern
in

(

PT3

)

It is remarkable how commonly The Received View--or

some consequence of it--is simply taken for granted.

And we

shall see that there are some good reasons why this view has

been so widely accepted.

Nevertheless,

I

believe that if we

reflect on certain facts about the concepts of generic

thinking and of sentential expression, intuitive

considerations arise that call the Received View, and
consequently the Propositional Tradition, into question.

I

shall present and discuss these considerations in the

following chapter.
In the present chapter,

I

propose to formulate two

principles that jointly constitute the Received View’s

pronouncement concerning the attitudes of occurrent belief,
wishing and occurrent wondering.
principles,

(

RV 1

)

,

is a

One of these two

consequence of (PT2),

(PT3) and one

further assumption that was attributed to the Propositional

Tradition earlier.

The second thesis,

(RV2),

is independent

of any tenets or assumptions of the tradition formulated so
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far.

think it is safe to say, however, that
this second
principle would be counted a firm commitment
by any follower
of the Propositional Tradition.
I shall
discuss these two
principles in turn.
I

7.2.1

(

RV

1

)

In Chapter 2,

I

noted that the following tenets of the

Propositional Tradition distinguish it from the alternative
that
(PT2)

I

wish to propose:
VR( if R is an intentional attitude, then
nec Vx( pos( ^y R(y,x)
only if x is a
proposition )))
)

(PT3)

VR(

if R

is an intentional attitude, then
nec Vx( pos( ly R(y,x)
only if
pos( fy( y believes x )))
ii)
nec Vk( pos( ly R(y,x)
only if
pos( ly( y desires x )))
iii) nec Vx( pos( ly R(y,x)
only if
pos( ly{ y wonders x ))))
i)

)

)

(1)

)

It is a consequence of

(

PT2

)

that the "objects" of belief

are propositions:
nec Vx( pos ly(
proposition

y

believes

x

)

only if x is a

)

And it is a consequence of (PT3) that the attitudes of

belief, desire and wondering have the same modal ranges;

this is captured by the following two formulations:

(2)

nec Vx( pos ly(

y

believes

x

)

iff

pos ly{
(3)

nec Vx( pos ly{

y

believes

x

)

desires

x

))

y

wonders

x

))

iff

pos ly{
226

y

,,

think that the conjunction of (1) and (2) is a fair

I

formulation of the outlook Russell was promoting in the
remarks quoted at the start of this chapter.

I

see the

influence of the Received View in those remarks.

And

although Russell only cited the cases of desire and belief
there,

I

suspect he would have had similar things to say

concerning the relationship between belief and wondering.
believe he would have said (to paraphrase him):

I

it may seem

unnatural to say that one wonders a proposition, but as a

matter of fact, that is only

a

prejudice; what we believe

and what we wonder are of exactly the same nature.

Now recall that in Chapter
(

A6

)

3,

3

we made an assumption,

implying that each of the three non-occurrent

attitudes of belief, desire and wondering has the same modal
range as its principal occurrent counterpart.

I

believe

that this assumption would be accepted by and large within
the Propositional Tradition as well.
(

A6

)

(1*)

(2’)

(3’)

From (1)

-

(3)

and

we get:

nec Vx( pos ly{

nec Vx( pos Jy(
nec Vk( pos

y

y

y

is

is

is

-»
occurrently believing x
x is a proposition
)

)

iff
occurrently believing x
x
wishing
is
pos Jy( y

))

iff
occurrently believing x
x
wondering
is
pos Jy( y

))

)

)

The conjunction of these three is equivalent to the first

component principle of our version of the Received View.
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^ 1

^

jointly imply that the three occurrent
attitudes

^

at issue have the very same modal

range, and that this

common modal range is made up exclusively of
propositions.
If we apply the definition of "occurrent
belief"

question
Chapter

(

RV1

)

6,

"wish" and

provided in the preceding chapter (see (D8),
p.7), we can simplify:

a-

nec V*(

b.

nec Vx(

x

c.

nec Vx(

x

t

if x

.

is an

occurrent belief, then x is a
proposition )
is an occurrent belief iff x is a
wish
is an occurrent belief iff x is a
question )
.

)

This shall be our formulation of the first component

principle of the version of the Received View that

I

shall

be examining in what follows.

7.2.2

(

RV2

)

The second component principle of the Received View has
to do with which proposition it is that we may be said to be

occurrently believing, wishing or wondering, as the case may
be,

when given ascriptions of occurrent belief, wishing or

occurrent wondering are true of us.
this second principle asserts,

To get an idea of what

let me begin by considering

how it applies to a particular case; then we shall consider

how to generalize from the example.

Suppose that A is occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive on time, that
time,
time.

B

is wishing that Jones would arrive on

and that C is wondering whether Jones will arrive on

There is a particular proposition such that our
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second principle, given only these
assumptions, entails that
A is occur rentl y believing that
proposition, B is wishing
it, and C is wondering it.
The proposition in question is
the one we would normally take ourselves
to be referring to
when we speak of 'the proposition that Jones
will arrive on
time’, having some particular Jones in mind. 4
Before attempting to formulate a suitable

generalization, it will be helpful to have some further
terminology.

sensitive just

Let us say that a sentence is contextin case

it does not express the same thought

from context to context.

sensitive and moreover

,

If an

the thought it expresses is true or

false (i.e., a proposition),

I

shall say that the indicative

"standard"; thus:

is

(D9)

I

indicative is not context-

0 is standard =df 0 is an indicative; 0 is not
context-sensitive & icjx( 0 expresses x wrt c & x
is a proposition )

believe that very many indicatives are not context-

sensitive, and moreover, that among indicatives that are not

context-sensitive, very many are standard in the present
sense.

(It is controversi al whether these sentences are

,

quite so common as

,

I

am here making out.

claimed that "standard" is
but

I

a

c

So it might be

misleading choice of phrase,

have not been able to think of a better term for

sentences that are not only context-insensitive, but such
that the things they express are truth-valued.)
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:

We are interested in generalizing the claim above

concerning conditions under which persons may be said to be

occurrently believing, wishing or wondering the proposition
that Jones will arrive on time.

The generalization should

assert, to put it loosely, that for every standard

indicative, 0
0"

the item we speak of as "the proposition that

is necessarily such that someone

wishing it or wondering

it,

is

t

respectively,

it,

occurrently believing that 0

or wondering whether 0.

will

is occurrently believing
if he or she

wishing it would be that 0

,

So instances of this generalization

involve proposition-denoting terms of the form
the proposition that 0

Before formulating the relevant

where 0 is a sentence.
generalization, then,

let me try to make the relevant use of

this last bit of terminology clear.

I

propose to adopt the

following:
(DIO)

For any indicative,

0

we shall take

,

[the proposition that 0]
to be a singular term i) rigidly designating the
thing satisfying the following open sentence
x
)
( for
*

’

[Jc(

'

expresses

0'

x

wrt c;

x

is a proposition

and
Vc’VyC

'

0

'

expresses

y

wrt

c’

iff y

=

x

is such a thing, and ii) designating
otherwise.
nothing

if there

Note that the following holds:

230

))

]

If 0 is standard,

then there is a thing uniquely
satisfying the open sentence (for 'x’),

(4)

'

0'

Vc’Vy(

*

[fc(

expresses x wrt c;
and
0' expresses y wrt

For suppose S is standard.

x
c’

is a proposition

iff y = x

))

]

Then there is a unique thought

that it expresses from context to context; moreover, this

thought is a proposition.

So there is a proposition

uniquely such that it is expressed by

S at any context.

This thought satisfies the above square-braced open sentence
when S is the substituend for

'

0'

From (4) and (DIO),

.

follows that [the proposition that

0]

it

rigidly designates a

proposition, provided that 0 is standard.
With this terminology set, the second component

principle of the Received View may be put:
for any standard 0, the following expresses a
truth (at any context):

(RV2)

x
a) nec( Vx( x is occurrently believing that 0
that
proposition
0 ))
is occurrently believing the

[

b)

nec(

Vx

that 0 -»

is wishing that it would be the case

(

x

x

is wishing the

proposition that 0

wondering whether 0 -»
wondering the proposition that 0 )) ]
c)

I

nec(

Vx(

x

is

assume that 'Jones will arrive on time’

Then

(

RV2

)

implies that if persons,

A,

B,

x

))

is

is standard.

g

and C, are such

that A is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time,

B

is wishing that

it would be the case that Jones will

arrive on time, and C is wondering whether Jones will arrive

231

on time,

then there is at least one thing, the proposition

that Jones will arrive on time, such that A is occurrently

believing it, B is wishing

it,

and C is wondering it.

This

is the result we wished to generalize.

(RV2)

implies that the proposition that Jones will

arrive on time, call

it

"PJ"

for short,

is one thing

occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering, if

I

am

am,

I

respectively, occurrently believing that Jones will arrive
on time, wishing that he would or wondering whether he will.

Can’t we identify PJ

simply, as what

,

am occurrently

I

believing, wishing or wondering under these conditions?

But

this would imply that there is a unique thought such that,
say, my occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on time
is a

sufficient condition for my occurrently believing

It is not clear that this is correct.

I

it.

warned the reader

at the end of Chapter 4 that the Plurality of Thoughts

Argument (PTA) would bother us again (see Chapter
4.8).

Here is a case in point.

4,

section

An analogue of PTA leads to

the conclusion that there are rather at least two thoughts

each such that my occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive on time is a sufficient condition for my occurrently

believing it; intuitively, two such thoughts would be:

the

thought that Jones will arrive on time, and the thought that
Jones will arrive.

7

I

find PTA itself fairly compelling;

its analogue in the present case is surely just as

compelling.

If we aim at least to suspend judgment on the

soundness of PTA, then

I

think we ought not commit ourselves
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.

to the claim that PJ is uniquely such that one’s occurrently

believing that Jones will arrive on time is a sufficient

condition for occurrently believing
The conjunction of

(

RV1

)

and

(

it.

RV2

)

shall serve as our

formulation of the Received View in what follows.®

Let us

turn to consider what grounds there might be for accepting

this doctrine.

7

.

3

Motivation for the Received View
It is not surprising that the Received View has enjoyed

widespread acceptance; there are certainly some

considerations that lend it prima-facie credibility.
considerations

I

The

have in mind may be separated into three

groups
7.3.1

A

Semantic Rule for Sentential Complements

In connection with PTA,

we considered a semantic rule

that one might suppose governs the behavior of indicative

clauses in certain constructions (see Chapter
4.8,

discussion of (A?), p.75 and ff.).

4,

section

Although this rule

is independent of principles embodied in the Received View,
it is nevertheless a very natural

view.

accompaniment to that

The rule asserts that indicative clauses, when they

figure as complements in ascriptions of the form
(FI)

t

is thinking that

0

,
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are rigid designators.

The rule didn’t pronounce on what

things are rigidly designated by indicative clauses in these
contexts, but

I

suggested that one might suppose that a

given clause [that 0 ]

,

for appropriate 0

rigidly designates

,

the thought we refer to by the phrase
the thought that 0

.

Let us consider a related thesis:

(R)

If 0 is standard, t is an appropriate singular term,
and V is the appropriate form of an attitude verb
(or verb phrase) taking indicative clauses as
complements, then the following expresses a truth:

[the occurrence of 'that 0 in 't V that 0
rigidly designates the proposition that 0 ]
'

'

Roughly speaking, the idea is that, in the relevant contexts
and for suitable 0

the indicative clause,

,

designates the proposition that 0

.

[that 0 ]

,

rigidly

think this is a

I

plausible idea. 9,10
(R) entails the first clause of

to (R),

if

(

RV2

)

.

For according

0 is standard, then the occurrence of [that 0 ] in

the open sentence:

[x

is occurrently believing that 0 ]

rigidly designates the same proposition designated by [the

proposition that 0 ]

.

From this fact, we can establish the

truth of:
nec(

Vx(

x

is occurrently believing that 0 -» x is

occurrently believing the proposition that 0
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))

:

for any standard 0

standard 0

And if we instantiate (RV2), for any

.

this is precisely what we get in clause a) of

,

the result.

Then if one finds (R) plausible, one ought to

find that what (RV2) implies concerning occurrent belief is

plausible too.
However,

(R)

as it stands does not guarantee what is

required by the last two clauses of

standard 0
a

(

RV2

)

:

that for any

the proposition that 0 is necessarily such that

,

person is wishing it or wondering it,

if he or she

is,

respectively, wishing that it would be that 0 or wondering

whether 0

In any

.

(grammatical, English) ascription formed

from 'is wishing’, the complement clause will not have an
indicative main verb; the main verb of the complement

clauses in such ascriptions will either be in the

subjunctive or else be formed from one of the modal
auxiliaries,

clauses

(

'could’,

'would’ or 'might*.

Indicative

that-cl auses formed with indicatives) cannot figure

as complements of the present progressive of 'wonder’

either.

Consequently,

(R)

does not imply either clause b)

or c) of any instantiation of (RV2), for given standard 0
Still

it may seem a natural

.

step from (R) to suppose

that what (R) says about indicative clauses may be said,

mutatis mutandis

,

of any sentential clauses that figure as

complements of attitude verbs.
fol lowing
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Thus, we could adopt the

y

(R

,

If 0 is standard, t is a singular
term,
appropriate inflection of an intentional and V is the
attitude verb
(or verb phrase) taking sentential
clauses as
complements, then where S-clause is a
grammatically
appropriate sentential clause obtained from
0 the
following expresses a truth:

)

,

[The occurrence of

‘

S-clause in 't V S-clause
rigidly designates the proposition that
0]
’

'

(R

'

implies each clause of (RV2), and it proposes a
simple

)

and uniform treatment of the sentential complements
figuring
in many and

(R)

appl

thinks
knows

various attitude ascriptions:

ies— including ascriptions formed with
,

is

occurrently be lieving’

asserts

,

,

etc.

'hopes’

,

desires’,

'doubts’

including any having the

following as their main verb phrases:
,

the verbs

but as well to a host of other

sorts of attitude ascriptions,

wishing

those to which

'is adamant

’,

'wishes’,

'wonders’,

'is

'guesses’,

'is

trying to think’, etc.
(R

)

is a very simple and general

This fact by

rule.

itself does not constitute grounds for accepting any of its

consequences.

However,

if other

considerations provide

independent motivation for accepting

(

RV2

)

,

the fact that it

is the view required by such an attractively simple and

general semantic thesis may well add to (RV2)’s appeal.

7.3.2

What is Occurrently Believed (etc.) to be the Case
The following possibility might be noted:

that one and

the same thing is such that one person is occurrentl

believing that it is the case, some other person is wishing
that it were the case and yet another is wondering whether
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it is the case.
is

One might suppose that such a possi

bi

1 i

ty

realized, for example, under the following circumstances:

Jones is thinking that Bush is honest; Sarah knows he isn’t,
but wishes he were, and William has always thought that Bush

was honest, but has now come to have some doubts; at this
very moment,

in fact,

he is wondering whether Bush is

honest.

And one might suppose that in this case, one thing

such that

— i)

ii)
is

Jones is occurrently believing it is the case,

Sarah is wishing that it were the case, and iii) William

wondering whether it is the case

— is

a

thing such that

i)

Jones is occurrently believing it, ii) Sarah is wishing it,
and iii) William is wondering it.

Then we would have it

that one and the same thing is an occurrent belief, a wish
and a question.

And plainly the point here is not limited to thoughts

concerning Bush’s honesty; it is plausible to suppose that

a

relevantly similar claim could be made concerning anything
one is thinking when one may be said to be occurrently

believing that something is the case, wishing that it would
be the case or wondering whether it is the case.
is natural

Indeed it

to think that anytime one is occurrently

believing anything at all, there is something one is thereby

occurrently believing to be the case and this thing is also
such that one could wish that it would be the case and also

wonder whether it is the case.

This in turn might naturally

be taken to show that anything that can be occurrently
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believed is a thing that could be wished
and as well a thing
that could be wondered.
Similar considerations suggest that
anything that can be wished can be occurrently
believed and
wondered, and that anything that can be wondered
can be

occurrently believed and wished.

Thus, an important part of

the Received View would be secured concerning
occurrent

beliefs, wishes and questions:

these three sorts of thought

are in fact coextensive.

This point, by itself
beliefs,

,

does not show that occurrent

wishes and questions are all propos i t ons
i

.

But if

there is adequate reason to suppose that any of these types
have propositions as their instances, the above line of

consideration apparently supports the view that all three
types do.

Coupled, then, with adequate reason to think that

any one of these sorts of thought are propositions, the

present considerations may be viewed as affording direct
support for (RV1).

And,

indeed, the claim that occurrent

beliefs may be identified with propositions has substantial

plausibility;

I

shall discuss this matter in 7.3.5 below.

There are considerations which tend to confirm the

Received View having to do with that view’s passing some
tests of adequacy to which any account of the nature of

thoughts should be submitted.
tests;

I

I

will mention two such

think it should be fairly clear that our restricted

version of the Received View passes each of these.
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)

.

7

-

Test

3 -3

1

:

Thoughts Can Be Shared

Thoughts are things that can be shared, had in common.
For example,

it is possible for you and me both to be

occurrently believing that President Bush is an honest man.
In such circumstances it will
I

be correct to say that you and

are thinking the same thing:

Parallel

we share a thought.

remarks apply concerning shared wishes and

questions.

If you and

I

are both wishing that Bush were

honest or both wondering whether he is, either way, it would
be correct to say that we are thinking the same thing;

again, we share a thought.

items as thoughts

— as

If a theory

identified certain

occurrent beliefs, wishes and

quest ons--and those items couldn’t correctly be said, in
i

the present sense, to be shared under such circumstances,

then the theory just doesn’t afford an acceptable conception
of thoughts.

The test could be put this way:

if an

account of the

nature of thoughts is adequate, it ought to capture

faithfully our intuitive judgments concerning occasions with
respect to which we would be inclined to say that persons
are having the same thought--the theory ought to imply that

there is a shared thought with respect to most cases

concerning which our intuitions say there is a shared
thought
(

RV2

meets this requirement.

It implies,

that any circumstances in which you and

I

for example,

are both

occurrently believing that Bush is honest are circumstances
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)

.

in which there

honest

is a thing

that you and

I

the proposition that Bush is

are occurrently believing.

thesis guarantees that if

I

The

am wondering whether Bush is

honest and you are wondering whether Bush is
honest then
there is a thing again, the proposition that
Bush is

honest

that both of us are wondering.

Then as long as the

proponent of the Received View uses 'thought’ so that it
applies to such "objects" of attitudes, that proponent will
have the desired result that thoughts can indeed be shared.
Plainly,

(

RV2

)

does not apply to all cases in which we

would want to say that there is

shared thought.

a

It can

only predict shared thoughts with respect to cases in which
our thinking may be reported by instances of
(FI)

t

is

(F2)

t

is wishing that it would be that 0

t

is wondering whether 0

occurrently believing that 0

or
(

F3

in which the substituends for

'

0

'

are standard.

But within

this limited range (RV2) may seem to capture our intuitions
exactly.

A fully general

formulation of the Received View

could be expected to capture our intuitions in this matter
with respect to an even broader class of cases (on this

point

,

see Note 8 )

The present test does not require that the items that
can be commonly occurrently believed, wished and wondered
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:

.

will

,

be of any particular sort;

it only requires,

regarding

cases concerning which we would intuitively say that there
is a shared thought,

that the theory (by and large) says so

too
It may be noted that this test does not weed out

unreasonable theories.

It is passed for example by a theory

according to which the only thought in the world is some

particular telephone pole in Pocatello Idaho, and everybody
is always
in

"having" it.

So,

passing the present test is not

itself much of a recommendation of a theory;

nevertheless, the test places a necessary condition on

adequacy for theories about the nature of thoughts, and it
is a test that our version of the Received View passes.

Test

7.3.4

Identifying Occurrent Beliefs with
Propositions

2:

.

A second test of adequacy for any account of the nature

of thoughts concerns the relationship proposed between

occurrent beliefs and propositions.

The proposal of the

Received View in this connection is afforded by the a)-

clauses of

(

RV1 a

)

(RV2a)

(

RV1

)

and

(

RV2

)

by which

I

mean the following:

Necessarily, for any x, if x is an occurrent
belief only if x is a proposition.
For any standard 0
truth
[nec(

Vk(

Consider (RVIa).

I

the following expresses a

is occurrently believing that 0

x

occurrent!

,

y

-•»

believing the proposition that 0

x

))]

think it is plain that of the many and
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is

various cases in which
occur rent

1

a

person could be said to be

believing something, a vast number of such cases

y

are ones concerning which we would say that
whatever the

person is occurrently believing is a true or false
thought,

hence a proposition.

also take it that if a thought is

I

true or false, and is in the modal range of any
intentional

attitude at all, then we would be inclined to say that this

thought is at least possibly in the modal range of occurrent
belief, and so,

is an

occurrent belief.

afford some support for

,

the idea that the modal

These observations

and make it very natural to accept

range of occurrent belief is made up

exclusively of propositions, as required by (RVIa).

12

There is also some presumption in favor of (RV2a).
Take the indicative,

'Henry is a noisy bird’, for example.

It is standard (in my idiolect at least;

Henry is our pet

cockatiel).

It is not implausible to hold that,

necessarily,

if a person

is a noisy bird,

is occurrently believing that Henry

one thing the person is, then, occurrently

believing is the thing that is in fact expressed by this
sentence.
is

Consider any possible situation in which

occurrently believing of our Henry that he is

bird.

a

a

person

noisy

Isn’t it correct to say, concerning such a situation,

that what we express by our use of 'Henry is a noisy bird’
is something this person is occurrently believing in that

situation?

I

think so.

If

I

am right, then so is the

instantiation of (RV2a) for this particular sentence.

242

Similar considerations support the
consequences of (RV2a)
concerning other standard sentences.
We should expect an acceptable
account of the nature of
thoughts to predict at least that a vast
number and wide

variety of occurrent beliefs are propositions.

Also,

I

think we should expect any viable account to
predict that
when one’s occurrent believing is properly
reported by the

ascription

[t

is occurrentl y believing that 0 ]

for some standard indicative, 0

the proposition we would

,

refer to as [the proposition that 0 ] will be among the

things that one is then occurrently believing.

Plainly,

(RVIa) and (RV2a) meet these expectations.

7

.

Summary

4

In the next chapter,

shall discuss grounds for

I

questioning the Received View.
but

I

My focus will

be on (RV2)

think it will become clear enough that if there is

reason to question that component of the view, there is
reason as well to question

(

RV

1

)

In turn,

.

these

considerations provide motivation for considering some
alternative to the Propositional Tradition that does not
commit itself to the Received View (or to the conjunction of
(PT2) and (PT3)).

alternative.

In Chapter 9,

I

propose such an

However, any viable alternative to the
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.

Propositional Tradition that eschews the Received View ought
to accommodate the considerations raised in the previous

section
This accommodation can be furnished in various ways.
It seems clear that any account of the nature of thoughts

ought to pass the two tests of adequacy discussed in 7.3.3
and 7.3.4.
7.3.1

But in the case of the considerations raised in

and 7.3.2, there is some leeway.

the latter two groups of considerations,

Concerning either of
if we are

supporting some alternative to the Propositional Tradition
that rejects the Received View, we ought to show either

i)

that the considerations do not really offer support for the

Received View, contrary to appearances, or ii) that they

support the proposed alternative just as well.

In any case,

we ought to be able to show that whatever real support these

considerations provide for the Received View

is,

one way or

another, counterbalanced by benefits derived from accepting
the alternative.

Since

I

shall be proposing an alternative

view of the sort in question here,

I

shall have to address

these matters sooner or later.
To conclude this chapter,

let me mention a further

reason why the Received View may strike one as such a
natural view to accept.

Virtually everybody (whether

philosopher or philosophically-oriented linguist or
logician) has been brought up within the Propositional

Tradition.

Within that tradition, research concerning so-
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called propositional attitudes has been dominated by the

Received View.

Consequently, the problems and projects that

have arisen within this research have been largely those

having to do with the analysis of belief or, on the semantic
side, with proper treatment of belief ascriptions.

For the

Received View leads one to suppose that in looking at the
’objects" of belief, one is looking at the very things that

are objects of all the other attitudes.
I

do not deny that there are problems to be faced

concerning intentional attitudes and attitude ascriptions,
generally, that can be addressed by restricting one’s

attention to belief and belief ascriptions.

Nevertheless,

with the focus of research directed so exclusively to

problems parochial to the study of belief (or to the study
of the semantics of belief ascriptions),

it is not

surprising that one does not come across much evidence

contravening the claim that all intentional attitudes are
relations we bear to propositions, or contravening the claim
that other attitudes (desire and wondering, and their

occurrent counterparts
modal

,

for example) have the very same

range as belief.

Under these circumstances, then, it is not so

surprising that the Received View continues to enjoy

widespread acceptance.^

But of course these circumstances,

though making acceptance of the view quite natural and

something to be expected, don’t constitute good grounds for
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accepting it.
that

I

I

wish to turn now to discuss some matters

think call the Received View into question.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

Russell in his "Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Russell
[1956], p.218

1.

Perhaps some would accept a stronger definiens,
requiring that propositions be necessarily true or false.
Perhaps some would claim that the present definiens is too
strong, and that it should only be required that
propositions are possibly true or false. Surely some link
to truth-val uedness along these lines would be required.
The present formulation will suffice and is most convenient
for purposes of exposition here.

2.

3.
It should be noted, however, that Russell goes on, in
this very essay, to promote what is called the "multiple
relation" account, according to which it is denied that
propositions are the objects of the attitudes. Since this
essay is a compilation of a series of lectures that Russell
gave over a period of many weeks, it is possible that he
adhered to the propositional account at the point in the
course of his lectures where this passage occurs.
It is
also possible that he was appealing to the propositional
account as a simplifying picture, at this point, just to get
across the view--common to both the multiple relation and
the propositional accounts that all the attitudes should be
accounted for in a uniform way.

—

There is a question here that I have not addressed, and
which
for which I have simply assumed an answer:
propositions are such that, according to the Received View,
it follows from the fact that a person is wishing that Jones
would arrive on time, that the person is wishing those
I am
propositions? Take the case just cited in the text.
assuming that according to the second component of the
Received View now in question, it follows from B’s wishing
that Jones would arrive on time, that B is wishing a
proposition, x, which in turn is such that from A’s
occurrently believing that Jones wi 1 arrive on time, it
follows that A is occurrently believing x. One such
the proposition that Jones will
I claimed,
proposition is,
arrive on time.
I
The case of occurrent belief is not at issue here.
that
proposition
the
that
all
by
agreed
be
would
think it
Jones will arrive on time is a proposition, x, such that it
follows, from A’s occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time, that A is occurrently believing x (more on
What is not clear is whether this
this in section 7.3.5).
proposition the proposition that Jones will arrive on time-is also such that, from B’s wishing that Jones would arrive
Just to give some
on time, it follows that B is wishing it.
4.

—
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f t e p oblem
here are some other possibilities:
n«rh a S what
^
^
Bis wishing is rather the proposition
that
Jones is arriving on time, or the proposition
that
Jones
^es arrive on time, or the proposition that Jones is qoina
a
H
to arrive on time, etc.
Presumably, some of the relevant propositions
will be
ones expressed by indicatives formed with
'Jones’ as subject
and s ome form of arrive on time’ as verb
phrase.
But this
leaves open the possi bi
ti es noted just above.
It’s not as
a
such indicatives express the same proposition.
For
example, the following two do not:
'Jones will arrive on
time
Jones is arriving on time’.
In my formulation of
RV2
I opt for the first of the
two choices just mentioned.
At least, this is what I
intend.
I assume the following strict
equivalence:
>

1

i

1

,

(

(a)

)

,

Necessarily, for any x:
x is wishing that it would be the case that
Jones
will arrive on time iff x is wishing that Jones would
arrive on time ).
(

Actually,
x is wishing that Jones would arrive on time’ is
ambiguous; on one reading, I take (a) to express a truth.
See Note 11 below (part B.), for further discussion of the
ambiguity in question here and of the general topic raised
in this note.
As far as I can see, the choice one makes
among the above candidates for which proposition is being
wished makes no difference to the considerations that I
raise in the next chapter against (RV2).

Richard and Soames would certainly count fewer
indicatives standard than I do. See Note 11 to Chapter
for references and a brief description of their view.
5.

5

6.
Actually, this seems questionable.
I think that on its
most natural i nterpretati on
'Jones will arrive on time’ is
context-sensitive.
For I think we would normally and
properly take it to be saying, with respect to some
contextually determined occasion in the future, that Jones
will arrive on time on that occasion.
It is not clear to me
that there is an i nterpretati on of the sentence on which it
is not context-sensitive in this way.
Does the sentence
have an i nterpretati on on which it can be used merely to
assert of some future occasion or other, that Jones will
arrive on time on that occasion? I’m inclined to think so,
but perhaps it is not clear.
Perhaps there is an habitual
interpretation that is context- i nsensi ti ve an
interpretation on which the sentence may be used to assert
At
that Jones can generally be relied on to arrive on time.
any rate, the natural interpretation mentioned first is the
one intended in all the discussions to follow.
Still, I shall proceed with the assumption that 'Jones
Though it is
will arrive on time’ is standard.
,

,
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questionable, for purposes of illustration, it seems
harmless enough.
7.
The conclusion of PTA implies that it is not the case
that there is any thought, x, uniquely such that necessarily
if I am occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, then I am occurrently believing x.
But I assume that
the sentence, 'Politicians lie and cheat’, is standard.
So
we already have a case against the claim that for any
standard 0 the following expresses a truth:
,

[

there’s a unique thought, x, such that necessarily
one is occurrently believing that 0 then one is
occurrently believing x ].

if

,

The argument is fairly compelling (I won’t repeat it here,
see Chapter 4, section 4.8).
But we can construct a
parallel argument for the case of our sentence 'Jones will
arrive on time’.
The parallel depends on the following
inference rule, which seems to me to be as plausible as its

analogue in PTA:
For any appropriate singular term, t, from
arrive on
time]
i nf er
[t is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive],

(DISTj)

[t is occurrently believing that Jones will

The parallel argument aims to establish that no thing is
uniquely such that I am occurrently believing it whenever I
am occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on time.
An analogous argument casts doubt on whether, roughly
put, for any standard 0 there is a thought that can be
properly identified as what I am wishing, whenever I am
For shouldn’t we
wishing that it would be the case that 0
accept the following inference?
,

.

(

For any appropriate singular term, t, from
wishing that Jones would arrive on time]
[t
i nf er
[t is wishing that Jones would arrive]

DISTo

)

is

is accepted, then again we have a line of
DISTo
reasoning parallel to that of PTA leading to the conclusion
that no thing is uniquely such that I am wishing it whenever
I am wishing that Jones would arrive on time.
In the case of wondering, however, it is clear that the
analogue of PTA does not go through; consider:

If

(

)

For any appropriate singular term, t, from
[t is wondering whether Jones will arrive on time]
infer:
[t is wondering whether Jones will arrive]

(DISTo)
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—
Instantiating with 'Aronszajn’, (DIST
3

)

tell s us that from

Aronszajn is wondering whether Jones will arrive
on time
we may infer

Aronszajn is wondering whether Jones will arrive.

(b)

But surely there may be some occasions on which I am
wondering whether Jones will arrive on time, but have no
doubt that she will arrive eventually.
So there are
situations with respect to which (a) is true, while (b) is

false.
So (DISTg) is not in general valid.
At any rate, the two analogues to PTA involving (DIST..)
and (DIST
call into question whether, for every standard
2
0 there is some thought uniquely satisfying the following
open sentence (for y’):
)

,

'

nec Vx( x is occurrently believing y, wishing y or
wondering y, respectively, rf x is occurrently
believing that 0 wishing that it would be that 0 or
wondering whether 0
]

[

,

,

)

And it is worth noting that related considerations
suggest that it may also not be the case, generally, that,
for any standard 0 there is a thought uniquely satisfying
the f ol lowing:
,

nec Vx( x is occurrently believing y, wishing y or
wondering y, only if x is, respectively, occurrently
believing that 0 wishing that it would be that 0 or
wondering whether 0
]

[

,

,

)

Again, there would seem to be more than one thought
satisfying the resulting open formula, for at least some
choices of 0
The problem may be intuitively put as
proposition
that Jones will arrive and the
follows:
the
arrive on time are distinct;
will
proposition that Jones
the
case of occurrent believing
yet take, for example,
would
each seem to be such that one
these two propositions
if one is occurrently
only
is occurrently believing it
believing that Jones will arrive.
.

—

let me mention two ways in which I take
and (RV2) to formulate only restricted versions of the
( RV 1 )
two component principles that make up the Received View.
First, there are many other attitudes besides desire and
wondering (and their principal occurrent counterparts) that
(RV1
would be claimed to share the modal range of belief.
of
assert,
would
is a restricted version of a thesis that
modal
same
the
all of these attitudes, i) that they have
8.

In passing,

)
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range, and ii) that this common modal range is made up
exclusively of propositions.
I do not have any criterion to offer that
would
properly pick out the other attitudes that would be counted
as sharing the modal range of belief.
Certainly, not all
attitudes would be counted. Here is an argument that shows
why not.
Either it is possible for contradictions to be
believed, or it is not.
(I would assume that it is
possible; but for the sake of argument, let us suspend
judgment.) Suppose it is possible. Then the modal range of
belief and knowledge cannot be the same, for there are
contradictions in the modal range of belief and none in that
of knowledge.
On the other hand, suppose that it is not
possible to believe contradictions. Then there will be
contradictions in the modal range of di sbel ief (and
doubting, too, presumably) that are not in the modal range
of belief.
Still, it is safe to say that, according to a
fully general version of the first component principle of
the Received View, there would be very many attitudes, both
occurrent and non-occurrent that should be counted as
having the same modal range as belief.
(RV2) is restricted in another respect.
It is intended
formulate
to
a version of the second component principle of
the Received View, a principle that tells us, roughly, which
proposition it is that a person bears an attitude to, given
that what is expressed by an attitude ascription of the
appropriate sort is true of that person.
But (RV2) concerns
itself with only three particular sorts of attitude
ascriptions:
those expressing the attitudes of occurrent
belief, wishing and occurrent wondering, and of these
ascriptions, only those that have sentential complements
obtained from standard indicatives. A fully general version
of the Received View would concern itself with the
implications of what is reported by a much wider variety of
ones formed from a wide variety of
attitude ascriptions:
attitude verbs (all those expressing attitudes that have the
same modal range as belief) and ones containing sentential
clause complements obtained from any sort of indicative, not
just the standard ones.
and RV2 ) formulate substantially restricted
So (RV1
versions of these two component principles of the Received
View.
This should not affect the considerations to be
raised against the Received View in the following chapter.
Despite the restrictions, (RV1) and (RV2) formulate
principles that capture central aspects of that view.
,

)

(

The rule is not plausible for de re interpretations of
On this point, see the
the relevant attitude ascriptions.
the rule, (A?),
concerning
4
Chapter
11
to
remarks in Note
PTA.
discussing
in
cited
was
similar to (R), that
9.

There are
10.
is very natural

To begin with,
grounds for accepting (R).
are
clauses
indicative
that
to hold
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it

n

y

.

.

referential terms.
Logical and syntactic behavior of such
S akl
to that of terms that are uncontroversi
al
,
i
rlfprpnt
S
referential.
So,
for example, positions occupied by such
S
e
t0 existentia1 generalization, as in
P
the move
from (a) to ?b)
1

(a)

Many kids kicked that tin can

(h)

There is something that many kids kicked.

Likewise, the move from (c) to (d) seems acceptable
and may
be counted as a strai ghtforward case of existential

generalization, provided that indicative clauses are
referenti al
(

c

Smith doubts that Jones will arrive on time

)

There is something that Smith doubts

(d)

A syntactic operation, passive transf ormati on
move from (a) to

,

allows the

That tin can was kicked by many kids.

(e)

Likewise a passive transformation allows the move from (c)

to
(

f

That Jones will arrive on time is doubted by

)

Smi th

(Although awkward, (f) is nevertheless grammatical).
This
behavior is character sti c of noun phrases generally, but
apart from quantified expressions would seem to be otherwise
characteristic of referential terms in particular, terms
that purport to refer.
Unless indicative clauses are in
some heretofore unforeseen way to be analyzed as expressions
of quantification (as Russellian theory of sentential
clauses?), their behavior with passi vi zation would seem to
be most naturally accounted for by taking them to be
ref erent al
There are also grounds for thinking that the items
designated by indicative clauses are just what (R) says they
should be.
For some evidence in this connection, see the
discussion of the plausibility of (RV2a) in 7.3.5. More
generally, it certainly seems natural to suppose that such
clauses figuring, for example, as complements in instances
of the forms
i

i

(Fa)

t

believes that 0

(Fb)

t

doubts that 0

(Fc)

t hopes that

0
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y

serve to specify those things to which the subjects
of such
attitude ascriptions bear the ascribed attitudes. This
function is strai ghtforwardl y accommodated if we accept
(R)
and suppose that indicative clauses are terms designating
things satisfying open sentences of the forms
(Fa’

)

t bel

(Fb*

)

t

doubts

(Fc’

)

t

hopes

i

eves

x

x
x

.

As to whether indicative clauses designate rigidly,
there is reason to think that they do.
We have just noted
that when such clauses occur as complements of attitude
verbs, as in ascriptions of forms (Fa) - (Fc), they serve to
specify what things the subjects of the ascriptions bear the
ascribed attitude to, what things the subjects are thinking.
We may note, then, that whether or not such an occurrence of
an indicative clause lies within the scope of a modal
operator seems to make no difference to its function in this
connection.
Consider, for example:

Smith is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy,

(g)

and
It is possible that Smith is thinking that some
shrewd spy is wealthy.

(h)

There seems to be no difference between, on one hand, what
is claimed, in (g), to be a thing in fact such that Smith is
occurrently believing it, and, on the other hand, what
claimed, in (h), to be a thing possi bl
such that Smith is
occurrently believing it. This appearance is accounted for
if we suppose that indicative clauses are rigid designators
when they occur as complements in such attitude ascriptions.
Further support for this account comes from
consideration of inferences like the following:
1)

Smith is thinking that some shrewd spy is wealthy.

2)

It is possible that Aronszajn is thinking that

some shrewd spy is wealthy.
::

3)

There is something that Smith is thinking, and it
is possible that Aronszajn is thinking it too.

The inference will be valid if
The inference seems valid.
we suppose that in the two premises, the indicative clauses
figuring as complements of 'is thinking’ rigidly designate.
In sum, (R) seems to me a plausible thesis.
253
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11.
Two points of clarification concerning certain
concepts involved in (R ):
A.
a point should be made concerning the "grammatical
appropriateness of a sentential clause as a complement of a
given attitude verb.
It is clear that we cannot freely
interchange sentential clauses as complements from one such
verb to another.
Sentential clauses come in various forms;
attitude verbs are highly selective in which forms they
accept as complements.
Let me briefly survey some examples
of such selectiveness.
The following are pretty clearly unacceptable:

(al)

?

I

am wondering that Tom was finished with dinner.

(

a2

)

?

I

am wishing whether Tom was finished with dinner.

(

a3

)

?

I

believe whether Tom was finished with dinner.

'Determine’, 'see’, 'decide’, 'try to think’,
'remember’ all take either indicative or 'whether’ clauses,
but do not accept subjunctive clauses; thus, the following
are unacceptable:
(

b1

)

?

I

remember that Tom were going to the store.

(

b2

)

?

I

saw that Tom go to the store.

The following is perfectly acceptable, but does not contain
a subjunctive sentential complement
(

b3

)

I

saw Tom go to the store

Here, 'go to the store’ is a so-called "naked infinitive",
not a subjunctive form.
In current English, indicative clauses are coming to be
acceptable as complements of 'wish’ and 'is wishing’; for
example, it’s getting so that one would be counted
inordinately picky if one held
(cl)

Jones wishes that McGovern was elected back in
1972.

to be unacceptable, and insisted,
(c2)

rather, on

Jones wishes that McGovern had been elected back
in

1972.

The following, however,

is unacceptable to my ears as

yet:
(

c3

Jones wishes that McGovern is president.
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)

)

.

•

(Quine used
ix(

Witold wishes that

x

is

president

),

but recall his antecedent apology for "violence to grammar"
p. 186.
[ 1976]
The subjunctive clause plainly acceptable in (c2) seems
pretty clearly unacceptable in

Quine

(

d)

,

?

Jones believes that McGovern had been elected in
1972

.

I do not know what rules determine the grammatical
appropriateness of a given sentential clause as complement
to a given verb.
I am inclined to think our intuitions of
acceptability in these cases reflect lexical constraints at
work, but I am prepared to believe that semantic factors are
involved too.

B.
A second point of clarification should be made
concerning which sentential clauses are "obtained from"
which indicative sentences.
Let me consider three cases:

whether-cl auses

i)

,

like that in

William is trying to think whether Sarah said

(e)

"

yes"

am leaving out an enormously varied group of
nterrogat ve clauses here, including for example all those
beginning with 'if’, 'how’ or with the wh-terms, 'who’,
'when’, 'where’, 'which’, 'why’, etc.
Making (R*) as
plausible and clear as possible is hard enough without
considering these cases.)
(I
i

i

present-tense subjunctive clauses, like that in

ii)

Sarah insists that Jones arrive on time.

(f)

(Note that I am not counting verb phrases formed with 'were’
or 'had’ as present-tense subjunctives, but only those
spelled the same as their corresponding naked infinitive
forms, e.g., 'arrive on time’, 'be prompt’, 'have cleaned
the table in time for dinner’.) And
iii) clauses whose main verbs are either subjunctive and
formed with 'were’ or 'had’, or else formed from one of the
modal auxiliaries, 'would’ and 'could’, as in
(

g

(

g2

1

)

Sarah wishes that Jones were prompt
Sarah wishes that William could get the message
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.

(g3)

.

William is wishing that Jones would arrive on time

Please bear in mind with the following proposals that I am
only attempting to clarify the notion of a clause being
obtained from an indicative well enough so that the reader
can give (R
a run for its money.
The details of what this
notion comes to, and any improvements needed for proposals
suggested here (and any defense of (R*) against criticism),
I
leave to proponents of (R
and the Received View.
I am
engaging in a bit of Devil’s advocacy in what follows.
)

)

i)
let us suppose that a whether-cl ause is "obtained from"
an indicative 0 iff the clause is [whether 0]
Thus,
.

whether Sarah said "yes"
is obtained from the indicative

Sarah said

"

yes"

R* ) that the clause,
It follows from this assumption and
’whether Sarah said "yes" ’, as it figures in (e), for
(

example, rigidly designates the proposition that Sarah said
"yes".
Note that this proposal does not associate the
clause, 'whether anyone left’, with any indicative since
'anyone left’ is not a sentence of English.
The following
is an i ndi cat ve— Wi 1 1 am is owed anything valuable that is
recovered’
consequently, there is one i nterpretati on of
the clause, 'whether William is owed anything valuable that
is recovered’ on which it is associated with that
indicative, but there is also an nterpretati on of the
clause on which it is not associated with any indicative.
The two interpretations are brought out by considering two
corresponding i nterpretat ons of

—

i

'

i

i

i

(h)

Sarah is wondering whether William is owed
anything valuable that is recovered

Are
On one reading of (h), Sarah’s question comes to this:
owed
to
at least some of the valuable things recovered
William? On the other reading of (h), Sarah’s question is
Are all of the valuable things recovered owed to
rather:
William? So the notion of obtaining a clause from an
indicative must be taken to be relative to an interpretation
We shall see shortly that this parameter for
of the clause.
has to be acknowledged as well in the case of
i nterpretati on
sentential clauses whose main verbs are formed with the
auxi 1 i ary would
'

’

Let us suppose that, where t is a singular term and VP
ii)
is the present subjunctive form of a verb with suitable
inflection, the clause [that t VP] is obtained from the
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,

indicative [t will VP].

So,

for example, the clause

that Jones arrive on time

obtained from the indicative

is

Jones will arrive on time,
and (R
in

)

(f),

implies that the clause, as it occurs, for example,
rigidly designates the proposition that Jones will

arrive on time.
i i i

)

Let us suppose that
a.

if the main verb of the clause is subjunctive and
formed with ’were’ or ’had’, then the clause is
obtained from the correspondi ng present- tense
indicative,

for example:
'that Jones were prompt’ is obtained from
'Jones is prompt’; 'that Jones had some money’ is obtained
from 'Jones has some money’.
And let us suppose
b.

if the main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'could’, then the clause is obtained
from the indicative form of the verb with the
auxi 1 ary
can
i

'

’

for example:
'that William could get the message’ is
obtained from 'William can get the message’.
(But contra
b.
what about 'that John could be with us now’?)
If the main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'would’, there is an ambiguity to be dealt with.
The indicative sentence from which the clause is obtained
may well have the correspondi ng future indicative form of
the verb, formed with the auxiliary 'will’, but it needn’t;
it might contain the simple present form, understood on its
For example, on the most natural
habitual reading.
interpretation of
,

(i)

Jones is wishing that McGovern would run for
office again.

say that what (i)
I take it that the Received View will
expresses implies that Jones is wishing the proposition
expressed by the sentence 'McGovern will run for office
again’.
But consider (g3) from above:

William is wishing that Jones would arrive on time.
On one interpretation, it
This sentence is ambiguous.
some particular timely
concerning
wish
reports William’s
that the Received View
it
take
part.
I
arrival on Jones’
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will say that what is expressed by (g3), on this
i nterpretat i on
implies that William is wishing the
proposition expressed by 'Jones will arrive on time’. On
the other hand, there is an interpretation of (g3) on which
it reports William’s concern for Jones’ lack of promptness.
I
suppose that the Received View will say that on this
interpretation, what is expressed by (g3) implies that
William is wishing the proposition expressed by 'Jones
arrives on time’, on the habitual interpretation of this
i nd i cat i ve
My suggestions here are intended to make (R*) as
plausible as possible given appeal to the intuitive test
outlined at the end of note 3. Here is one case:
If Jones
is wishing that McGovern would run for office again, we can
ask:
which proposition is it that Jones is wishing would be
true (assume that Jones is familiar with the concept of
truth)? Presumably:
the proposition that McGovern will run
for office again (at some relevant future time).
Applying
this test to (g3):
suppose William is wishing that Jones
would arrive on time, and he’s only concerned about her
punctuality, not about any particular upcoming arrival.
Then we can ask Which proposition is it such that William
is wishing that it would be true?--a natural answer (from
the perspective of the Propositional Tradition) would be:
the proposition that Jones arrives on time (is so disposed).
The results of this test suggest that we adopt the
,

—

following proposal:
c.

main verb of the clause is formed with the
auxiliary, 'would’, then the sentence from which
it is obtained either contains as its main verb
the simple present indicative or the future
indicative formed with the auxiliary 'will’,
depending on the nterpretati on of the clause.
if the

i

On assumptions

a.

-

c.,

(R*) tells us that the clauses

that Jones were prompt
that William could get the message
that Jones would arrive on time
as these occur in (gl) - (g3),

designate, respectively,

the proposition that Jones is prompt
the proposition that William can get the message

and either
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the proposition that Sarah arrives
on time,

or

the proposition that Sarah will arrive
on time,

depending on interpretation.
nou9h devil's advocacy.
R*
may look simple, but in
5n .pJ
S a Pr P0S t 0n
adlti0nalist
ser -i°usly proposes
"
that tho
?
^ "
? /*
1
simplicity
of
(R
is supposed to afford some
mnt^v
^
motivation
for their acceptance of the Received View,
these
matters concerning which sentential clauses are
obtained
from which indicative sentences are important
and must be
b fore any accurate assessment of
the simplicity
f
of
(

)

1

-

)

(R

)

can be made.

actually, I have reservations with (RVIa) as it stands.
think it is plain that there are people (I am one) who
satisfy the following open ascriptions:
I

x

believes that the Mona Lisa is beautiful.

believes that President Bush ought to change his
policy in the Persian Gulf crisis.
x

I
also take it to be clear that there are thoughts expressed
by the following (perhaps with respect to a given context;
let us set the matter of indexicality aside):

(c)

The Mona Lisa is beautiful

(d)

President Bush ought to change his policy in the
Persian Gulf crisis,

Call the thoughts expressed by (c) and (d), "T" and "T ",
d
respectively.
Moreover, I take it that if a person, s,
satisfies either (a) or (b), then the pair <s,T >, or as
c
well the pair <s,T >, satisfies the following formula
(for
d
x* and *y*, respectively):
f

(e)

x

believes

y.

Then by (A6) (see Chapter 3) and D8 (see Chapter 6), we
get the result that T„ and T are occurrent beliefs.
It
d
seems clear to me that this is right, as long as we are
taking (e) to express the intentional attitude expressed by
the verb 'believe* in ordinary English (what else?).
What
is not clear to me, however, and what is certainly
controversi al
is the matter of whether T c and T d are either
true or false.
T
is a value judgment; T d
a normative
p
judgment.
Many philosophers would deny that such items have
truth-value.
If they are right, then T c and T d are
counterexamples to (RVIa).
I happen to think that if a person satisfies (a) or
(b), then the person is either incorrect (mistaken, wrong)
(

)

,

,
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in s o believing, or else correct (unmistaken,
right).
And I
think that this will be so just in case what this person
believes in such cases are things that are either true or
false.
But these considerations would not persuade any who
take the other side on the issue of whether T and T are
r
H
truth- val ued
In what follows, I shall set this controversy
aside, and stick with (RVIa) as it stands.
The questions I
raise concerning the Received View in the next chapter do
not hinge on any of the matters raised here.
.

13.
Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis have (independently)
arrived at a certain account of intentional attitudes which
might be thought to be incompatible with the Received View.
See Chisholm [1981] and Lewis [1979a].
But care is required
on this point.
Let me confine my attention to the case of
Lewis.
It is not clear to me that parallel remarks may be
expected to hold for Chisholm’s views.
It is a consequence of Lewis’ view that "objects" of
the attitudes are properties; this i_s incompatible with the
view that "objects" of the attitudes are items of the sort
he speaks of as "propositions".
Thus, on his present view,
Lewis would no longer identify the "objects" of attitudes
with sets of his possible worlds (and likewise, Chisholm
would no longer identify the "objects" of attitudes with
what he speaks of as "states of affairs").
But I use
"proposition" to apply, by stipulation, to any truth-valued
thought.
So if there are any items in the modal range of
belief that may be assigned truth-values, my use of
"proposition” does apply to them.
And I think that Lewis
would allow that there are such items.
(I have in mind
certain "vacuous" properties:
there is the property, for
example, of being such that grass is green, true just in
case grass is green, and the property of being such that
there are two gods, true just in case there are two gods.
These properties are objects of belief and truth-valued
according to Lewis.) So I am inclined to think that Lewis
would grant that there are at least some occurrent beliefs
that are propositions.
Still, it is fairly clear that he
would reject the more general claim that all occurrent
beliefs are proposi tions--expressed in clause a. of ( RV
At any rate, I suspect that Lewis would fully accept
the b. and c. clauses of (RV1), and accordingly, would
except (PT3) and its analogue concerning occurrent attitudes
And I
--the conjunction of (2’) and (3’) in the text.
suspect that both Lewis and Chisholm retain the outlook of
that the
the Propositional Tradition in this respect:
precisely the
have
wondering
and
desire
belief,
of
attitudes
If
counterparts.
occurrent
their
do
same modal range, as
to
subject
still
are
views
current
their
then
this is right,
in
View
Received
the
against
raised
the considerations to be
those
of
targets
principal
the next chapter, for the
considerations are (PT3), (2’) and (3’).

—
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CHAPTER

8

AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW

8

.

Preface

1

In the previous chapter,

suggested that a test of

I

adequacy for any account of thoughts would be that it

accommodate a relationship between propositions and

occurrent beliefs along the lines proposed by the Received
View,

in the a.

clauses of

(

RV 1

)

and

(

RV2

)

Those clauses

.

assert that all occurrent beliefs are propositions, and more
specifically, that if a person’s occurrent believing is

correctly reported by the ascription,
[t

is occurrently believing that 0 ]

for some standard indicative, 0

,

,

then at least one thing the

person is occurrently believing is the proposition denoted,

according to (DIO), by [the proposition that 0 ]
The question remains:

Can analogous relationships be

plausibly asserted between wishes and propositions, or
implies that

between questions and propositions?

(RV1

occurrent beliefs are propositions.

We may accept this

)

without accepting the separate claim, also implied by (RV1),
that wishes and questions are occurrent beliefs.
put,

(

RV2

)

identifies the proposition that 0 as a thing not

only such that a) necessarily,
it,

if

I

Roughly

I

am occurrently believing

am occurrently believing that 0
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,

but also such that

b)

necessarily

I

be that 0>

am wishing it,

if

I

am wishing that

and such that c) necessarily,

am wondering whether 0

I

it.

wondering

it,

if

a),

it remains open whether we should accept a thesis that

I

Even if we should accept

.

implies b) and c) as well.
8.1.1

A

Proviso

In this chapter,

that

I

I

shall address some considerations

believe motivate an alternative to the Propositional

Tradition, considerations that suggest that the Received

View should be abandoned.

How these considerations would be

viewed by Propositional Traditionalists depends, in part, on
some questions of

i

nterpretati on

— on

whether we differ in

our understanding of the philosophical locutions figuring in
(RV1) and (RV2).
a certain way

—a

Only upon interpreting these formulations
way that

I

think is quite natural but that

nevertheless may not be the way intended by all
Propositional Tradi ti onal i sts--do we get principles

expressed that

I

claim are called into question by the

considerations to be raised

in

what follows.

For now, to make matters clear let me stress that
be concerned with what

shall

I

I

think are philosophically

familiar and central uses of the following locutions:
x

is a thought

x

is wishing y

x

is thinking y

x

is wondering y

x

is occurrently believing y

x

expresses
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y

—

,

On the uses in question, these locutions express concepts

that

I

assume are related to one another in ways discussed

in the course of Chapters

3-6.

I

shall try to make these

assumed relationships explicit whenever
8.1.2

(RV2.

1

I

appeal to them.

)

In sections 8.3 and 8.4,

I

shall consider two lines of

argument for claims that conflict with
"The Linguistic Argument" as I’ll call

(

RV2

it

)

;

one of these

— depends

on

intuitions concerning the concept of sentential expression;
the second line of argument--The Argument from Sameness of

Thought"

— relies

on intuitions concerning the conditions

under which persons may properly be said to be thinking the
same thing.
Both lines of argument call

into question the following

consequence of (RV2):
(RV2.1)

The proposition that Jones will arrive on time is
an x such that:
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that Jones
a.
will arrive on time -» y is occurrently
believing x
nec vy( y is wishing that it would be that
b.
Jones will arrive on time -> y is wishing x
nec Vy( y is wondering whether Jones yill
c.
arrive on time -> y is wondering x
)

)

)

This formulates the contention with which we began our

discussion of

(

RV2

)

in the

preceding chapter:

is occurrently believing that Jones will

whether one

arrive on time,

wishing that she would or wondering whether she will,

in

either case, one thing one is occurrently believing, wishing
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or wondering,

as the case may be,

Jones will arrive on time.

is the proposition that

The conclusions of the arguments

we shall be considering are in direct conflict with this

particular consequence of (RV2).
But

I

take the choice of embedded sentence in (RV2.1)--

Jones will arrive on time’--to be arbitrary among, and
representati ve of standard indicatives generally.
it,

then,

the considerations

I

(

RV2

)

see

fails in the case of a

vast number if not all standard indicatives.
I

I

shall be raising in the

following sections suggest that

mention, too, that

As

should

I

shall be contrasting just the cases of

occurrent belief and wishing
implications of clauses

a.

— examining

and

b.

only the

of (RV2.1).

Still,

I

think it will be clear enough that considerations parallel
to those we shall address in 8.3 and 8.4 provide equal

grounds for questioning the Received View on wondering

— for

questioning whether the proposition that Jones will arrive
on time is a thing that one is wondering whenever one is

wondering whether Jones will arrive on time.
Before discussing these difficulties for the Received
View,

I

need to so some stage-setting.

The considerations

I

wish to raise have to do with a particular class of possible

situations that

I

want to describe now in some detail.
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y

.

Setting Stage:

8 2
.

*-Si tuat i ons"

Imagine a situation in which two persons, O’Brien and
Witold, are awaiting the arrival of another person, Jones.
0 Brien has utter confidence in Jones’

promptness; at this

very moment, he’s occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive on time.

Witold is not at all confident about Jones’

arriving on time, but he is presently wishing that it would
be that Jones will

arrive on time--he has a plane to catch,

and Jones is supposed to take him to the airport.

So the

situation is one relative to which the reports expressed by
these two ascriptions are true:
Brien s occurrent!
arrive on time.

(1

0’

(2)

Witold

i

i

s

believing that Jones will

wishing that it would be that Jones will

arr i ve on time.
So far, surely, we have a description of a possible

situation
The Analogues of PTA, Again

8.2.1

It would be good if we could further constrain the sort

of situations at issue by assuming them to be ones in which,

roughly, the occurrent belief that Jones will arrive on time
is all

that is on O’Brien’s mind and,

likewise, the wish

that Jones would arrive on time is all that is on Witold’s
mind

— situations,

thought.

then,

in which each

is having just one

Then we could properly speak of "what O’Brien is

occurrently believing” and "what Witold is wishing
265

,

and

::

,

investigate whether, as the case is described, there is
reason either to maintain or to deny that O’Brien’s

occurrent belief is identical to Witold’s wish.
be good,

This would

because it would allow a simpler exposition of the

case and a simpler formulation of my arguments.

Unfortunately, the analogues of the Plurality of Thoughts

Argument (PTA) alluded to in the last chapter show,

if they

are sound, that no constraint of the sort envisioned is

possible.

Briefly,

let’s consider why this is the case.

One of the two relevant analogues of PTA, call it

"PTA.,"

relies on the following inference rule
(DIST<)
[t

is

For any singular term, t, from
occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on

time]
i

[t

nf er

is occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive],

From this, together with some further premises analogous to

those involved in PTA, we get:

Conclusion of PTA
Necessarily, if O’Brien is occurrently believing
that Jones will arrive on time, then there are at
least two things that O’Brien is occurrently
believing
.,

The other analogue, call

(

it

"PTA2", appeals to the rule

For any singular term, t, from
ft is wishing that Jones would arrive on time]
i nfer
[t is wishing that Jones would arrive],

DISTp

)
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and again, with premises analogous to those in PTA, yields:

Conclusion of PTA 2
Necessarily, if Witold is wishing that it would be
that Jones will arrive on time, then there are at
least two things that Witold is wishing.
These two arguments, PTA^ and PTA
2

compelling as PTA itself; and
compelling.

O’Brien and

I

,

are surely just as

think that PTA is fairly

— to return to our situations involving
Witold — the conclusions of PTA and PTA imply
But

2

1

that in those situations there is no single thing that is
"what" O’Brien is occurrently believing, and no one thing

that is "what" Witold is wishing.
the case requires,

The very description of

if these arguments are sound,

that

O’Brien is occurrently believing at least two things and
that Witold is wishing at least two things.

The reader will

get an idea of how this result complicates the matters

I

wish to discuss once we undertake the discussion.

Nevertheless,

I

propose to grant here that

PTA 2 are indeed sound.

I

PTA.,

and

don’t think that the resulting

complications in exposition will affect the intuitive force
of the arguments against (RV2.1) that we shall

discussing.

I

be

do think that those arguments can be

presented in a more clear-cut fashion, however,

if we pare

down, as much as possible, what things O’Brien and Witold

may be said to be occurrently believing or wishing.

There

are some constraints that can be added to our description of
the case that serve this purpose and that are nevertheless
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y

compatible with the conclusions of PTA
1

set the stage,

8.2.2

and PTA 2

to

So,

.

let me present and discuss these constraints.

*-Si tuati ons

First,

would like to give an intuitive idea of which

I

situations the added constraints are supposed to corral.
far

,

I

So

have said that we are considering situations in which

O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive on
time,

and Witold is wishing that it would be that Jones will

arrive on time.

attention to

a

But now

I

propose that we confine our

proper subset of such situations in which, to

put it intuitively, what is crossing O’Brien’s mind at the

moment is exhausti vel

reported by the following displayed-

sentence ascription:
(1’)

O’Brien is thinking:

By saying that (1’)

O’Brien’s mind,

I

Jones will arrive on time.

reports "exhaustively" what is on

mean to rule out that he is, say, wishing

or wondering anything, or bearing any other attitude not

required by his occurrently believing things.

And

I

mean to

rule out that he has any "stronger" occurrent beliefs than

what is reported by (1’).

Thus, although it might be

accurate to use (1’) to report what O’Brien is thinking
he is thinking:
as usual

.

if

Jones will arrive on time and out of breath

(1’) would not,

in such circumstances,

exhaustively what is crossing his mind.

Put another way,

the idea is that these are situations in which,
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report

if you asked

)

O Brien what he is thinking,

he would report by saying

something like "I’m thinking that Jones will arrive on
time.

and if you ask,

he d say:

That

to arrive on time

s
,

it;

Well, what else are you thinking",
I

was just thinking:

Jones is going

and nothing else was on my mind at all".

(He might well consider it frivolous, even if true (if he

accepts PTA
1

)

,

if we pointed out to him that he must also be

thinking that Jones will arrive
Likewise for Witold:
will

(2’)

(

tout court )

the situations

I

.

wish to attend to

be ones such that

Witold is thinking:

Arrive on time, Jones.

reports exhaustively what is crossing Witold’s mind.

I

take

this to rule out situations in which Witold is bearing other

attitudes not required by the wishing reported by (2’).
Also, as in O’Brien’s case,

I

understand the restriction to

rule out cases in which Witold is wishing anything stronger

than what is reported by (2’).

Ask Witold what he was

thinking at the time, he will say

was just wishing that

"I

Jones would arrive on time, that’s all

I

was thinking,

that’s all that was crossing my mind.
That’s the idea, roughly put.
refer to the situations

I

From here on,

shall

I

have in mind, described here

roughly and intuitively, as "*-si tuations"

.

Next,

I

propose

to state some constraints that corral these situations

somewhat more precisely.
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8-2.3

Constraints on *-Si tuati ons
The first constraint that

I

wish to impose may be put:

Constraint
^-situations are ones in which
1

!
I
I

a.

O’Brien is thinking, concerning Jones:
arrive on time.

b.

Witold is thinking, concerning Jones:

\

Jones will

I
I

!

time,

!

I

Arrive on

Jones.

take the conditions of this constraint to imply that (1),

(1*),

(2)

and (2’) express things that are true relative to

those situations.

It would not have sufficed simply to say

that the situations are ones relative to which the things

expressed by (1) and (2) are true.

For

I

believe that this

would not capture all that follows, concerning these
situations, from the truth, there, of the things expressed
by

And the features that, as it seems to me,

(1’) and (2’).

would get left out, are ones that

I

wish to require.

Then why not simply put that the situations in question
are ones relative to which the things expressed by (1’) and
(2’) are true?

and

I

used to think that this would be enough,

thought so because

were implied,

adverbial,
if the

I

I

used to think that (1) and (2)

respectively by (1’) and (2’), and that the

"concerning Jones", was not needed.

And indeed

implication of (1) by (1’) (and of (2) by (2’))

hold (so to speak),

di_d

it would be sufficient in the present

connection to require that ^-situations are ones relative to
which the things expressed by (1’) and (2’) are true.
270

But

I

think it is open to question whether (1) and (2) are
implied,

respectively by (1’) and (2’).

2

Then why not simply require that ^-situations are ones

relative to which the conjunctions
(2)

and (2

express truths?

)

— of

and (1’) and of

(1)

The problem with putting the

constraint this way, roughly put, is that the things

expressed by the

di spl

ayed-sentence ascriptions might be

true relative to some situations on grounds independent of
the grounds of truth at those situations of the things

expressed by

(

1

)

and (2).

Take the case of

( 1

and (1’).

)

I

wish to require, roughly speaking, that in a ^-situation,

O’Brien is occurrently believing of Jones that she will
arrive on time, and that he pulls off this bit of occurrent

believing in a way indicated by the truth of the displayed-

sentence ascription,

(1’).

*-si tuati ons

,

then,

are to be

understood, roughly, as ones where the same bit of thinking

makes the claims expressed by both (1) and (1’) true.
same idea goes, mutatis mutandis
(2’).

I

,

The

for the case of (2) and

hope that the constraint stated above captures

clearly enough, something at least in the neighborhood of
the desired requirement.
In order to state the second constraint,

useful to have some further terminology.

it will

be

We say that one

attitude requires another (from (D6), Chapter

4,

roughly if bearing the one attitude to a thing,

p.31)
x,

entails

bearing the other attitude to something (though perhaps not
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x).

Then, where V-ing is the present participle form
of any

verb whose present progressive expresses an occurrent
attitude,

R,

I

propose to use ascriptions of the form,

[t is only V-ing t’]

to assert of persons (or any things denoted by substituends
of

'

t

’

)

that they are bearing

substituends of

t’ ),

R to

things (denoted by

and that the only occurrent attitudes

they are bearing to those things are ones required by R.

I

assume that occurrent belief requires neither wishing nor

occurrent wondering.

Then, for example, to say that a

person is only occurrently believing, does not imply that
she isn’t also brushing her teeth, combing her hair or

getting breakfast under way, but it does imply that she is

neither wishing anything, nor wondering anything (nor
bearing any other occurrent attitude not required by

occurrent belief).
One further piece of terminology relating to the

character of Witold’s wishing will be useful in stating the
second constraint.

In Chapter 6,

I

noted that in certain

cases, what a person is wishing might be thought expressed
by an optative rather than by an imperative.

I

noted as an

example that depending on the character of my wishing,
am wishing that Rachel would pick up Carl’s violin,
be plausible to say that what
a context
1 i

in

I

if

it might

am wishing is expressed (wrt

which Rachel is addressee) with an optative,

ke
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I

.

If only you would pick up Carl’s violin

or the more archaic

Would that you pick up Carl’s violin
and not by the imperative

Pick up Carl’s violin.

I

do not propose to settle the question of whether the

optatives in such triples express the same thing as the
imperative.

But when

raised this matter in Chapter

I

6,

I

also noted that at least in some cases where one’s wishing
is,

as

I

put it then,

what one is wishing
i

"sufficiently demanding" in character,

i_s

pretty clearly expressed by an

mperat ve
i

I

don’t have

a

precise account of conditions under

which a wishing may be said to be demanding,
to a sufficient degree.

however:

I

in this sense,

assume that we can say this much,

roughly, that an event of wishing has this

demanding character if that event is properly reported by an

ascription of the form
t

is thinking:

0

in which the substituend for

f

t’

wishing, and the substituend for

denotes the subject of the
'

0

'

is an

imperative.

Let

me call such sentences "displayed-imperati ve ascriptions".
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It seems to me that any such ascription,

truth,

if

it expresses a

does report a wishing, and it seems to me, as well,

that circumstances in which such ascriptions would
be

clearly counted as expressing truths are fairly familiar
(even if the truth conditions for such ascriptions are

themselves not exactly clear).
I

suggest that we view wishings of the sort in question

here as involving a particular, distinguishing occurrent

attitude:

an occurrent attitude, R,

such that

i)

an event

of wishing is sufficiently demanding in character iff it is
an event of someone’s bearing R to a thing,

species of wishing.

and ii) R is a

(The notion of spec i es relevant here was

defined in (D7), see Chapter
is a species of another

if

4,

p

.

3

1

;

roughly, one attitude

bearing the first to a thing,

entails bearing the second to

x,

x,

and the second does not

require the first.)
Now

want a verb phrase that will serve to express

I

this occurrent attitude.

Though

I

think that events

involving this species of wishing are very familiar, there
isn’t,

as far as

I

know, any verb in English that expresses

the attitude precisely.

On one of the more familiar

interpretations of instances of
t

wants

t’

to VP

('Mark wants Rachel to pick up Carl’s violin’, for example)

these sentences report states that persons are in in virtue
of bearing what

I

would say is a non-occur rent counterpart
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y

y

v

of the occurrent attitude in
question.

But

I

don’t think

any form of the verb 'want’ expresses
the species of wishing
in question.
Nor do I know of any adverb in
English that
can modify 'is wishing’ so that
the resulting verb phrase
expresses this attitude.

propose to expropriate the adverb
'imperatively’, and

I

prefix it to the present participle in
progressive forms of
wish
obtaining such locutions as
,

is

imperatively wishing,

were imperatively wishing, etc.
and

I

shall take any such verb phrase to express the
species

of wishing in question (or else some directly
related

attitude,

in the case of progressive forms that are not

present- tense
it

)

To have a name for the attitude,

.

I’ll

call

"imperative wishing".
Now the second constraint on ^-situations can be put,

simpl

Constraint 2
^-situations are ones in which:

3

!

I

I

a.

O’Brien is on

b.

Witold is only imperatively wishing.

1

occurrently believing;

I

!

In *-si tuat i ons

prompt,

Witold may believe that Jones is never

,

but this can’t be something that he is occurrentl

bel ievi ng

.

For

I

suppose that occurrent belief is not
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:

y

,

required by wishing and Witold is onl
onl_y

wishing imperatively.

Consequently, there are no

situations meeting Constraint
believes anything at all.

wishing, and in fact

in which

2

Witold occurrently

Likewise, there is nothing that

O’Brien is wishing in such situations, though it is

compatible with Constraint

2

that there be things that he

desi res (I mean the non-occur rent attitude of desire).

Constraint
in the

captures part of what

2

I

meant when

I

said

intuitive description offered in 8.2.2, that (1’) and

(2’) serve to report exhaustively what is on Witold’s and

O’Brien’s minds in *-si tuati ons

.

The third constraint

captures another feature of these situations that was
supposed to be conveyed by that remark; it concerns which

occurrent belief and wish may be said, intuitively, to be
the strongest that O’Brien and Witold are having in the

situations in question.
f ol

1

The constraint may be put as

ows

Constraint 3
^-situations are ones in which
J
I

I

!

a.

O’Brien is occurrently believing x, then
if y is occurrently believing that Jones
nec
will arrive on time, then y is occurrently
bel

J

if
Vy(

Vx(

i

evi ng x

)

)

I

b.

!

I
I

Witold is wishing x, then
if y is imperatively wishing that it would
be that Jones will arrive on time, then y is
Vx(

if
nec Vy(

wi shi ng x

—

)

)

—

Let us consider briefly what this further constraint is

supposed to accomplish.
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It will

(Dll)

be useful

to have the following notions:

as strong an occurrent belief as y =df
and y are occurrent beliefs;
ii)
nec Vz( if z is occurrently believing x,
then z is occurrently believing y )
x is as strong a wish as y
=df
i) x and y are wishes;
ii)
nec Vz( if z is wishing x, then z is

x is
i) x

a.

b.

wishing

y

)

One occurrent belief (wish) is as strong as another,
roughly, just in case whenever you are occurrently believing

(wishing) the one, you are occurrently believing (wishing)
the other.

that

I

There are some notions closely related to these

shall employ as well:

we may say, for example, that

an occurrent belief is stronger than another (it is as

strong as the other, but the other is not as strong as it),
or that two wishes are independent of one another (neither
is as strong as the other).

Finally,

it will

make subsequent discussions easier if

There are things

we adopt the following terminology.

necessarily such that a person occurrently believes them

if

he or she is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive.
I

shall

refer to any of these as a "Jones belief".

Similarly, there are things necessarily such that a person

occurrently believes them if he or she is occurrently
believing that Jones will arrive on time
And

of these a "Jones-on-time belief".

"Jones wish" and "Jones-on-time wish

analogous ways.

If PTA 1

is sound,
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I

Let us call any

propose to use

understood in

we must grant that every

)

Jones belief is a Jones-on-time belief but not vice-versa

.

An analogous point holds concerning Jones wishes and Jones-

on-time wishes, if PTA is sound.
2
With this terminology, then, we may characterize the

effects of Constraint

3

as follows:

i)

it rules out any

situations in which O’Brien is occurrently believing
anything that is independent of or stronger than any Jones-

on-time beliefs, and ii) it rules out any situations in
which Witold is wishing anything independent of or stronger
than any Jones-on-time wishes.

Let’s consider how this

affects what Witold may be said to be wishing.
I

am inclined to think that there are possible

situations conforming to the first two constraints relative
to which the report expressed by

(2*)

Arrive on time, Jones, and
Witold is thinking:
please have the tickets in hand.

is true.

Let us call these

"

(

2* )-si tuat i ons"

.

Although the

open formula
(2**)

imperatively wishing that it would be that
Jones will arrive on time
y

is

is satisfied by Witold relative to

(

2* — s i tuati ons

,

there

are things Witold is wishing in such situations some of

which are stronger than, others independent of, anythi ng one
is wishing whenever one satisfies (2

).

Intuitively put,

there’s an imperative wish that Jones will arrive on time
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and have the tickets in hand, and there’s also an
imperative
wish, simply, that Jones will have the tickets in
hand.

Each of these is a wish Witold has in

(

2* ) — si tuations

,

yet

the first is stronger than, the second independent of any

Jones-on-time wishes.
meet Constraint

3,

Consequently,

(

2* )-si tuati ons do not

and cannot be counted among *-si tuati ons

Analogous points apply concerning the effect of

Constraint
believing.
in

on what O’Brien may be said to be occurrently

3

For example, the constraint rules out situations

which O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive on time and out of breath, for in such situations, he
has an occurrent belief
will

— intuitively,

arrive on time and out of breath

the belief that Jones

— stronger

than any

Jones-on-time beliefs.
Hereafter, when

I

speak of ”*-si tuati ons"

,

I

may be

understood to mean all and only those situations conforming
to Constraints

1-3.

I

believe that these constraints do

capture the situations fitting the intuitive description
gave in 8.2.2.
on time

;

Jones will arrive

We have O’Brien thinking:

Arrive on time, Jones,

we have Witold thinking:

and moreover,

given Constraints

I

and 3,

2

I

think these

situations are ones concerning which each of these
di spl

ayed-sentence ascriptions I’ve just used may be said to

report exhaustive!

what the person is thinking, what is

crossing his mind, what’s occurring to him.
some such situations are possi

bl
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Although

I

assume that

I

don’t have an

.

argument to buttress this assumption, it seems plausible to
me on the face of it.

Next,

in the

following two sections,

I

wish to present

some intuitive considerations concerning these ^-situations
that form the basis for two separate lines of argument

against

8

.

3

(

RV2

.

1

)

The Linguistic Argument
In the last section of Chapter 6,

develop and motivate
express.

Thesis

a

I

was concerned to

certain thesis about what sentences

Loosely, the thesis can be put:

2

a.
b.
c.

Indicatives express occurrent beliefs
Imperatives express wishes
Interrogati ves express questions

Further reflection suggests that in the case of many

sentences of each of the three varieties in question here,
there isn’t any latitude in which of these three breeds of

thought those sentences may be said to express.
say:

in the case of a large number of

That is to

indicatives,

it

appears that they do not express anything besides occurrent
beliefs;

in the case of a large number of

imperatives,

it

is

implausible to hold that they express anything besides
wishes, and in the case of very many

i

nterrogati ves

,

it is

not plausible to hold that they express anything besides

questions.

Intuitions supporting these generalizations form
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the basis of what

against
8.3.1

(

RV2

.

1

.

I

shall call the "Linguistic Argument"

)

First Pass
I

take it to be clear and uncontroversi

® i tuat i on

,

al

that in any

one thing that O’Brien is occurrently believing

is the thing in fact expressed by

(3)

I

Jones will arrive on time.

am assuming that there is a unique thing expressed by (3)

in English.

The import of Thesis

this very thing

— the

2,

concerning (3),

thing expressed by (3)

— is

is that

such that

there are possible situations in which it is something

someone is occurrently believing.
to be plain,

What

I

am here claiming

additionally, is that ^-situations are examples

of such possible situations,

and that,

in particular,

the

thing expressed by (3) is one of O’Brien’s occurrent beliefs
in such situations.

motivated Thesis

2,

Also,

if we

accept the intuitions that

then we will grant that in any *-

situation, one thing that Witold is wishing is the thing

expressed by the following imperative:

(4)

Arrive on time, Jones.

Again, as in the case of (3),

I

am assuming that there is a

unique thing expressed by (4), and it seems extremely

plausible to me to say that this thing (4) expresses
something Witold is wishing in *-si tuat ons
i

281

is

y

However,

.

it is surely counterintuitive to claim that

the thing O’Brien is occurrently believing, and that (3)

expresses,

is also the very thing expressed by

(4).

The

claim seems counterintuitive in two ways.
First,

I

have assumed (with (A7), Chapter

what a person is occurrently believing at
the person’s thoughts at the time
gen thinking.

— the

4,

a time,

p.30) that

are among

things he or she is

This seems plausible prima-facie

.

and in

particular it seems plausible to say that O’Brien’s

occurrent belief that is expressed by (3)

is among the

things he may be said to be thinking in these *-si tuati ons
By contrast,

however,

it seems to me quite implausible to

say that (4) expresses anything that O’Brien is thinking in
*-si tuati ons

.

For although it does seem to me that there

are situations relative to which it would be correct to say
of a person that (4) expresses something he or she is

^•^ thi nki ng (Witold, for example, in our *-si tuati ons

)

,

to

say this of a person seems to me to imply that the person is

wishing something in those situations, indeed imperatively

wishing that it would be that Jones will arrive on time,
that the person satisfies the open sentence

x

is thinking:

Arrive on time, Jones

relative to such situations.

But this can’t be the case

with our situations involving O’Brien, for by Constraint
si tuati

ons are ones where O’Brien is on 1

believing, and isn’t wishing anything.
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occurrently

So it seems that (4)

can’t be said to express anything O’Brien is thinking.

If

this is right, and we wish to maintain that the occurrent

belief expressed by (3)

j_s

among O’Brien’s thoughts, then we

have to allow that the latter occurrent belief is not what

expresses.

(4)

Second,

if

(4)

expresses this occurrent belief

expressed by (3), we should have to say that (3) and (4)
express the same thing.
of it;

if one

This seems implausible on the face

understands the strict and literal usage of

these sentences and has a proper grasp of the concept of

sentential expression, one will not be inclined to equate
what these sentences express.
here is one.
if

a

But if an argument is wanted,

If two sentences express the same thing,

then

person has complete command of the proper usage of each

sentence, and is not ignorant of what things the referring

terms in the sentences denote, or of what properties or

relations are expressed by constituent verbs, this person
will

be prepared to utter one of the two sentences literally

and sincerely only if he or she is prepared to utter the

other sentence sincerely and literally as well.

It seems to

me as clear as anything can be that a person may have

complete command of proper usage of (3) and

(

4

)--understand

what 'will arrive on time’ means, and understand the

imperative form 'arrive on time’--and know, moreover

,

who is

denoted by 'Jones’, and yet sincerely utter either (3) or
(4),

intending the utterance to be taken literally, yet not
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be willing to utter the other sentence sincerely and intend

that utterance to be taken literally.

Then (3) and (4) do

not express the same thing.
In sum,

it seems counterintuitive to say that (4)

expresses the same occurrent belief that O’Brien has in
these ^-situations that
if only

i_s

expressed by (3).

At this point,

it were right to speak of the thing O’Brien is

occurrently believing and the thing Witold is wishing, we
would have a result that conflicts with (RV2.1).

expresses what O’Brien is occurrently believing

For if (3)
in *-

situations, and (4) expresses what Witold is wishing in such
situations, then we would have it that there are possible

situations in which a person is occurrently believing that
Jones will arrive on time, another person is wishing that it

would be that Jones will arrive on time, yet in which it is
not the case that there is any item,

in

particular not the

proposition that Jones will arrive on time, that the one is
occurrently believing and the other wishing
(RV2.1).

Unfortunately, the effects of PTA

complicate matters.

Still, Constraints

1

-

— contrary
and PTA 2

1

3

to
,

serve to keep

the matters manageable, and the considerations raised just

above concerning (3) and (4) and what they express in these

^-situations can be generalized.
8.3.2

Let me explain how.

The General Case

The main thing to see is that in *-si tuati ons

,

there

just aren’t that many things that it is plausible to think
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that O’Brien is occurrently believing or that Witold is

wishing, besides the occurrent belief and wish expressed

respectively by (3) and (4).

Let us consider the case of

each person in turn.
If PTA 1

is sound then there are at least two things

that O’Brien is occurrently believing in *-si tuati ons

.

But

one gets the idea of which beliefs are in question; they

must be Jones-on-time beliefs.
(3),

One of these is expressed by

and there is a weaker one that is expressed by

(3’)

Jones will arrive.

Perhaps there are yet other Jones-on-time beliefs that

analogues of PTA will require us to grant that O’Brien is

occurrently believing in these situations.

I

am not sure of

this, even conceding the sort of intuitions that underlie
PTA. 4

At any rate, whatever occurrent beliefs O’Brien must

be said to be having in *-si tuati ons

,

I

would claim that any

occurrent beliefs O’Brien is having in these ^-situations
will

be such that,

if they are expressed by sentences of

English at all, they are expressed by

i

ndi cati ves

.

It seems

to me extremely plausible that we can say at least this much

about O’Brien’s beliefs in those situations.
Now consider Witold’s case.

If,

as we are assuming,

PTA 2 is sound, then it is true that there is no unique thing

that Witold is wishing.
2

and

3,

But still,

in

virtue of Constraints

he is not bearing any other occurrent attitudes

besides any that are required by his imperatively wishing
285
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things, and moreover

,

the only things he is imperatively

wishing are Jones-on-time wishes.
these is expressed by (4), and

I

We have seen that one of

think it is clear, too,

that there is a weaker wish he is having that is expressed
by

(

4

’

Arri ve

)

,

Jones

And maybe there are other Jones-on-time wishes that we must

allow that Witold is wishing if we accept analogues of
PTA along the lines of PTA 2

.

(But see note 5.)

since, according to Constraint

2,

However,

Witold is only

imperatively wishing in these situations, and moreover, by

Constraint

3,

there is nothing that he is imperatively

wishing apart from Jones-on-time wishes, it seems extremely
plausible to me to say that anything Witold is wishing in
these situations will be such that, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all,
i

it is expressed by an

mperati ve
But if we grant these contentions concerning the

thoughts O’Brien and Witold are having in *-si tuati ons
it seems to me that considerations parallel

,

then

to those raised

above concerning (3) and (4) will show that none of the

things O’Brien is occurrently believing is expressed by any
of the imperatives that express things that Witold is

wishing.

Again, there are two separate grounds.

Let OB be

an arbitrary occurrent belief that O’Brien is having in
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these *-si tuations

;

and suppose that 0 is any one of the

imperatives that expresses something Witold is wishing.
claim 0 does not express OB.

For two reasons:

First, whatever imperative 0 happens to be
or any other

— if

I

— (4),

(4’)

it expresses something O’Brien is

occurrently believing, then it expresses something he is
9en thinking.
9en thinking

But if it expresses something he is
we ought to be able to report that thought by

the d spl ayed- i mperat ve ascription
i

i

[O’Brien is thinking:
And

I

0]

claim that if this ascription expresses a report that

is true,

then it follows that O’Brien is wishing something,

indeed imperatively wishing something, and this contradicts
our description of *-si tuati ons

Second, suppose 0 does express OB.

If what

I

have said

about O’Brien is right, then anything he is occurrently

believing that can be expressed in English at all is

expressed by an indicative.
*

indicative, 0

,

Then there must be some

that expresses OB, and consequently,

expresses the same thing as 0

.

But this,

I

claim,

is

implausible; an argument analogous to the one considered
above, concerning (3) and (4), can be constructed to show

that 0 and 0* do not express the same thing.
*

whatever indicative and imperative 0

Briefly:

and 0 may be, surely

it could be that an ideally competent English speaker could
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sincerely utter the one, yet not be prepared to utter the
other sincerely.

So it can’t be that 0 expresses OB.

These considerations support the second premise of the

following argument.

To simplify formulation,

let me use '$’

to denote an arbitrary ^-situation; then we may put:

The Linguistic Argument (LA)

::

i)

Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.

ii)

No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is
occurrently believing in $.

iii)

Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.

But we have already seen that in general, ^-situations are

ones in which whatever Witold is wishing,

if

it can be

expressed in English at all, it is expressed by an
imperative.

So it seems to me that we have intuitive

support for both premises.

And the argument is valid.

So

I

think we have some compelling grounds for accepting the

conclusion of this argument.
It is easy to see,

conflicts with (RV2.1).

however, that the conclusion of LA
Let me use

J
'

to denote the

proposition that Jones will arrive on time.

(RV2.1)

implies

that necessarily, anyone occurrently believing that Jones
will arrive is occurrently believing J,

and also

necessarily, anyone who is wishing that it would be that
Jones will arrive is wishing

J.
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But from (DIO) it follows

.

that

is a thing that is expressed in English

J

expressed by (3).

— it

is

From this fact and (RV2.1), then, we get

the result that there

_i_s

a

thing--this proposition, J--that

can be expressed in English, such that in any *-si tuati ons

(indeed in any possible situations relative to which the

reports expressed by (1) and (2) are true), O’Brien is

occur rent

1

y

believing

J,

and Witold is wishing J.

result contradicts the conclusion of LA.

This

Consequently, we

must either give up (RV2.1) or else one or the other of the

premises of this argument.
In section 8.5 below,

I

shall examine these options

more closely, and address the question of how a proponent of
the Received View might respond to LA.

Before proceeding to

these matters, there is another line of argument that

I

would like to present and discuss whose conclusion conflicts
with (RV2.1).

This second argument hinges on intuitions

concerning the conditions under which two persons may
properly be said to be gen thinking the same thing.

The

intuitions in question are brought out fairly clearly,
think,

in

I

connection with O’Brien’s and Witold’s thoughts in

*-si tuations

8 4
.

8.4.1

The Argument from Sameness of Thought

What Would a Mind-Reader Say?
Imagine that we are mind-readers and that we re in the

company of O’Brien and Witold, in a *-si tuati on as described
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y

above.

y

Suppose in fact that we are reading their minds, and

that we are being careful to read all of what’s crossing

their minds.

Then

I

think we would know that the

ascr pti ons
i

(1

0 Brien is thinking:

)

Jones will arrive on time.

and

(2’)

Witold is thinking:

Arrive on time

express truths under the circumstances.

,

Jones.

Moreover,

if we are

good mi nd- readers--abl e to read anyone’s mind accurately and

thoroughly

— and

are exercising our abilities with O’Brien

and Witold, then presumably we would know that (1’) and (2’)

report exhaust vel
i

what things are crossing O’Brien’s and

Witold’s minds at the moment.
on 1

We would know that O’Brien is

occurrently believing, that Witold

is onl

imperatively

wishing, and that neither of them has any wish or occurrent

belief stronger than, or independent of the ones reported by
(1’) and (2’).

Let us suppose that we are good mind-readers

in this sense and that we do know these things about

O’Brien’s and Witold’s thoughts in these circumstances.
Imagine, next, that another person, Smith, joins our

company.

Smith is a mind-reader too, and is reading

O’Brien’s mind, but for some reason is drawing a blank with
Witold; he cannot tell what Witold is thinking.

wants to know.
true?

Yet he

What can we tell Smith that’s relevant and

Of course one way to tell him what he wants to know
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IS by

issuing (2’).

Perhaps just a mental utterance would

suffice; perhaps we could just think:

Arrive on time, Jones.

Witold

is

thinking:

If we added that this report is a

thorough and exhaustive one, Smith would have the whole
truth on the matter of what O’Brien is thinking.

suppose we don’t tell him so much;

I

But

wish to emphasize two

separate points.
First,
a

I

think it is clear, on one hand, that there is

familiar reading of progressive on which, in these *-

situations,

if we told Smith that both O’Brien and Witold

are thinking things, we would be telling him the truth.

The

reading is that on which the progressive expresses
^ en thinking.

In other words,

if we take the

occurrence of

the verb figuring in

(5)

O’Brien is thinking something and Witold is
thinking something.

on this reading,

interpreted,

is

the report expressed by (5), so

strictly speaking true relative to the

situations under consideration.

It is not clear to me,

on

the other hand, whether there is any familiar reading of 'is

thinking’ on which

i)

the verb applies to mental events (as

we should want in these circumstances, since Smith wants to

know what Witold is thinking at the moment, what thoughts he
is having),

yet on which ii) the report expressed by (5) is

not strictly speaking true relative to *-si tuations

.

If

there were an occurrent belief reading of the progressive as
291

it figures

in

(5),

these conditions would be met, for the

report expressed, on this interpretation, would imply that

Witold is occurrently believing something, and that is not
the case.

But

I

think it is very questionable whether such

an occurrent belief reading exists.

(For a summary of

considerations relevant to this issue, see Chapter

4,

section 4.5.)
Second,

if the

gen thinking,

progressive is understood to express

it seems plainly

i

ncorrect to say that there is

anything that O’Brien and Witold are both thinking in these
*-si tuati ons

,

anything that they are thinking in common.

If

we were to tell Smith that Witold is thinking something that

O’Brien is thinking, surely it would be proper for Smith to
infer from our claim, together with what he knows (keep in
mind, he knows what O’Brien is thinking) that Witold is

occurrently believing somethi ng--perhaps the belief that
Jones will arrive on time, perhaps the belief, simply, that

Jones will arrive, perhaps some other Jones-on-time belief-but in any case, Smith could properly infer that Witold is

occurrently believing somethi ng

.

But this conclusion is

false under the envisioned circumstances; Witold is not

occurrently believing anything.

Since the inference is

proper, our claim must itself be false.

claims, concerning these *-si tuati ons

,

Any mind-reader who

that Witold is

thinking something that O’Brien is thinking is either a poor
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mind reader, or a deceitful one (or perhaps a Propositional

Traditionalist under tow of the Received View).
8-4.2

Two Features of Generic Thinking
I

find that appeal to considerations of mind-reading

has some heuristic value here, because

have pretty clear intuitions

I

— concerning

think most of us

situations where we

suppose ourselves to be reading people’s minds

— about

which

cases are ones where we could correctly say that the people
in

question are having the same thoughts, or not.

intuitions hinge in turn,

I

These

think, on our intuitions about

the things that persons may be said to be thinking,

relational, gener
the sort that

I

i

in the

sense, and these are intuitions of just

have wished to bring to the fore.

But

perhaps the reader finds thought-experiments that appeal to

mind-reading unhelpful.

It is worth stressing then that the

possibility of mind-reading is not essential to the point
wish to make.

I

The point is this:

It seems to me clearly false to say that O’Brien and

Witold are thinking any of the same things in these *situations.

At least, this seems clearly false,

if the

relational, generic reading of the progressive is intended,
and

I

we have seen it to be questionable whether there is

any other event reading available in ordinary English usage.

Consider any ^-situation and assume that you know (whether
by mind-reading or any other means) what O’Brien and Witold

are thinking.

Ask yourself whether it would be correct to
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say that these two have any thoughts in common, whether it

would be correct to say that there are any things that are

crossing both of their minds, occurring to them both.

It

seems to me to be clear that the answer to these questions
is

No.

Then

I

take it that there isn’t anything that both

can be said to be thinking,

in the generic sense

in

question
Somewhat more formal and general grounds for this point
may be put as follows.

It seems to me a plain feature of

the generic reading of the progressive of 'think’, that if
we are told that one person is thinking something that

another is thinking, and moreover, we know that this other
is bearing some species of generic thinking,

R,

and is not

bearing any other occurrent attitude (apart from any that

happen to be required by R), then it is proper for us to
infer that both people are bearing R to something in common

too

More specifically,

I

claim that the following theses

gen thinking by which it is
capture two clear features of

related to the attitudes of occurrent belief and wishing:

(

A9

a.

b.

gen thinking z, and
y is
nec VxVy nec( if Jz( x is
gen thi nki
ng z ), and x is only occurrently
believing, then Jz( x is occurrently believing z
and y is occurrently believing z ))
gen thinking z, and
nec VxVy nec( if lz( x is
gen thi nki
ng z ), and x is only wishing, then
x is wishing z and y is wishing z ))

y

is

Roughly, a) if two persons are thinking something in common
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and one of them is only occurrently believing, then there
is

something that both of them are occurrently believing, and
similarly for wishing, b) if two persons can be said to be
thinking something in common, and one of the two is onl

y

wishing (whether imperatively or optatively, or in any other
manner), then there is something that both of them are

wishing (in some manner or other).
Let me try to bring out some intuitions relevant to

these assumptions without appeal to mind-reading.

Suppose

that O’Brien and Witold are accompanied in these *-

situations by some partners, O’Brien* and Witold*, and let
us suppose that the following express reports that are true

relative to the situation in question:
(6)

O’Brien* is thinking:

(7)

Witold* is thinking:

I

Jones will arrive on time

Arrive on time, Jones

think that most of us might ordinarily be inclined to say,

concerning such a case, that O’Brien and his partner are
thinking the same thing, and also that Witold and his
partner are thinking the same thing.

And if it weren’t for

considerations of the sort raised by PTA^ and PTA 2
other analogues of PTA,

I

,

and

would contend that these things

we’d ordinarily be inclined to say might well be correct.
But we are granting that such arguments are sound, and so

I

take it that, strictly speaking, we must deny that they are

thinking the same thing.
and his partner.

A similar point goes for Witold

Moreover, the truth of (6) and (7)
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relative to given ^-situations does not even suffice for
it’s being the case that either O’Brien and his partner, or

Witold and his, are thinking the same things.
case of Witold*:

For take the

perhaps (7) isn’t an exhaustive report of

what is on his mind.

Perhaps the following expresses a

truth as well:

Witold* is thinking:

(7*)

Then

I

Arrive on time, Jones and
have the tickets in hand.

think it would be incorrect, strictly speaking, to

say that Witold and Witold* are thinking the same things.

Nevertheless, the following claims do seem to me

clearly true:
(8)

O’Brien and O’Brien* are thinking some things in
common

(9)

Witold and Witold* are thinking some things in
common
By contrast,

truth,

I

think,

the following expresses a report whose

is not guaranteed by our description of the

case so far:

( )

o

)

O’Brien* and Witold* are thinking some things
common

in

som e
This sentence does express a report true relative to

situations conforming to our description.

For

I

suppose

that in
that we may consistently add to that description

addition to the thoughts reported by (6) and (7), the
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y

.

partners are both thinking:

y

Jones has a tendency to be late

in a crunch.

However, on any

i

nterpretati on available in English,

I

think it is plain that the following expresses a report that
is false given just the description of the case so far:

O’Brien and Witold are thinking some things in
common

(11)

It seems to me that this assessment is clear if we

understand the description of the case; and it seems to me
that adequate grounds for this assessment are that we know
by description of ^-situations that O’Brien is only

occurrently believing, we know that Witold is on

wishing,

1

and it can’t be that one person is only occurrently

believing, and another is on!

wishing, and yet there are

any things the two may both be said to be thinking.

For the

claim that either is thinking some things the other is
implies that they share one of these two attitudes, and by

description of the case, they do not.

Behind this reasoning

lie the assumptions expressed in clauses a.
I

and b. of (A9).

do not have an argument to offer to establish that

what these clauses assert is true; nevertheless,

it seems

plain to me that the claims formulated there do in fact

govern the concept of thought expressed with the generic
reading of 'think’

in English.
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I

assume them to be true.

:

8-4.3

The Argument
I

take it that occurrent belief, wishing and wondering

are all species of generic thinking (this follows
from the

definition of 'is a species of’, together with (A7) and some
other very natural assumptions about these attitudes).
if this

right,

is

But

then the claim that O’Brien and Witold are

not thinking any things in common can be seen to conflict

with (RV2.1).

suppose

'$’

For we have the following argument (again,

to denote some arbitrary *-si tuation

)

The Argument from Sameness of Thought (AST)
i)
Whatever O’Brien is occurrently believing in $ is
something he is gen thinking in $, and whatever
Witold is wishing in $ is something he is
9en thi nki
[from (A7)]
ng in $.

::

ii)

There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are both
9en thi nki
[from (A9) and Constraint 2]
ng in $.

iii)

Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.

Plainly this conclusion conflicts with (RV2.1).
is correct,

If

(RV2.1)

then in any ^-situation (indeed in any situation

where O’Brien is occurrently believing that Jones will
arrive on time, and where Witold is wishing that it would be
that Jones will arrive on time), there is a thing

proposition that Jones will arrive on time

— that

— the
O’Brien is

occurrently believing, and that Witold is wishing.

a thing such that O’Brien

according to (RV2.1), there

j_s

occurrently believing it in

$ and

This contradicts iii).

So

Witold is wishing it in

is
$.

Since the argument is valid, we must

either give up (RV2.1), or the first premise (together with
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:

from which it is derived), or else premise ii) which is

(A7)

supported by the intuitive considerations raised above

concerning the conditions under which two people may be said
to be thinking something in common.
In the next section,

I

propose to point out ways in

which the considerations that motivate LA and AST can be
generalized.
is shown,

I

If those considerations are right,

much more

believe, than merely that (RV2.1) is wrong with

respect to a few isolated cases.

8

.

Generalizing the Results of the Arguments

5

That No Instance of (RV2) Holds

8.5.1
I

claimed at the end of 8.1, after formulating (RV2.1),

that since the thesis was an arbitrary and representative

instantiation of (RV2)--by choice of the (assumed) standard
i

ndi cati ve

,

(

3

)

Jones will arrive on time
for '^’--the arguments

I

was about to propose against

(RV2.1) would count against any instance of (RV2) at all.

Briefly, here’s why

I

think that this is so.

No matter how one proposes to instantiate (RV2)

matter which indicative one puts in for

'

0'

— no

--I am inclined

*to think that there are possible situations analogous to

situations in the following respects:
i)

for the selected

0,

the claims expressed by the following pairs of standard
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:

:

ascriptions and

di spl

ayed-sentence ascriptions will be true

relative to those situations:

Standard

Di spl

[

O’Brien is occurrently believing that 0

[

Witold is wishing that it would be that 0

ayed-Sentence
O’Brien is thinking:
[
[

ii)

Witold is thinking:

0

]

]

]

Let it be that 0.

],

the claims expressed by these sentences are true

relative to these situations in virtue of the occurrence,
there, of the same bit of occurrent believing on O’Brien’s
and the same bit of wishing on Witold’s part,

part,

5

and

iii) the claims expressed by the di spl ayed-sentence

ascriptions are not only true, but exhaustive as well.
saying that the claims are "exhaustive"

analogues of Constraints

2

and

3,

I

In

mean that

discussed in 8.2, will

apply.
A

choice of standard indicative, 0

,

then, will

determine a class of such ^-situation analogues, and

concerning that class of possible situations,

a pair of

arguments paralleling LA and AST may be formulated; where
"$"

denotes any situation in the class:
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LA0
Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.

i)

i i

No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is

)

occurrently believing in
:

:

i

i i

$.

Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.

)

AST 0

Whatever O’Brien is occurrently believing in $ is
something he is gen thinking in $, and whatever
Witold is wishing in $ is something he is
gen thinking
in $.
[from (A7))

i)

ii

:

:

There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are both
9en thinking in
[from (A9) and Constraint 2]
$.

)

Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is occurrently believing in $.

i i i )

It seems to me that the intuitive support available for the

premises of any of these arguments will be precisely on a
par with that afforded for the premises of LA and AST

themselves by the considerations raised

in 8.3 and 8.4.

Entirely analogous considerations can be raised in each
case.

To put it briefly, choice of indicative

'

0

'

simply

makes no difference to the intuitive support available.
And

I

fa

take it to be plain, that if every such analogue

of LA or AST is sound, then we will have it (put roughly)

that no matter the choice of indicative, 0

,

there are

possible situations in which, although O’Brien is

occurrently believing that 0 and Witold is wishing that it
would be that 0
if

,

nevertheless, whatever Witold is wishing,

it can be expressed in English at all,

301

it is distinct

>

:

from anything O’Brien is occurrently believing.

Then we

will have the result, contrary to the relevant
instantiation

of (RV2), that it is

0 is an

x

I

if a person

is

occurrently

that person is occurrently believing

,

and necessarily,
,

the case that the proposition that

such that necessarily,

believing that 0

that 0

riot

if a

x,

person is wishing that it would be

that person is wishing

x.

assume, then, that if the considerations raised in

the previous sections in support of the premises of LA and

AST are to be accepted, then not only (RV2.1) but any

instance of
if all

(

RV2

)

should be rejected as well.

Consequently,

LA- and AST-anal ogues cited above are indeed sound,

then a first generalization of this result could be put as
f ol

1

ows
For any standard indicative, 0
expresses a truth:

(12)

[

,

the following

It is not the case that the proposition that 0 is
an x such that:

nec vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 —
y is wishing x
]
)

8.5.2

The Proposition that 0 Is Not an Isolated Case
(12)

is only a start at generalizing the results of the

preceding sections.

If

LA# and AST# are indeed sound

concerning any relevant situation,
choice of #)
arguments,

,

$

(determined by our

then if we consider the conclusions of those

it will

be apparent that a much more substantial
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generalization can be made.

For those conclusions suggest

that the proposition that 0 is no isolated case in this
regard:

simply

more generally,
j_s

in the relevant situations,

there

no thing such that O’Brien is occurrently

believing it, and Witold is wishing it.

Put a little more

carefully, the view that emerges is this:

(

1

3

For any standard indicative, 0
expresses a truth:

)

[

the following

,

There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 -» y is
occurrently believing x ), and
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 -»
y is wishing x ) ]

No matter the choice of standard indicative, 0

thought, x, such that

i)

,

there is no

occurrently believing that 0

entails occurrently believing

x,

and al so

it would be that 0 entails wishing x.

ii) wishing that

,

This result is one

important generalization of the considerations raised in

sections 8.3 and 8.4.
Strictly speaking, the conclusions of the LA-analogues
do not support this view expressed in (13).

arguments,
standard, 0

if sound,
,

Rather, those

merely yield the view that, for any

there is no

x

expressible in English such that

occurrently believing 0 entails believing
that it would be that 0 entails wishing

x.

x,

and wishing
Still,

it would

be an odd result if it turned out that there is some thought

not expressible in Enolish-- and only such a thought--that
has the property of being an

x
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such that necessarily,

if one

.

is occurrently believing that 0

believing

x,

and necessarily,

would be that 0

,

one is occurrently

if one

one is wishing x.

,

is wishing that it

It might well

be

wondered what other thoughts could plausibly be supposed to
have this property if no thoughts expressible in English do.
The attitudes in question are themselves reportable in

English with the very ascriptions employed just above

embedding an Engl sh indicative, 0
i

.

One might have thought

that if there are any thoughts such that, for some Engl i sh
i

nd i cat i ve

,

0

,

occurrently believing that 0 entails

occurrently believing those thoughts, and wishing it would
be that 0 entails wishing those thoughts,

then at least some

thoughts expressible in English would be among them.
rate,

At any

the conclusions of the AST-anal ogues do support the

claim expressed in (13), for they involve no restriction at
all

to thoughts expressed by any particular class of

sentences
8.5.3

Choice of 0 Not Restricted to Standard Indicatives
But (13), too, can be generalized on the basis of

considerations akin to those already raised.

The analogues

of *-si tuati ons we have been envisioning are situations in

which, for some standard indicative, 0

occurrently believing that 0
would be that 0

.

,

,

one person is

and another, wishing that it

But the restriction here to standard

indicatives was introduced because (RV2) was formulated by
appeal to ascriptions embedding only such sentences, and
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this latter restriction was only imposed on (RV2) in order

that we could employ the "proposition that

formulating the Received View.

convenience in formulation.

0"

terminology in

But this was a matter of

The considerations raised

against (RV2) in the preceding sections do not hinge on

choosing standard indicatives as the embedded sentences in
the attitude ascriptions by which ^-situations were

character i zed

Relevantly analogous considerations can be

.

raised regarding situations in which O’Brien is occurrently

believing that

0,

and Witold is wishing that

0,

whether 0 is

standard or not.

Consider for example, the following context-sensitive
i

ndicati ve
You are noisy.

(14)

I

take there to be situations relative to which the claims

expressed by the following are both true and exhaustive:
(15)

O’Brien is thinking, concerning Henry:

(16)

Witold is thinking, concerning Henry:

I

You are
noisy.
Be noisy.

believe it is fairly plain, upon reflection, that

analogues of LA and AST concerning such situations will be
just as compelling as LA and AST themselves.
Then

I

take it that the intuitive support for the

following generalization of (13) will be just as compelling
as the support for (13)

itself:
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>

(

17

>

for any indicative, 0 if c is a context, and
0
expresses something wrt c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:

)

,

[

There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —
y is
occur rentl y believing x ), and
nec Vy y is wishing that it would be that 0 —
(

y

Roughly,

i

s wi shi ng x

'

)

]

(17) asserts that whether 0 is standard or not,

there is no thought such that

occurrently believing that

i)

0 entails having that thought as an occurrent belief, and
yet also such that ii) wishing that it would be that 0

entails having that thought as a wish.

If the relevant

analogues of LA and AST are indeed sound,

I

believe it

should be granted that this much is established.
8.5.4

Thesis
(17)

3

is the view that emerges

if we are

attending

solely to cases involving, roughly, a person’s occurrently

believing that 0
that 0

.

,

and another’s wishing that it would be

But considerations still quite parallel to those

raised in sections 8.3 and 8.4 arise regarding cases in

which one person is occurrently believing that 0

another is wondering whether 0
in which one person

is

and as well

,

wondering whether 0

wishing that it would be that 0

.

,

In brief:

,

and

regarding cases
and another is
any pair of the

three occurrent attitudes at issue in (RV2) will be
affected.

So,

in particular,

considerations relevantly like

those raised so far support the view that there is no thing,
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x,

of which it is both the case that occurrently believing

that 0 entails occurrently believing

whether 0 entails wondering

x,

and wondering

Likewise, analogous

x.

considerations support the view that there is no thing,

x,

of which it is both the case that wishing that it would be

that 0 entails wishing

wondering

x,

and wondering whether 0 entails

x.

As an illustration,

let us consider the latter view

concerning wishing and wondering.
no matter which indicative,

0

,

It seems clear to me that

one picks, there will be

possible situations relative to which the reports expressed
by the following pairs of standard and di spl ayed-sentence

ascriptions will be true, exhaustive and true in virtue of
the same bit of wondering on O’Brien’s part and in virtue of

the same bit of wishing on Witold’s:

[

O’Brien is wondering whether 0

[

Witold is wishing that it would be that 0

[

O’Brien is thinking:

[

Witold is thinking:

(On this point,

Is

it

]

]

the case that 0?

]

Let it be the case that 0.

though, see notes 6. and 7.)

Then again,

arguments precisely parallel to LA and AST may be
"$" denotes
formulated, this time with the assumption that

one of the presently envisioned situations:
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]

]

LA*#
i

ii

:

:

Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is in fact
expressed by an imperative, if it can be expressed
by a sentence of English at all.

)

No imperative expresses anything O’Brien is
wondering in $.

)

i i i

Whatever Witold is wishing in $, if it is in fact
expressed in English at all, is distinct from
anything O’Brien is wondering in $.

)

AST*#
i

Whatever O’Brien is wondering in $ is something he
is genthinking in $, and whatever Witold is
wishing in $ is something he is gen thinking in $.

)

[from

::

(

A7

)

ii)

There is nothing that O’Brien and Witold are both
gen thinking in
[from (A9) and Constraint 2]
$.

iii)

Whatever Witold is wishing in $ is distinct from
anything O’Brien is wondering in $.

If the premises of the relevant instances of LA*# and AST*#

(determined by the choice of 0

)

are understood to concern

any one of the situations now envisioned,

it seems to me

that the intuitive support for those premises will still be
as strong as in preceding cases;

me that it will

in particular,

it seems to

be just as strong as the intuitive support

for LA and AST afforded by the considerations raised in

sections 8.3 and 8.4.
Then the view that emerges is this:
for any indicative, #, if c is a context, and #
expresses something wrt c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:

(18)

[

There is no thing, x, such that:
nec Vy( y is wondering whether 0 -» y is
and
wondering x
nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 ->
)

y

i

,

s wi shi ng x

)

]
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(18) asserts just what was proposed above,

the choice of indicative 0

that both
well

i)

that no matter

there is no thought,

,

x,

wondering whether 0 entails wonder i ng

such
x,

and as

ii) wishing that it would be that 0 entails wishing x.
I

think it should be plain enough that relevantly

similar considerations, but regarding cases in which one
person is occurrently believing that 0

wondering whether 0

,

,

and another is

will provide motivation for a principle

parallel to (18) concerning the attitudes of occurrent

belief and wondering.

Perhaps it is safe by now not to

rehearse the steps for this case.
Let me gather the generalizations that

I

have proposed

so far into a single broad claim:

Thesis

3

0 and context, c, if 0 expresses
something with respect to c, then the following
expresses a truth with respect to c:
For any indicative,

[

,

There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and nec Vy( y is wishing
that it would be that 0 -» y is wishing x );
a.

There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is occurrently believing that 0 —» y is
occurrently believing x ), and nec Vy( y is wondering
whether 0
y is wondering x );
b.

There is no thing, x, such that
nec Vy( y is wondering whether 0 -> y is wondering x
and nec Vy( y is wishing that it would be that 0 -»
]
y is wishing x )

c.

),

.

I

submit that, whatever intuitive appeal the reader finds in

considerations of the sort raised in sections 8.3 and 8.4,
309

in support of the premises of LA and of AST,

similar

considerations, with equal intuitive force, can be raised

support of each of the clauses here in Thesis
what indicative, 0

,

3,

no matter

one picks for the instantiation.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

8

1.
Strictly, (RV2.1) is not a consequence of (RV2) alone,
but rather of (RV2) together with (DIO), and some semantic
assumptions, including the assumption that 'Jones will
arrive on time’ is standard.
For questions concerning this
last assumption, see Note 11 to Chapter 5, and Note 6 to

Chapter

7.

2.
I think it is fairly clear that the following
inference
schemes, of which ( 1 *)/::( 1 ) and (2 ’)/::( 2 are instances,
have some invalid instances:
i

)

::
i i

)

::

s thi nki ng

t

i

t

is occurrently believing that 0

t

i

t

is wishing that it would be that you 0

s thi nki ng

0

:

*

0

:

*

where substituends of 0 are indicative sentences, and
substituends of 0* are verb phrases (serving as displayed
imperatives in premises of i ) )
The following instance of i), for example, is open to
counterexamples
'

'

'

’

i

i

M

)

::

Max is thinking:

(a)

That is a mint-condition

Chippendale
(a’)

Max is occurrently believing that that is a mintcondition Chippendale.

Suppose that Max is having a vivid hallucination and that
there isn’t anything that he is demonstrating, in thinking:
like
I mean a case
that is a mint-condition Chippendale.
the one I described in Chapter 4 where I was concerned to
give some idea of the grounds I had for questioning the
inference (the subscripts, i and t, indicate, respectively,
that intransitive and transitive readings are called for):
III)

t
::

is thinking^
t

is thinking^ x

)

noted then (in effect) that the premise of
implies

I

M

)

,

(a),

Max is thinking^

(b)

And

i

I

suggested that, in some circumstances of the sort

i

.

envisioned, although (a) expresses a truth, what is
expressed by
(c)

^x(

Max is thinking^ x

)

is false.
Then III) fails.
But I am inclined to believe
that if the conclusion of i^), (a’), expresses a thing that
is^true relative to a situation, then so does (c).
But if
(a’) implies (c), and (a) does not imply (c), then (a) does
not imply (a’), and the inference, i ), fails.
So i) itself
M
is not an inference scheme whose instances are in general
valid.
Similar counter-examples, I believe, show that some
instances of ii) are not valid as well.
It may be that
cases of this sort defeat the claim that (1) and (2) may be
inferred, respectively, from (1’) and (2’).
I am not sure.
It is worth contrasting i) with a similar inference
rule relating direct to indirect quotation:
i

i i

t sai d

)

:

:

"
,

0

"

t sai d that

0

One might suppose that instances of i) will stand or fall
with correspondi ng instances of iii) (having the same
substituends for 't’ and 0
Well-worn examples involving context sensitivity show
that instances of iii) are not in general valid.
Consider
the following:
'

'

i i i

w

)

William said, "Someone wants you to say 'yes’."

)

::

William said that someone wants you to say "yes".

Let a context, c, be fixed that assigns Nancy Reagan to
Now consider a situation in which William has never
'you*.
said anything about Nancy Reagan, and in particular, has
never said that anyone wants her to say "yes" to anything.
But suppose too that in this situation, William has, a
moment ago, asked Sarah if she’ll marry him, and after a
I am
pause, told her that someone wants her to say "yes".
of
premise
the
by
expressed
is
that
what
say
inclined to
iii w ), with respect to c, is true relative to some such
Yet surely what is
Let "s" denote one such.
situations.
respect to c is
with
i
i
of
conclusion
expressed by the
w)
fails.
Then
iiiw)
false relative to s.
The point here is that although we keep a context fixed
in determining what is expressed by both the premise and
conclusion, the occurrence of 'you’ figuring in the premise,
in contrast with that figuring in the conclusion, does not
So
have it’s semantic contribution determined by context.
contextwill
be
the conclusion, but not the premise,
With variation of context, then, we find that
sensitive.
what is expressed by the premise remains constant but what
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)

.

n

,

is expressed by the conclusion will vary, and do
so with
attendant variation in truth-value relative to selected
situations.
I
believe that similar cases mutatis mutandis
hinging in this way on context-sensitivity of the
conclusions yield counterexamples to certain instances of
both
and ii) as well.
But if the inference of (1) from
fails, it will not be due to such examples since, I
(1
take it, (1) is context— sens itive, and the same goes for
the inference of (2) from (2’).
However, perhaps it is worth noting that there are some
instances of iii), with context- i_nsensi ti ve conclusions,
that are invalid as well.
Consider:
(

i

l

)

)

i

iii F

Benjamin Franklin said:
"President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq"

)

Benjamin Franklin said that President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq.

::

I assume that the conclusion here is not context-sensitive.
Now suppose that back in the early 1800’s, Benjamin Franklin
had uttered these words:
"President Bush will never order
an invasion of Iraq".
Then I take it that the premise of
i i
expresses a truth, just by virtue of Franklin’s
p
utterance.
But I am inclined to say that the conclusion of
i i i
does
not,
by that fact alone, express a truth.
There
p
wasn’t and had never been, as of Franklin’s time, any such
person as President Bush, nor any such country as Iraq.
It
perhaps doesn’t follow given this, that it is incorrect to
assert of Franklin that he said Bush will never order an
invasion of Iraq.
Perhaps, under the following
circumstances, even though there had never been a president
Bush, nor any such country as Iraq, the conclusion of iiip)
would express a truth:
imagine that Franklin said, "Listen,
I’m telling you that there will be a 41st president of our
country, and in 1990 there will be a foreign country that
occupies the region ... [lengthy specification of longitudes
and latitudes follows that picks out the region in fact to
be occupied by Iraq (pre-annexation of Kuwait)]..., and I’m
telling you that he, that president-to-be, will never order
Maybe relative to
an invasion of i_t, that country-to-be.
such circumstances, the conclusion of iiip) expresses a
truth
However, it seems clear to me that it does not follow,
merely upon the truth of what is expressed by the premise of
iiip), that what is expressed by the conclusion of iiip) is
Then if I’m right about iiip), and moreover,
true.
corresponding instances of i ) and iii) stand or fall
together, then I think we should have to grant that the
inference of (1) from (1’), in particular, is not valid.
It is not clear to me that instances of i) and iii) do
stand or fall together, but the validity of the inferences,
2
remains unclear to me as well.
( 2 )
)/
(
/
1
i

)

,

1

(

’

)

:

:

(

)

,

’

:

:
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3.
I think it is plausible to claim that Witold
can’t be
wishing that Jones will arrive on time unless he believes
some things; in particular, wishing that Jones will arrive
may entail believing that someone exists.
If one accepts
this claim, one might be tempted to infer that situations
meeting Constraint
are not possible.
For I say that
Witold is only wishing, yet from the description of the case
it follows that he is also believing something.
But this
reasoning is based on a confusion.
Constraint 2 does not
require that Witold lacks any beliefs at the moment; it
requires only that he isn’t bearing any occur rent attitudes
apart from those required by that of imperative wishing.
Imperative wishing does not require occurrent belief. Then
if Witold is only wishing, he can’t be having any occurrent
beliefs.
But that is not incompatible with the description
of the case.
Belief and occurrent belief seem plainly to be
different in this respect:
it is plausible to claim that
bearing the attitude of wishing or wondering (or as well any
of a host of other attitudes) to a thing entails having a
belief (though perhaps only a quite minimal belief, such as
that something exists); bearing that same attitude to that
same thing, however, does not entail occur rent!
believing
anything
1

4.
It is not clear to me that there are such other
occurrent beliefs that we should acknowledge that O’Brien
(Similar points apply, I believe,
having in *-si tuations.
to the question of whether Witold is having other wishes
besides the two expressed by (4) and (4’); see note on
following page in the text.) The matter depends on what
other analogues of (DIST^) must be accepted. One might
find the following plausible, for example:

is

occurrently believing that Jones will arrive
on time

(DIST?)

t is

::

occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time

t

is

(DIST?) is correct, we should allow that the following
ascription also expresses a report true relative to *situations, in addition to (3) and (3’):
If

(a)

O’Brien is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time

However, conclusions of inferences sanctioned by (DIST?) are
ambiguous and may be interpreted either de re or de d ctQ
Assessment of the validity of a given instance of (DIST?),
then, must await disambiguation.
i
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On one hand, if the conclusions are to be understood
as
de chcto ascriptions, with the quantifier 'someone’
not
taking wide scope over 'O’Brien is occurrently believing’,
then it is not clear to me that inferences sanctioned by
(DIST?) are in general valid.
The case is different with
inferences involving non-occurrent belief.
I grant that if
a person believes that Jones will arrive on time, then
this
person may be ascribed de dicto the belief that someone will
arrive on time.
But with occurrent belief, I do not see
that matters go the same way.
I grant as well
that if a
person is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, then
that person may be said to believe, non-occurrentl y de
dicto that someone will arrive.
But that is not an
entailment relevant to the inferences with which we are
,

,

concerned

On the other hand, if the ascriptions that figure as
conclusions to instances of (DIST?) are to be interpreted de
.re, then I am inclined to think that such inferences are
questionable for other reasons. Consider the parallel:

(DIST?’)

::

occurrently believing that Santa Claus will
arrive
t

is

ix(

t

is

occurrently believing that

x will

arrive)

Surely, instances of (DIST?’) are not in general valid.
Then we should say the same for (DIST?), if the conclusions
of its instances are to be interpreted de re
.

In Note 2.

5.

it was observed that some instances of the

pai r
(

f

1
’

(f2’)

thi nki ng

t

i

:

0

t

is thinking:

0

*

do not imply the corresponding instances of
(fl)

t

is

occurrently believing that 0

(f2)

t

is

wishing that it would be that you 0

*

And although in some cases this is due to the relevant
and (f2) being context-sensitive, this is
instances of (fl
One case was considered above deriving from
not always so.
the choice of the standard indicative, 'President Bush will
So there are cases
never order an invasion of Iraq’, for 0
where the truth of the di spl ayed-sentence ascription does
not guarantee the truth of the corresponding standard
Any such case will be one where it does not
ascription.
the constraint presently at issue, to require
for
suffice,
analogues be ones relative to which the
^-situation
that the
alone is true.
ascription
di spl ayed-sentence
)

.
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So I am putting a lot of weight on the present
clause
and the requirement expressed loosely in it, that
the claims
expressed by corresponding standard and di spl ayed-sentence
ascriptions are to be true relative to these situations in
virtue of the same bit of occurrent believing or wishing,
as
the case may be.
In formulating Constraint 1
I avoided
this (or meant to avoid it) by adding the adverbial clause,
concerning Jones’, to ( 1 ) and (2’). The resulting
displayed-sentence ascriptions (clauses a. and b. ) seem to
me to do the trick.
In general
however, I do not see any
clear, principled way to produce, for any given indicative,
0, a pair of displayed-sentence ascriptions that will
suffice in this connection:
ones that express claims such
that it is enough to require that those claims be true
relative to a situation, in order to impose a constraint, in
the case of 0 with an effect analogous to that of
Constraint 1, in the case of 'Jones will arrive on time’.
Suppose, for example, that the indicative, 0, selected
for instantiating (RV2), contains occurrences of two proper
names.
Suppose 0 is 'Henry won’t bother Laurie’.
In such a
case, I do not see how the addition of adverbial clauses to
instances of (fl’) or (f2’) will do the trick.
It will not
do to say that the ^-situation analogues in this case are
situations relative to which the claim expressed by the
following is true:
,

*

,

,

(a)

Witold is thinking, concerning Laurie and Henry
Let it be that Henry won’t bother Laurie.

Briefly, the problem that I see with this particular
proposal
is that it might be that Witold uses the name
'Laurie’ for Henry, and 'Henry’ for Laurie.
Some such
situations will be ones relative to which the claim
expressed by (a) is true, though they are not ones in which
Witold is wishing that Henry wouldn’t bother Laurie, but
rather, ones in which he’s wishing that Laurie doesn’t
bother Henry.
Plainly, similar problems would confront
other appeals to instances of (fl’) or (f 2 ’) with these
"concerning x" modifiers.
It may be that a proposal can be fashioned that gets
around this sort of difficulty by employing the concept of
event-character zati on introduced in the next chapter
For any standard indicative, 0, an event of
(section 9.2).
may be said to have the conjunctive
believing
occurrent
")
being
an event of O’Brien’s occurrently
of
property ("P 5
well
an event of O’Brien’s
believing that 0, and as
of wishing may be said to
event,
an
Likewise,
thinking:
0.
have the conjunctive property ("P^") of being an event of
Witold’s imperatively wishing that it would be that 0, and
I
Let it be that 0.
as well an event of Witold’s thinking:
possible
it
is
properties
believe that for each of these
that an occurring event has it; moreover I think that it is
possible for two events, each one having one of these
i

,
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properties (and not the other) to co-occur.
I claim,
in
particular that there are two such co-occurring events in
any ^-situation; I believe this is guaranteed by the
condition imposed by Constraint 1.
The idea, then, would be to require that, for the
selected 0 the relevant ^-analogues are situations in which
,

,

there are two occurring events, e and e’, such that
has P £ and e’ has P{J.

(b)

e

(the analogue of Constraint 2 will guarantee that only one
of the events has each property).
I
be 1 i eve that a precise
and adequate analogue of Constraint 1 can be stated in
generality along these lines.
I am not sure.

There is a difficulty confronting my appeal to instances

6.

of
f

(

1

t

)

is thinking:

Let it be that

0,

in stating analogues of Constraint 1.
The difficulty is of
the sort of problems raised in the preceding note, and has
rather to do with the choice of displayed imperative.
To illustrate the problem, take 0 to be

No bird is noisy

(a)

In this case, I do not believe that the problems discussed
in the preceding note arise in stating an analogue of
Constraint 1.
I am inclined to think that it suffices to
say, in O’Brien’s case, that the relevant ^-situation

analogues are ones relative to which the following expresses
a truth:

O’Brien is thinking:

(b)

For

I

no bird is noisy

take it that (b) implies

O’Brien is occurrently believing that no bird is

(c)

noisy.

compatible with what would be the
counterpart of Constraint 3 in this case: that O’Brien does
not have an occurrent belief stronger than any required by
(For this notion of an occurrent belief (or wish)
(c).
being stronger than another, see discussion of Constraint 3
And I suppose that, in general, if i) an
in the text.)
instance of
and also that (b)

(

f

2
’

t

i

is

thi nki ng

:

0

or
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f3

(

*

—

.

)

)

0*

t is thinking:

subst i tuends of 0* being imperatives) implies the
corresponding instance of
(

'

(f2)

’

t

occurrently believes that 0

t

is

or
(f3)

wishing that it would be that

0,

and in addition, ii) the instance of (f2’) or ( f 3 ) is
compatible with the counterpart of Constraint 3 if it does
not require an occurrent belief or wish stronger than any
required by the corresponding instance of ( f 2 or (f3), as
the case may be then to express a constraint (for the
relevant substituend of 0'
whose effect is parallel to
that of the a. or b. clause of Constraint
(for the
indicative, 'Jones will arrive on time’), it will suffice to
require that the instance of ( f 1 ) or (f2’) at hand
expresses a truth relative to the ^-situation analogues at
i ssue
But it is perhaps not clear, for any indicative, 0
whether the constraint in Witold’s case can be expressed by
an instance of (fl).
In particular, it may be questioned

—

’

)

'

1

’

,

whether
(d)

Witold is thinking:

Let it be that no bird is
no isy.

impl ies
(e)

Witold is wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy.

am inclined to think that there is at least one available
interpretation of (d) on which it does imply (e), but this
inclination, and the inclination to hold, more generally,
that instances of (f3) are implied by corresponding
instances of (fl), may be questioned.
modulo the
It may be claimed that, strictly speaking
difficulty of the preceding note), instances of (fl) imply,
not the corresponding instances of (f3), but rather the
correspondi ng instances of
I

(

(

f4

t

is wishing that you will

let it be that 0

The contention would be that, taken strictly and literally,
imperatives of the form
Let it be that 0

should be understood to involve the reading of 'let’ that is
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.

involved in literal
form
t will

i

nterpretati ons of indicatives of the

let it be that 0.

The problem then is that, strictly speaking, the claim
expressed by (d) with respect to a context, c, would imply
the claim expressed, with respect to c, by
(

f

)

Witold is wishing that it would be that you let it
be the case that no bird is noisy.

but not that expressed by (e).
If this contention isL right,
then the conclusions of the relevant instances of LA^ and
AST will not conflict with (RV2 ).
For there would be some
a
situations satisfying the analogues
of Constraints 1-3
relative to which the claim expressed by (e) is false
Consequently, (RV2 a ) will not yield, concerning all such
situations, that there is a proposition (that no bird is
noisy) such that O’Brien is occurrently believing it, and
Witold is wishing it.
It seems to me, too, that if the present objection to
employing instances (fl) is correct, then we cannot employ
those instances in formulating analogues of Constraint
along the lines suggested at the end of the preceding note.
Employing the instance of (fl), got with (a) in for 0
that proposal would require that the relevant ^-situation
analogues be situations where
.

1

'

'

(g)

there is an occurring event that is both an event of
Witold’s wishing that it would be that no bird is
noisy, and as well, an event of Witold’s thinking:
Let
it be that no bird is noisy.

I am inclined to think that at least on one interpretation
this expresses a claim that is possibly true and compatible
But if
with the relevant analogues of Constraints 2 and 3.
the present line of objection is right, and (d) does not
imply (e), then I think we should have to say that there
couldn’t be any single occurring event that has this
conjunctive property, at least not in situations that also
For the analogue
meet the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3.
of Constraint 3 will require that the strongest thing Witold
is imperatively wishing in such situations is (intuitively
But if there is an
put) the wish that no bird is noisy.
occurring event of Witold’s wishing that someone (referent
of 'you’) would let it be that no bird is noisy, then there
is this other wish--( intuitively put) the wish that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy that is ndependent
of the previous one; neither one is a stronger wish than the
other
Two responses to this line of questioning do not seem
One might dismiss the problem, claiming
to me satisfactory.

—
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that it is clear enough which imperative wishes are supposed
to be captured by requirements formulated using instances of
f )
th ® ones reported by instances of
f3
But it seems
to me that this just begs the line of questioning at issue.
The contention at hand is that instances of (fl) do not
imply corresponding instances of (f3).
If that claim is
right, then whether or not one "gets the idea" of which
constraints I want by employing instances of (fl), those
constraints are not, strictly speaking, expressed by those
appeals.
I
am interested in how, strictly speaking, those
constraints may be expressed.
Another response might be to claim that (f) itself
implies (e) (and more generally, that instances of (f4)
themselves imply correspondi ng instances of (f3)).
I don’t
think that from the fact that I am occurrently believing
that you will let it be the case that one bird escapes, that
I am occurrently believing that one bird will escape (though
I
think it would follow that I bel eve this). And I doubt
too that it follows from the fact that I am wishing that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy, that I am wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy (though, it perhaps
does follow that I desi re this).
On the discrepancies noted
here between belief and occurrent belief, and between desire
and (occurrent) wishing, see notes 3. and 4. above.
Also,
this response would leave us with the obstacle discussed
just above for the proposal I offered at the end of the
previous note:
even if (f) implies (e), it presumably
requires a wish stronger than any required by (e). Then
there won’t be any situations (not possible ones anyway)
that conform to the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3, yet at
which any event is occurring that is one of Witold’s wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy and also one of
Let it be that no bird is noisy.
Witold’s thinking:
Perhaps it is not possible to find, for any standard
indicative, some displayed-imperative ascription that serves
to express the desired condition on situations (along the
Similar problems would
lines of clause b. of Constraint 1).
forms that one
imperative
other
with
arise in connection
'See to it
example,
for
connection:
might employ in this
0'
that 0'
about
it
'Bring
that
case
that 0\ 'Make it the
subjunctive
for
that
form,
Perhaps the Yiddish
0 ],
etc.
[
0 ( as in 'That a radish grow on your navel, God forbid’)
believe that French allows such constructions
I
would work.
in ordinary usage, and that the sentence [ Que 0 ] for
(French) subjunctive 0 serves just the called for function,
If such forms are to be
of expressing an imperative wish.
found in French and happen not to have proper translations
in English, perhaps it would not be unwarranted to
appropriate instances of (fl) (or one of the other forms
just cited) for the purpose.
At any rate, there are very many cases where displayedsentence ascriptions (instances of (f2’) and (f3’)) are
available which imply the corresponding instances of (f2)
(

1

:

(

)

i

,

,
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and

f3
(surely, clauses a. and b. of Constraint
constitute one case among very many relevantly similar
cases).
In all of these many cases, analogues of
- 3 can be formulated, and ^-situation
Constraints
analogues can be specified consideration of which motivates
analogues of LA and AST that are just as compelling as the
originals.
Reflection on this fact by itself, it seems to
me, should provide some grounds for allowing that if. LA and
AST are to be accepted, then we may doubt whether there is
any standard indicative, 0 such that the instantiation of
(RV2) for 0 expresses a truth.
(

)

1

1

,

This formulation is not quite adequate in the case of
ambiguous sentences.
I don’t think that the added
complexity required to accommodate such cases (by making the
parameter of interpretation explicit) is necessary for our
purposes.
So the present statement should be understood to
The
be restricted to the case of unambi guous indicatives.
Thesis
same point holds for (20) and for my formulation of
3, both further on in the text.
7.
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9

THOUGHTS AS TYPES OF EVENT

A Fable About R*SS*LL’s Step

Once it is definitely recognized that the
proposition is... not a belief..., but an object of
belief, it seems plain that a truth differs in no
respect from the reality to which it was supposed
merely to correspond.
G.E. Moore
1

In Chapter

1,

alluded to an old argument dating back

I

to Frege, Moore and Russell, designed to show that we cannot

take

thought --used as a common noun in the sense that has
’

'

been of concern to us throughout this study--to stand for

concrete events of thinking, to stand, that
of particular persons’

is,

for events

doing some thinking.

It needn’t be denied that there is a usage of

'thought’

on which the term does stand for particular events of

thinking.

But on that usage,

it couldn’t be said that your

thought and my thought were the same.
thought’ denotes, on that usage,

For what 'your

is an event involving you

and not me as subject, whereas the thing denoted by 'my

thought’, on that usage,
you.

Since you and

I

is an event

involving me and not

are distinct, so are our thoughts, on

that usage of 'thought’.
Let us reserve the phrase,

'shareable sense’, for the

sense of 'thought’ that has been our principal concern

in

this study, the sense in which the term stands for items
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that you and
in

I

may be said to have or be thinking in common,

virtue of having or thinking the same thought.

(Strictly

speaking it hasn’t been ruled out that there are many such
‘'shareable” senses of the term 'thought’,

exposition,

but for ease of

let me set this point aside and suppose that

there is only one such sense; the policy will not jeopardize
any of the main points

I

wish to make.)

Concrete events of

thinking themselves do not seem to be items of the sort to
which the common noun
sense.

,'

thought

’

,

applies in this shareable

That is the thrust of the old argument.

Then what

sort of items are the things that we refer to when we speak
of

'thoughts’

in the

Tradition proposes
I

a

shareable sense?

The Propositional

particular answer to this question, and

wish to turn now to consider how certain followers of that

tradition may have arrived at their answer.
I

have used the term,

in the study so far,

on what

and tolerably clear usage:

circumstances

in

'circumstance’, at various points
I

think is a fairly familiar

for example,

I

have spoken of

which someone did something or other, or in

which such and such an event took place, or circumstances

relative to which this or that claim is true, etc.

I’ve

also used 'situation’ to stand for things of the same sort;
some might use instead the phrase "state of affairs" for
the kind of items

I

have in mind.

Although this ordinary

usage of "circumstance" has been clear enough for purposes
so far,

let me briefly say something further at this point

concerning the sort of thing intended.
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I

take circumstances to be abstract items, ways for

things to be

at least some of which may be taken to be

represented by sets of possible worlds.

circumstances of my now having

a good time may be

by sets of worlds whose members all

time presently.
actual

—

For example,

represented

include me having a good

Circumstances may be said to obtain or be

use the predicates 'obtains’ and 'is actual’

I

interchangeably

— but

a

circumstance’s obtaining or being

actual should not be confused with its existence.

assume

I

that there are (that there exist) circumstances that do not

obtain (aren’t actual):
possible".
a set of

actual

circumstances that are "merely

If a circumstance is taken to be represented by

possible worlds, we may say that it obtains or is

iff the actual world is one of its members.

I

have

reservations about whether circumstances are properly
represented along these lines,

in

terms of possible worlds.

There are other conceptions that have been proposed that

expand the notion of circumstance to include ways for things
to be that are not possible (and that, accordingly, are not

well
I

represented by any sets of possible worlds).

do not think that the main points

I

However,

wish to make in what

follows hinge on this question.
There is a sense in which a circumstance may be said to
be the content of thoughts of various sorts:

an occurrent

belief, wish and question may be said to have one and the

same circumstance as their common content.
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Loosely, the

content of

a

thought is the circumstance that the thought

may be said to concern or be about.

For example,

if

I

am

thinking that Jones will arrive on time, my thought (at
least one thought
Jones’

I

am having) is about the circumstance of

being such that he will arrive on time;

if you are

wishing that Jones would arrive on time, your thought (the
wish, or at least one wish, you are having) concerns that

same circumstance.

There are problems with this

character i zati on of content,
perhaps

I

^

but for purposes at hand,

may assume that the reader has an acceptable idea

of what it is for a circumstance to be the content of a

thought, whether an occurrent belief, a wish, a question, or
an "object" of any other attitude.

At any rate,

I

shall

proceed with this assumption, and with the assumption, as
well, that in examples to be discussed,

it will

be clear

with respect to given thoughts, which circumstances are the

contents of those thoughts in the relevant sense.
The fact is that many philosophers of the Propositional

Tradition have supposed that what we mean by "thoughts",
when we use the phrase in the shareable sense, just are

circumstances (or some might rather use one of the terms,
'proposition’ or 'state of affairs’,

intending by it,

however, the same sort of thing as

here intend when

speak of circumstances).

I

I

In fact their view would be that a

It may seem

given thought iust is that thought’s content.

odd to identify a thought with anything that that thought

itself could be said to concern or be about;
325

I

find it

.

counterintuitive.

Nevertheless, it is pretty easy to see

the plausibility in such a proposal.

Here is a fable about

how a philosopher might have arrived at this view.
9.1.1

The Fable

There once was a famous philosopher named

M

R*SS*LL"

Having seen quite clearly that thoughts could not plausibly
be identified with concrete events of thinking,

the following observation:

R*SS*LL made

"Take any two acts of judging"

('judging’ was his technical term for occurrent believing,
and he commonly counted events of occurrent believing as
acts) "and suppose that,

in virtue of engaging

in those

particular acts, the subjects may properly be said to be
thinking the same thing.

Then plainly," R*SS*LL observed

"on any such occasion, we should want to say that the

thought these two have in common concerns the same fact",
('fact’ was R*SS*LL’s term for what

I

have been speaking of

as "circumstances", for what his friend W*ttg*nst*n spoke of
as "states of affairs".)

"Suppose, for example," R*SS*LL

proceeded "that our two subjects are both judging that Mt.
Blanc has many snowfields.

This would be a case where we

should say they are thinking the same thing.

But then

surely, we should also say that their common thought

concerns the same fact, namely the fact of Mt. Blanc’s
having many snow fields."
"But," R*ss*ll continued,

direction.

"let us now go in the other

Suppose that our two thinkers are having
326

thoughts that could be said to concern the same fact.
it clear that

in any such case

it will

Isn’t

be correct to say

that they are thinking the same thing, having the same

thought?

Suppose for example, that both are wishing to know

whether Scott authored Waverly.

Here is a case where we

should be inclined to hold that their thoughts concern the
same fact, namely that of Scott’s authoring Waverly.

But

then plainly this is also a case where we should say that

they are thinking the same thing, having the same thought."
It is apparent,

then" R*SS*LL concluded,

"that for any

two acts of thinking, the subjects may be said to be

thinking the same thing just in case what they are thinking
concerns the same fact.
thought that

a

Then we might as well equate the

person has (though not to say the particular

act of thinking in which the person is engaged) with the

fact that the person’s thought concerns or is about."

With this lead set by R*SS*LL, all philosophers

following in his footsteps (keep in mind that this is

a

fable), arrived very naturally at the central tenets of the

Propositional Tradition.

If one assumes that the things

occurrently believed are in general truth-valued, and
moreover, one follows R*SS*LL in identifying thoughts with
contents, one will be led to the conclusion that

circumstances, at least those that are the contents of

occurrent beliefs, are true or false thoughts--hence
propositions.

And since it is plausible to suppose that if
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a

circumstance is the content of an occurrent belief it may

also be the content of what one is thinking when one is

wishing or wondering, hoping or doubting, etc., it will be
natural to conclude as well that circumstances

propositions— are the "objects" of

all

the attitudes.

Philosophers were led, this way, to the two component
principles of the Received View.

Since it is plausible to

think that any circumstance that is the content of an

occurrent belief, is as well the content of a wish, and
question,

if one

is

a

identifying contents with what is

occurrently believed, wished or wondered, one will be led
strai ght-away to (RV1).

More specifically, the content of

what one is occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering,
when one is occurrently believing that 0

would be that 0

,

or wondering whether 0

,

,

wishing that it
will

be the very

same circumstance, what R*SS*LL would have spoken of as "the

fact that 0

"

(let me set aside R*SS*LL’s troubles that arose

concerning cases where it

is not a fact that

0

)

.

Thus,

if

one is inclined to identify this circumstance with the

proposition that 0

,

one arrives strai ght-away at (RV2).

Plainly, all this still leaves open the question of

what sort of things propositions are; circumstances, of

course (or states of affairs, R*SS*LLian facts, situations;
choose your phrase), but what sort of thing are thes e?

Proposals varied in response to this latter question, with

concomitant variation in proposals as to the nature of
propositions.

There was the old R*SS*LLian view according
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to which propositions

facts"--are complex entities, each

an arrangement of an object and property (or of several

objects under a relation), the object and property (or
objects and relation) being counted as constituents of the
fact.

More recently, the concept of possible worlds has

been employed in explicating the nature of propositions.
Thus, philosophers have suggested that we view propositions
as sets of possible worlds, or as functions from worlds to

truth- val ues
"

Others have proposed to take propositions as

.

intensional relations" of a certain sort:

O-ary ones.

Still, the conception of propositions as things akin to what
I

mean by "circumstances" has been the leading idea.

these accounts,

in their own ways,

All

of

have proved to be

fruitful and promising proposals concerning propositions,
and consequently

it was supposed--of thoughts in

Here the parable ends.

general.

9.1.2

— so

R*SS*LL
What

I

’

s

Step

wish to highlight in this fable is a certain

step that R*SS*LL and all his followers made
to it as

"

R*SS*LL s step".
’

I

—

shall

I

refer

believe that this step, or one

closely analogous to it (concerning specifically belief), is
implicit in G.E. Moore’s remarks that
of this section.

I

quoted at the head

It is the step of supposing,

that the term 'thought’,

in

upon noting

its shareable sense,

cannot

plausibly be held to apply to particular concrete events of

occurrent believing (or wishing, or wondering, etc.), that
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the term must apply rather to contents

would,

— to

items that we

intuitively speaking, say the thoughts are about, or

concern (that the term applies to things in significant
respects akin to what

I

mean by 'circumstance’:

R*SS*LL’s

complexes, or sets of possible worlds, or functions from
sets of worlds to truth values, etc.)
If one has one’s attention focussed exclusively on the

case of belief (or occurrent belief), R*SS*LL’s step has
some plausibility.

For as R*SS*LL noted (in effect), the

following expresses a truth:
(1)

nec Vx Vx Vy Vy nec( if x is occurrently believing y, and
is occurrently believing y’, and y and y’ have the
same content, then Jz( x is thinking z and x’ is
thinking z ))
’

’

x’

Restricting attention to the case of occurrent belief,

it

seems indeed to be the case that two persons are bearing
this attitude to things that have the same content

concern the same circumstance

— iff

— that

these persons may be said

to be thinking something in common, sharing a thought.

There is, then, an equivalence, at least in the case of

occurrent belief, between sharing

a

belief and having

beliefs with the same content.
In fact,

it is plausible to think that the same point

can be made, mutatis mutandis

attitudes:

concerning many occurrent

,

whenever one person

imperatively wishing a thing,

x,

is,

and another person is

imperatively wishing an item, x’, if
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for example,

x

and x’ may be said to

.

have the same content

to concern the same ci rcumstance--

then it is plausible to say that the two persons are

thinking something in common--shar ng a thought.
i

An

analogous claim can be made concerning the occurrent
attitude of wondering.
attitudes,

it will

For any one of a host of occurrent

be plausible to claim that the attitude

satisfies (for 'A’):
(2)

nec VxYx' Vy Vy nec( if A(x,y) and A(x’,y’), and y and y’
have the same content, then ^z( x is thinking z and x’
is thinking z ) 4
’

)

If sharing thoughts and sharing contents are equivalent in

these single attitude cases,

it may seem quite natural

suppose that the thought shared

.just

to

shared content.

is the

And in fact, philosophers working within the Propositional

Tradition commonly have restricted their attention to cases
in which a single attitude is in question,

especially in

discussions where the nature of "objects" of the attitudes
was at issue.

As

I

have noted before,

it has been a

commonplace in that tradition to attend solely to the case
of belief,

and to suppose that the results arrived at in the

case of that attitude apply as well to the case of all other

attitudes
What should we make of R*SS*LL’s step?

Since it leads

directly to some of the central tenets of the Propositional
Tradition, and since

I

believe that we should take seriously

the doubts that were raised concerning those tenets in the
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preceding chapter

,

I

am inclined to think that we ought to

Question R*SS*LL’s step.

The arguments of the preceding

chapter suggest that in cases involving two persons bearing
any pair of our three attitudes of occurrent believing,

wishing and occurrent wondering, the apparent equivalence of
shared thought and shared content breaks down.

In cases

where one person is bearing one of those attitudes, and only
bearing it, and the other is bearing another of those
attitudes, and only bearing that attitude, then whether or
not any of the things these two are thinking have the same

content,

it will

be counterintuitive to claim that they are

thinking anything in common.

Yet if we were to follow

R*SS*LL’s step concerning cases where there
in common,

i_s

a content had

we would be led to claim that the two persons are

thinking something in common.

It seems to me,

then, that we

should think twice about taking R*SS*LL’s step.
Fortunately, R*SS*LL’s step is not forced on us; there
are other items that 'thought’ may plausibly be taken to

refer to,

9

.

2

in

its shareable sense.

The New Category
The question is:

what are the things we correctly

speak of having, when we correctly speak of having thoughts?

What are the things persons may properly be said to be
gen thinking?

One could say, simply,

"thoughts", and

suppose, moreover, that there isn’t any other natural,

ontological category to which thoughts may be subsumed.
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This was not R*SS*LL’s view.

When R*SS*LL proposed that we

take thoughts to be facts, he was proposing, concerning a

certain category of items that he had independent reasons to
acknowledge, that thoughts should be understood to be things
of that category.

However, as we’ve just seen, any view

that identifies thoughts with their contents will be subject
to the same sort of doubts that were raised in the preceding

Chapter against
chapter,

I

proposal.

(

RV2

)

In the remaining sections of this

.

wish to develop an alternative to R*SS*LL’s
But

I

shall follow R*SS*LL at least in this

there is a certain category of items that

respect:

we have independent reason to acknowledge, and

I

I

think

shall claim

that thoughts should be understood to be things of that
These things,

category.

I

believe, prove to be a better

choice than contents for the sort of items we speak of when
we speak of thoughts in the shareable sense.

section,

I

In the present

lead up to a claim concerning which

shall

category of items is in question here, by introducing

a

battery of concepts and assumptions that will be important
in subsequent development.

Characteri zation

9.2.1
I

propose to use the phrase

"noetic event

for any

event, e, such that for some person (or thinking thing of

some other sort),

x,

and some thought,

x’s gen thinking

5

(Hereafter,

y.

to range solely over events.)

333

I

y,

e

is an event of

shall take "e" variables

Before discussing this

.

concept,

matters.

would like to address a few important background

I

I

have been using the gerund,

9en thi nki ng

'

’

,

as a

common noun applying to any event of a person thinking
something, but it is not clear to me that all events fitting
this description are noetic events.

Perhaps there are, so

to speak, existentially quantified events

— such

a thing,

for

example, as an event of Sarah’s thinking something, though
not an event that could be said, for any thought, to be an

event of Sarah’s thinking it.

If there are such events,

they fit the description of 9en thi nki ngs

,

but not of noetic

events
This way of character

i

zi ng

noetic events places a lot

of weight on the idea that an event may be said to be an

event of x’s 9en thinking
discussions,

I

y,

for given x and

y.

In preceding

have frequently appealed the notion of an

event’s being one of 0-ing, where "0-ing" is some gerund or

gerundive clause

(

"an event of kicking a football",

"an

event of my dispatching my chore for the day", etc.).

I

believe that the notion in question here may be understood
to involve a relationship between events and properties, and
I

would now like to attend to that relation more directly.
When we employ an ascription of one of the forms
or

(FI)

e

is an event of 0-ing,

(F2)

e

is an event of t’s 0-ing

(where substituends of '0-ing’ are gerunds, and substituends
of

't’s’

are noun phrases in their possessive forms),
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I

take

.

.

it that we ascribe a certain sort of property
to the event

denoted by the substituend of 'e’.

And

I

suppose that when

we refer to an event using a gerundive clause of the form:
t s
’

0- i ng

we presuppose that the event referred to has a property of

the sort in question;

in using such a term,

that the event is an event of t’s 0-ing.

we presuppose

One way to

understand what is being presupposed here, and what is
asserted of events when we employ instances of (FI) and (F2)
is as foil ows
I

suggest that in characteri

zi ng

an event as one of 0-

ing (or of t’s 0-ing), we assert a particular relation

between the event in question and the property of 0-ing (or
of being such that t is (or are) 0-ir\g)

Actually,

I

take

it that in certain cases the relation in question holds,

rather,

between an event and a relation (for example,

in

saying that an event is one of hitting we assert a relation

between this event and the relation of hitting,

in

saying

that an event is one of giving we assert a relation between
the event and the relation of giving).

In stating

assumptions and principles in what follows, though, just for
ease of formulation,

I

matter of convenience:

shall disregard these cases.

Another

instances of (F2) may contain plural

possessive noun phrases and quantifier expressions as

substituends for 't’s’, but in discussions to follow,
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I

shall usually set aside consideration of such cases and

attend to instances of (F2) in which the possessives of

singular referring terms are substituends for 't’s’.

I

think the discussions will be clearer for it, with no
central points for our purposes jeopardized by the practice.
So,

I

am assuming in what follows that if there is a

property expressed by the verb phrase [is 0-ing], there is

a

property denoted by the corresponding singular terms:
[the property of 0-ing]
[the property of being such that t is 0-ing]

for singular term, t, and gerund 0-ing.

further practice out of convenience here:

(I

am adopting one

the "ing" forms

figuring in the present progressives of verbs

— as

in

ing"--are normally referred to as present participles

whereas the "ing" forms figuring
(F2),

in

"is 0,

instances of (FI) and

and in instances of the two schemas for property terms

just cited, are normally referred to as gerunds

:

but

I

shall

ignore the distinction of participle and gerund in what
follows, and speak of "gerunds" in both sorts of case.)
As

I

see it, there are actually any number of relations

that satisfy instances of:
holds between an event, e, and the property of
0-ing (of being such that t is 0-ing) just in case
the event is an event of 0-ing (of t’s 0-ing)

R

for the variable

'

R

’
,

where substituends for

suitable gerunds (each one,

G,
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'

0-ing' are

such that [is G] expresses a

.

property).

But

I

propose to assume that there is just one

of these many relations that is expressed when we
use

ascriptions that are instances of (FI) and (F2) in

characterizing events.
I

of

shall

refer to the relation in question here as that

characterization", and shall appropriate the various

forms of the verb,
the relation.

So

'

I

characteri zes’

taking them to express

take the following to express truths

(for suitable gerund,

[

,

0-ing):

nec Ve( the property of 0-ing characterizes e iff
is an event of 0-ing ) ]

e
[

nec VteVx( the property of being such that x is
0-ing characteri zes e iff e is an event of
x’s 0-ing
]
)

I

do not claim that adopting this view of matters is of

direct help in finding informative, necessary and sufficient

conditions under which the things expressed by instances of
(FI) and (F2) are true.

But

relationship of character i

z

i

I

do think that positing this

ng will

make it easier to

formulate such proposals, and will allow us to consider
questions concerning such proposal s--and other proposals

concerning the concepts expressed by instances of (FI) and
(F2)--in a more regimented and perhaps more tractable
fash on
i

It should be borne in mind when considering assumptions

that

I

claim govern the relation of characterization that

ultimately they should be tested against intuitions we have
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concerning

a

relation expressed when we speak of an event

being an "event of 0-ing", or an "event of t’s 0-ing"

;

I

don’t mean to supplant this concept, only to regiment it.®
9.2.2

Some Features of Character zati on
i

One feature of the relation of character i zati on is that

events cannot bear it to just any property.

I

have not been

able to find a precise way, though, to mark off those

properties that can from those that cannot characterize
events.

Intuitively, there is a distinction to be made

between event properties and properties of other sorts that

might be thought to be of help in the present connection.
Let us say that a thing engages in an event according to
=df
x engages (is engaging) in e
of e and e occurs (is occurring)

(D12)

Then,

roughly, an event property,

such that for any

having

P,

x

is

x,

if x has P,

P,

is a subject

x

may be said to be one

then in virtue of x’s

engaging in an event.

Doing

a

sprint,

exhaling, occurrently believing that politicians lie and

cheat are all examples of event properties; being wise,
being malleable, believing (not occurrently) that
And the first three

politicians lie and cheat are not.

properties just cited can indeed characterize events,

whereas the latter three cannot.

We might say,

the latter three characterize states

— there

rather, that

are states of

being wise, states of being malleable, states of belief, but
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no events can be character! zed these ways.

In general,

it

seems that if a property does fit the intuitive

specification of event properties just given, then it can
characterize events.
These observations might lead one to think that a

property can characterize an event iff it is an event
property.

But on the conception of characterization

proposed here, there are plenty of non-event properties that
can characterize events.

Vacuous properties such as being

such that Sarah is running, being such that O’Brien is

occurrently believing something, being such that Jones is
dancing the Boogaloo

— all

such properties by which,

claim,

I

we characterize events when we employ instances of (F2)

not intuitively event properties.

— are

After all, the number two

may be such that Sarah is running, but it wouldn’t,

virtue of that, be the subject of any event.

in

So such a

distinction between event and non-event properties does not
seem to be immediately helpful in drawing a line between
those properties that can and those that cannot be said to

characterize events.
Could we say that for any property that can

characterize an event, either it
else it is a property,

event property,
has P’?

P*

,

P,

is an

event property or

such that for some

x

and some

the property of being such that x

P =

But an event may be properly character i zed

,

for

example, as one of somebody’s doing the wash in the sink.

When this is the case,

I

would claim, we correctly assert
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that the property, of being such that somebody is doing the

wash in the sink, characterizes that event.

property in question here is not
and some event property, P’

that

x

has P’.

I

,

But the

a P such that,

for some

x

P = the property of being such

shall have to leave the matter of which

properties can characterize events on

a rather

loose and

intuitive footing, but there do seem to me to be some clear

cases on both sides of the line.

The examples cited in the

preceding paragraph are cases in point.
I

suppose that if

a

property characterizes an event,

then the occurrence of the event is conditioned by the

subject’s exemplifying the property in question

(I

am

confining attention here to events that have single
subjects).

If e

is an event of sprinting,

occurs only if the subject of

e

then presumably

is sprinting.

e

It is not

clear to me, however, what manner of conditioning is the
Material

strongest that may be taken to hold here.

conditioning surely holds; that

nec VteVP( P characterizes e -)
the subject of e has P ))

(A10)

(Note:

is:

(

e is occurring

the conditioning at issue is expressed by the main

consequent of this and of each of the following two
formulations.)
direction.
miles.

The conditioning doesn’t hold in the other

Suppose that

e

is some

Then the property, call it

event of my running five
R,

am running five miles characterizes e.
340

of being such that

But surely it

I

:

doesn’t follow from this alone that if
occurring.
but

1987,

e may
I

I

have R, e itself is

be some event that occurred in Amherst
in

may have R in virtue of engaging in
some event

of running five miles in Seattle in
the Summer of 1990.

Surely we shouldn’t say that e itself is
then occurring.
I

am inclined to think that an event’s
occurrence is

"subjunctively" conditioned by the subject’s having
a

property that characterizes the event:
nec VeVP( P character zes e ->
if e were
occurring, the subject of e would have P ))

(3)

i

However,

(

it is not clear to me that strict conditioning

holds

(

4

nec VbVP(
occurring

)

P

character zes e -» nec( e is
the subject of e has P ))
i

We shall consider a case in the next subsection that has led
me to question the thesis formulated in (4).

Upon reflection,

I

think it is pretty clear that the

three grades of conditioning expressed in the consequents of
(A10),

(3)

and (4) are not themselves sufficient conditions

for characterization.

That is,

if we

replace the main

conditionals in these formulations by their converses, the
resulting formulations do not express truths.
simplicity,

For

let me refer to the claims expressed by these as

the "converses" of (A10),

converse of (A10):

(3)

and (4).

Consider the

suppose that there is an event
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characterized by my running that is occurring at this
moment, and suppose too that

something.

am presently thinking

I

Then the claim that this event of my running is

occurring materially implies that
thinking something.

I

have the property of

But surely we should not want to say

that this event of my running is an event of thinking

something.

Then we should not accept that the property of

thinking something character i zes

e.

So the converse of

(A10) should be rejected.

Examples concerning events that are inessential but
regular accompaniments of one another defeat the converse of
(3).

It might so happen that any likely event of my working

on the dissertation is such that were

also be drinking coffee.

I

to engage in it,

I’d

But no event of working on this

dissertation is any event of drinking coffee, no matter how
likely it is that my working will be accompanied by coffee-

drinking

— the

event of working is not character zed by the
i

So the converse of (3) fails.

property of drinking coffee.

Examples concerning properties that cannot characterize

events clearly defeat the converse of (4).

Anyone who is

occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, believes that
Jones will arrive.

occurrent 1 y

)

But there are no events of (non-

believing that Jones will arrive, so no event

of occurrently believing that Jones will arrive is an event
of believing that she will.

I

am not sure whether an

amended version of the converse of (4), with
to properties that can characterize events,
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'P’

restricted

is to be

accepted or not.

That seems to me a difficult Question.

Roughly, the question is:

suppose an event

and the

e,

property of 0-ing, are such that necessarily

e

occurs only

when its subject is 0-ing, and suppose too that there are

events that may be said to be events of 0-ing (i.e., that
the property of 0-ing is one that can characterize an

event); does it follow, concerning any such case, that the

event in question is an event of 0-ing?

I

don’t know.

We may formulate a certain thesis of event identity by

appeal to the concept of characteri zation

For we can ask

.

whether it is the case, roughly put, that if
of 0-ing,

and e’

is an event of 0’-ing,

e

is an event

and 0-ing and 0’-ing

are different properties, then e and e’ are different

events.

We may ask,

in other words,

whether the following

expresses a truth:
nec VeVe’(( P characterizes e
-» e * e’
)

(5)

e’

I

&P^P’

&

P’

characterizes

)

am very much inclined to think that the thesis formulated

here is false.

For it seems to me that some events of

hitting someone, for example, are events of punching
In fact,

someone.

I’d be inclined to say that any event of

punching someone is an event of hitting someone.

I

do not

have any arguments to offer for this particular contention,
and it does conflict with certain extant accounts of event

identity.

^

However,

it is surely the case that the property

are
of punching someone and the property of hitting someone
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:

distinct.

Then if it is at least possible that there is an

event of punching someone that is also an event of hitting
someone,
e’,

it will

be the case concerning a pair <e,e’>, e

=

that this pair satisfies the antecedent of (5) but fails

to satisfy its consequent.

Some cases that seem to me to

provide further counterexamples along similar lines concern

events of persons bearing intentional attitudes.
come to this matter below,

Although

I

We shall

in section 9.5.

consider it plausible to hold that events of

punching someone are events of hitting someone,

I

do not

think that a proper generalization is to be derived here

from the observation that punching someone entails hitting
someone.

I

do not suppose that anytime a property,

P,

entails a property, P’, then any event characterized by
will

P

be characterized by P’

-»
nec Vx( x has P -V x has P’
nec VP VP
nec Ve( P characterizes e -V P’ character i zes e

(6)

’

)

(

))

As in the case of the converse of (4), counterexamples here

derive from the fact that not all properties are ones that
can characterize events.

As in that case,

if the

amended so as to concern solely properties that

claim is

can,

characterize events, the resulting claim is still not one
that

I

am confident is correct.

Another question that can be asked by appeal to this

concept of characterization:

is an event

characterized by any property that
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in fact

essentially
character zes it?
i

In other words,

does the following formulate a truth?

nec VeVP( P characterizes e -» nec( e exists -»
P character i zes e ))
The claim expressed here is quite close to that expressed by
(4).

In fact,

in the presence of

a few other natural

(7).

As

I

assumptions,

(A10)

— which

I

accept

— and

(4) can be derived from

noted, we shall shortly discuss a case

consideration of which leads me to question whether the
thesis formulated in (4), and consequently that expressed by
(7),

should be accepted.
Finally one last matter before turning to consider some

assumptions specifically concerning noetic events.

Perhaps

there are conjunctive events, events that may be said,
some sense, to "conjoin" other events.

So,

in

for example,

perhaps there is an event of Moe and Larry’s hitting Curly
that conjoins an event of Moe
of Larry’s hitting Curly.

character

i

’

hitting Curly and an event

s

Should we say that the properties

the "conjuncts" in such cases characterize

zi ng

the conjoining event as well?

I

doubt that reflection on

our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or (F2) can be

expected to yield firm intuitions on this matter.
Nevertheless,

I

propose to assume that if a property

character i zes a conjunct of an event,

e,

then that property

may be said to characterize e itself iff it character zes
i

each of e’s conjuncts:
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(

.

(

A1

1

nec VeVP(

Je'
e’ is a conjunct of e &
characterizes e’
-» ( P character i zes e iff
Vte
e’ is a conjunct of e -»
P characterizes e’ )))

)

P

)

’

(

As an illustration,

imagine that Larry is hitting Curly and

Moe is hitting Larry.

I

take it that in at least some such

situations, there is an event, call it "L", of Larry’s

hitting Curly that is occurring and is not an event of Moe’s

hitting Larry.
in which L

"M",

I

also suppose that in some such situations

is occurring,

there is also an event, call it

of Moe’s hitting Larry that is not an event of Larry’s

hitting Curly.
possible.

It seems to me that some such situations are

Now let us suppose further that in some (any?)

situations in which
event,

LM,

and M.

I

and M are occurring, there is an

L

that conjoins these and only these two events,

L

take (All) to guarantee that the property of

hitting someone characterizes LM.

For it seems to me that

we should allow that any event that is either an event of

hitting Larry or an event of hitting Curly is an event of
hitting someone.

characterizes both

Then the property of hitting someone
L

and M.

characterized as well.
hitting someone.

But then by (All),

LM is so

So we may say that LM is an event of

This seems acceptable.

But according to

(All), we cannot say that the property of being such that

Moe is hitting Larry characterizes LM
one of the conjoined events,

L,

property
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,

for by hypothesis,

is not characterized by this

There may be some regimentation imposed by
(All) that
is not

supported by any features to be discerned by

reflection on our ordinary usage of instances of (FI)
or
(F2).

But

I

am presuming this regimentation when

a noetic event is an event of x’s gen thinking
y,

I

say that

for given x

and y, and this presumption will have to bear some weight in

what follows; so we shall proceed with (All).
9.2.3

Noetic Events
I

shall

use lambda expressions of the form

>v,...v n t0]
(where variables go in for
'

0

'

'

1

vl

vn’

and sentences for

,

as terms denoting properties and relations.

)

variable,

v,

isn’t free in 0

,

property of being such that 0 "

read
.

[

)<v[0]

]

If the

as "the

Then 'noetic event’ may be

defined as follows:
(D13)

I

e

is a noetic event
=df
gen thinking
)iz[x is
y]

character zes e
i

assume that there are noetic events--that there are events

each of which may be characterized as an event of x’s

thinking
y.

)

y,

for particular thinking thing, x, and thought,

It seems to me that in any familiar circumstance in

which it would be correct to say that someone is thinking

something we are supplied with an example of such an event.
I

wish to discuss some assumptions that

govern the concept obtained from (D13).
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All

I

take to

of these

.

)

:

)

assumptions may be seen, in effect, as placing
constraints
on the relation of character i zati on when its
domain is

restricted to properties of particular persons 9en
thinking

things
light of (D13), every noetic event, e, may be

In

associated with an
y]

characterizes

association.
x,

I

x

e.

and a

y

such that

),z[x

Let us consider some features of this

assume that for any noetic event, a thing,

is such that the event is characterized by x’s thinking

something iff

x

(A12)

*te(

nec

is a

subject of that event:

e is a noetic event -»
9en thinking
Jy( )z[x is
y]
iff x is a subject of e )
^x(

I

is 9en thinking

characterizes

e

)

also assume that every noetic event has at most one

subject
nec Vte( e is a noetic event —» VxVy(( x is a
subject of e & y is a subject of e
-» x = y

(A13)

)

)

Against this it might be suggested that there are

conjunctive events satisfying the definiens of (D13), and
that some of these should be said to have more than one
subject.

So,

for example, for two noetic events, one an

event, say, of Moe’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
the other of Larry’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,

perhaps there is a single event that conjoins these two.
Let "T

"

denote the thought that Curly is an ignoramus, "L*"

denote the event of Larry’s thinking
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Tc

,

and “M* " denote the

s

event of Moe

’

s

thinking T c

.

And let us suppose that there

is an event that conjoins L* and M*

,

call

it

"

LM* "

Perhaps

.

it should be claimed of LM* that it has both Moe and Larry

as its subjects.

Then don’t we have in this case a noetic

event with more than one subject?
am inclined to think not, for

I

that LM

is not a noetic event

— that

I

am inclined to think

there isn’t any

particular, neither Moe nor Larry) nor any

y

x

(in

(in particular,

not T c such that LM
is an event characterized by x’s
gen thinking
Here is why:
y.
L* itself is surely not
)

character i zed by any property that, for some thought,
the property of being such that Moe is gen thinking

is

y,

y.

Provided that Moe is not Larry (they were the three stooges
after all),
y.

L

is not an event of Moe

’

thinking

y,

for any

Then it is a consequence of (All) that the conjunctive

event,

LM*,

is not character i zed by any such property.

parallel reasoning suggests that there is also no

y

And

such

that the property of being such that Larry is gen thinking

characterizes LM*.

And

I

y

take it that if this event

conjoining solely L* and M* isn’t characterized by
properties of either of these two sorts, then there

is no x

gen thinking
y] characterizes
and y at all such that yz[x is
LM*.

If no thinking on Moe’s part alone character i zes that

conjunctive event, and no thinking on Larry’s part alone
does so either, then there is no person such that thinking
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s

on his or her part characterizes LM*

if this is right,

.

then by (D13), LM* is not a noetic event.

From here on,

shall suppose it safe to speak of the

I

subject of any noetic event
one subject;

— (A12)

guarantees it at least

(A13) guarantees it a unique one.^

(D13) also guarantees that every noetic event, e,
may
be associated with at least one thought,

some

x

the property of x’s

What can we say of th

i

^ en thinking

association?

y

such that for

y,

character zes
i

For one thing,

e.

it is

doubtful that for every noetic event, there is a unique

thought with which it is associated in this way.
doubtful

in view of

This is

considerations of the sort raised in

Chapter 4 that lead to the Plurality of Thoughts Argument
(PTA) and its analogues.

Suppose that

politicians lie and cheat.
supposing just this,
things that

1

am thinking that

purports to show that

it follows that there are at least two

am thinking.

I

Argument

I

Indeed the line of argument

suggests three thoughts in particular that
be having:
ii)

i)

I

may be said to

the thought that politicians lie and cheat,

the thought that they lie, and iii) the thought that

they cheat.

But must we hold that in such circumstances

there are three corresponding events of thinking?

I

don’t

have an argument against this contention, but in the absence
of any argument in its favor

,

it seems plausible to allow,

rather, that it is at least possible that

I

may be thinking

that politicians lie and cheat and only be engaged in one

event of thinking.
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)

But (DIST)
1;

(the distribution rule employed in Argument

see Chapter 4, p.36) will still yield the result that

I

may be said not only to be thinking that politicians lie and

cheat but also to be thinking that politicians lie, and to
be thinking that politicians cheat.

three of these

If all

ascriptions are indeed true relative to the imagined

circumstance in which
event, then

I

I

am engaging in only one noetic

take it that this one event of thinking may be

character zed as an event of my thinking that politicians
i

lie and cheat,

as an event of my thinking that politicians

and as an event of my thinking that politicians cheat.

lie,

Then there would be three thoughts associated with a single

noetic event in the manner in question.

Since

inclined to think that such cases are possible,

am somewhat

I

I

do not

propose to accept:
nec Vte( e is a noetic event -» VyVy’( ix( ^z[x is
gen thinking y’] characterizes e)
y’ =

(8)

y

)

There are certain essential characteristics of noetic

events that are worth noting here.

what sort of event is at issue,
events to be essential to them.
of noetic events,

I

I

In general,

no matter

assume the subjects of

Consequently,

in the case

suppose that if a person is the subject

of such an event, the event is essentially such that that

person is its subject:
(

A1 4

)

nec Vfe( e is a noetic event -»
subject of e & nec( e exists — >
of e

)
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x

x is the
is the subject

I

assume, further, that noetic events are essentially events

of thinking,

each an event of a person doing some thinking.

We may indicate that an intransitive reading is called for
by affixing an

*

i

subscript to a verb.

"

Then what

I

propose

to accept is:
(A15)

nec V<e( e is a noetic event
nec( e exists -»
^z[the subject of e is thinking^] characterizes e

However,

it

is another matter whether a noetic event is

essentially an event of someone thinking somethi ng
specifically,
e,

is

))

1

More

it is not clear to me that every noetic event,

essentially such that for some

x

and

y,

e

is an event

of x’s gen thinking y:

(9)

nec Ve( e is a noetic event —> nec( e exists -»
yz[x is gen thinking y] character zes e )))
i

The sorts of considerations that lead me to question (9)

have to do with cases of another sort alluded to in Chapter
4.

At one point in section 4.2,

some idea of the grounds

I

I

was concerned to give

had for doubting whether the

following rule is valid:
x
:

:

Jy

is thinking^
(

x

is thi nki ng t y

)

(where the ’t* subscript indicates a transitive reading).

described a case (pp.9-10, 4.2) that had to do with an
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I

antique furniture connoisseur, Max, who was having

a

very

vivid hallucination of an 1870’s vintage Chippendale
chair.
Now imagine a somewhat different situation:

suppose that

the circumstances in which Max finds himself really are as
he mistakenly took them to be in the original case of

hallucination.

In other words,

imagine that Max really is

looking at an 18th century Chippendale and is thinking,

concerning that chair, that it is a mint-condition
Chippendale.

The "text" of his thinking, so to speak, may

be precisely the same as that in the original case of

hallucination.

With respect to at least some cases fitting

the present description, however,

it is clearly correct to

say that Max is thinking something.

Indeed he is thinking a

thing expressed by the sentence

That is a mint-condition,

late 70’s Chippendale

(with respect to suitable contexts).

Let us call this

thought that Max is having, "T_".

I

think it is intuitively

plausible to suppose that there is

a

particular mental event

in which Max

is engaging

in this situation,

an event that we

are referring to if, speaking of this situation, we were to

speak of "the event of Max’s thinking T m "
this event,

.

And concerning

it is simply not clear to me whether or not we

should say that

i_t

— that

very event

— can

possibly occur in

circumstances of the sort originally described, where Max
only having an hallucination of a chair, where there isn’t

anything that Max is thinking at all.
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Couldn’t this very

is

event be the one we would be reporting in such circumstances
were we to say:
Max is thinking:

If this

is a possibility,

that is a mint-condition late
70' s Chippendale

then it would be a case in which

an event of a person’s thinking something
Tm

— is

— Max’s

thinking

possibly such that it occurs without there being

anything that the subject is thinking.
One might be tempted here to respond that if the event

we’re speaking of in the non-hal 1 uci natory case is really
one properly described as an event of Max’s thinking

Tm

,

then surely for that very event to occur is for Max to be

thinking

Tm

.

thinking T m

,

thinking

Tm

.

Surely, one might say, the event, Max’s
is necessarily such that if

However,

I

is one

Max is

can see no non-question-begging

grounds for supporting this contention.
hypothesis,

it occurs,

in fact

The event, by

characterized by the property of

being such that Max is thinking T m

.

Can we infer from this

much that the event is necessarily such that if it occurs,
Max is thinking T m ?

I

10
do not know.

Considerations along these lines are what lead me to
suspend judgement on two claims formulated in the preceding
subsection.

There is the matter of whether, if a property

character zes an event, that event is essentially
i

characterized by the property— of whether we should accept
the thesis formulated in (7).
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Also there is the matter of

T

whether a property,

P,

T

)

that character i zes an event is

necessarily such that if the event occurs, the subject of
the event has P (in cases where the event has unique

subjects)
in

of whether we should accept the thesis formulated

Since (4) can be derived from (7) (in the presence

(4).

of some assumptions that

I

have made or am willing to make),

to show that this case concerning Max’s thinking T
m

undermines both claims, it will suffice to see that it calls
into question the claim expressed by (4).

So note that the

following is a consequence of (4):
nec Ve( ^z [ gen thi nki ng Max

(4’)

(

nec( e occurs -» Max has

,

y.z

->
m ) ] character i zes e
gen thi nki
[
ng Max
m ] )
(

,

)

But if the case described above is indeed possible, then it
is possible that there be an event of Max’s 9en thinking T
m

(i.e.,

characterized by the property of being such that Max

is 9en thinking T m ) that is possibly such that it occurs,

though its subject, Max,

is not thinking T m or any other

thought.

is

If such a case

indeed a possibility, then (4’),

and consequently (4) and (7), do not express truths.
I

have noted that,

in

light of (D13), every noetic

event may be associated with at least one thought:
thought,

y,

any

such that the event is one of x’s thinking

for some person x.

y,

My hunch is that if one is not committed

to the view that each thought associated this way with a

noetic event,

e,

is one of the ob.i ects of e

presume that the thought is as much
355

a

if one does not

constituent of the

,

activity of which e consists as is the subject of

e

— then

one will be less inclined to suppose that e is essentially

associated in the way
On the view

in

question with each such thought.

am proposing, thoughts are not objects, nor

I

constituents of any other sort, of events of thinking.
section 9.5,

I

In

shall address the question of what sort of

things do occupy the role of object in noetic events.
In passing it is worth noting that the putative

possibility that leads me to question (4), (7) and (9), does
not undermine (A15).

For

hallucinating or not,

if

thinking:

I

assume that whether Max is

it is correct to say

That is a mint-condition,

"Max is

late 70’ s Chippendale "

then Max is doing some thinking--he is thinking^.
I

shall make one further assumption concerning noetic

events before proceeding.

Nothing in what has been

explicitly assumed so far guarantees a certain connection
that exists between

a

person’s gen thinking a thing, and the

occurrence of a noetic event character zed by that person’s
i

gen thi nk ing that thing:

(A16)

nec VxVy( x is gen thinking y -»
gen thinking
}e( \z[x is
y] character zes e
r
x i s engaging
i

&
i

n

e

)

The assumption implies that if a person may be said to be
gen thinking something, then there is a noetic event that is

occurring and has that person as subject.
may be put
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A related thesis

)

(

10

nec

e
in e -> x

)

(

is a noetic event
is 9 n thinking y

(10) follows from (A10),

9.2.4

—>

^xfy( x is engaging

).

(A12) and (A13).

Types and Instances

There is a distinction commonly drawn in philosophy

between concrete, particular events, and items that are

sometimes spoken of as "event types".

Perhaps the same

distinction is intended when philosophers have spoken of

distinguishing concrete events from generic events.
sure.

At any rate, for the moment

I

I’m not

shall assume that the

reader is familiar enough with the concept of a type.
usage,

’type’,

’sort’

and 'kind’

On my

are all more-or-less

interchangeable expressions that apply to the same bunch of
things.

I

am not sure of the precise features of our

ordinary concept of

a type.

In the present study

to adopt a somewhat regimented notion, and

I

I

propose

shall be

restricting my attention to types of event, and a rather
select group of such types, at that.

little later on,

A

shall have more to say about what sort of thing
'types’

(and specifically,

I

I

understand

'event types’), to refer to,

in

this regimented sense.

Types of event may be said to have particular events as
their instances just as types of tiger may be said to have

particular tigers as their instances.
of

instantiation as a primitive.

take this relation

On the usage

only types are possibly instantiated.
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I

So

I

I

propose,

am assuming:

,

(

A1

7

nec Vx

)

(

pos }y(

instantiates

y

do not suppose that al

I

instances.

Also,

I

1

x

)

-> x is a type)

types of events have

do not suppose that among event types

that do have instances, their instances all occur;

I

am

prepared to allow that there are some types none of whose
instances in fact have occurred or ever will occur.
Furthermore,

I

do not assume that events instantiate their

types essentially

— if

an event happens in fact to be an

instance of a given type,

I

do not take it to follow from

this that wherever it exists (nor even wherever it occurs)
it

instantiates that type.

Thus

I

do not accept any of the

following (here and in what follows,

I

use T-variables to

range exclusively over event types):

(11)

nec VT ( pos ^e( e instantiates T

(12)

nec VteVT( e instantiates T -» e has occurred or
will occur )

(13)

nec VfeVT( e instantiates T -» nec( e exists -» e
T
i nstanti ates
)

))

)

Noetic Event Types

9.2.5
I

assume that among all the various types of event,

some are types of noetic event.

I’m afraid that again

I

cannot offer any useful set of necessary and sufficient

conditions for what

I

"noetic event types".

shall mean when
I

I

speak here of

assume that noetic event types can

only be instantiated by noetic events:
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(

A1 8

nec VT T is a noetic event type —» nec Ve(
e
instantiates T
e
s a noetic event ))

)

(

i

I

also suppose that among the things that

I

would count as

event types at all, any that are instantiable and can
only
be instantiated by noetic events are noetic event
types:
(

A1 9

nec VT
pos }y( y instantiates T
y’
& nec Vy
instantiates T -V y* is a noetic event )) —> T is
a noetic event type )

)

(

(

)

’

(

But informative, necessary and jointly sufficient conditions

elude me.

The problem is that on the conception of types to

be proposed below,

there are many event types that are not

possibly instantiated that
types of noetic event.

I

would not wish to count as

So the condition expressed in the

consequent of (A18) is not sufficient.

On the other hand

I

do not wish to rule out that there are noetic event types

that are themselves uni nstanti abl e

.

Consequently, the

condition expressed in the antecedent of (A19) is not
necessary.

I

can offer some examples of instantiable noetic

event types, and

I

shall have to hope that this serves to

convey the idea.
I

assume that among noetic events, some are events of

persons occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, some are events of persons imperatively wishing that

Sarah would say "yes" (for some given Sarah), and others are

events of persons wondering whether Jones will arrive on
time (for some given Jones).

And
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I

assume that in each of

these cases, the noetic events of which we
speak instantiate
a noetic event type:
there is, for example, a type

necessarily such that it is instantiated by all
and only
occurrent believings that politicians lie and cheat,

a type

of imperative wishings,

necessarily such that it is

instantiated by all and only imperative wishings that Sarah
would say "yes", and so on.

In each of these cases,

instantiable noetic event type is in question:

an

a type of

event that is possibly instantiated and is necessarily such
that,

for some thought,

x,

any events instantiating that

type are events of persons 9en thinking

x.

Let us say that an event type is a "^correlate" of a

thought, according to the following:

(

D1 4

correlate of x =df T is a noetic event
nec Ve( e instantiates T iff
n
thinking x] character i zes e ))
}y( )z[y is 9

T

)

is a

type

&

Roughly, a ^correlate of a thought,

x,

is a noetic event

type necessarily such that all and only events instantiating
it are events of persons 9en thinking x.
I

assume that there are noetic event types and thoughts

related in this way.

Take for example, a type suggested

above--one necessarily such that it is instantiated by
exactly those events of persons occurrently believing that

politicians lie and cheat.
event type is a

I

take it that any such noetic

correlate of the thought, call it

that politicians lie and cheat.
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MM
T

p c
-|

Relative to any possible

,

f

)

)

situation, any instancs of such

typs will b© an event

a

satisfying the following (for 'e’):
4y(

I

is a

)z[y is gen thinking T

3
pi c

characterizes e

)

do not assume that for every noetic event type there

thought of which it is a ^correlate.

of types to be proposed below,

I

will

On the conception

not wish to rule out

that there are disjunctive event types,

instantiated as well

by events of gen thinking x and by events of gen thinking y,

for distinct thoughts,

types, then

I

x

noetic event type,

T,

event instantiates

T

of any thought.

So

But we couldn’t say, of any such

that there is any thought such that an
i

thinking that thought.
I

f

the event is one of a person’s

shall not assume

fx(

(

I

there is a

correlate

Then such a type is not a

nec VT T is a noetic event type
correl ate of x )

(14)

(A20)

If we must admit such

would be inclined to hold that some of them

are noetic event types.

However,

and y.

T

is a

do propose to assume that for every thought,
%

correlate:

nec

Vix(

of x

x

is a thought -»

JT

(

T

is a

^correlate

)

This is a very substantial assumption, and the conception of

thoughts that

I

shall

be laying out in the next sections

hinges on it.
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,

,

is expressed by the conclusion will vary, and do so with
attendant variation in truth-value relative to selected
situations.
I believe that similar cases
mutatis mutandis
hinging in this way on context-sensitivity of the
conclusions yield counterexamples to certain instances of
both i) and ii) as well.
But if the inference of (1) from
(1’) fails, it will not be due to such examples since, I
take it, (1) is context-i_nsensi ti ve and the same goes for
the inference of (2) from (2’).
However perhaps it is worth noting that there are some
instances of iii), with context- j_nsensi ti ve conclusions,
that are invalid as well.
Consider:
(

l

,

,

iiip)

Benjamin Franklin said:
“President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq"
::

Benjamin Franklin said that President Bush will
never order an invasion of Iraq.

I assume that the conclusion here is not context-sensitive.
Now suppose that back in the early 1800’s, Benjamin Franklin
had uttered these words:
"President Bush will never order
an invasion of Iraq".
Then I take it that the premise of
iiip) expresses a truth, just by virtue of Franklin’s
utterance.
But I am inclined to say that the conclusion of
iiip) does not, by that fact alone, express a truth.
There
wasn’t and had never been, as of Franklin’s time, any such
It
person as President Bush, nor any such country as Iraq.
perhaps doesn’t follow given this, that it is incorrect to
assert of Franklin that he said Bush will never order an
invasion of Iraq.
Perhaps, under the following
circumstances, even though there had never been a president
Bush, nor any such country as Iraq, the conclusion of iiip)
imagine that Franklin said, "Listen,
would express a truth:
I’m telling you that there will be a 41st president of our
country, and in 1990 there will be a foreign country that
occupies the region ... [lengthy specification of longitudes
and latitudes follows that picks out the region in fact to
be occupied by Iraq (pre-annexation of Kuwait)]..., and I’m
telling you that he, that presi dent- to-be will never order
Maybe relative to
an invasion of i_t, that country-to-be.
expresses a
iiip)
of
conclusion
the
circumstances,
such
truth.
However, it seems clear to me that it does not follow,
merely upon the truth of what is expressed by the premi se of
iiip), that what is expressed by the conclusion of iiip) is
Then if I’m right about iiip), and moreover
true.
corresponding instances of i) and iii) stand or fall
together, then I think we should have to grant that the
inference of (1) from (1’), in particular, is not valid.
It is not clear to me that instances of i) and iii) do
stand or fall together, but the validity of the inferences,
2
1
remains unclear to me as well.
/
( 1 )
2
(
(
)/
,

,

’

:

:

»

’

)

:

:

(

)
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3.
I
think it is plausible to claim that Witold can’t be
wishing that Jones will arrive on time unless he believes
some things; in particular, wishing that Jones will arrive
may entail believing that someone exists.
If one accepts
this claim, one might be tempted to infer that situations
meeting Constraint
are not possible.
For I say that
Witold is on! y wishing, yet from the description of the case
it follows that he is also believing something.
But this
reasoning is based on a confusion.
Constraint 2 does not
require that Witold lacks any beliefs at the moment; it
requires only that he isn’t bearing any occurrent attitudes
apart from those required by that of imperative wishing.
Imperative wishing does not require occurrent belief. Then
if Witold is onl
wishing, he can’t be having any occurrent
beliefs.
But that is not incompatible with the description
of the case.
Belief and occurrent belief seem plainly to be
different in this respect:
it is plausible to claim that
bearing the attitude of wishing or wondering (or as well any
of a host of other attitudes) to a thing entails having a
belief (though perhaps only a quite minimal belief, such as
that something exists); bearing that same attitude to that
believing
same thing, however, does not entail occurrentl
anything
1

It is not clear to me that there are such other
occurrent beliefs that we should acknowledge that O’Brien
(Similar points apply, I believe,
having in *-si tuat ons
to the question of whether Witold is having other wishes
besides the two expressed by (4) and (4’); see note on
following page in the text.) The matter depends on what
other analogues of (DIST^) must be accepted. One might
find the following plausible, for example:
4.

i

(DIST?)

t

is

.

is occurrently believing that Jones will

arrive

on time
:

:

t

is occurrently believing that someone will

arrive on time
(DIST?) is correct, we should allow that the following
ascription also expresses a report true relative to *situations, in addition to (3) and (3’):
If

(a)

O’Brien is occurrently believing that someone will
arrive on time

However, conclusions of inferences sanctioned by (DIST?) are
ambiguous and may be interpreted either de—re or de die t o
Assessment of the validity of a given instance of (DIST?),
then, must await disambiguation.
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On one hand, if the conclusions are to be understood as
de d i cto ascriptions, with the quantifier 'someone’ not

taking wide scope over 'O’Brien is occurrently believing’,
then it is not clear to me that inferences sanctioned by
(DIST?) are in general valid.
The case is different with
inferences involving non-occurrent belief.
I grant that if
a person believes that Jones will arrive on time, then this
person may be ascribed de dicto the belief that someone will
arrive on time.
But with occurrent belief, I do not see
that matters go the same way.
I grant as well
that if a
person is occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, then
that person may be said to believe, non -occurrent! v de
di cto
that someone will arrive.
But that is not an
entailment relevant to the inferences with which we are
concerned
On the other hand, if the ascriptions that figure as
conclusions to instances of (DIST?) are to be interpreted de
re
then I am inclined to think that such inferences are
questionable for other reasons. Consider the parallel:
.

,

.

(DIST?’)

is occurrently believing that Santa Claus will
arrive

t

t

::

is

occurrently believing that

x

will

arrive)

Surely, instances of (DIST?’) are not in general valid.
Then we should say the same for (DIST?), if the conclusions
of its instances are to be interpreted de re
.

In Note 2.

5.

it was observed that some instances of the

pai r
(

f

(

f

1

thi nki ng

’

t

i

’

t

is thinking:

2

:

0
0*

do not imply the corresponding instances of
(fl)

t

is occurrently believing that 0

(f2)

t

is wishing that it would be that you 0

*

And although in some cases this is due to the relevant
instances of (fl) and (f2) being context-sensitive, this is
One case was considered above deriving from
not always so.
standard indicative, 'President Bush will
the
the choice of
So there are cases
of Iraq’, for 0
invasion
never order an
ascription does
ayed-sentence
spl
di
the
where the truth of
standard
corresponding
the
not guarantee the truth of
it does not
where
one
be
will
Any such case
ascription.
to require
issue,
at
presently
suffice, for the constraint
to which the
relative
ones
be
that the ^-situation analogues
true.
is
alone
displayed-sentence ascription
.
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:

am puttin 9 a lot of weight on the
present clause
1
ex P ressed loosel y in it, that the
claims
expresse^bv
eS £° n ln9 standard and displayed-sentence
?
ascriptions are \to be true
relative to these situations in
virtue of the same bit of occurrent
believing or wishing as
the case may be.
in formulating Constraint 1, I avoided’
is (or meant to avoid it) by adding
the adverbial clause
concerning Jones’, to (1’) and (2’).
The resulting
displayed-sentence ascriptions (clauses a. and b. seem
to
me to do the trick.
In general, however, I do not see any
clear, principled way to produce, for any
given indicative,
a pair of displayed-sentence ascriptions
that will
suffice in this connection:
ones that express claims such
that it is enough to require that those claims be
true
relative to a situation, in order to impose a constraint,
in
the case of 0 with an effect analogous to that of
Constraint 1, in the case of 'Jones will arrive on time’.
Suppose, for example, that the indicative, 0, selected
for instantiating ( RV2 )
contains occurrences of two proper
names.
Suppose 0 is 'Henry won’t bother Laurie’.
In such a
case, I do not see how the addition of adverbial clauses to
instances of ( f
or ( f 2 ) will do the trick.
)
It will not
do to say that the ^-situation analogues in this case are
situations relative to which the claim expressed by the
following is true
_ nrl

*°

1

.

)

,

,

1

’

’

Witold is thinking, concerning Laurie and Henry:
Let it be that Henry won’t bother Laurie.

(a)

Briefly, the problem that I see with this particular
proposal
is that it might be that Witold uses the name
'Laurie’ for Henry, and 'Henry’ for Laurie.
Some such
situations will be ones relative to which the claim
expressed by (a) is true, though they are not ones in which
Witold is wishing that Henry wouldn’t bother Laurie, but
rather ones in which he’s wishing that Laurie doesn’t
bother Henry.
Plainly, similar problems would confront
other appeals to instances of f
or (f2’) with these
"concerning x" modifiers.
It may be that a proposal can be fashioned that gets
around this sort of difficulty by employing the concept of
event-characterization introduced in the next chapter
(section 9.2).
For any standard indicative, 0 an event of
occurrent believing may be said to have the conjunctive
property ("Pq" of being an event of O’Brien’s occurrently
believing that 0, and as well an event of O’Brien’s
thinking:
Likewise, an event of wishing may be said to
0.
have the conjunctive property ("P*)") of being an event of
Witold’s imperatively wishing that it would be that 0 and
I
Let it be that 0.
as well an event of Witold’s thinking:
believe that for each of these properties it is possible
that an occurring event has it; moreover, I think that it is
possible for two events, each one having one of these
,

(

1

’

)

,

,
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properties (and not the other) to co-occur.
I claim,
particular, that there are two such co-occurring eventsin
in
any ^-situation; I believe this is guaranteed by
the
condition imposed by Constraint 1.
The idea, then, would be to require that, for the
selected 0 the relevant ^-analogues are situations in which
,

there are two occurring events, e and e’, such that
has P£ and e’ has PjJ.

(b)

e

(the analogue of Constraint 2 will guarantee that only one
of the events has each property).
I
be! ieve that a precise
and adequate analogue of Constraint 1 can be stated in
generality along these lines.
I am not sure.

There is

6.

a

of
(fl)

difficulty confronting my appeal to instances

is thinking:

t

Let it be that

0,

in stating analogues of Constraint 1.
The difficulty is of
the sort of problems raised in the preceding note, and has
rather to do with the choice of displayed imperative.
To illustrate the problem, take 0 to be

No bird is noisy

(a)

In this case,

I
do not believe that the problems discussed
preceding note arise in stating an analogue of
Constraint 1.
I am inclined to think that it suffices to
say, in O’Brien’s case, that the relevant ^-situation
analogues are ones relative to which the following expresses
a truth:

in the

O’Brien is thinking:

(b)

For

I

no bird is noisy

take it that (b) implies

O’Brien is occurrently believing that no bird is

(c)

noisy.

and also that (b) is compatible with what would be the
that O’Brien does
counterpart of Constraint 3 in this case:
not have an occurrent belief stronger than any required by
(For this notion of an occurrent belief (or wish)
(c).
being stronger than another, see discussion of Constraint 3
And I suppose that, in general, if i) an
in the text.)
of
instance
(

f

2
’

t

i

thi nki ng

:

0

or
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(f3*

—

.

)

)

’

0*

is thinking:

t

subst i tuends of 0* being imperatives) implies the
corresponding instance of
(

’

'

(f2)

t

occurrently believes that 0

t

is wishing that it would be that 0

or
(

f3

,

and in addition, ii) the instance of (f2’) or (f3’) is
compatible with the counterpart of Constraint 3 if it does
not require an occurrent belief or wish stronger than any
required by the corresponding instance of (f2) or (f3), as
the case may be then to express a constraint (for the
relevant substituend of 0' ) whose effect is parallel to
that of the a. or b. clause of Constraint
(for the
indicative, 'Jones will arrive on time’), it will suffice to
require that the instance of ( f 1 ) or ( f 2
at hand
expresses a truth relative to the ^-situation analogues at
i ssue
But it is perhaps not clear, for any indicative, 0
whether the constraint in Witold’s case can be expressed by
an instance of (fl).
In particular, it may be questioned

—

'

1

*

)

,

whether
Witold is thinking:

(d)

Let it be that no bird is
noisy.

implies

Witold is wishing that it would be that no bird is

(e)

noisy.
am inclined to think that there is at least one available
interpretation of (d) on which it does imply (e), but this
inclination, and the inclination to hold, more generally,
that instances of f 3 are implied by corresponding
instances of (fl), may be questioned.
modulo the
It may be claimed that, strictly speaking
difficulty of the preceding note), instances of (fl) imply,
not the corresponding instances of (f3), but rather the
corresponding instances of
I

(

(

(f 4

)

t

is wishing that you will

let it be that 0

The contention would be that, taken strictly and literally,
imperatives of the form
Let it be that 0
is
should be understood to involve the reading of 'let’ that
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)

involved in literal
form
t will

i

nterpretati ons of indicatives of the

let it be that 0.

The problem then is that, strictly speaking, the claim
expressed by (d) with respect to a context, c, would imply
the claim expressed, with respect to c, by

Witold is wishing that it would be that you let it
be the case that no bird is noisy.

(f)

but not that expressed by (e).
If this contention ia right,
conclusions of the relevant instances of LA^ and
AST^ will not conflict with (RV2 a ).
For there would be some
situations satisfying the analogues of Constraints 1 - 3
relative to which the claim expressed by (e) is f al se
Consequently, (RV2 ) will not yield, concerning all such
situations, that there is a proposition (that no bird is
noisy) such that O’Brien is occurrently believing it, and
Witold is wishing it.
It seems to me, too, that if the present objection to
employing instances ( f 1
is correct, then we cannot employ
those instances in formulating analogues of Constraint 1
along the lines suggested at the end of the preceding note.
Employing the instance of (fl), got with (a) in for 0'
that proposal would require that the relevant ^-situation
analogues be situations where
therv the

.

'

,

(g)

there is an occurring event that is both an event of
Witold’s wishing that it would be that no bird is
Let
noisy, and as well, an event of Witold’s thinking:
it be that no bird is noisy.

I am inclined to think that at least on one i nterpretati on
this expresses a claim that is possibly true and compatible
But if
with the relevant analogues of Constraints 2 and 3.
not
does
(d)
and
right,
is
objection
of
line
the present
there
that
say
to
have
should
we
think
then
I
imply (e),
couldn’t be any single occurring event that has this
conjunctive property, at least not in situations that also
For the analogue
meet the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3.
thing Witold
strongest
the
that
require
will
of Constraint 3
(intuitively
is
situations
such
in
is imperatively wishing
But if there is an
put) the wish that no bird is noisy.
someone (referent
that
wishing
occurring event of Witold’s
noisy, then there
is
bird
of 'you’) would let it be that no
that you
wish
the
put)
(intuitively
is this other wish
i ndependent
that
is
would let it be that no bird is noisy
than the
wish
stronger
a
of the previous one; neither one is
other.
Two responses to this line of questioning do not seem
One might dismiss the problem, claiming
to me satisfactory.

—

—

.
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that it is clear enough which imperative wishes are supposed
to be captured by requirements formulated using instances of
f )
the ones reported by instances of ( f 3
But it seems
to me that this just begs the line of questioning at issue.
The contention at hand is that instances of (fl) do not
imply corresponding instances of (f3).
If that claim is
right, then whether or not one "gets the idea" of which
constraints I want by employing instances of (fl), those
constraints are not, strictly speaking, expressed by those
appeals.
I
am interested in how, strictly speaking, those
constraints may be expressed.
Another response might be to claim that (f) itself
implies (e) (and more generally, that instances of (f4)
themselves imply corresponding instances of (f3)).
I don’t
think that from the fact that I am occurrently believing
that you will let it be the case that one bird escapes, that
I am occurrently believing that one bird will escape (though
I think it would follow that I bel eve this).
And I doubt
too that it follows from the fact that I am wishing that you
would let it be that no bird is noisy, that I am wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy (though, it perhaps
does follow that I desi re this).
On the discrepancies noted
here between belief and occurrent belief, and between desire
and (occurrent) wishing, see notes 3. and 4. above.
Also,
this response would leave us with the obstacle discussed
just above for the proposal I offered at the end of the
previous note:
even if (f) implies (e), it presumably
requires a wish stronger than any required by (e). Then
there won’t be any situations (not possible ones anyway)
that conform to the analogues of Constraints 2 and 3, yet at
which any event is occurring that is one of Witold’s wishing
that it would be that no bird is noisy and also one of
Let it be that no bird is noisy.
Witold’s thinking:
Perhaps it is not possible to find, for any standard
indicative, some displayed-imperative ascription that serves
to express the desired condition on situations (along the
Similar problems would
lines of clause b. of Constraint 1).
arise in connection with other imperative forms that one
for example, 'See to it
might employ in this connection:
that 0 \ 'Make it the case that 0 \ 'Bring it about that 0
Perhaps the Yiddish form, [ that 0 ], for subjunctive
etc.
0 ( as in 'That a radish grow on your navel, God forbid’)
I believe that French allows such constructions
would work.
in ordinary usage, and that the sentence [ Que 0 ] for
(French) subjunctive 0 serves just the called for function,
If such forms are to be
of expressing an imperative wish.
found in French and happen not to have proper translations
in English, perhaps it would not be unwarranted to
appropriate instances of (fl) (or one of the other forms
just cited) for the purpose.
At any rate, there are very many cases where displayed
sentence ascriptions (instances of (f2’) and (f3’)) are
available which imply the corresponding instances of (f2)
(

1

:

)

i

'

,

.
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and (f3)

(surely, clauses a. and b. of Constraint
constitute one case among very many relevantly similar
cases).
In all of these many cases, analogues of
Constraints 1-3 can be formulated, and ^-situation
analogues can be specified consideration of which motivates
analogues of LA and AST that are just as compelling as the
originals.
Reflection on this fact by itself, it seems to
me, should provide some grounds for allowing that if LA and
AST are to be accepted, then we may doubt whether there is
any standard indicative, 0, such that the instantiation of
(RV2) for 0 expresses a truth.
1

7.
This formulation is not quite adequate in the case of
ambiguous sentences.
don’t think that the added
I
complexity required to accommodate such cases (by making the
parameter of interpretation explicit) is necessary for our
purposes.
So the present statement should be understood to
be restricted to the case of unambi guous indicatives.
The
same point holds for (20) and for my formulation of Thesis
3, both further on in the text.
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CHAPTER
AN ALTERNATIVE:

9

•

1

9

THOUGHTS AS TYPES OF EVENT

A Fable About R*SS*LL’s Step

Once it is definitely recognized that the
proposition is... not a belief..., but an object of
belief, it seems plain that a truth differs in no
respect from the reality to which it was supposed
merely to correspond.
G.E. Moore
1

In Chapter 1,

I

alluded to an old argument dating back

to Frege, Moore and Russell, designed to show that we cannot

take 'thought’

— used

as a common noun in the sense that has

been of concern to us throughout this study

— to

concrete events of thinking, to stand, that

is,

of particular persons’

stand for
for events

doing some thinking.

It needn’t be denied that there is a usage of

'thought’

on which the term does stand for particular events of

thinking.

But on that usage,

it couldn’t be said that your

thought and my thought were the same.
thought’ denotes, on that usage,

For what 'your

is an event

involving you

and not me as subject, whereas the thing denoted by 'my

thought’, on that usage,
you.

Since you and

I

is an event involving me and not

are distinct, so are our thoughts, on

that usage of 'thought’.
Let us reserve the phrase,

'shareable sense’, for the

sense of 'thought’ that has been our principal concern in
this study, the sense in which the term stands for items
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that you and
in

I

may be said to have or be thinking in common,

virtue of having or thinking the same thought.

(Strictly

speaking it hasn’t been ruled out that there are many such
"shareable" senses of the term 'thought’, but for ease of

exposition,

let me set this point aside and suppose that

there is only one such sense; the policy will not jeopardize
any of the main points

I

wish to make.

Concrete events of

)

thinking themselves do not seem to be items of the sort to
which the common noun
sense.

thought

’

,

applies in this shareable

That is the thrust of the old argument.

Then what

sort of items are the things that we refer to when we speak
of

'thoughts’

in the

Tradition proposes
I

a

shareable sense?

The Propositional

particular answer to this question, and

wish to turn now to consider how certain followers of that

tradition may have arrived at their answer.
I

have used the term,

in the study so far,

on what

and tolerably clear usage:

circumstances

in

'circumstance’, at various points
I

think is a fairly familiar

for example,

I

have spoken of

which someone did something or other, or in

which such and such an event took place, or circumstances
relative to which this or that claim is true, etc.

I’ve

also used 'situation’ to stand for things of the same sort;
some might use instead the phrase "state of affairs" for
the kind of items

I

have in mind.

Although this ordinary

usage of "circumstance" has been clear enough for purposes
so far,

let me briefly say something further at this point

concerning the sort of thing intended.
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I

take circumstances to be abstract items, ways for

things to be

— at

least some of which may be taken to be

represented by sets of possible worlds.

For example,

circumstances of my now having a good time may be represented
by sets of worlds whose members all

time presently.
actual

—

include me having a good

Circumstances may be said to obtain or be

use the predicates 'obtains’ and 'is actual’

I

interchangeably

— but

a circumstance’s obtaining or being

actual should not be confused with its existence.

assume

I

that there are (that there exist) circumstances that do not

obtain (aren’t actual):
possible".
a set of

actual

circumstances that are "merely

If a circumstance is taken to be represented by

possible worlds, we may say that it obtains or is

iff the actual world is one of its members.

I

have

reservations about whether circumstances are properly
represented along these lines, in terms of possible worlds.
There are other conceptions that have been proposed that

expand the notion of circumstance to include ways for things
to be that are not possible (and that, accordingly, are not

well
I

represented by any sets of possible worlds).

do not think that the main points

I

However,

wish to make in what

follows hinge on this question.
There is a sense in which

a

circumstance may be said to

be the content of thoughts of various sorts:

an occurrent

belief, wish and question may be said to have one and the

same circumstance as their common content.
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Loosely, the

content of a thought is the circumstance that the thought
may be said to concern or be about.

For example,

if

I

am

thinking that Jones will arrive on time, my thought (at
least one thought

Jones

I

am having) is about the circumstance of

being such that he will arrive on time;

if you are

wishing that Jones would arrive on time, your thought (the
wish, or at least one wish, you are having) concerns that

same circumstance.

There are problems with this

characteri zation of content

perhaps

I

3
,

but for purposes at hand,

may assume that the reader has an acceptable idea

of what it is for a circumstance to be the content of a

thought, whether an occurrent belief, a wish, a question, or
an “object” of any other attitude.

At any rate,

I

shall

proceed with this assumption, and with the assumption, as
well, that in examples to be discussed,

it will

be clear

with respect to given thoughts, which circumstances are the

contents of those thoughts in the relevant sense.
The fact is that many philosophers of the Propositional

Tradition have supposed that what we mean by "thoughts",
when we use the phrase in the shareable sense, just are

circumstances (or some might rather use one of the terms,
'proposition’ or 'state of affairs’,

intending by it,

however, the same sort of thing as

here intend when

speak of circumstances).

I

I

In fact their view would be that a

It may seem

given thought just is that thought’s content.

odd to identify a thought with anything that that thought
itself could be said to concern or be about;
325

I

find it

counterintuitive.

Nevertheless, it is pretty easy to see

the plausibility in such a proposal.

Here is a fable about

how a philosopher might have arrived at this view.
9.1.1

The Fable

There once was a famous philosopher named "R*SS*LL".

Having seen quite clearly that thoughts could not plausibly
be identified with concrete events of thinking,

the following observation:

R*SS*LL made

"Take any two acts of judging"

('judging’ was his technical term for occurrent believing,
and he commonly counted events of occurrent believing as

acts) "and suppose that,

in virtue of engaging

in those

particular acts, the subjects may properly be said to be
thinking the same thing.

Then plainly," R*SS*LL observed

"on any such occasion, we should want to say that the

thought these two have in common concerns the same fact",
('fact’ was R*SS*LL’s term for what
as "circumstances",

I

have been speaking of

for what his friend W*ttg*nst*n spoke of

as "states of affairs".)

"Suppose, for example," R*SS*LL

proceeded "that our two subjects are both judging that Mt.
Blanc has many snowfields.

This would be a case where we

should say they are thinking the same thing.

But then

surely, we should also say that their common thought

concerns the same fact, namely the fact of Mt. Blanc’s
having many snow fields."
"But," R*ss*ll continued,

direction.

"let us now go in the other

Suppose that our two thinkers are having
326

thoughts that could be said to concern the same fact.
it clear that in any such case it will

Isn’t

be correct to say

that they are thinking the same thing, having the same

thought?

Suppose for example, that both are wishing to know

whether Scott authored Waverly.

Here is a case where we

should be inclined to hold that their thoughts concern the
same fact, namely that of Scott’s authoring Waverly.

But

then plainly this is also a case where we should say that

they are thinking the same thing, having the same thought."
"It is apparent,

then" R*SS*LL concluded,

"that for any

two acts of thinking, the subjects may be said to be

thinking the same thing just in case what they are thinking

concerns the same fact.
thought that

a

Then we might as well equate the

person has (though not to say the particular

act of thinking in which the person is engaged) with the

fact that the person’s thought concerns or is about."
With this lead set by R*SS*LL, all philosophers

following in his footsteps (keep in mind that this is

a

fable), arrived very naturally at the central tenets of the

Propositional Tradition.

If one assumes that the things

occurrently believed are in general truth-valued, and
moreover, one follows R*SS*LL in identifying thoughts with
contents, one will be led to the conclusion that

circumstances, at least those that are the contents of

occurrent beliefs, are true or false thoughts
propositions.

hence

And since it is plausible to suppose that if
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a

circumstance is the content of an occurrent belief it may

also be the content of what one is thinking when one is

wishing or wondering, hoping or doubting, etc., it will be
natural to conclude as well that circumstances

propositions

are the "objects" of all the attitudes.

Philosophers were led, this way, to the two component
principles of the Received View.

Since it is plausible to

think that any circumstance that is the content of an

occurrent belief, is as well the content of
question,

if one

is

a wish,

and a

identifying contents with what is

occurrently believed, wished or wondered, one will be led
strai ght-away to (RV1).

More specifically, the content of

what one is occurrently believing, wishing, or wondering,

when one is occurrently believing that 0

would be that 0

,

or wondering whether 0

,

,

wishing that it
will

be the very

same circumstance, what R*SS*LL would have spoken of as "the
fact that 0

"

(let me set aside R*SS*LL’s troubles that arose

concerning cases where it is not a fact that 0

)

.

Thus,

if

one is inclined to identify this circumstance with the

proposition that 0

,

one arrives strai ght-away at (RV2).

Plainly, all this still

leaves open the question of

what sort of things propositions are; circumstances, of

course (or states of affairs, R*SS*LLian facts, situations;
choose your phrase), but what sort of thing are these?

Proposals varied in response to this latter question, with

concomitant variation in proposals as to the nature of
propositions.

There was the old R*SS*LLian view according
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to which propositions

— "facts" — are

complex entities, each

an arrangement of an object and property (or of several

objects under a relation), the object and property (or
objects and relation) being counted as constituents of the
fact.

More recently, the concept of possible worlds has

been employed in explicating the nature of propositions.
Thus, philosophers have suggested that we view propositions
as sets of possible worlds, or as functions from worlds to

truth-val ues

Others have proposed to take propositions as

.

"intensional relations" of a certain sort:

O-ary ones.

Still, the conception of propositions as things akin to what
I

mean by "circumstances" has been the leading idea.

these accounts,

in their own ways,

All

of

have proved to be

fruitful and promising proposals concerning propositions,
and consequently

general.
9.1.2

— so

it was supposed

— of

thoughts in

Here the parable ends.

R*SS*LL s Step
*

What

I

wish to highlight in this fable is a certain

step that R*SS*LL and all his followers made
to it as "R*SS*LL s step".
’

I

—

shall

I

refer

believe that this step, or one

closely analogous to it (concerning specifically belief),
implicit in G.E. Moore’s remarks that
of this section.

I

quoted at the head

It is the step of supposing,

that the term 'thought’,

in

is

upon noting

its shareable sense,

cannot

plausibly be held to apply to particular concrete events of

occurrent believing (or wishing, or wondering, etc.), that
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the term must apply rather to contents

would,

— to

items that we

intuitively speaking, say the thoughts are about, or

concern (that the term applies to things in significant
respects akin to what

I

mean by 'circumstance’:

R*SS*LL’s

complexes, or sets of possible worlds, or functions from
sets of worlds to truth values, etc.)
If one has one’s attention focussed exclusively on the

case of belief (or occurrent belief), R*SS*LL’s step has
some plausibility.

For as R*SS*LL noted (in effect), the

following expresses

a truth:

(1)

nec Vx Vx vy Vy nec( if x is occurrently believing y, and
x’ is occurrently believing y’, and y and y’ have the
same content, then
x is thinking z and x’ is
thinking z ))
’

’

Restricting attention to the case of occurrent belief,

it

seems indeed to be the case that two persons are bearing
this attitude to things that have the same content

concern the same circumstance

— iff

— that

these persons may be said

to be thinking something in common, sharing a thought.

There is, then, an equivalence, at least in the case of

occurrent belief, between sharing a belief and having
beliefs with the same content.
In fact,

it is plausible to think that the same point

can be made, mutatis mutandis

attitudes:

concerning many occurrent

,

whenever one person is, for example,

imperatively wishing a thing,

x,

and another person is

imperatively wishing an item, x’, if
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x

and x’ may be said to

—

.

have the same content

— to

concern the same circumstance

then it is plausible to say that the two persons are

thinking something in common

— sharing

a thought.

An

analogous claim can be made concerning the occurrent
attitude of wondering.
attitudes,

it will

For any one of a host of occurrent

be plausible to claim that the attitude

satisfies (for 'A’):
(2)

nec Vx Vx Vy Vy nec( if A(x,y) and A(x’,y’), and y and y’
have the same content, then
x is thinking z and x’
4
is thinking z
’

’

)

)

If sharing thoughts and sharing contents are equivalent in

these single attitude cases, it may seem quite natural to

suppose that the thought shared

.just

is the shared content.

And in fact, philosophers working within the Propositional

Tradition commonly have restricted their attention to cases
in which a single attitude

is

in question,

especially in

discussions where the nature of "objects" of the attitudes
was at issue.

As

I

have noted before,

it has been a

commonplace in that tradition to attend solely to the case
of belief,

and to suppose that the results arrived at in the

case of that attitude apply as well to the case of all other

attitudes
What should we make of R*SS*LL’s step?

Since it leads

directly to some of the central tenets of the Propositional
Tradition, and since

I

believe that we should take seriously

the doubts that were raised concerning those tenets in the
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y

preceding chapter,

I

am inclined to think that we ought to

question R*SS*LL’s step.

The arguments of the preceding

chapter suggest that in cases involving two persons bearing
any pair of our three attitudes of occurrent believing,

wishing and occurrent wondering, the apparent equivalence of
shared thought and shared content breaks down.

In cases

where one person is bearing one of those attitudes, and onl

y

bearing it, and the other is bearing another of those
attitudes, and onl

bearing that attitude, then whether or

not any of the things these two are thinking have the same

content,

it will

be counterintuitive to claim that they are

thinking anything in common.

Yet if we were to follow

R*SS*LL’s step concerning cases where there
in common,

i_s

a content had

we would be led to claim that the two persons are

thinking something in common.

It seems to me,

then, that we

should think twice about taking R*SS*LL’s step.
Fortunately, R*SS*LL’s step is not forced on us; there
are other items that 'thought’ may plausibly be taken to

refer to,

9

.

2

in

its shareable sense.

The New Category
The question is:

what are the things we correctly

speak of having, when we correctly speak of having thoughts?

What are the things persons may properly be said to be
gen thinking?

One could say, simply,

"thoughts", and

suppose, moreover, that there isn’t any other natural,

ontological category to which thoughts may be subsumed.
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This was not R*SS*LL’s view.

When R*SS*LL proposed that we

take thoughts to be facts, he was proposing, concerning

a

certain category of items that he had independent reasons to
acknowledge, that thoughts should be understood to be things
of that category.

However, as we’ve just seen, any view

that identifies thoughts with their contents will be subject
to the same sort of doubts that were raised in the preceding

Chapter against (RV2).
chapter,

I

proposal.

wish to develop an alternative to R*SS*LL’s
But

respect:

In the remaining sections of this

shall follow R*SS*LL at least in this

I

there is a certain category of items that

we have independent reason to acknowledge, and

I

I

think

shall claim

that thoughts should be understood to be things of that

These things,

category.

I

believe, prove to be a better

choice than contents for the sort of items we speak of when
we speak of thoughts in the shareable sense.

section,

I

In the present

lead up to a claim concerning which

shall

category of items is in question here, by introducing a
battery of concepts and assumptions that will be important
in

subsequent development.
Character zati on

9.2.1

i

I

propose to use the phrase

"noetic event" for any

event, e, such that for some person (or thinking thing of

some other sort),

x,

and some thought, y, e is an event of

x’s gen thinking

5

(Hereafter,

y.

to range solely over events.)
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I

shall take "e" variables

Before discussing this

.

concept,

matters.

would like to address a few important background

I

I

have been using the gerund,

9en thi nki ng

'

’

,

as a

common noun applying to any event of a person thinking
something, but it is not clear to me that all events fitting
this description are noetic events.

Perhaps there are, so

to speak, existentially quantified events

— such

a thing,

for

example, as an event of Sarah’s thinking something, though
not an event that could be said, for any thought, to be an

event of Sarah’s thinking it

If there are such events,

.

they fit the description of gen thi nki ngs

,

but not of noetic

events
This way of characterizing noetic events places a lot
of weight on the idea that an event may be said to be an

event of x’s 9en thinking
discussions,

I

y,

for given

x

and

y.

In preceding

have frequently appealed the notion of an

event’s being one of 0-ing, where "0-ing" is some gerund or
gerundive clause ("an event of kicking a football",

"an

event of my dispatching my chore for the day", etc.).

I

believe that the notion in question here may be understood
to involve a relationship between events and properties, and
I

would now like to attend to that relation more directly.
When we employ an ascription of one of the forms
or

(FI)

e

is an event of 0-ing,

(F2)

e

is an event of t’s 0-ing

(where substituends of
of ’t’s’

'

0-ing’

are gerunds,

and substituends

are noun phrases in their possessive forms),
334

I

take

.

it

that we ascribe

a

certain sort of property to the event

denoted by the substituend of 'e’.

And

I

suppose that when

we refer to an event using a gerundive clause of the form:
t’s 0- i ng

we presuppose that the event referred to has a property of

the sort in question;

in using such a term,

that the event is an event of t’s 0-ing.

we presuppose

One way to

understand what is being presupposed here, and what is
asserted of events when we employ instances of (FI) and (F2)
is as foil ows
I

suggest that in character i

z

i

ng an event as one of 0-

ing (or of t’s 0-ing), we assert a particular relation

between the event in question and the property of
of being such that t is (or are) 0-ing).

0-ir\g

Actually,

I

it that

in

rather,

between an event and a relation (for example,

(or

take

certain cases the relation in question holds,
in

saying that an event is one of hitting we assert a relation

between this event and the relation of hitting,

in saying

that an event is one of giving we assert a relation between
the event and the relation of giving).

assumptions and principles
ease of formulation,

I

matter of convenience:

in

In stating

what follows, though, just for

shall disregard these cases.

Another

instances of (F2) may contain plural

possessive noun phrases and quantifier expressions as

substituends for 't’s’, but

in
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discussions to follow,

I

shall usually set aside consideration of such cases
and

attend to instances of (F2) in which the possessives of

singular referring terms are substituends for 't’s’.

I

think the discussions will be clearer for it, with no
central points for our purposes jeopardized by the practice.
So,

I

am assuming in what follows that if there is a

property expressed by the verb phrase [is 0-ing], there is

a

property denoted by the correspondi ng singular terms:
[the property of 0-ing]
[the property of being such that t is 0-ing]

for singular term, t, and gerund 0-ing.

further practice out of convenience here:

(I

am adopting one

the "ing" forms

figuring in the present progressives of verbs

— as

in

ing"--are normally referred to as present participles

“is 0,

whereas the "ing" forms figuring in instances of (FI) and
(F2),

and in instances of the two schemas for property terms

just cited, are normally referred to as gerunds

:

but

I

shall

ignore the distinction of participle and gerund in what
follows, and speak of "gerunds" in both sorts of case.)
As

I

see it, there are actually any number of relations

that satisfy instances of:
holds between an event, e, and the property of
0-ing (of being such that t is 0-ing) just in case
the event is an event of 0-ing (of t’s 0-ing)

R

for the variable 'R’, where substituends for

suitable gerunds (each one,

G,
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’

0-ing’ are

such that [is G] expresses

a

.

property).

But

I

propose to assume that there is just one

of these many relations that is expressed when we
use

ascriptions that are instances of (FI) and (F2) in
character
I

of

i

zi ng

shall

events.

refer to the relation in question here as that

characterization", and shall appropriate the various

forms of the verb,
the relation.

So

'characterizes’, taking them to express
I

take the following to express truths

(for suitable gerund,

[

0-ing):

nec Ve( the property of 0-ing character i zes e iff
is an event of 0-ing
]

e
[

)

nec V<eVx( the property of being such that x is
0-ing character i zes e iff e is an event of
x’s 0-ing
]
)

I

do not claim that adopting this view of matters is of

direct help in finding informative, necessary and sufficient

conditions under which the things expressed by instances of
(FI) and (F2) are true.

But

I

do think that positing this

relationship of characterizing will make it easier to

formulate such proposals, and will allow us to consider
questions concerning such proposal s--and other proposals

concerning the concepts expressed by instances of (FI) and
(F2)

— in

a more

regimented and perhaps more tractable

fashion
It should be borne in mind when considering assumptions

that

I

claim govern the relation of characterization that

ultimately they should be tested against intuitions we have
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concerning a relation expressed when we speak of an event
being an

event of 0-ing", or an "event of t’s 0-ing"

don’t mean to supplant this concept, only to regiment
9.2.2

I

;

it. 6

Some Features of Characteri zation

One feature of the relation of characterization is that

events cannot bear it to just any property.

I

have not been

able to find a precise way, though, to mark off those

properties that can from those that cannot characterize
events.

Intuitively, there is a distinction to be made

between event properties and properties of other sorts that

might be thought to be of help in the present connection.
Let us say that a thing engages in an event according to

engages (is engaging) in e =df
of e and e occurs (is occurring)

(D12)

Then,

x

roughly, an event property,

such that for any x,

having

P,

x

is

if x has P,

P,

x

is a subject

may be said to be one

then in virtue of x’s

engaging in an event.

Doing a sprint,

exhaling, occurrently believing that politicians lie and

cheat are all examples of event properties; being wise,
being malleable, believing (not occurrently) that
And the first three

politicians lie and cheat are not.

properties just cited can indeed characterize events,

whereas the latter three cannot.

We might say,

the latter three characterize states

— there

rather, that

are states of

being wise, states of being malleable, states of belief, but
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no events can be characters zed these ways.

In general,

it

seems that if a property does fit the intuitive

specification of event properties just given, then it can
characterize events.
These observations might lead one to think that a

property can characterize an event iff it is an event
property.

But on the conception of character i zati on

proposed here, there are plenty of non-event properties that
can characterize events.

Vacuous properties such as being

such that Sarah is running, being such that O’Brien is

occurrently believing something, being such that Jones is
dancing the Boogaloo

— all

such properties by which,

claim,

I

we characterize events when we employ instances of (F2)

not intuitively event properties.

— are

After all, the number two

may be such that Sarah is running, but it wouldn’t,

virtue of that, be the subject of any event.

in

So such a

distinction between event and non-event properties does not
seem to be immediately helpful in drawing a line between
those properties that can and those that cannot be said to

characterize events.
Could we say that for any property that can

characterize an event, either it is an event property or
else it is a property,

event property,
has P’?

P’

,

P,

such that for some

x

and some

the property of being such that

P =

But an event may be properly character i zed

,

x

for

example, as one of somebody’s doing the wash in the sink.

When this is the case,

I

would claim, we correctly assert
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that the property, of being such that somebody is doing the

wash in the sink, character zes that event.

But the

i

property in question here is not

a P such that,

and some event property, P’

the property of being such

that

x

has P’.

I

,

P =

for some x

shall have to leave the matter of which

properties can characterize events on a rather loose and
intuitive footing, but there do seem to me to be some clear
cases on both sides of the line.

The examples cited in the

preceding paragraph are cases in point.
I

suppose that if a property characterizes an event,

then the occurrence of the event is conditioned by the

subject’s exemplifying the property in question

(I

am

confining attention here to events that have single
subjects).

If e

is an event of sprinting,

occurs only if the subject of

e

then presumably e

is sprinting.

It is not

clear to me, however, what manner of conditioning is the
Material

strongest that may be taken to hold here.

conditioning surely holds; that is:
nec VeVP( P characterizes e ->
the subject of e has P ))

(A10)

(Note:

(

e

is occurring

the conditioning at issue is expressed by the main

consequent of this and of each of the following two
formulations.)
direction.
miles.

The conditioning doesn’t hold in the other

Suppose that e is some event of my running five

Then the property, call it

R,

am running five miles character i zes e.
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of being such that

But surely it

I

:

>

:

doesn’t follow from this alone that if
occurring.
but

1987,

I

have R, e itself is

e may be some event that occurred
I

Amherst in

in

may have R in virtue of engaging in some event

of running five miles in Seattle in the Summer of 1990.

Surely we shouldn’t say that e itself is then occurring.
I

am inclined to think that an event’s occurrence is
y

"subjunct vel
i

"

conditioned by the subject’s having

a

property that character zes the event:
i

nec VeVP( P characterizes e -»
if e were
occurring, the subject of e would have P ))

(3)

(

However,

it

is not clear to me that strict conditioning

holds
nec VbVP( P characterizes e -» nec(
occurring — the subject of e has P

(4)

is

e
))

We shall consider a case in the next subsection that has led
me to question the thesis formulated in (4).

Upon reflection,

I

think it is pretty clear that the

three grades of conditioning expressed in the consequents of
(A10),

(3)

and (4) are not themselves sufficient conditions

for characterization.

That is,

if we

replace the main

conditionals in these formulations by their converses, the
resulting formulations do not express truths.
simplicity,

let me refer to the claims expressed by these as

the •’converses" of (A10),

converse of

For

(

A1 0

)

(3)

and (4).

Consider the

suppose that there is an event
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characteri zed by my running that is occurring
at this
moment, and suppose too that

something.

I

am presently thinking

Then the claim that this event of my running is

occurring materially implies that
thinking something.

I

have the property of

But surely we should not want to say

that this event of my running is an event of thinking
something.

Then we should not accept that the property of

thinking something character i zes

e.

So the converse of

(A10) should be rejected.

Examples concerning events that are inessential but
regular accompaniments of one another defeat the converse of
(3).

It might so happen that any likely event of my working

on the dissertation is such that were

also be drinking coffee.

I

to engage in it,

I’d

But no event of working on this

dissertation is any event of drinking coffee, no matter how
likely it is that my working will be accompanied by coffee-

drinking

— the

event of working is not characterized by the

property of drinking coffee.

So the converse of (3) fails.

Examples concerning properties that cannot characterize

events clearly defeat the converse of (4).

Anyone who is

occurrently believing that Jones will arrive, believes that
Jones will arrive.

But there are no events of (non-

occurrently) believing that Jones will arrive, so no event
of occurrently believing that Jones will arrive is an event
of believing that she will.

I

am not sure whether an

amended version of the converse of (4), with
to properties that can characterize events,
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'P’

restricted

is to be

accepted or not.

Ihat seems to me a difficult question.

Roughly, the question is:

suppose an event

e,

property of 0-ing, are such that necessarily

e

and the

occurs only

when its subject is 0-ing, and suppose too that there are

events that may be said to be events of 0-ing (i.e., that
the property of 0-ing is one that can characterize an

event), does it follow, concerning any such case, that the

event in question is an event of 0— ing?

I

don’t know.

We may formulate a certain thesis of event identity by

appeal to the concept of character i zati on

whether it is the case, roughly put, that
of 0-ing,

and e’

is an event of 0’-ing,

For we can ask

.

if e

is an event

and 0-ing and 0’-ing

are different properties, then e and e’ are different

events.

We may ask,

in

other words, whether the following

expresses a truth:
(5)

I

nec VfeVe’(( P character i zes e
-» e i e’
)

e’&P^P’

&

P’

character zes
i

)

am very much inclined to think that the thesis formulated

here is false.

For it seems to me that some events of

hitting someone, for example, are events of punching
someone.

In fact,

I’d be inclined to say that any event of

punching someone is an event of hitting someone.

I

do not

have any arguments to offer for this particular contention,
and it does conflict with certain extant accounts of event

identity.^

However,

it is surely the case that the property

of punching someone and the property of hitting someone are
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:

distinct.

Then if it is at least possible that there is an

event of punching someone that is also an event of hitting
someone,
e’,

it will

be the case concerning a pair <e,e’>,

e =

that this pair satisfies the antecedent of (5) but fails

to satisfy its consequent.

Some cases that seem to me to

provide further counterexamples along similar lines concern

events of persons bearing intentional attitudes.
come to this matter below,

Although

I

We shall

in section 9.5.

consider it plausible to hold that events of

punching someone are events of hitting someone,

I

do not

think that a proper generalization is to be derived here

from the observation that punching someone entails hitting
someone.

I

do not suppose that anytime a property, P,

entails a property, P’, then any event characterized by
will

P

be characterized by P’

->
nec VPVP’( nec Vx( x has P -» x has P’
nec Ve( P characterizes e -* P’ character i zes e

(6)

)

))

As in the case of the converse of (4), counterexamples here

derive from the fact that not all properties are ones that
can characterize events.

As in that case,

if the

claim is

amended so as to concern solely properties that can

characterize events, the resulting claim is still not one
that

I

am confident is correct.

Another question that can be asked by appeal to this

concept of characteri zation

:

is an event

essentially

characterized by any property that in fact characterizes it?
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In other words,

does the following formulate a truth?

nec V<e VP( P character i zes e
P character i zes e ))

(7)

nec( e exists ->

The claim expressed here is quite close to that expressed by
In fact,

(4).

in the

a few other natural

(7).

g

As

presence of (A10)

assumptions,

— which

I

accept

— and

(4) can be derived from

noted, we shall shortly discuss a case

I

consideration of which leads me to question whether the
thesis formulated in (4), and consequently that expressed by
(7),

should be accepted.

Finally one last matter before turning to consider some

assumptions specifically concerning noetic events.

Perhaps

there are conjunctive events, events that may be said, in
some sense, to "conjoin" other events.

So,

for example,

perhaps there is an event of Moe and Larry’s hitting Curly
that conjoins an event of Moe’s hitting Curly and an event
of Larry’s hitting Curly.

character

i

z

i

Should we say that the properties

ng the "conjuncts"

the conjoining event as well?

in such cases
I

characterize

doubt that reflection on

our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or (F2) can be

expected to yield firm intuitions on this matter.
Nevertheless,

I

propose to assume that if a property

character zes a conjunct of an event,
i

e,

then that property

may be said to characterize e itself iff it characterizes

each of e’s conjuncts:
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s

.

(

A1

1

nec VeVP( ^e’( e’ is a conjunct of e &
P characterizes e’
P characterizes e iff
(
Ve
e’ is a conjunct of e ->
P characterizes e’ )))

)

)

’

(

As an illustration,

imagine that Larry is hitting Curly and

Moe is hitting Larry.

I

take it that in at least some such

situations, there is an event, call it "L", of Larry’s

hitting Curly that is occurring and is not an event of Moe
hitting Larry.
in which L

"M"

,

is

I

’

also suppose that in some such situations

occurring, there is also an event, call it

of Moe’s hitting Larry that is not an event of Larry’s

hitting Curly.
possible.

It seems to me that some such situations are

Now let us suppose further that in some (any?)

situations in which
event,

LM,

and M.

I

and M are occurring, there is an

L

that conjoins these and only these two events,

L

take (All) to guarantee that the property of

hitting someone characterizes LM.

For it seems to me that

we should allow that any event that is either an event of

hitting Larry or an event of hitting Curly is an event of
hitting someone.

characterizes both

Then the property of hitting someone
L

and M.

characterized as well.
hitting someone.

But then by (All),

LM is so

So we may say that LM is an event of

This seems acceptable.

But according to

(All), we cannot say that the property of being such that

Moe is hitting Larry characterizes LM
one of the conjoined events,

L,

property
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,

for by hypothesis,

is not characterized by this

.

There may be some regimentation imposed by (All) that
is not supported by any features to be discerned
by

reflection on our ordinary usage of instances of (FI) or
(

F2

But

)

I

am presuming this regimentation when

a noetic event is an event of x’s gen thinking
y,

I

say that

for given

x

and y, and this presumption will have to bear some weight in

what follows; so we shall proceed with (All).
9.2.3

Noetic Events
I

shall

use lambda expressions of the form

)v,...v n [0]
(where variables go in for
'

0

'

*

vn’

vl

and sentences for

,

as terms denoting properties and relations.

)

variable, v,

isn’t free in 0

property of being such that

,

0"

read
.

[

^v[0]

If the

as “the

]

Then 'noetic event’ may be

defined as follows:
(D13)

I

e

is a noetic event
=df
gen thinking
JxJyi )<z[x is
y]

assume that there are noetic events

character zes

— that

i

e

there are events

each of which may be characterized as an event of x’s

thinking
y.

y,

for particular thinking thing, x, and thought,

It seems to me that in any familiar circumstance in

which it would be correct to say that someone is thinking

something we are supplied with an example of such an event.
I

wish to discuss some assumptions that

govern the concept obtained from (D13).
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All

)

I

take to

of these

.

)

:

assumptions may be seen, in effect, as placing constraints
on the relation of character i zati on when its domain
is

restricted to properties of particular persons 9en thinking
thi ngs

light of (D13), every noetic event, e, may be

In

associated with an
y]

character i zes

association.
x,

I

x

e.

and a

y

such that

),z[x

Let us consider some features of this

assume that for any noetic event, a thing,

is such that the event is characterized by x’s thinking

something iff

x

(A12)

V<e(

nec

is a

subject of that event:

e is a noetic event
9en thinking
iy( )z[x is
y]
iff x is a subject of e ))

characterizes e

V!x(

I

is 9en thinking

)

also assume that every noetic event has at most one

subject
nec Ve( e is a noetic event
VxVy(( x is a
-» x = y
subject of e & y is a subject of e

(A13)

)

)

Against this it might be suggested that there are

conjunctive events satisfying the definiens of (D13), and
that some of these should be said to have more than one
subject.

So,

for example, for two noetic events, one an

event, say, of Moe’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,
the other of Larry’s thinking that Curly is an ignoramus,

perhaps there is a single event that conjoins these two.
Let "T

"

denote the thought that Curly is an ignoramus,

denote the event of Larry’s thinking
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Tc

,

and

M

"L*"

denote the

s

event of Moe

s

thinking T c

And let us suppose that there

.

is an event that conjoins L* and M*

,

call

it

"

LM*

"

Perhaps

.

it should be claimed of LM* that it has both Moe and Larry

as its subjects.

Then don’t we have in this case a noetic

event with more than one subject?
am inclined to think not, for

I

that LM

is not a noetic event

— that

I

am inclined to think

there isn’t any

particular, neither Moe nor Larry) nor any

y

x

(in

(in particular,

not T c such that LM* is an event character zed by x’s
gen thinking
Here is why:
y.
L* itself is surely not
)

i

characterized by any property that, for some thought,
the property of being such that Moe is gen thinking

is

y,

y.

Provided that Moe is not Larry (they were the three stooges
after all),
y.

L

is not an event of Moe

’

thinking

y,

for any

Then it is a consequence of (All) that the conjunctive

event,

LM

,

is not

characterized by any such property.

parallel reasoning suggests that there is also no

y

And

such

that the property of being such that Larry is gen thinking

characterizes LM*.

And

I

y

take it that if this event

conjoining solely L* and M* isn’t character zed by
i

properties of either of these two sorts, then there

is no x

gen thinking
y] characterizes
and y at all such that )<z[x is
LM*.

If no thinking on Moe s part alone characterizes that
’

conjunctive event, and no thinking on Larry’s part alone
does so either, then there is no person such that thinking
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on his or her part characterizes LM*

If this

.

is right,

then by (D13), LM* is not a noetic event.
From here on,

I

shall suppose it safe to speak of the

subject of any noetic event--(A12) guarantees it at least
one subject;
(

D1 3

(A13) guarantees it a unique one.

9

also guarantees that every noetic event,

)

may

e,

be associated with at least one thought,

y,

some x the property of x’s gen thinking

characterizes

What can we say of this association?

y

such that for

For one thing,

e.

it is

doubtful that for every noetic event, there is a unique

thought with which it is associated in this way.
doubtful

Chapter

This is

in view of considerations of the sort raised in
4

that lead to the Plurality of Thoughts Argument

(PTA) and its analogues.

Suppose that

politicians lie and cheat.

Argument

1

I

am thinking that

purports to show that

supposing just this, it follows that there are at least two
things that

am thinking.

I

Indeed the line of argument

suggests three thoughts in particular that
be having:
ii)

i)

I

may be said to

the thought that politicians lie and cheat,

the thought that they lie, and iii) the thought that

they cheat.

But must we hold that in such circumstances

there are three corresponding events of thinking?

I

don’t

have an argument against this contention, but in the absence
of any argument in its favor

,

it seems plausible to allow,

rather, that it is at least possible that

I

may be thinking

that politicians lie and cheat and only be engaged

event of thinking.
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in one

)

)

But (DIST)

(the distribution rule employed in Argument

see Chapter 4, p.36) will still yield the result that

1;

I

may be said not only to be thinking that politicians lie and

cheat but also to be thinking that politicians lie, and to
be thinking that politicians cheat.

three of these

If all

ascriptions are indeed true relative to the imagined

circumstance in which
event, then

I

I

am engaging in only one noetic

take it that this one event of thinking may be

character zed as an event of my thinking that politicians
i

lie and cheat,
lie,

as an event of my thinking that politicians

and as an event of my thinking that politicians cheat.

Then there would be three thoughts associated with a single

noetic event in the manner in question.

Since

am somewhat

I

inclined to think that such cases are possible,

do not

I

propose to accept:

(8)

nec Vte( e is a noetic event -» VyVy’(
gen thinking y’] characterizes e)
y’

)tz[x
=

y

is

)

There are certain essential character sti cs of noetic
i

events that are worth noting here.
what sort of event is at issue,

events to be essential to them.
of noetic events,

I

I

In general,

no matter

assume the subjects of

Consequently,

in the case

suppose that if a person is the subject

of such an event, the event is essentially such that that

person is its subject:
(

A1 4

nec Ve( e is a noetic event -»
subject of e & nec( e exists —>
of e
)
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x

x is the
is the subject

assume, further, that noetic events are essentially events

I

of thinking,

each an event of a person doing some thinking.

We may indicate that an intransitive reading is called for
by affixing an

i*

*

subscript to

a verb.

Then what

I

propose

to accept is:

(

A1 5

nec Ve( e is a noetic event
nec( e exists -»
)<z[the subject of e is thinking^] character i zes e

)

However,

it is another matter whether a noetic event is

essentially an event of someone thinking something
specifically,
e,

is

))

!

More

is not clear to me that every noetic event,

it

essentially such that for some

x

and y, e is an event

of x’s gen thinking y:

(9)

e is a noetic event -> nec( e exists
gen thinking
)cz[x is
y] character i zes e

nec

Vfe(

)))

The sorts of considerations that lead me to question (9)

have to do with cases of another sort alluded to in Chapter
4.

At one point in section 4.2,

some idea of the grounds

I

I

was concerned to give

had for doubting whether the

following rule is valid:
x

(where the

'

:

:

t

’

is thinking^

}y{

x

is thinking t y

subscript indicates

)

a

transitive reading).

described a case (pp.9-10, 4.2) that had to do with an
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I

antique furniture connoisseur, Max, who was having

a

very

vivid hallucination of an 1870’s vintage Chippendale
chair.
Now imagine a somewhat different situation:
suppose
that

the circumstances in which Max finds himself really
are as
he mistakenly took them to be in the original case
of

hallucination.

In other words,

imagine that Max really is

looking at an 18th century Chippendale and is thinking,

concerning that chair, that it is a mint-condition
Chippendale.

The "text" of his thinking, so to speak, may

be precisely the same as that in the original

hallucination.

case of

With respect to at least some cases fitting

the present description, however,

it is clearly correct to

say that Max is thinking something.

Indeed he is thinking a

thing expressed by the sentence
That is a mint-condition,

late 70’s Chippendale

(with respect to suitable contexts).

thought that Max is having,

"T m "

.

plausible to suppose that there is
in which Max

is

Let us call this

I

think it is intuitively

a

particular mental event

engaging in this situation, an event that we

are referring to if, speaking of this situation, we were to

speak of "the event of Max’s thinking T m "
this event,

.

And concerning

it is simply not clear to me whether or not we

should say that

i_t

— that

very event--can possibly occur in

circumstances of the sort originally described, where Max
only having an hallucination of a chair, where there isn’t

anything that Max is thinking at all.
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Couldn’t this very

is

event be the one we would be reporting in such
circumstances
were we to say:
Max is thinking:

If this is a possibility,

that is a mint-condition late
70 ’s Chippendale

then it would be a case in which

an event of a person’s thinking something
T

m

— Max’s

thinking

Possibly such that it occurs without there being

anything that the subject is thinking.
One might be tempted here to respond that if the event

we’re speaking of in the non-hal uci natory case is really
1

one properly described as an event of Max’s thinking

T

then surely for that very event to occur is for Max to be

thinking

Tm

.

thinking

Tm

,

thinking

Tm

.

Surely, one might say, the event, Max’s
is necessarily such that if

However,

I

is one

Max is

can see no non-question-begging

grounds for supporting this contention.
hypothesis,

it occurs,

in fact

The event,

by

character zed by the property of
i

being such that Max is thinking

T

m

.

Can we infer from this

much that the event is necessarily such that if it occurs,
Max is thinking T m ?

I

do not know. 10

Considerations along these lines are what lead me to
suspend judgement on two claims formulated in the preceding
subsection.

There is the matter of whether,

if a

property

characterizes an event, that event is essentially
character zed by the property
i

— of

the thesis formulated in (7).
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whether we should accept

Also there is the matter of

T

[

whether a property,

P,

)

that characterizes an event is

necessarily such that if the event occurs, the
subject of
the event has P (in cases where the event
has unique
subjects)
in

of whether we should accept the thesis
formulated

Since (4) can be derived from (7) (in the
presence

(4).

of some assumptions that

I

have made or am willing to make),

to show that this case concerning Max’s thinking T
m
undermines both claims, it will suffice to see that it calls

into question the claim expressed by (4).

So note that the

following is a consequence of (4):
(

4

’

>z[9 en thinking(Max,T

nec

)

nec(

e

m )]

character zes e
i

occurs -> Max has )z gen thi nki ng Max
(

,

m

) ]

)

But if the case described above is indeed possible, then it
is possible that there be an event of Max’s gen thinking T
m

(i.e.,

characteri zed by the property of being such that Max

is gen thinking T )
m

that is possibly such that it occurs,

though its subject, Max,
thought.

is not thinking T
m or any other

If such a case is indeed a possibility,

then (4’),

and consequently (4) and (7), do not express truths.
I

have noted that,

in

light of (D13), every noetic

event may be associated with at least one thought:
thought,

y,

any

such that the event is one of x’s thinking

for some person x.

y,

My hunch is that if one is not committed

to the view that each thought associated this way with a

noetic event,

e,

is one of the objects of

e— if

one does not

presume that the thought is as much a constituent of the
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)

activity of which

consists as is the subject of

e

e— then

one will be less inclined to suppose that e is essentially

associated in the way in question with each such thought.
On the view

am proposing, thoughts are not objects, nor

I

constituents of any other sort, of events of thinking.
section 9.5,

In

shall address the question of what sort of

I

things do occupy the role of object in noetic events.
In passing

it

is

worth noting that the putative

possibility that leads me to question (4), (7) and (9), does
not undermine (A15).

For

I

assume that whether Max is

hallucinating or not, if it is correct to say "Max is
thinking:

That is a mint-condition,

then Max is doing some thinking
I

— he

late 70’s Chippendale ",
is thinking^.

shall make one further assumption concerning noetic

events before proceeding.

Nothing in what has been

explicitly assumed so far guarantees a certain connection
that exists between a person’s 9en thinking a thing, and the

occurrence of

a

noetic event character zed by that person’s
i

9en thinking that thing:

(

A1 6

)

nec VxVy( x is gen thinking y -»
9en thi nki
}e{ \z[x is
ng y] character zes e &
'
x is engaging in e
i

)

The assumption implies that if a person may be said to be
9en thi nki
ng something, then there is a noetic event that is

occurring and has that person as subject.
may be put
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A related thesis

(

10

nec

Vfe( e
in e -> x

)

is a noetic event ->
is 9 n thinking y ).

(10) follows from (A10),

9.2.4

is engaging

x

(A12) and (A13).

Types and Instances
There is a distinction commonly drawn in philosophy

between concrete, particular events, and items that are

sometimes spoken of as "event types".

Perhaps the same

distinction is intended when philosophers have spoken of

distinguishing concrete events from generic events.
sure.

At any rate, for the moment

I’m not

shall assume that the

I

reader is familiar enough with the concept of a type.
usage,

’type’,

’sort’

and 'kind’

On my

are all more-or-less

interchangeable expressions that apply to the same bunch of
things.

I

am not sure of the precise features of our

ordinary concept of a type.

In the present study

to adopt a somewhat regimented notion, and

I

shall

a rather

little later on,

A

have more to say about what sort of thing

'types’

(and specifically,

propose

shall be

restricting my attention to types of event, and
select group of such types, at that.

I

I

I

understand

'event types’), to refer to,

in

this regimented sense.

Types of event may be said to have particular events as
their instances just as types of tiger may be said to have

particular tigers as their instances.
of

instantiation as a primitive.

take this relation

On the usage

only types are possibly instantiated.
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I

So

I

I

propose,

am assuming:

(

A1

7

nec Vx ( pos Jy{

)

instantiates

y

x

)

-» x is a type)

do not suppose that all types of events have

I

instances.

Also,

I

do not suppose that among event types

that do have instances, their instances all occur;

I

am

prepared to allow that there are some types none of whose
instances in fact have occurred or ever will occur.
Furthermore,

I

do not assume that events instantiate their

types essentially

— if

an event happens in fact to be an

instance of a given type,

do not take it to follow from

I

this that wherever it exists (nor even wherever it occurs)
it

instantiates that type.

Thus

I

do not accept any of the

following (here and in what follows,

use T-variables to

I

range exclusively over event types):

(11)

nec VT( pos fe( e instantiates T

(12)

nec VbVT( e instantiates T
will occur )

(13)

nec VeVT( e instantiates T -» nec( e exists -»
T )
i nstant i ates
)

—»

))

e has occurred or

e

,

Noetic Event Types

9.2.5
I

assume that among all the various types of event,

some are types of noetic event.

I’m afraid that again

I

cannot offer any useful set of necessary and sufficient

conditions for what

I

"noetic event types".

shall mean when
I

I

speak here of

assume that noetic event types can

only be instantiated by noetic events:
358

(

)

(

A1 8

nec VT( T is a noetic event type —» nec
Ve( e
instantiates T -> e is a noetic event
))

)

also suppose that among the things that

I

I

would count as

event types at all, any that are instantiable and
can only
be instantiated by noetic events are noetic
event types:
(

A

1

nec VT
pos Jy( y instantiates T
y’
& nec Vy
instantiates T -» y’ is a noetic event ))
T is
a noetic event type

9

(

)

’

(

)

But informative, necessary and jointly sufficient conditions

elude me.

The problem is that on the conception of types to

be proposed below,

there are many event types that are not

possibly instantiated that
types of noetic event.

I

would not wish to count as

So the condition expressed in the

consequent of (A18) is not sufficient.

On the other hand

I

do not wish to rule out that there are noetic event types

that are themselves uni nstanti able

.

Consequently, the

condition expressed in the antecedent of (A19) is not
necessary.

I

can offer some examples of instantiable noetic

event types, and

I

shall have to hope that this serves to

convey the idea.
I

assume that among noetic events, some are events of

persons occurrently believing that politicians lie and
cheat, some are events of persons imperatively wishing that

Sarah would say "yes" (for some given Sarah), and others are

events of persons wondering whether Jones will arrive on
time (for some given Jones).

And
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I

assume that in each of

these cases, the noetic events of which we
speak instantiate
a noetic event type:
there is, for example, a type

necessarily such that it is instantiated by all
and only

occurrent believings that politicians lie and cheat,
of

type

a

imperative wishings, necessarily such that it is

instantiated by all and only imperative wishings that Sarah
would say "yes", and so on.
i

In each of these cases,

nstant able noetic event type is in question:
i

an

a type of

event that is possibly instantiated and is necessarily such
that,

for some thought,

x,

any events instantiating that

type are events of persons 9en thinking

x.

Let us say that an event type is a "^correlate" of a

thought, according to the following:

(

D1 4

correlate of x =df T is a noetic event
nec Ve( e instantiates T iff
n
thinking x] characterizes e ))
iy( )z[y is 9

T

)

is a

type

Roughly, a

&

correlate of a thought,

x,

is a noetic event

type necessarily such that all and only events instantiating
it are events of persons 9en thinking x.
I

assume that there are noetic event types and thoughts

related in this way.

Take for example, a type suggested

above--one necessarily such that it is instantiated by
exactly those events of persons occurrently believing that

politicians lie and cheat.
event type is a

I

take it that any such noetic

correlate of the thought, call it

that politicians lie and cheat.
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T

p

-|

c

Relative to any possible

>

)

f

)

situation, any instance of such a type will be an event

satisfying the following (for 'e’):
iy(

I

is a

)z[y is 9en th inking T
plc ] characterizes e

)

do not assume that for every noetic event type there

thought of which it is

a *cor rel ate

of types to be proposed below,

I

On the conception

.

will not wish to rule out

that there are disjunctive event types,

instantiated as well

by events of 9en thinking x and by events of 9en thinking y,

for distinct thoughts,

types, then

I

x

and y.

would be inclined to hold that some of them

are noetic event types.

noetic event type,

T,

event instantiates

T

of any thought.

So

But we couldn’t say, of any such

that there is any thought such that an
i

thinking that thought.
I

f

the event is one of a person’s

shall not assume

)

I

there is a

(

A20

correlate

Then such a type is not a

nec VT ( T is a noetic event type
correl ate of x

(14)

However,

If we must admit such

fx(

T

is a

)

do propose to assume that for every thought,
$

correlate:

nec Vx(
of x

x

is a thought -»

(

T

is a

^correlate

)

This is a very substantial assumption, and the conception of

thoughts that

I

shall

be laying out in the next sections

hinges on it.
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y

.

y

1

.

Actually, on the conception of types to be proposed
below,

it

is not

plausible to suppose that every thought has

some unique type ^correlated with it.

However,

have not

I

been able to envision any case concerning which it would be

intuitively plausible to say that there are several thoughts
sharing a

correlate, apart, perhaps, from vacuous cases

where the type is uni nstanti abl e

1

If there were any non-

vacuous cases, they would be ones in which some single
noetic event type (that can be instantiated) is necessarily
such that it is instantiated by all and on!

thinking

x,

and at the same time necessarily such that it is

instantiated by all and onl
and

y

events of

events of thinking

are distinct thoughts.

y,

where

x

Then there would have to be

two thoughts such that all events of thinking the one were

events of thinking the other and vice-versa
that this is impossible.

But

I

.

I

do not say

have not been able to

imagine such a case.
With the foregoing concepts and assumptions addressed,
let us turn to the matter of which category of entities it

thoughts are supposed to comprise, according to the

is that

alternative to the Propositional Tradition that

I

wish to

consider

9.2.6

A General

Category for Thoughts

According to the alternative

I

things we refer to when we speak of

wish to consider, the

thoughts

in the

shareable sense of that term just are noetic event types.
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)

.

In particular,
$

every thought is identical to one of its

correl ates
Let us say that a person is an "instancer" of a type of

event, according to:

(

D15

is an instancer of T
instance of T

x

)

=df

An instancer of an event type, then,

x

is engaging

in an

is a subject of an

occurring event that instantiates that type.

It may be

noted that if a noetic event type is *correl ated with a
thought, a person will be an instancer of that type iff he
or she is 9en thinking that thought: 12

VxVT( T is

(15)

instancer of

x -> nec Vy(
9en
is
thinking x )

correlated with
iff y

T

y

is an

Let us adopt:

(D16)

x
T

is an instancer
of T
=df x
*
correlated with y
Jy( T is

is an

&

instancer of

)

The relation defined here is just the "instancer" relation

with its range restricted to types that are *cor rel ates
light of (15),

In

.

it can be seen that this relation and the

attitude of 9en thinking require one another (the notion of

requirement is defined in (D6), Chapter
(16)

i)

ii)

nec VxVy nec(
9en thinking y*

is an

x

instancer

)), and
9en thinking

nec VxVy nec( x is
of y
i nstancer
’

)
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4,

p.30):

of
y

y

-> }y

-» Jy
’

(

x

’

(

x

is an

is

)

.

Indeed the two relations are more closely
linked than this.
Necessarily, any two persons are 9en thinking
something in
common iff they are both instancer*s of a
common "correlate
nec Vx Vy ( iz{ x and y are gen thinking
x and y are instancer s of z

(17)

z

)

iff

)

There is then a close connection between these two
rel ations
A

parallel closeness exists between the attitude of

occurrent belief and the relation, let us call it "R",
def ned
i

R(x,y)

=df

x

is occurrently believing something
with content y

Then the following expresses a truth:
(18)

nec VxVy (
z

)

iff

lz{ x and y are occurrently believing
lz{ R ( x z ) and R(y,z) ))
,

It was upon having noted this equivalence in the case of

belief, that the R*SS*LL in my fable from the preceding

section was led to make what

I

called "R*SS*LL’s step", that

led him and his followers to equate the things "judged" with

the items in the modal

range of R.

The step may be seen as

that of moving from what is formulated in (18) to the

stronger thesis expressed by:
(19)

nec

V)<Vy(

x

is

occurrently believing

364

y

iff R(x,y)

)

A similar move

is made on the alternative view of

thoughts we are about to consider.

But on this view,

thoughts generally (and things occurrently believe,
particular) are not equated with contents.

in

Rather, the view

holds that there is a distinguished subset of - correl ates
such that, with their modal ranges restricted to that
subset, the instancer relation is equivalent to gen thinking.
The step made on this view, then,

is that from the thesis

formulated in (17), to the stronger claim, that there is

a

distinguished subset of ^correlates, each member of which
satisfies (for 'x’):
nec Vy( y is an instancer of
gen thinking x

(20)

x

iff y is

)

Then what you’re gen thinking

.just

is one of these

distinguished ^correlates of which you are an instancer.
That, at any rate,

is a

consequence of the view we are about

to consider.

There are, however, many noetic event types that are
not counted as thoughts, according to the view
And

propose.

suggested above that on the development of the view

I

am about to undertake,

it will

one can be identified with the thought.

section,
I

I

account,

I

.

Plainly only

In the following

propose to provide a somewhat fuller account of

mean by "type of event".

Then, within this fuller

wish to give a more precise specification of
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I

be plausible to think that

for each thought, there are many *correl ates

what

I

certain classes of noetic event types that
thoughts.

In section 9.4,

I

take to be

I

shall turn to the task of

explaining what motivation there is for at least considering
the unorthodox proposal that such things are thoughts.

9

•

3

Some Details of the New Proposal

9-3.1

A

Review of Where Things Stand

For convenience,
"WN"

for the modal

let me use the labels,

"OB",

ranges of occurrent belief,

wishing and occurrent wondering, respectively.

"IW" and

imperative
So OB

contains all and only occurrent beliefs, IW contains all and
only imperative wishes (wishes in the modal range of

imperative wishing) and WN includes all and only questions.
We have seen that if the considerations raised in Chapter

8

are accepted, then things other than propositions must be

identified as the items making up IW and WN

.

Let me briefly

discuss a couple of ways that this can be accomplished, but
that

I

i)

do not consider attractive.

We could retain one of the standard conceptions of

propositions as an account of the nature of occurrent
beliefs

— taking

them to be, say, sets of worlds, or

Russellian complexes, and suppose that imperative wishes and

questions fall under some other genus of thing (or perhaps
under separate genera).
But this is not intuitively appealing.

Better to have

new accounts for proposi ti ons/occurrent beliefs as well;
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,

accounts according to which there is some
category that can
be seen to subsume all of OB, IW and WN
(some genus a little
narrower though, than say, that of entities or
exi stents
a
genus including all but only thoughts).
.

ii)

Since the items in each of OB, IW and WN are

distinguished from the members of either of the other
two
sets according to the attitudes one may bear to them,
we

could artificially concoct a species of thing that would
at
least serve to represent each of these species of thoughts.
For example, we could use the three attitudes themselves as

tags or indices, taking thoughts to be ordered pairs of

attitude and content, where the content is understood to be
a thing of the sort that the standard view equates with

propositions.

So,

for example,

if we took

contents to be

sets of worlds, we would have it that thoughts could be

represented by pairs of attitude and set of worlds, the

attitude in a given pair serving as an index marking what
species of thought the represented thought belongs to.

In

particular, we could have the following sorts of pairs, all
with sets of worlds as their second members:
a. proposi t ons/occur rent beliefs represented by pairs,
each with the attitude of occurrent belief as first
member
i

imperative wishes represented by pairs, each having
as its first member the attitude of imperative wishing,
b.

questions represented by pairs, each with the
attitude of occurrent wondering as its first member.
c.
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a

n

But this representation is not very natural.

Having

such a concocted variety of object serving to represent

thoughts, we will not be in much of a position to predict
any further features that thoughts have by appeal to any

features that the representati ves are known to have.
Noetic event types,

I

believe, are items that display

the very features that we would be seeking to represent by

employing the artificial representat on afforded by taking
i

thoughts to be ordered pairs of attitude and content.

I

assume that types of occurrent believings, wishings, and

wonderings make up pairwise disjoint groups.

So we have,

effect, a distinction according to attitude.

And within any

of these groups,

in

say among types of wishings, types will be

further distinguished from one another according to content:

wishing that Jones would arrive on time is one type of
wishing, wishing that Sarah would say "yes" is another type.
The two types are distinguished by what circumstance it is

that is being wished to be the case when events of either
one or the other type occur.

In effect,

then, we have a

distinction according to content.
The account to follow is restricted to the case of

occurrent beliefs (members of OB), imperative wishes
(members of IW), and questions (members of WN

)

,

and it will

not be a complete account even for the thoughts in these

select groups.

No informative set of necessary and jointly

sufficient conditions will be provided for a thing
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s be i

—

g

.

thought

,

nor even for a thing’s being an occurrent belief,

imperative wish or question.

But

I

think the account to be

offered covers enough cases that it will serve to illustrate
the leading ideas of the approach.
I

9.3.2

shall

begin by explaining what

I

take types to be.

T ypes

The concept of type that

I

intend when

I

propose that

there are types of noetic event, and that thoughts are such
things,

is a familiar one.

We commonly speak of types of

dances, types of tigers, types of people, and

I

assume that

there is a single concept of type involved in such talk.
do not claim that it is a thoroughly clear notion.
I

I

And what

wish to do presently is suggest a somewhat regimented

conception that one gets by adopting a certain account of
the nature of types.

It may be that some other way of

accounting for our ordinary notion of type would be

philosophically preferable.

But

I

would hope that any

acceptable account would serve our purposes here well
enough, though

I

can’t be sure of this.

The conception

afforded by the following account does serve our purposes
wel

1

enough
I

take types to be properties.

we speak of types of cns

,

More specifically, when

for common noun,

dances, types of tigers, types of people),

cn (types of
I

am supposing

that we are speaking of properties of a sort to be had by
cns (of a sort to be had by dances,
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tigers, people), and

that the relation of instantiation that

I

have taken as a

primitive is just the relation of exemplification
(restricted to those properties that are types).
The contention from the previous section
was that

thoughts are certain types of noetic event.
types

I

On the view of

am now suggesting, this contention amounts
to the

claim that thoughts are certain properties of noetic
events.
Before proceeding to give an idea of which properties
I

count as thoughts,
way,

about what

let me say a little more,

in a general

am not going to be assuming, given this

I

conception of types as properties.
I

tigers,

don’t suppose that just any property had, say, by
is a type of tiger.

For example,

presumably no

property, T, should count as a type of tiger if it is

possibly exemplified but also such that for any

exemplifies

it,

In general,

then,

(21)

necessarily
I

x

x

that

and x alone exemplifies it.

think it would be plausible to suppose

nec VP( P is a type
pos Jy ( y has P & y

nec Vx( x has P -»
i

x

)))

We may wish to grant that there are types that are possibly
or perhaps are in fact uniquely instantiated, but if a

property is to count as a type it should be possible that
more than one thing instantiate

it.

Some properties are

distinguished from others by the fact that they are possibly
exemplified.

But

instantiated, so

I

I

have not assumed that types are possibly
shall not assume
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)

(

22

nec VP( P is a type -» pos fx(

)

x

has P

))

Some properties are such that anything that has them has

them essentially, but

have proposed not to assume that

I

types of events are essentially instantiated by the events
that in fact instantiate them.

Finally, then,

I

am not

going to assume:
nec

(23)

VPV6<

x

9.3.3

P

(

has P

is a type

&

x

has P -» nec( x exists

)

Attributing, Prescribing and Querying
will focus attention on a certain group of occurrent

I

believings,

imperative wishings, and wonderings, and some of

their properties.

But to get at which occurrent believings,

imperative wishings, and wonderings will be at issue, and
which of their properties

I

wish to attend to,

I

am going to

begin by confining attention to the case of occurrent
belief.

assume that there are noetic events each of which may

I

be said to be one of a person’s attributing a property to an
In ordinary

object.

language we count events of a very wide

variety as attr buti ngs
i

;

acts of asserting,

may properly be said to be attr i but ngs
i

events,

I

claim, any event of attributing
These,

believing.

which

I

in turn,

mean to attend.

believings

.

I

A

in particular,

But among noetic
i_s

an occurrent

are the occurrent believings to

paradigm case of the occurrent

have in mind are ones that might be termed,
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:

"directly referential" occurrent believings or attr i buti
ngs

noetic events correctly reported by ascriptions of the form
(FI)

t

is thinking:

where substituends of

t* is 0

t*
'

’

are directly referential terms,

and the displayed sentences express things that are true or

false

(

wrt the appropriate context).

sort of events another way:

Or to get at the same

the events in question are ones

such that in virtue of their occurrence, the subjects of the

events may be said to be having occurrent beliefs accurately

expressed by sentences of the form:

(

F2

t* is 0

)

where again, substituends of

t*
*

’

are directly referential

terms, and the instances express things that are true or

false (wrt an appropriate context).

Concerning such cases,

the assumption is that the occurrent believing

attributing of a property to an object:

j_s

an

the property

attributed is the one expressed by the relevant substituend
of

'is 0

and the item to which this property is being

'
,

attributed is the thing denoted by the relevant substituend
of

*t*’.

I

think the sort of events at issue could be

broadened by including as well any occurrent believing that
could be viewed as an attributing of a property to se vera

l

things, or as an attributing of a relation to objects in a

sequence

.

However,

I

shall confine attention here to cases

of attributing properties to single objects.
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As an example, consider an event that we
might report
by saying "O’Brien is thinking:

Jones will arrive on time."

This event of occurrent believing, on the present

assumption,

is an event of

O’Brien’s attributing the

property of arriving on time to Jones.
thinking:

If William is

You will not say "yes”, meaning Sarah by 'you’,

then the present view has William engaged in an event of
his

attributing
"yes"

— to
I

a

property

— being

an x such that x will

not say

Sarah.

take the property attributed to be the ob.iect of the

event of attributing, and

I

shall speak of the thing to

which the property is attributed as the
the event.

"

indirect object " of

Since, on the present proposal, occurrent

believings just are (a certain subset of attr buti ngs
i

)

and

occurrent believings are events of gen thinking, we have the
result that events of gen thinking may have objects and

indirect objects.
property;

But the object of such a thinking is a
not be an item of the sort ordinarily

it will

intended by the philosophical usage of 'object of thought’.

That’s why

I

proposed not to use "object of thought” as a

technical term for thoughts here.

The usage encourages the

idea that thoughts are being taken to be objects of
th i nk i ngs

Now

,

I

which

I

believe is in general false.

propose to do in the case of imperative wishings

and wonderings, what

occurrent believings.

I

have done above in the case of
I

shall assume that certain
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imperative wishings are events of a person’s
bearing

particular relation to a property,

P,

a

and some item, x,

in

virtue of bearing which relation, the person may
be said to
be imperatively wishing that x have P.
Similarly for
wonderings:

I

assume that certain wonderings may be said to

be events of a persons bearing a particular relation
to a

property,

P,

and some item, x,

in virtue of bearing which

relation, the person may be said to be wondering whether
has P.

So far as

I

know,

there are no verbs in English

expressing the relations that
acknowledge

— no

I

am proposing that we

verbs that (so to speak) are to either

’wishes’ or 'wonders’ as 'attributes’

believes’.

But

x

I

is to

'occurrently

assume that there are such relations;

I

propose to use the following locutions to express them:

I

x

prescribes

x

queries

P for y

P of

y

am assuming then that there are imperative wishings

that are prescribings of properties for things, and that

there are wonderings that are queryings of properties of
things.

I

shall suppose that prescribings and queryings may

be said to have objects and indirect objects in exactly the

same sense that attributings may be said to.
an event of prescribing (querying)

The object of

is the property

prescribed (queried) and the indirect object of
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a

prescribing (querying) is the thing to which the object

is

prescribed (queried).
9.3.4

Some Formalities
shall suppose that being an attributing

I

prescr

i

events.

bi ng

being a

,

and being a querying are properties of noetic

,

And

shall suppose that for any property,

I

any sort of item,

noetic events:

P,

and

the following are also properties of

x,

being an event having P as its object and

being an event having

as its indirect object

x

such properties in formulations to come,

I

To express

.

propose to use

the following predicates:

a.

'ATTRIBe’ for 'e is an attributing’

b.

’PRESCRBe’ for 'e is a prescribing’

c.

'QUERYe’

d.

'OBJ(e,P)’ for 'P is the object of

e.

'

i

ndOBJ e
(

for 'e is a querying’

for 'x is the indirect object of

)
,

x

e’

’

e’

Then we may employ ^-expressions of the following forms;

I

shall take them to be terms designating the properties of

noetic events cited above:

a.

)e[ ATTRIBe

d.

)e[ OBJ (e 0 )
,

],

],

where substituends of

b.

)e[

PRESCRBe

e.

)e[

indOBJ(e,t)

'

0'

c.

],

)e[ QUERYe

],

].

are singular terms for properties,

and substituends for 't’ are any singular terms.
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p

)

:

.

assume that there are conjunctive properties
uniquely

I

related to other properties— thei
of conjunction,

and

]

,

.

.

.

,^v[0n ]

)v[ 0
y

Also,

I

a relation

if the )-expressi ons

shall suppose that

...

&

0n

&

denotes the conjunction of
Then,

conjuncts— by

denote the properties, P

,

respectively, then

[

r

assume that any bunch of properties

I

has a unique conjunction.
^v [#1

,

]

]

P.

P

for any property,

P and object,

x,

there is a

unique conjunction of the following three properties:
)te

[

ATTRIBe

^e[ OBJ(e,P)

],

Likewise, for any property,

P,

^e[

],

indOBJ(e,x)

]

and object, x, there is a

unique conjunction of each of the following two trios of
properti es

PRESCRBe

i)

)te[

ii)

^e[ QUERYe ],

I

],

^e[ OBJ(e,P)

^e[ OBJ(e,P)

],

],

^e[

^e[

indOBJ(e,x)

indOBJ(e,x)

]

]

assume that the three conjunctive properties of events at

issue here are noetic event types.

Then we may put the

following as existence axioms:
a

VPVxJ\T( T
i ndOBJ
e x
(

b.
i

c
i

,

)e[ ATTRIBe

=
]

)

VPVx^!T( T
ndOBJ e x

=

)e[

]

)

VPVxi'.K T
ndOBJ e x

=

\e[ QUERYe

]

)

(

(

,

,

&

PRESCRBe
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&

OBJ ( e P
,

&

)

&

OBJ ( e P )
,

OBJ e P )
(

,

&

&

9.3.5

The Proposal

According to the account

obtained directly from (A21)

I

a.

am proposing, any type
-

c.

is a thought.

particular, the thoughts obtained from
given P and

x,

a.

-

c.,

In

for any

are (respectively) an occurrent belief

(member of OB), an imperative wish (member of WS) and a

question (member of WN

)

Thus, the account proposes the

.

following as sufficient conditions for being an occurrent
belief, an imperative wish, or a question:

Thesis 4
a.

nec VPVxVT
if T =

then
b.

c.

T

^e [ ATTRIBe & OBJ(e,P)
is an occurrent belief;

&

indOBJ(e.x)

if T = )<e[ PRESCRBe & OBJ(e,P) & indOBJ(e,x)
then T is an imperative wish, and
if T = )te[ QUERYe & OB J e P
& indOBJ(e,x) ]
then T is a question.
(

,

),

]

)

),

]

),

Intuitively, the thoughts identified in each clause, for
given P and

x,

are the occurrent belief that

imperative wish that
has P,

x

respectively.

have
If

I

P,

x

has P, the

and the question whether

x

am occurrently believing that

Sarah is saying "yes", and William is occurrently believing

this too, then William and

I

have a thought in common.

According to the present account, this is equivalent to
saying that there is
and
a

I

are instancers.

a

noetic event type of which both you
And indeed we are both instancers of

common type in these circumstances:

we are both

attributing the property of saying "yes", and we are both
attributing that property to Sarah.
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Hence we are both

instancers of the type:
\e[ ATTRIBe
i

&

ndOBJ e Sarah
(

,

OBJ(e,\x[
)

x

is saying

"yes"

])

&

]

According to the present account, this noetic event type
ju st

i_s

a

thought that we have in common.

The starting question of the present study may be put

various ways:

in

What sort of things are we referring to

when we speak of what a person is thinking?
item is it that comprises the modal

What sort of

range of the relation

expressed on their relational reading, by progressive forms
'think’?

of

What are the "objects" of thinking?

The answer

that is proposed above--that the things in question are

types of events of thinking--is certainly unorthodox.

But

the proposal finds some support in the case of other verbs.
The fact is that there are other event verbs that admit

complements that are plausibly understood as designating
types of events of the very sorts to which those verbs
apply.

9

.

4

Precedent for Types as "Objects" of Event Verbs
Cases Where Complements do not Apply to Constituents

9.4.1
I

believe that there are many examples of event verbs

in English each of which,

V,

with the following property:
of which,

0

,

is such that i)

has a relational

reading,

r,

there are sentences each one

0 has
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V as

its main verb and a

referring term (or a quantifier phrase),
of V,
r,

if

and ii) on any of the

0 expresses

reading of
i

t

a truth,

i

t,

as a complement

nterpretations of 0 involving

it reports an event,

but iii) a

involved in at least some of these

nterpretat ons of 0
i

,

is one on

which the term is not

plausibly seen as designating (or ranging over) constituents
of events reported by 0 on those interpretations.

This is a

complicated relationship; so let me try to convey the idea
by way of some examples.

The verb 'dance’
to before.

is a case

in point that

I

have alluded

The verb has a transitive reading displayed in

the following sentence:

Jones is dancing a tango.

(24)

Let us suppose that there is presently an event occurring

that is reported by this sentence, that the Jones denoted
by the subject term is actually dancing a tango.

The

complement of (24) does not range over any objects of the
event reported by the sentence.

The event reported by (24)

is a particular instance of dancing on Jones’

part.

The

event has no constituent in the role of object; at least
that is what

I

am inclined to say about such an event.

If

what I’m inclined to say here is right, then whatever items
are in the range of the quantifier phrase 'a tango’ are not

objects of that event.
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Similar remarks apply to the reading of the verb 'run’
called for by its occurrence in

William ran the 60th Boston Marathon.

(25)

Again, a reading is called for on which available

example of

— the complement appearing here in
many — do not refer to constituents

reported.

As in the case of dancings of tangos,

complements

(25)

is one

of the events

I’m

inclined to say that instances of running the 60th Boston

Marathon are not events that have constituents in the role
of object.

But in any case, surely 'the 60th Boston

Marathon’ denotes no such constituent of these events.
The two cases just considered are instances of a

phenomenon that is very common

— it

is not

restricted to

verbs that apply just to events lacking object constituents.
The verbs,

'hit’

and 'serve’,

for instance,

both have

readings that afford further examples, though the events we
refer to when we speak of "hittings" and "servings",
intuitively,

relevant sense, are events that do,

in the

involve

constituents in the role of object.
Here is a such a case; consider:
(26a)

Sarah served an ace.

Assume that this sentence reports an event, and suppose that
the reported event has taken place in a tennis match.

fairly complex bit of

assume that the event in question is

a

activity involving Sarah’s hitting

tennis ball
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a

I

in such a

way that it clears the net, hits the appropriate portion
of
the court on the side opposite Sarah, and is not returned
by

Sarah’s opponent.
The intuitive notion of a thing’s being a constituent
of an event does not apply clearly in all cases,

and the

present example is one case where the application of this

concept is certainly not clear.

What things should be said

to be constituents of services in a tennis match?

I

it is clear enough that such events have subjects

— the

persons responsible for the activity, the servers.

constituent of the event in question.

is one

character zati on of the role of object
i

1

I

think

So Sarah

On the loose

offered in Chapter

--consti tuents that bear "the brunt" of the activity of

which the event consists--it would seem plausible enough to
say that the tennis ball that Sarah served was an object of
But perhaps there are other

her service reported by (26a).

items that should be counted as constituents of services,

other constituents in the role of object.
At any rate,

it does seem clear that events of serving

themse ves should not be said to be constituents of events
1

of serving.

But the complement in (26a),

over just such events.

'an ace’,

ranges

The ace Sarah served is precisely

the event reported by (26a).

So there is a reading of the

verb 'serve’ on which it takes a complement not designating
(or ranging over) constituents of the events reported by

sentences calling for that reading.
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It is worth contrasting the reading of

'serve’

called

for by (26a) with that called for by
(26b)

Sarah served that tennis ball
purple.

I

spray-painted

Here, the reading called for is one on which it would
be

plausible to say that the verb takes

a

complement

designating a constituent of the event reported.
And

suppose that remarks parallel to those just made

I

concerning the readings of 'serve’ as it figures in (26a)
and b) apply concerning the readings of 'hit’ that are most

plausible for the following pair:
(27a)

Sarah hit a line-drive

(27b)

Sarah hit a baseball.

In

the verb calls for a reading on which it expresses

(27b),

a relation between persons and constituents of hittings;

(27a),

in

the reading called for is one on which 'hit’

expresses

relation between persons and things that are not

a

constituents of hittings.
In sum,

there seems to me to be a general pattern

displayed by certain event verbs on certain of their
readings:

on those readings,

the verbs take complements

that do not designate (or range over) constituents of the

events reported by sentences formed from those verbs.

Within the wide variety of cases conforming to this
general pattern, there are many cases where,
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it seems to me,

the complements of the event verbs are
plausibly seen as

designating types of the reported events.
common this particular phenomenon is,

To see just how

let me begin by noting

certain ambiguity attaching to complements of
a sort
commonly associated with the general pattern noted
a

above.

9

-

4

-

An Ambiguity Attaching to Verbal Nouns

2
I

wish to draw attention to a class of common nouns

having the following features:

each noun,

from some event or action verb,

V,

some singular term,

t,

cn,

is

i)

derived

and is such that ii) for

and action or event verb V’

(perhaps

not V itself), the sentence,

[tv’
is grammatical

and,

cns

]

moreover, expresses a claim that is

possibly true (where cns is the plural of cn)

.

I

shall

refer to such terms as "verbal nouns"; the following are

examples:

'a hit’,

'a hike’,

'a shot’,

feeling’,

'a sight’,

'a serve’,

'a run’,

'an experience’,
'a drink’.

used to refer to events;

'a

'a

dance’,

'a punch’,

sensation’,

'a

Often such nouns may be

but there are exceptions.

It is

not clear to me, for example, that 'a drink’ has a reading
on which it applies to events.

has no reading (that

I

The common noun 'a sight’

know of) on which it applies,

in

general, to events.

With most any verbal noun,

vn

,

there is associated a

host of related nouns that apply to species of the sort of
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)

:

things to which vn itself applies;
generally, any noun,

n,

have in mind,

I

such that the following expresses
a

truth

nec( any n is a(n)

[

vn

)

]

Each of the following nouns is related in this way
to a

verbal noun:
'home run’

'swing’,

punch

).

'lob’,

'top-spin’

(to 'hit’),

'waltz’

'ace’,

(to 'shot’),

'line drive’,

'double-fault’

(to 'serve’),

(to 'dance’),

'left-hook’

'right jab’

(to

for example, we have (on appropriate

So,

read ngs
i

nec(

any lob is a shot

nec(

any line-drive is a hit

),

nec( any ace is a serve

),

),

nec(

any waltz is a dance

nec(

any left hook is a punch

),
),

etc.

Let us say that if a noun has a reading on which it is thus

related to a verbal noun,
on that reading.

it is a subordinate of that noun,

A verbal

subordinate of itself.

noun,

it may be noted,

is a

It may also be noted that some of

the examples of subordinates just given are themselves

verbal nouns; one can lob a lob, and waltz a waltz.

(Although in these cases one hesitates to say that the noun
is

in any sense derived from the verb.)

There is

a

certain ambiguity attaching to verbal nouns

and their subordinates.

To discuss the ambiguity,
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I

propose

.

to confine attention to such nouns,

and their subordinates,

that have readings on which they stand for events.

Let us

say that a common noun is an event noun just in case it is a

subordinate of some verbal noun,
on that reading,
of verbal

cn,

on a reading such that,

cn applies to events.

Most of the examples

nouns and their subordinates that have been

considered as examples above are event nouns (though, as
noted,

'sight’

and perhaps 'drink’

The ambiguity
of readings:
as

I

I

are exceptions).

wish to point out hinges on two sorts

the "concrete readings" and "type readings",

shall call them.

Briefly, concrete readings of event

nouns are those on which the nouns apply to events--to

particular instances of activity.

On their type readings,

such nouns apply to types of event.

I

am inclined to

believe that readings of both sorts attach to any event
noun

1

3

Take the case of the noun 'lob’.

Singular terms formed

with this noun may be used to refer to particular events of
a sort that occur

in tennis matches,

typically when a player

is returning a shot the opponent has made from the net.

Consider,
"That lob was impossible to return."

With such a remark, we may well be speaking of a particular

event of lobbing
'lob’

a ball.

Then we are using the common noun,

on its concrete reading.
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Note that on this concrete

reading, we cannot say that two persons have the same lob.
In fact,

on its concrete reading we wouldn’t speak of a

person having a lob at all.
But there is a reading of the noun 'lob’ on which it

correct to speak of

a

i_s

person having a lob, and to speak of

several persons having the same lob--a "shareable" reading,
so to speak, of the noun.

terrific lob,

"Old Hale" we might say,

"had a

incredible amount of spin and always

it had an

went to the far left-hand corner of his opponent’s court.
He could hit it from just about anywhere.

ground and take off like a bullet."

It would touch

Here we are not

speaking of any particular instance of lobbing; we are
referring to

a

type of lob that Old Hale had down pat.

we say "That lob was impossible to return",

When

if we are

speaking of the lob old Hale used to pull off, we are using
the noun 'lob’ on what

I

am calling its "type reading".

In a large number of cases,

event nouns apply, on their

concrete readings, to events that are instances of the very
types to which those nouns apply, on their type readings.
Let me use subscripted prefixes to mark the concrete and

type readings ("c" and "t", respectively).

Then

That lob was a perfect example of that lob
and

That punch was a perfect example of that punch
may be disambiguated as follows (and only as follows,

if the

sentences are to be understood to express claims that are
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:

possi bl

y

true

)

Th a t c lob was a perfect example of that
t lob.

That c punch was a perfect example of that

t punch.

If the claims expressed by these sentences are indeed true,

then in each case, the denotation of the first occurrence of
the noun phrase, with the c-prefix,

is an

instance of the

denotation of the second occurrence of that noun phrase,
with the t-prefix.

Though this relationship between the concrete and type
readings of event nouns holds in many cases, there are

exceptions:

'dance’

has a concrete reading, but on that

reading it does not stand for items that are instances of
the types for which it stands on its type reading (at least

not on its most familiar type reading).

The

c dance

we went

to last night is not an example of the twist, the boogaloo,

the quickstep or any other ^dance.

Some event nouns have more than one concrete reading
each.
run’

The noun,

'run’

On one reading,

is an example.

'a

stands for a particular instance of a person (or

persons) running, as in

(28)

Laurie and I went on a run last night, and didn’t
get back till after dark.

But 'run’ also has a reading, distinct,

I

believe, from the

one called for in (28), which is akin to the concrete

reading of 'dance’ discussed above.
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On this other reading,

'a run’

applies to foot-races, to gatherings for the
purpose

of foot-racing.

In one sense,

then,

of one or more persons running;

in

'run’

applies to events

another sense, it applies

to events that we might say include a bunch of
runnings,

may well

but

include a lot of other instances of activity, such

as an official

signaling the runners to their mark,

s

another official

recording the time of each run (in the

’s

first concrete sense), etc.
I

think it is very clear that event nouns, generally,

have readings distinct from their concrete readings, those

that

I

have here been speaking of as the type readings of

the nouns.

And

I

think it plausible at least that, as

I

have proposed, the items to which event nouns apply on these
type readings are types of event (in this connection see

Carlson [1977]).

A more

thorough-going account of the

nature of events, and of types, before this proposal can be

carefully assessed.

Nevertheless, we do have a rough,

familiar conception of types of event, just as we have
rough,

a

familiar conception of types of tiger, and it seems

to me plausible to hold that Old Hale’s lob
(of c 1ob,

I

j_s

a type of

lob

assume), on this rough, familiar conception.

And it seems to me that similar things could plausibly be

said about the items to which other event nouns apply on

their type readings.

It seems not unreasonable to accept

this as a place to start, and then seek a precise account of
the nature of types that accommodates this beginning
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,

assumption.

Ordinary parlance might also allow that
Old

Hale’s lob is

way of lobbing, a manner of lobbing, a
style

a

or sort or kind of lob (of
c lob,
it,

assume).

I

But as

I

see

these are all ways of speaking of the same sort
of

thing:

9-4.3

of types of event.

Type-Matching Readings
Next

I

event verbs;

wish to draw attention to a class of readings of
I

shall

refer to them as "type-matching

readings", according to:
(D17)

r

is a type-matching reading
=df
i)
r is a relational reading of an event

(or action) verb,

V;

expresses a relation on r whose modal
range includes event types, and
iii) if a sentence formed from V with a
referential complement denoting one of
those event types, T, is true on an
interpretation involving r, then that
sentence, on that nterpretati on
reports an instance of T.
ii)

V

i

Again, the idea is somewhat involved so

I

shall try to

convey the sort of readings in question by way of examples.
I

believe there are a large number of event verbs in English

that admit type-matching readings.

Most of the verbs used in examples above--that take
their own verbal nouns and subordinates as complements

cases in point.
hits,

We commonly speak,

— are

for example, of hitting

dancing dances, serving serves, shooting shots, and

such like.

Though the sentences,

danced a dance",

"he hit a hit",

"she

"he served a serve"--sentences in which a
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,

verb is complemented by its own verbal noun— are certainly
not commonly uttered,

I

take them to be grammatically

acceptable and to express things that are at least possibly
true.

Sentences formed from these verbs together with

subordinates of their verbal nouns certainly are
commonplace, plainly are grammatical, and these sentences,
in many cases,

possibly true.

definitely express things that are at least
The following are examples:

(29)

Jones served an ace.

(30)

Sarah hit an incredible
backspin serve.

(31

William and Sarah danced a waltz

)

1

oop

returning that

Jones shot a jumper from the line, right at the
buzzer

(32)

But if (29) - (32) express things that are possibly true,
and 'ace’,

'loop’,

and 'jumper’

'waltz’

readings, subordinates of 'serve’,
'shot’,

are,

'hit’,

on suitable

'dance’

and

respectively, then it follows that

(33)

Jones served a serve

(34)

Sarah hit a hit.

(35)

William and Sarah danced

(36)

Jones shot a shot.

a dance.

express things that are possibly true as well.
we wouldn’t be inclined to utter (33)
if we utter

(29) -

(32)

I

-

(36),

And even

if

nevertheless,

think it is correct to say that we

are speaking of a person serving a serve, of a person
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hitting a hit, of two people dancing

a dance,

and of a

person shooting shots.
Each of (29)

-

(36) may be so interpreted that their

complements are understood to range over types of the very
events that the sentences serve to report.
readings of the verbs involved in such

type-matching.

Indeed,

in all

cases

I

i

I

claim that the

nterpretati ons are

have been able to

think of in which an event verb figures as main verb of

a

sentence, and has a complement formed from an event noun

derived from it, or from
least one

i

a

subordinate of such

a noun,

at

nterpretati on of the sentence will be one

involving a type-matching reading of the main verb.
In many cases,

interpretations of such sentences are

available involving either the concrete or the type reading
of the complement.

So,

for example, suppose that the

following sentence expresses

a

truth and reports an event:

He hit that lob.

(37)

On its concrete reading,

'that lob’

denotes the event of

hitting reported.

But it may be interpreted according to

its type reading,

for it may be used to denote Old Hale’s

lob;

Old Hale’s lob being a

someone hits a

c

t

lob exemplified whenever

lob that has just the right touches to it.

Sometimes, either the concrete or the type reading is
favored.

Ordinarily, talk of hitting line drives does not

involve a type reading of 'line drive’.
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On the most natural

interpretation of the following, for example,
Ruth hit a line drive to center field.

(38)

’a

line drive’ would presumably be understood to apply
to

events of hitting.

But a type reading can be discerned.

if

Ruth had so refined his hitting of line drives that there
was a particular type that seemed worthy of note, one might
well

find such claims being made as that expressed by

There’s that line drive again, he hit it to left
field this time.

(39)

Here,

I

take it,

'that line drive’

denoting a type of line drive.

calls for a type reading,

It is not clear to me that

we must say in such cases that different readings of the

verb itself are involved.

It may be that the type-matching

reading of the verb may be accompanied by either the

concrete or the type reading of the complement.
Unlike the case of 'hit’,

'serve’

and 'shoot’, there

are some verbs with type-matching readings from which there
are no verbal nouns derived that apply to the sort of events

reported by sentences formed from those verbs:
(40)

She landed a right upper cut square on his jaw.

(41)

She planted a left in his midsection.

(42)

She pulled her right hook,
would have done him in.

Upper cuts,

luckily for him;

it

lefts and right hooks are not examples of the

things we refer to when we speak of landings, plants or
392

pulls.

Nevertheless,

in each of

(

40

)

-

(

42

),

the event

reported is one denoted by the complement
(or over which the
complement ranges).
So here as well, type-matching readings
of the main verbs are involved.

Not all event verbs from which event nouns are
derived
have type-matching readings.

Some serve to report events to

which the derived event noun applies, but do not admit

complements formed from those nouns or any of their
subordinates.

As we’ve just seen,

of planting punches,

it is acceptable to speak

landing punches, pulling punches; but

the following is anomalous:

*

She punched a left hook

If this sentence manages to express anything at all,

what it

expresses is at any rate not possibly true--left hooks
cannot be punched.

I

take it, then, that the verb,

does not have a type-matching reading.

'punch’,

Perhaps a rule of

thumb is that if a verb does not take complements formed
from its associated verbal noun or subordinates, the verb
does not have a type-matching reading.

I

do not claim that

it follows from the fact that a verb does not take such

complements, that it lacks a type-matching reading.
have not found any exceptions.

I

But

I

have also not been able to

think of any principled explanation of why it should be that
some event verbs accept complements formed from their verbal

nouns or subordinates, whereas other such verbs do not.
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’

If type-matching readings are in fact
displayed in the

cases discussed above, then by (D17), those
readings must be
relational ones.
This point may be questioned; but it
seems

prima-facie plausible to suppose that the readings
question are relational.
following pairs,
each

i

I

in

For example in each of the

take it that the complement position in

nter rogat i ve is bound by an existential quantifier

ranging over types

— and

that the complements of the

indicatives are genuine referring terms--ref err
ng to types:
i

Did he hit anything in the second set at all?
He hit Old Hale’s lob.

(43) a.
b.

Were they dancing anything familiar?
They were dancing the quickstep.

(44) a.
b.

Did she land anything in the first round?
She landed that bollo punch she’s been working on.

(45) a.
b.

I

do not see any grounds for denying that relational

readings of the main verbs are indeed involved here.
such readings are involved in these cases, then

I

that there are readings available for all of (29)

If

assume
-

(42)

above that are relational as well.
9.4.4

’Thinking’ and ’Dancing’.
Exper i ences

’Thoughts’ and

’

One source of motivation for the proposal

I

am about to

develop lies in the idea that the relation between the
verbal noun 'thought’, and the verb 'think’ from which it is

derived,

is analogous to that between the verbal

'dance’,

'hit’,

'shot’,

'experience’
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nouns

(etc.), and the event

.

verbs from which these are derived.
in each case,

According to this idea,

the nouns display a concrete/type
ambiguity,

and in each case, the idea would be, the
type reading

available for the noun may accompany the type-matching
reading available for the verb.

There are two parts to the idea.
is that the generic

First, the contention

relational reading of forms of the verb

'think’ just is a type-matching reading.
x

is

thinking

is

Thus,

y

assimilated to the case of
x

is dancing y

Both formulas are taken to be satisfied by pairs whose

second members are types of the very events reported by
true sentences obtained by substituting singular terms for
*x’

and

'

y
’

Both formulas are seen as expressing relations

between subjects of events of the sort in question (reported
by sentences that result from substitutions of the sort just

mentioned), and types of those very events.
then,

is that the verb,

The contention,

'think’, on its generic,

relational

reading expresses a relation between thinkers and types of

thinking

— types

of noetic event--that the modal

range of

generic thinking is comprised of noetic event types.
Second, the idea has it that the common noun 'thought’

functions in important respects like the common nouns,
'hit’,

'shot’,

'dance’

'experience’
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(etc.).

Like the latter

e

four,

'thought’

is ambiguous:

it has a concrete reading
on

which it applies to particular events of the
relevant sort,
but like the latter four, it has a type reading

on which it

applies to types of those events.

The contention is that

what we refer to when we use the term 'thought’

shareab

1

in

its

sense--the sense in which two persons may be said

to be having the same thought

— are

term applies on its type reading:

the things to which the
to types of thinking, to

types of noetic event.
I

wish to stress that

I

do not have arguments for these

contentions concerning the relational, generic reading of
the verb,

'think’

the verbal noun,

and concerning the "shareable" reading of

'thought’.

There are certainly some

notable similarities between our use of 'thought’, on its

shareable reading, and our use of certain other verbal
nouns, on what

I

have referred to as their type readings:

we speak of having the same thoughts;
of having the same experiences,

likewise we may speak

the same sensations, the

same feelings, the same reactions, the same responses.

Moreover,
'has’

is

in all

these cases it seems to me that the verb

functioning in very similar ways.

the present progressive,

'is having’,

In each case,

can be used together

with a complement formed from the event noun to form

a

sentence that reports an event of the relevant sort.
These similarities are only suggestive, but it seems to
me that they provide some motivation for supposing that
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these cases should all be treated on a par.
that 'experiences',

'sensations',

One can grant

'feelings’, etc. stand for

event types but resolutely look elsewhere for
items to
identify as the sort of things to which 'thought’

applies,

in

its shareable sense.

But it seems reasonable at least to

pursue the idea that in all of these cases, we are using
the

event nouns,

'thought’,

'experience’

etc., on readings of a common sort,

'sensation’,

'feeling’

readings on which all

these nouns apply to types of the very events to which the

verbs from which they are derived apply.
I

believe it is clear that the following phenomenon

does indeed occur in the case of a large number of event

verbs and event nouns:

the verbs have type-matching

readings on which they take complements denoting types of
the events to which those verbs, on those readings, apply;

the derived nouns have type- read i ngs on which they apply to

just such types of event.

The fact that this phenomenon

arises commonly with other event verbs and event nouns

is

not evidence that the verb 'think’ and the noun 'thought’
are cases in point.

But the prevalence of the phenomenon

seems to me to provide some motivation for pursuing the idea
that they are cases in point.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER

9

This passage is taken from Moore’s article "Truth", in
Mark Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
London:
MacMillan, 1902, Vol.2; I got it from Cartwright
[1987a] where it is quoted, p. 74.
1*

J.

.

2See for example Salmon’s discussion of "ways for things
to be" in his "The Logic of What Might Have Been" (Salmon
[1989]
I
assume that there is a circumstance of five’s being
the sum of two and three and a circumstance of three’s being
the sum of two and one, and I am inclined to say that I have
just now mentioned two circumstances, not one an occurrent
belief that two plus three is five concerns, and has as its
content, the former circumstance; the question whether one
plus two is three concerns the latter circumstance and has
that one as its content.

3.

—

take gen think ing to be an occurrent attitude, but I
deny that it satisfies (2):
though I am 9en thinking an
occurrent belief, y, and you are 9en thinking a question, y’,
whether y and y’ have the same content or not, it doesn’t
follow that you and I are 9en thinking anything in common.
And there may well be other attitudes besides generic
thinking that fail to satisfy (2).
Perhaps, for example, we should countenance an attitude
whose modal range includes all and only wishes of the sort
expressed by optatives, and deny that any such wishes are in
the modal range of imperative wishing (see the discussion in
Chapter 8, section 8.2.3, where the concept of imperative
wishing is first distinguished). Yet an imperative wish,
and an "optative" wish may nevertheless be said to have the
Compare, for example, the wish expressed by
same content.

4.

(a)

I

Arrive on time

with that expressed by
(b)

If only you would arrive on time

I take it
(with respect to contexts sharing an addressee).
that
as
content
same
the
has
(a)
expressed
wish
that the
(Chapter
6), I
before
stressed
have
I
As
(b).
expressed by
as
seen
be
should
these
pairs
as
such
that
am not convinced
think
to
inclined
am
I
(though
things
different
expressing
But if in general there is an attitude of “optative
so).
wishing" with a modal range disjoint from that of imperative
wishing, it will be plausible to suppose that an optative
wish and an imperative wish may nevertheless have the same
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content.
Yet since both of these attitudes would be species
of the more generic attitude of wishing tout court 1.
that
latter attitude will include wishes of either sort in its
modal range.
And if this is the case, that latter attTtude
will not satisfy (2).
(

According to one standard dictionary entry, to say that
something is noetic is to say that it is of or pertaining
to... the intellect; characterized by, or consisting in
intellectual activity" (Webster’s Collegiate, 1989). This
seems reasonably appropriate for the usage I am proposing.
Husserl made use of a Greek phrase, 'noema'
in his work
on intentional ity.
I
first came across the English
adjective, ’noetic’, in some of Alvin Plantinga’s work in
epistemology.
Plantinga speaks of a person’s "noetic
structure", by which he means, roughly, the structure of
propositions that comprises the person’s beliefs, ordered
according to their epistemic status for the person.
I do
not know whether Plantinga’s terminology is derived from
Husserl s
5.

,

’

It may prove tempting to suppose (even though I am
hereby warning you not to) that when I speak of an event
being characterized by a property, I mean that the event
exemplifies that property.
But this is not what I mean.
Rather, when I say that an event is characterized by the
property of 0-ing, I mean what is more ordinarily expressed
by saying that the event in question is an event of 0-ing.
An event of running is, as I would put it, characterized by
the property of running, but the event doesn’t have the
property of running.
My choice of terms may be misleading,
Kim speaks (see
but I have not found any preferable choice.
[1980]) of the same relationship as that of "constitution"
(the property of running constitutes any event of running).
though in
I find that Kim’s phrase to be misleading as well,
To say that a property constitutes an
a different respect.
event suggests that the property is essential to that event;
as if every event of 0-ing is essentially an event of 0-ir\g.
But this is a view upon which I wish to suspend judgment.
6.

7.

See Kim [1973] and [1980], and Goldman [1971].

In addition to (A10) and (7), a proof of (4) in S5 will
also rely on

8.

nec Ve( e is occurring -» e exists

which

I

)

assume to be true.

Could there be a non-conjunctive event of two or more
persons thinking a thing? I have in mind what would be
called a "joint" event of thinking on the part of several
persons, an event whose occurrence requires a joint effort
9.
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.

in the same way that an event of
moving a large couch, or of
playing a sonata for four hands, may require
a joint effort
on the part of more than one person.
This idea that certain
events involve a concerted effort is familiar
enough.
However the idea that there could be joint
events of
thi nki 3 is not so f am iliar.
Could it be that several
persons are having a thought in concert and strictly
speak g not true that any one of these persons
is the one
having the thought? I do not see that this s an
,

i

l

impossi bi 1 i ty
I
assume that joint events, generally, each have more
than one constituent in the role of subject.
So if there
are joint events of thinking then I take it that such
events
have more than one subject too.
I shall
also assume, though
my intuitions are not quite firm on the matter, that a joint
event of 0-ing is not correctly character i zed as an event of
y s 0- ing, for any individual y, even when y is one of the
event s subjects.
Consider an analogous case: suppose for
example that Moe Larry and Curly are jointly carrying a big
sofa.
Then there is an occurring joint event of sofacarrying.
Is this event one that may properly be
character i zed as one of Moe
carrying that big sofa? I am
inclined to say not.
A general rule here would seem to be (roughly):
,

’

For any event, e,

(*)

if e satisfies (for 'x’)
characterizes
x ]
0
]
[
where t is a referring term (singular or plural),
and 0 is a suitably inflected event verb phrase,
then e is an event whose subject is (or whose
subjects are denoted by t.
)tz[t

)

It seems to me that (*) captures a feature of one familiar
usage of instances of (F2) in characterizing events.
Consider two results concerning the application of this rule
to the case of Moe, Larry and Curly’s sof a-carry i ng
1) The
rule would tell us that this event is not one of Moe’s (or
Larry’s or Curly’s) carrying the sofa; for Moe is not the
subject of that event, so according to (*), the event can’t
be said to satisfy the sentence,
^z[ Moe is carrying the
sofa] characterizes x’.
does
not rule out, however,
2) (*)
that the event may properly be said to be one of Moe. Larry
For Moe, Larry and Curly
and Curly’s carrying the piano.
two results seem to
event.
These
are the subjects of the
conform with ordinary usage.
If
is accepted, though, then if there are any such
*
joint events of gen thinking, they are not noetic events.
For it won’t be the case for any such event, e, that there
x, nor any thought, y, such that ^z[x is
is any individual
9 en thinking
Then by (D13), e is not
y] characterizes e.
noetic
.

f

(

)

,
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10.
There is an issue suggested here that parallels
a
question ran sed by David Lewis and others having
to do with
whether thoughts are properly conceived of as things
"in the
S S Lew s s " what Puzzling Pierre
Does
Not
Believe"
r
o i
?
98
also
L
relevant is a personal correspondence from
j
Lewis to David Austin, quoted in Austin [1990],
p. 110-12.
Does the matter of which thoughts we may be said to be
having depend on factors not "in the head"? That is a
question that Lewis has said should be answered in the
negative.
Analogously, I am asking:
does the matter of
which n oet c—events we may be said to be engaging in depend
on factors not
in the head ?
Couldn’t this very event of
thinking occur in circumstances in which Max is
hallucinating? Why should it be that whether this mental
event is the one that is occurring in a situation or not
depends on external, "outside the head" considerations, such
as whether or not seeing some chair, in addition to Max’s
having a certain sensory state (which we may assume to be
alike in the two cases), happens to be a causal antecedent
to the thinking Max is doing?
I
do not know the answers to
these questions; this is one reason why I shall proceed
without assuming the claim expressed by (9).
]

.

1

1

;

i

Perhaps there are noetic event types that cannot be
instantiated, and thoughts each of which cannot be
entertained (i.e., each not possibly such that anyone is
thinking it).
If there are such types and thoughts, it may
£e
I
am not sure about this that any such type will be a
correlate of any such thought.
The issue is whether such a
type, T, and such a thought, x, satisfy
11.

—

—

Def i ni ens of
T
T

C D 1 4
is a noetic event type & nec Ve( e instantiates
iff iy{ ^z[y is 9en thinking x] characterizes e))
:

The first conjunct is satisfied by hypothesis.
The idea I
am considering is, roughly, that it might turn out that no
matter the choice of possible situation, and no matter the
choice of event, e, the triple <e,T,x> will fail to satisfy
either side of the biconditional in the second conjunct.
Then the second conjunct is satisfied vacuously.
haven’t
I
been able to settle on an opinion as to whether this would
be the case for a T and x as described above.
Let T and x be fixed as some uni nstanti abl e type and
Then go to any
unentertai nabl e thought, respectively.
event
that exists in
For any
possible situation you want.
that situation, e, this much will be true relative to the
Then if it is also
situation:
e does not instantiate T.
the case that the following is satisfied by e and x relative
to this situation,
(a)

there is no thing, y, such that ^z[y is
gen thinking x] character zes e,
i
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we will

have it that the biconditional in the second
conjunct of the definiens of D 4 is satisfied vacuously.
But must (a) be satisfied by any event relative to any
situation, provided that x is uni nstanti able?
Suppose that necessarily, all events are at least
possibly occurrent.
It might be thought that this
assumption gives us some leverage.
For if the thesis
expressed by
(

1

)

nec VteVP( P characterizes e
the subject of e has P ))

nec( e occurs

were true, (a) wou
be satisfied by any event, e, relative
to any possible situation in which e exists.
By
§|^® c f cat on of x, it is impossible that there be anyone
y
thinking x; then it_is impossible that the subject of e
should have ^y[y is gen thinking x]
But now su pose for
reducti
that there is a y such that \z[y is 9 h thi nki ng x]
characterizes e.
Then I take it that \y[y is gen thi nki ng x]
character zes e as well.
But since e >ossibly occurs, we
have it from (4) that there are situations in which e occurs
and in all of them the subject of e has \y[y is gen thinking
z].
This contradicts the previous result.
result,
Consequently we
must reject the reducti
assumption, that there is any y
such that z [ y is yer, thinking x] character zes e.
We would
then have established that (a) is indeed satisfied by any
event relative to any situation in which that event exists.
But I have suggested grounds for questioning (4) in the
text; I do not assume it to express a truth.
Presently I
cannot see any principled reason for claiming that (a) will
be satisfied relative to any situation by any event existing
in that situation (with x as fixed).
So I do not see any
way of showing that uni nstanti abl e types might vacuously be
correlates of any unentertai nabl e thoughts.
1

i

i

i

.

.

i

i

Here is a sketch of the proof of (15).
We may seek to show the main conditional of (15) by way
of Conditional Proof (this will be a sub-proof of a
So we assume the
Necessi ty- i ntro proof of (15) it|elf).
that T is a correlate of x.
antecedent of (15):
We then arrive at a step where we need a subproof of
We may
the left-right direction of (15)’s consequent.
assume that y is an instancer
proceed by Conditional Proof:
gen thinking x.
Since y is an
of T; seek to show that y is
instancer of T, there is an instance of T, e, in which y is
But we already have assumed that T is a
engaging.
It follows that any instance of T,
correlate of x.
including e, is such that for some y, )<z[y is 9 thinking x]
So we have that there is an occurring
character i zes e.
event (we have e in mind), of which y is a subject, such
that, for some y, this event is character i zed by )z[y is
gen thinking x]
But then we can show that if this is the
12.

.

.
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case, then y is gen thinking x.
The proof here will rely on
(A10) (that if an event is characterized by a property, and
the event is occurring, then the subject of e has that
property), on (A12) and (A13) (for uniqueness of a subject
of e), and on (D13) (the definition of 'noetic event’).
Then modus ponens will give us that y is gen thinking x
Q.E.D.
Then it remains to show the right-left direction of
(15)’s consequent.
Again we proceed by Conditional Proof;
this time we assume that y is gen thinking x, and aim to show
that y is an instancer of T.
From our assumption and (A16),
we get that there is an event, e, characterized by \z[y is
gen thinking x] in which
But from the
y is engaging.
antecedent assumption that T is a correlate of x, we get
that for any event, if there is a y such that \z[y is
gen thinking x] characterizes that event, then that
event is
an instance of T.
Then we will be able to show that there
is an occurring instance of T (we have e in mind) whose
From this and (D15) it follows that y is an
subject is y.
instancer T, Q.E.D.

Carlson has suggested (in Carlson [1977], cf. section
13.
2.3) that just about any common noun, cn, has an additional
"kind of cn"
reading that could be paraphrased by saying:
This, he claims, is true not only for count nouns but as
well for mass nouns, concrete as well as abstract, standing
take it that this reading could be
I
for events or not.
If so, then
"type of cn".
paraphrased as well by saying:
Carlson’s suggestion is that the phenomenon of what I am
calling "type readings" is ubiquitous among common nouns.
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